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Abstract 
Following from Sconce’s “Irony, nihilism, and the new American ‘smart’ film”, describing 
an American school of filmmaking that “survives (and at times thrives) at the symbolic and 
material intersection of ‘Hollywood’, the ‘indie’ scene and the vestiges of what cinephiles 
used to call ‘art films’” (Sconce, 2002, 351), I seek to link industrial and textual studies in 
order to explore Smart cinema as a transgeneric mode. I categorise it as a grouping of films 
which may have different formal characteristics, but are linked by industrial origins and 
production contexts, and through their use of genre, as Smart cinema embeds more 
challenging arthouse or cult tendencies in a framework of variable generic familiarity or 
accessibility. Individual texts contain thematic, stylistic and structural elements which can be 
positioned at, and interpreted along, loci on a continuum from mainstream to independent.   
 
This is achieved through a process of “double coding” (King, 2009), which King relates to 
Bourdieu’s ideas of habitus and distinction, but which I expand to include utilising textual 
attributes to create simultaneous calls to action to multiple audiences, along a continuum 
from ‘indie’ to ‘mainstream’, often in a manner that obscures their industrial positioning.  
Double coding works to simultaneously cultivate mainstream-resistant audiences, actively 
positioning texts as distanced from the industrial circumstances which produced them, and to 
accrue cultural capital for producers. Crucially, Smart attempts to combine the potentially 
transgressive, ‘cool’ underground appeal of cult cinema with echoes of high culture and 
artistic status which comes more directly from the arthouse tradition, and is therefore 
embedded within what James English calls ‘the economy of prestige’. (English, 2009) 
 
Rather than a generational outcropping, or intrusion of independent cinema into the 
mainstream, Smart cinema demonstrates product differentiation within the context of 
horizontal integration: studios making strategic interventions into what would previously 
have been seen as ‘indie cinema territory’.  While encouraging framing within an auterist 
model, and by utilising – or fetishizing – what we might casually consider ‘indie style,’ 
Hollywood studios extended their reach beyond the mass market by co-opting notions  such 
as ‘independence’, ‘cult’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘prestige’.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
the very regularity with which declarations of new epochs have been made, the sheer 
number of ‘New Hollywoods’ that one finds posited over the course of film history, 
recommends this more sober view: if things are always ‘new’, nothing is ever really new. 
There is a constant process of adjustment and adaptation to new circumstances, but this is 
an adaptation made on the basis of certain underlying and constant goals: the maximizing 
of profits through the production of classical narrative films. Rather than looking for a 
fundamental break between classicism and a putative post-classicism, we would do better 
to look for smaller-scale changes and shifts, at both the institutional and aesthetic levels, 
within a more broadly continuous system of American commercial filmmaking.  
(Neale and Smith, 1998, 14) 
 
This dissertation explores one of the “smaller-scale changes and shifts” of which Neale and 
Smith write, that is, the emergence and popularisation of Smart cinema during the period 
1990-2005.  The expression comes from Jeffrey Sconce’s 2002 “Irony, nihilism, and the new 
American ‘smart’ film”, and as a term, it allows us to contain and examine a particular 
intersection of mainstream and independent American cinema.  An unwieldy label for an 
unwieldy category, something Sconce acknowledges, the closest to a definition that he comes 
is to describe it as an art cinema ‘mutation’, or indeed “an American school of filmmaking 
that survives (and at times thrives) at the symbolic and material intersection of ‘Hollywood’, 
the ‘indie’ scene and the vestiges of what cinephiles used to call ‘art films’.” (Sconce, 2002, 
351)  It is this somewhat nebulous territory I explore, and my goal is to do so in a manner 
which elucidates both industrial and textual elements and contexts.  As any exploration of the 
field indicates, there is no specific common definition of what a Smart film constitutes.  The 
type of textually-based description implied by the word ‘Smart’ (the common strand Sconce 
sees as linking the texts being that highly mutable concept tone, rather than anything more 
textually concrete), has been all but replaced by more industrially-grounded classifications, 
circulating around terms such as ‘indie’ and ‘indiewood’; in light of the common use of these 
descriptive categories, my use of the term ‘Smart’ may perhaps seem somewhat archaic.   
 
I discuss the relevance of Sconce’s work in more detail in Chapter Two, but it is important to 
state at the outset that I use Sconce’s term throughout on the grounds that it both captures in a 
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generalised way the textual ‘tenor’ of the films under discussion, and locates them in a 
territory spanning independent and mainstream industrial practice.  In this sense, I concur 
with many aspects of Sconce’s analysis: his foregrounding of a film-historical context in 
which to locate the tendency of Smart films to make amendments to classical forms; his 
contention that narrative/textual constituent features do not appear consistently across Smart 
texts, but are “deployed in differing configurations by individual films” (Sconce, 2002, 358); 
his emphasis on tone as a primary textual determinant within the films; his central location of 
them within a production and reception environment of white middle class taste cultures.  I 
am, however, conscious that more contemporary accounts of the field have rather moved 
away from textually-grounded attempts at definition, an epistemologically understandable 
tendency, given that Smart’s formal qualities are – as pointed out by Sconce – variable and 
difficult to pin down.   
 
To produce a rigid taxonomy of textual features would not simply be impossible with films 
employing such a diversity of textual strategies, but would be pedagogically misleading, and 
minimise the extent to which industrial considerations are at issue.  At the same time my use 
of the term is not a simple matter of descriptive brevity.  I feel that to define these films 
through more or less singular industrial origins would neglect considerations of the way in 
which the textual strategies employed by Smart cinema have been mobilised across a variety 
of industrial contexts, and over time: within the mainstream studio system, through the major 
independents and quasi-autonomous studio production units often thought of as the locus of 
indiewood, and in the economically-marginal world of independent cinema. Additionally, I 
acknowledge that the term remains widely under-utilised in contemporary academic contexts, 
having resisted broader adoption.  This may be as much due to academic tendencies towards 
maintaining sharp focus on a topic – to adopt narrative-textual or industrial or sociological 
perspectives in research rather than attempting to combine them – as due to the undeniable 
fluidity or vagueness of the term itself: certainly it is the case that distinctions are now more 
commonly made using terms such as ‘indiewood’, which foreground production and textual 
contexts over those of reception.
1
   
 
Having said that, I am not alone in utilising the term, and others who use it also remark on – 
indeed embrace – the fluidity which characterises it.  Brereton, who acknowledges that 
despite having “acquired popular currency in academic circles in the late 1990s” (Brereton, 
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2012, 1), the term’s meaning remains subject to dispute, links Sconce’s term with “a reflexive 
and playful postmodern tendency which in turn is augmented by the specific attributes of 
contemporary new digital media……[and] a particularly complex dialogical engagement 
with cineastes” (ibid., 2).  In addition, he acknowledges the inclination of Smart aesthetics to 
arise at both ends of the cinematic marketplace, something which dovetails with my own 
vision of the Smart tendency as a ‘continuum’.  Indeed Brereton argues that home viewing 
technology including DVD add-ons played a role in creating “a level playing field between 
big- and small-budget productions and continue to remove the more obvious distinctions 
between niche/independent and mainstream output.” (ibid., 12) Given his study’s focus on 
the processes and results of DVD add-ons’ intertextual mediations, Brereton’s view of the 
Smart film is more technologically-defined – approached through the idea of “smart media” 
(ibid., 14) – than my own, but he too concludes that it “remains an extremely elastic term and 
constitutes a very broad church…a somewhat cloudy prism that constitutes a certain tendency 
in the evolution of new cinema.” (ibid., 199) 
 
Perkins veers away from industrial considerations, taking a Deleuzian approach to the texts at 
hand and explicitly attempt to extend Sconce’s work, and one which emphasises its 
generational aspects, describing it as “perhaps best understood as a nebulous 
tendency…[whose] films can be linked on the basis of characteristics pertaining to industry 
and production, textual properties and audience reception.” (Perkins, 2012, 5)  Her language 
repeatedly acknowledges this nebulousness, saying that “the smart sensibility…is not 
reducible to story, style or authorial disposition alone” (ibid., 20), emphasises that individual 
“films participate in this class discursively” (ibid., 21), and particularly that the smart film is  
a site of competing meanings…not intended to form a definitive group.  A 
consequence of understanding smart cinema as something in which films ‘participate 
without membership’ is that the designation ‘smart’ can never be exact……The films 
considered are designed not to define but to demonstrate the sensibility……seeking to 
release the notion of smart cinema from a fixed textual type to a constellation of 
forces and affects. (ibid., 24-28)  
Therefore, while Smart cinema can be described, investigated, analysed, and utilised as a 
descriptive category in itself, it is less clear as to whether as a category, it can ever be said to 
have a sharply-delineated ‘outline’. In light of this, it may in fact help to conceive of it as a 
tendency, rather than anything more rigidly-defined.  However, in an effort to characterise the 
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set of broadly-described Smart films in a wider sense, I would describe the form as a trans-
generic mode.  This term, I feel, captures both the sense in which common identifiable textual 
features and strategies are indeed often at issue, and function in ways that evoke generic 
characterisations (at the level of narrative structure, thematics, authorial strategy, tone, and so 
on), and the sense in which Smart cinema is an industrially-grounded category – certainly, all 
of these films are (regardless of their production origins) distributed by and exhibited within 
the more-or-less mainstream Hollywood context.  Additionally I feel the term facilitates the 
perspective I take, that Smart is not a ‘containing’ set of practices or features so much as it is, 
vitally, a spectrum or continuum along which a diverse range of creative work, and from a 
variety of industrial contexts, is positioned.  This is why the term can, for example, 
encompass Todd Solondz’s low-budget suburban dramas, and the lo-fi experimentation of 
Darren Aronofsky, as well as costlier studio action and sci-fi films like The Matrix and Fight 
Club, the ‘quirky’ tonal comedy of Wes Anderson, and the diegetic and narrative play of 
Spike Jonze and Michel Gondry.  
 
To clarify this, I must state that I am not using the term ‘mode’ in a purely textual-theory 
sense; that is, I do not use it to describe a genre-transcending textual modality, such as those 
of ‘comedy’ or ‘romance’, which manifest as textual components in a variety of ways across 
diverse genres.  Instead I use it in a similar manner to Bordwell’s description of the art film – 
a wide-ranging category encompassing a wide range of industrial, narrative-textual, and 
generic practices – not as a de facto genre but as “a distinct mode of film practice, possessing 
a definite historical existence, a set of formal conventions, and implicit viewing procedures.” 
(Bordwell, 1979, 56).  This argument, that the art cinema constitutes a “mode of 
production/consumption…… [wherein] the overall functions of style and theme remain 
remarkably consistent…a logically coherent mode of cinematic discourse.” (ibid., 57) utilises 
the term ‘mode’ in a way which links textual, industrial, and consumption contexts, and 
therefore sets a useful example for my own work.   In contemporary academic practice, I note 
too that Janet Staiger (2013) adopts Bordwell’s framework as she attempts to negotiate the 
blurred distinctions between mainstream and independent production, an approach I feel 
relevant to my own. 
 
I do not argue that Smart cinema constitutes a standalone genre, for all that the concept of 
genre remains useful in exploring the field. Genres themselves evolve and alter over time, as 
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does the popularity (or perceived significance) of any individual genre, and in ways which 
can be reflective of wider social as well as economic trends.  The term ‘generic cycle’, used 
to invoke the idea of a fixed set of discrete, sequential processes a genre may undergo, cannot 
be considered a sufficiently sophisticated model on which to base suppositions, in that it 
encourages an essentialism which is profoundly ahistorical.  In that sense, while I believe 
tentative suppositions can be made regarding the emergence, consolidation, and even gradual 
withering over time, of Smart cinema as a mode, these function to create a context in which 
to discuss the films themselves.  
 
Genre tends to be placed in the background of considerations of Smart film: regarded as a 
conventional (or even devalued) framework from which it diverges, a marker of mainstream 
tendencies against which Smart film gains distinction, something Perren refers to, writing of 
the diverging discursive attitudes to Miramax ‘proper’ and its genre label, Dimension (Perren, 
2012, 132-142).  We see this explicitly in Newman’s statement that “narratives like these 
might seem to be devoid of genre conventions such as those found in more recognizable 
popular entertainment forms...this lack of generic framework is a significant part of their 
appeal.” (Newman, 2011, 89)  However, generic aspects are present, albeit subordinated to 
narrative structure and thematics, in many approaches to the work.
2
  Perhaps this is due to a 
tendency to frame film which may seem to fall within an ‘independent’ category as a genre, 
as per Jon Lewis’s note that “we have come to talk about independent film as a genre” 
(Lewis, 1998, 7), or indeed more practical considerations: the budgetary exigencies of low-
cost production sometimes privilege classically realist forms such as the domestic drama over 
more expensive non-realist types.  Regardless, that approach involves adopting a de facto 
generic perspective, but one taking a macro view, neglecting more detailed considerations of 
genre within individual films.  
 
Therefore, without arguing for the existence of a distinctly Smart generic life cycle, I 
foreground generic concerns in my textual analysis. The emergence of Smart as a significant 
element within Hollywood cinema (as opposed to an ‘offshoot’ of independent cinema, for all 
that some of the films I discuss come from independent filmmakers) during the 1990s does 
follow a tentative historical narrative.  As such, while sex, lies and videotape (Steven 
Soderbergh, 1989) constitutes a significant intervention of independent cinema into the 
mainstream during the period immediately preceding the 1990s, its ‘official’ entry could be 
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marked by Pulp Fiction in 1994, with Welcome to the Dollhouse a year later included on the 
basis of illustrating the extent to which the ‘expropriation’ of indie cinema was beginning to 
take place.  The major studios’ involvement was becoming a great deal more evident by 1997 
and 1998, with Boogie Nights, Rushmore, the tiny but disproportionately successful Pi, and 
Dark City, which I count as of particular interest for its comparative mainstream failure, 
when a year later the similar The Matrix would be so colossally successful.   
 
Arguably the studios’ biggest year during the period, 1999 marked a significant moment for 
the Hollywood industry – or rather, for the way in which it was being represented within the 
wider media, with comparisons made to that other supposed annus mirabilis, 1939,
3
 yielding 
Magnolia, Fight Club, Being John Malkovich, and American Beauty, with the labyrinthine 
Memento following a year later.  During the following years it seemed Smart cinema might 
constitute a tenable framework of its own, with films like Donnie Darko, Storytelling, 
Adaptation, Lost in Translation all emerging.  2004 produced Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind, and I ♥ Huckabees; however while Brick can be seen as embedded in 
‘independent’ discursive contexts, by 2005 Smart tendencies also appear in much more 
mainstream films, illustrating a process of assimilation but not an ‘ending’ in any concrete 
sense. 
 
To digress in a manner which I hope will illuminate my reasons for using the term ‘trans-
generic mode’, I would like to focus for a moment on an almost analogous – and yet clearly 
in many ways textually dissimilar – mode, the ‘blockbuster’.  The blockbuster may seem 
diametrically opposed to the Smart film, which tends, comparatively speaking, towards the 
lower-budget end of the spectrum.  However, as a category, ‘the Smart film’ and ‘the 
blockbuster’ have more in common than might at first appear: each category is placed 
somewhere outside of the stricter concerns of genre theory, as a term used to contain a wide 
variety of generic frameworks.  However, both are defined as clearly in the mechanisms of 
production as of reception and consumption, and are perhaps most clearly delineated by 
industrial elements, from production contexts to marketing campaigns.  Indeed, few things 
illustrate more clearly the mutable nature, and intertwinement, of genre and industry than the 
evolution of the term ‘blockbuster’.   
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As Tom Shone points out, it has been subjected to a kind of “sideways drift” (Shone, 2005, 
28) and where once it “was conferred solely by a movie’s box office returns – and, by 
default, the audience…[t]oday it has…become the name a movie calls itself, before it is even 
out of the gate….Now it signifies a type of movie: not quite a genre, but almost; often science 
fiction but not necessarily; something to do with action movies but not always.” (ibid.).  This 
has a great deal to do with how the film industry defines its own production contexts: as 
Sheldon Hall says, “[w]hile at one time blockbusters were distinguished partly by their 
exceptionalism, their status as an economic category different from and ‘above’ the normal 
run of general releases, it now seems possible to believe that Hollywood makes nothing but 
blockbusters.” (Hall, 2002, 11) 
 
As Barry Langford suggests, the action blockbuster is, of all post-classical forms, “at once the 
most contemporary, the most visibly relevant to present-day Hollywood film-making, and 
also the least discussed and least well-defined.”  In line with Shone, Barry Langford points 
out the difficulties in assessing generic markers for the blockbuster as a ‘type’ without 
recourse to a wider set of parameters than the strictly iconographic or thematic, as  
a form like the action blockbuster pushes genre study to its limits, requiring it to 
integrate several diverse critical approaches (film-historical, economic/institutional 
and aesthetic/ideological) in the very process of constituting, defining and 
historicising a generic field…a task made yet more difficult by the rampant generic 
hybridity in contemporary Hollywood (Langford, 2005, 233) 
 
As the term ‘blockbuster’ has stopped functioning exclusively as a measurement of financial 
performance, it has become instead a term of marketing or positioning – one which attempts 
to convey and signify a measure of industrial-generic meaningfulness.
4
  Charles Acland 
clarifies this when he states that “there is a certain contemporary common sense about those 
claims. We refer to something as a blockbuster and expect that others will understand what 
we mean.” (Acland, 2013, 11)  So, too, the term ‘Smart film’ attempts to convey a measure of 
meaning about both industry and genre; of production contexts and of textual strategy.  In the 
way that Smart cinema functions as a trans-generic industrial mode, it also illustrates the way 
in which the conglomerated entertainment industry gives trans-generic modes industrial 
purpose, so to speak.  In the case of Smart cinema, my thesis is that that purpose was: to 
extend audience reach beyond mass markets, mainly by co-opting ideas such as 
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‘independence’, ‘prestige’ and ‘quality’, so as to compete with or push out films of other 
cinematic origin.   
 
The industry does this in a number of ways.  The one I regard as most significant is what I 
describe as a process of ‘double-coding’ texts – the term comes from Geoff King’s 2009 
Indiewood, USA, and where he uses the term largely in the context of Bourdieu’s ideas of 
habitus and distinction, by contrast I use it to investigate the material or textual qualities of 
Smart films.  That is, I contend that each film contains both multiple generic ‘entry points’, or 
ways into the text which attract different types of viewer, and frequently a level of textual 
experimentation and narrative play which would in another industrial context present as 
something more ‘art-house’ in origin.  This is a major aspect of my argument in relation to 
Smart cinema: that an understanding of its mechanisms must take into account the means by 
which any individual text uses a combination of generic appeals and other textual strategies 
(experimentation with narrative structure and the conventions of realism, references to ‘art 
cinema’ and often a high degree of formal and/or tonal play).  
 
These strategies also draw on the discursive mechanisms of prestige (however signalled – 
sometimes through critical perspectives, sometimes in reference to cult cinema, other times 
again through calls upon auteurism), and thereby function to create simultaneous calls to 
action to multiple audiences.  In this way, potential revenues from individual ‘small but 
significant’ audiences can be maximised.  We see the post-classical period – the post-Jaws 
period, so to speak, as focusing on opening audiences out – appealing to the widest possible 
audience.  In that context, Smart cinema functioned as a kind of economic mopping-up 
operation: the studios extending their reach beyond the mass market, by co-opting ideas such 
as ‘independence’, ‘prestige’ and ‘quality’, to smaller and perhaps more isolated or more 
disparate audiences, but in large enough numbers to be financially viable.   
 
Historically, the ‘New Hollywood’5 has been characterised by some as a post-Fordist industry 
(Murray Smith 1998, for example, although he acknowledges that there is not in all 
circumstances a strong case), defined by flexible specialisation rather than mass production, 
even where its target is the so-called ‘mass audience’.  In its own way, this suggests that the 
post-Fordist model, calling for production of smaller quantities of specialised goods for more 
specifically and narrowly-defined groups with pre-defined tastes, is well positioned to 
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produce what we might term as ‘independent’ or niche cinema.  In practice though, the 
industrial structure of New Hollywood can tend more towards the mercurial than the 
monolithic. It is this idea that I hope to unpack by illustrating how the historically specific 
conditions I outline in Chapter Three, during the 1980s-2000s period, resulted in the 
particular industrial circumstances which gave rise to Smart cinema.     
 
The industrial bifurcation I discuss in that chapter produced on the one hand extravagant 
‘blockbuster’-style films, whether action-oriented or not, designed for mass international 
audiences, focusing on innovation-through-spectacle and minimal intellectual or 
psychological engagement, and made on budgets which did not allow for a high degree of 
flexibility (i.e., exemplifying Hollywood as monolith).  On the other it produced smaller, 
more intimate films of a variety of different types, whose status as ‘contemporary, new or 
different’ relied specifically on textual innovation, whether at a narrative-structural level, or 
in terms of appeal to an intersecting set of specifically-targeted niche audiences (Hollywood 
in its ‘mercurial’ aspect).  In summary, industrially speaking these occur across a continuum 
from those wholly studio-produced, to those more-or-less independently produced, but 
distributed to wider audiences via studio-controlled exhibition structures.   
 
A fundamental element, too, in the complexities of exploring the industrial contexts of Smart 
cinema production, is the extent to which the industry itself plays “a central double role” in 
the contemporary cultural field, “as industries in their own right and as the major site of the 
representations and arenas of debate through which the overall system is imagined and 
argued over.” (Wasko, Murdock and Sousa, 2011, 2)  The vagaries of the box office and fan 
culture aside, film production remains an essentially lopsided or “asymmetrical” 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2010, 146) set of communicative practices, with no directly qualitative 
feedback loop built in from a producer standpoint.  Therefore, approbation from within the 
system (via awards and peer-to-peer networks, and through discursive approval in the form of 
media coverage) assumes a proportionally greater importance in the establishment of 
evaluative mechanisms.  As I discuss in Chapter Five, studios court ‘prestige’ via niche 
picture production, partially in their capacity as individuals in search of personal validation, 
but also as a means of position-taking within ‘Hollywood’ as a quasi-social, quasi-industrial 
entity itself, which figures both as producer and recipient of cultural markers of distinction.    
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This means that while individual studios do not necessarily directly construct brand images – 
as was the case in the studio system of the 1930s, with, for example Warner Bros. becoming 
noted for their mastery of the gangster picture – from the texts they create, the strategic 
positioning of individual texts can feed into the market positioning of a particular company.  
Labour functions as a commodity in the film industry as in other industries, and clearly cross-
pollination across modes of production, and internationally, is not new to the film industry: 
the industrial process is such that not only does, on occasion, marginal or independent talent 
‘infiltrate’ the mainstream, but it can also come to constitute that mainstream.6  Therefore, I 
also argue that Smart cinema comes to constitute a training ground for filmmakers, and that 
the trajectory of Smart cinema during the last decade of the twentieth century and the first 
decade of the twenty-first constitutes something of an assimilatory process.  
 
This helps, I believe, to illustrate how we can discuss the idea of Smart cinema in generic 
terms without immediately having to segregate specific films solely by means of textual or 
stylistic attributes.  Formally, Smart cinema can certainly be discussed in terms of the 
presence of particular traits, while bearing in mind that the set from which they are taken 
contains a wide variety of potential elements, structurally, iconographically and thematically.  
A defining characteristic of Smart film is that it comes from an industrial point tentatively 
within the mainstream but contradictorily – and vitally, to its positional identity – claiming 
the position of the outsider.  At the same time, this is usually only partially revealed within 
the industrial-public discourse, therefore many Smart films find themselves residing in a 
definition-resistant or contradictory space.  This can be seen in the cautious semantics 
employed by, for example, industry trade papers in discussing this tendency towards 
industrial hybridity, even some considerable time after it appeared to have become 
established.   
 
To illustrate, a 2006 Variety front-page article discusses the autumn release schedule and 
concludes that “the majors are jumping into the fray, not just with their own niche divisions, 
but with also with their own highbrow productions…that could be defined as art-house fare, 
but with bigger budgets……the fall of 2006 is loaded with studio projects that could be 
mistaken for art pics.” (Mohr, 2006, 1)  There is here a strong recognition of the industrial 
and textual hybridity – “they’re hybrids, meant to appeal both to rarified auds [sic] and the 
masses” (ibid.) – which Mohr argues characterises the 2006 release schedule, but the article’s 
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strapline and sub-heading are revealing.  The latter, “Studio sked jammed as town leans on 
niche pix” (ibid., sic.) emphasises both their importance and the difficulty of positioning, 
generically, such films as it refers to: among them Crash, Brokeback Mountain, Babel, Marie 
Antoinette, The Fountain, Stranger Than Fiction, and Southland Tales.  Without leaning on 
the notion of ‘art-house’ cinema, and in particular drawing on the notion of the search for 
prestige as a triangulation point, the article finds it difficult to ascribe commonality to them; 
the headline “Lost In Transition” seems not just a nod to Sofia Coppola’s work, but to the 
uncertain ground being described. 
 
Few accounts are as explicit even as this. The emphasis – even where studio involvement is 
referred to – instead rests on normalising the move of independent-styled cinema away from 
the traditional indie producer, towards the majors or aspirant mini-majors, through 
personality-driven accounts of the activities of industry personnel, whether production 
executives or stars (see Lyons, 2002; Bing and Lyons, 2001; Roman, 1998).  This is, in a 
sense, a kind of mirror image of the manner in which the mode of ‘cult cinema’ is inscribed, 
industrially speaking (and which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Four): that is, as 
possessed of an outsider status which presents it as marginal to, or directly challenging, 
conventional industrial systems.   As Mark Jancovich says, “the frequently stated problem of 
defining cult movies is precisely based on the fact that they are specifically defined according 
to a subcultural ideology in which it is their supposed difference from the ‘mainstream’ 
which is significant, rather than any other unifying feature.” (Jancovich, 2002, 308), although 
ideas of what ‘the mainstream’ itself might constitute remain fuzzy.  
 
For my purposes, drawing specifically industrially-based distinctions between ‘mainstream’, 
‘indie’ and ‘indiewood’ film – labels indicative of the kind of part-industrial, part-textual, 
media industries research which has become prominent over the last decade – is a useful task.  
However it is not one that is necessarily vital to an understanding of how Smart cinema 
operates, although the linking of textual and industrial trends that grounds that work is of 
paramount importance.  As Tzioumakis points out, as the classics divisions and quasi-
autonomous industrial units formed after 1990 ventured into the areas of film finance and 
production, “films associated strongly with the independent sector…were produced with 
funds from the conglomerated majors’ subsidiaries…...the label ‘independent’…became a 
signifier of a particular type of film, the ‘indie’ film (which subsequently gave birth to 
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arguments about films with an ‘independent spirit’).” (Tzioumakis, 2013, 34)  There are 
indeed tensions and contradictions at play, in particular between individual films’ industrial 
contexts and discursive representations, which I explore.   
As such, the terms will arise repeatedly, given that I am discussing an industrial context 
which spans mainstream, indie, and indiewood frameworks.  However, as per Staiger, the 
question of independence generally matters where “implicit declarations are being made that 
this sort of film is ideologically better or more worthwhile than what it is not: a classical 
Hollywood film.” (Staiger, 2013, 16) Certainly, I intend to make no such declarations or 
inferences, and so, while the question of ‘independence’ arises insofar as it is necessary to 
make specific points about the evolution or development of Smart, I make no claims to Smart 
film’s place as an independent practice, or anything approaching it. 
 
Largely this relates to my conception of the nature of Smart cinema as an assimilatory 
practice or process: through its movement into the mainstream, the notion of independence 
itself was being evacuated from the designation ‘indie’.  At the same time, it would be 
simplistic to regard this process of mainstreaming as an abandonment of some deliberately 
marginalised political or aesthetic perspective.  As an example, the standpoint of James 
Schamus and David Linde of Good Machine, later part of Focus Features, was that the task at 
hand was one of positioning. They outlined their reasoning in an industry article at the time 
as follows: 
‘We have a very symbiotic relationship with the studio,’ says Linde. ‘We’re not going 
to be making movies that the studio is making and vice versa.’ ‘Size doesn’t really 
matter to us, specificity does,’ says Schamus. ‘By definition, we make movies that 
aren’t necessarily for everyone…That’s our business, to find movies that make sense, 
that are made for specific but pretty substantial audiences.’ (Rooney, 2003, 11) 
 
The idea of the “specific but pretty substantial audience” is key to understanding the 
industrial processes which moved Smart cinema from the margins to the mainstream.  If the 
1970s facilitated the move to the centre of that era’s ‘maverick auteur’, and the 1980s 
consolidated the place of the event movie as the defining element of the industry, then the 
1990s was the period in which the market stratified once more, the Smart film forming part of 
a mid-range slate of what might be termed ‘prestige B movies’: perhaps independent in spirit 
or form, but industrially quite removed from the art-house periphery.   It would therefore be a 
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grave mistake to regard Smart cinema as a de facto independent cinema: where it in many 
cases constitutes a textual surge towards experimentation and innovation, industrially we find 
that a) much of it originates from directly within the studio mainstream, and b) where it does 
not derive straight from major studio activities, the drive to recuperate it into the Hollywood 
studio system (or rather the conglomerated international media industries) remains 
paramount.   
 
Smart cinema is circumscribed at all points by the wider industrial environment, and while 
individual films, or even the work of individual production companies, may represent a 
textual challenge to the dominant aesthetics and thematics of ‘Hollywood’ as a notional 
evaluative system, that is not to say that they represent a direct structural challenge to the 
industrial economics of same.  Independent cinema has often produced crossover hits, but the 
proportional success of films like sex, lies and videotape, and the expansion of the quasi-indie 
marketplace (as exemplified by the rise of Miramax with Pulp Fiction) provided convincing 
commercial reasons for major studios to embark on a strategy of product diversification (P.T. 
Anderson’s Boogie Nights (1997), and Rushmore (1998) by Wes Anderson perhaps 
indicating the first significant incursions of the ‘Smart’ style into the studio structure) which 
could serve two ambitions.   
 
The first goal was to exploit this revenue stream at moderate cost, in some cases at the risk of 
diffusing their own brand recognition, in an effort to obfuscate their industrial involvement 
(as certain audiences could theoretically be alienated by studio-originated products), and the 
second was to heighten their status within the industrial and social networks of Hollywood by 
exploiting the (multiple, and disparate) kinds of prestige that accrued to this work.  This 
process ran in parallel with the work of the traditional independent film sector, occasionally 
opening up mainstream access to independent filmmakers, but not in a systematic manner; 
the major studio ‘gatekeeper’ function retained the traditional power it has exerted over 
independents’ access to exhibition structures, despite the appearance of loosening control and 
greater access to the mainstream.   
 
My intent is not to produce a detailed industrial history, or to argue for or against these films’ 
independence (while such arguments are interesting economically, they add little of value to 
textual analysis), but to illustrate that to analyse these films textually without producing a 
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framework of industrial context against which to foreground them, is to neglect aspects of 
meaning which have become part of the texts themselves.  At the same time, these are films 
for whom the discursive perception or expectation of their ‘difference’ is key to the ways in 
which they can be read, and forms part of the continuum of reading along which they lie.  In 
this sense, given that expectations (to be fulfilled, denied or complicated by an individual 
text) constitute an element of genre, they also form an aspect of the trans-generic mode 
‘Smart cinema’. With all this in mind, I posit a research question as follows: can conceiving 
of Smart cinema as a trans-generic mode, in which arthouse or cult tendencies are embedded 
in a framework of (variable) generic familiarity or accessibility, such that textual attributes 
create simultaneous calls to action to multiple audiences along a continuum from ‘indie’ to 
‘mainstream’, allow us to describe more clearly how these film texts are linked by production 
and reception contexts; and if so, through what textual and industrial processes and strategies 
do they function?  
 
A word here on my use of some terms throughout.  I use the term ‘discourse’ liberally, 
following primarily from the example of King (2009, 2013), Perren (2012) and Newman 
(2009, 2011).  In their usage, the word stands for (or implicates) public and private 
frameworks of thinking about this kind of cinema, which are created through a multiplicity of 
interrelating threads of meaning, and originate both inside and outside of the text itself.  
Therefore, the discourse of Smart cinema is constructed through textual and auteurial choices, 
paratexts such as DVDs, posters and trailers, industrial positioning strategies at a formal and 
informal level (including reviews, interviews and other publicity, focusing on personalities 
and controversies as well as texts, in addition to paid-for advertising and promotions, 
although with more emphasis on journalistic criticism than academic), and prestige-awarding 
mechanisms originating outside of the direct industry (festival and audience awards) as well 
as those of industry bodies.   
 
I should note that my work rather neglects online content, for two reasons. The first is that the 
growth over time of the internet as a site of fan interaction, and indeed as a paratextual 
channel, rather parallels the development of Smart cinema itself.  To that extent, it is really 
only in the latter part of the period that the internet presents itself as a wholly alternative 
realm of investigation, and I judged that retaining a bias towards, in particular, press criticism 
gave a sense of historical continuity to the project.  The second reason is a problem of digital 
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historiography, and relates to the tendency of websites to manage their archives in eccentric 
or at least non-standardised ways.  Given the proliferative nature of the internet, the task of 
reconstructing some sense of internet users’ approach to these films at the time of their 
release – that is, to produce a temporal approximation of online information equivalent to the 
conventional media of the time still available to me – was beyond my limited technical skills.  
I say this with the additional recommendation that a useful further research project would be 
an exploration of the extent to which, if any, the spread of Smart cinema was itself related to 
the rise of the internet during that same time period.  
 
I use the term ‘positioning’ a great deal; as with discourse, to qualify its meaning in a given 
context is a complex task, and I utilise it in a similar way to Newman when he describes  
positioning in the market for culture…[as operating] on multiple levels: textual (forms 
and meanings of films) and paratextual (promotional discourses such as trailers and 
ads, as well as critical discourse) and contextual (institutions of cinema and culture). 
(Newman, 2011, 226)   
It is an effect and combination of: film professionals’ intent; the film as a text itself (its 
structure, tone, narrative aims, thematics, and effects); the paratextual materials which these 
days so often come with DVDs (and to a certain extent film websites, which as I say is a 
subject sufficiently large for me to have rather neglected here); the marketing and 
promotional tactics used in its service; the release strategy; the critical response to the film; 
and the audience’s response to it: a response which has to be, at many points, assumed, there 
being not a tremendous amount of available literature on actual audience interaction with 
Smart films.  Additionally, the positioning of an individual film can, I believe, reveal wider 
points about its originating studio’s wider industrial goals.  
 
To give a somewhat extended example, Miramax’s strategy was to position itself within the 
distribution market in such a way that the types of film it later produced dovetailed entirely 
with its image, even where that image contradicted fact (see Perren, 2012).  Miramax’s 
aggressive and controversy-courting marketing strategies not only arguably (ibid.) changed 
industry perceptions of quasi-independent film’s possibilities – Newman refers to the entire 
1990s period as the “Sundance-Miramax era” (Newman, 2011, 1) – but made the field of 
independent production a target for studios.  This segment on advertising for Miramax’s most 
successful early foray into Smart production illustrates, I believe, not just their canniness in 
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micromanaging the marketing of their products, but also the extent to which genre is a 
preoccupation at the forefront of constructions of Smart cinema: 
The campaign was designed to cross over as soon as possible from an art house 
audience to a wider action-thriller clientele. The trailer demonstrates this approach: 
the preview begins solemnly by announcing that the film has won the Palme d’Or at 
the Cannes Film Festival and that it has been one of the most critically acclaimed 
films of the year.  Suddenly gunshots appear through the screen, and a fast-paced 
barrage of shots from the film stressing the action, sexuality and memorable sound 
bites. Through the trailer, Miramax has been able to sell to the art house audience 
through the film’s credentials, but, more significantly, an image was created of the 
film as being full of action, comedy and sex.  This approach no doubt broadened the 
film’s audience without alienating those drawn by the critical acclaim. This strategy 
can also be evidenced in Pulp Fiction’s one-sheet which defines the term ‘pulp 
fiction’ for those unfamiliar – a process clearly aimed at educating the masses who 
might have been alienated by an ‘obscure’ title. (Wyatt, 1998, 81) 
 
While Wyatt’s account of the trailer is factually correct, he somewhat neglects the importance 
of tone to the marketing’s ultimate effect.  The trailer begins with a solemn stereotypically-
deep and resonant male voice, describing the film in terms of its status within a framework of 
bourgeois cultural endorsement signified by the awards it has won.  It then moves on to 
present its more directly textual rather than extra-textual claims, chiefly those of sex, 
violence, comedy, and coolness.  However it does not just smoothly shift from one mode of 
presentation to the other.  For the first part, the pretentious narration (“Miramax Films is 
proud to present one of the most celebrated pictures of the year, the winner of the 1994 Palme 
D’Or, the Best Picture of the Cannes Film Festival”7) is underpinned by an almost unbearably 
ponderous piano soundtrack.   
 
This music has an almost parodic character, its style something one might more closely 
associate with a television movie of the week – therefore it signals itself automatically as 
simultaneously the music of a mode known for ‘taking itself too seriously’, and which is 
often read as ‘trash’ (see Sconce, 1995).  This clearly-outlined over-seriousness is ruptured 
by the visual representation of gunshots appearing on the screen, as per Wyatt above, and the 
transition to more generically predictable elements.  This faux-seriousness is played on again 
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towards the end of the trailer, where cast names are read out in an almost ritualised manner 
which recalls more ‘high culture’ ensemble casts, or a ‘prestigious’ theatrical tradition.  
Adding an extra dimension to the recitation, though, is that although it does function as a 
conventional invocation of star power, at the time of the film’s release many of the names 
(Ving Rhames, Maria de Medeiros, Amanda Plummer, Samuel L. Jackson) would have been 
all but unknown to mainstream US audiences other than as character actors, and Tarantino’s 
championing of John Travolta was seen as little more than a manifestation of the director’s 
eccentricity.  This call to contradictory discourses of prestige, mockery, and transgression of 
accepted marketing norms, again locates the film in a more satirical territory than would 
otherwise be the case.  
 
Here, then, we have industrial appeals which rest on a number of simultaneous calls to action.  
The first, directed at the more traditionally art-house fan, relies on the creation of a sense of 
cultural status for the text itself – and for Miramax themselves, although this would be a 
somewhat (indeed, perhaps deliberately) ironicized status restricted to the highly-informed 
viewer, given the company’s reputation for the promotion of ‘exploitation’ films.  The second 
rests on the promise of conventional sex, violence and comedy (intended to attract the more 
mainstream action/thriller fan, presumed to be less interested in cultural prestige.  A third 
aspect is the manner in which the heavily ironicised use of, and play with, traditional markers 
of prestige creates a sense of breach or rupture of the ‘proper’, or socio-culturally sanctioned, 
structures of approval.   
 
This constitutes, I suggest, an appeal to – or indeed calls into being – a theoretical third 
audience.  While noting that this is empirically problematic in the absence of audience 
studies, following directly from the idea of the ‘implied audience’ which appears in the work 
of King, 2009 and Newman, 2011, it is possible to suggest that some audiences take a more 
liminal, or indeed contradictory, interpretive position, simultaneously claiming and rejecting 
hierarchical constructions of prestige.  This subversive gesture – this double-coding – makes 
a delicately-balanced and knowing case to multiple audiences: speculatively, those who may 
use awards as evaluative guidelines, those who reject the notion of those evaluative 
mechanisms, those curious regarding apparent disparities between text and award, and those 
who have no specific prior interest in extra-textual elements such as international awards (as 
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denoted by the manner in which the initial rolling text and voiceover outline that the Palme 
D’Or is equivalent to Best Picture at an American awards ceremony).    
 
However, we must also note that there is a consolidated effort at work to sell the film on the 
basis of its most obvious generic attributes (the ‘thriller’ or ‘action’ elements), and to obscure 
more narratively expansive and experimental elements.  Here, some aspects of the 
‘Smartness’ of the film are erased in favour of an action-based discourse with which the 
audience is presumed to be familiar, and to which it can be assumed to be kindly pre-
disposed.  This perhaps illustrates how genre can help to elucidate the notion of Smart: its 
generic attributes are alternately maximised in order to satisfy the necessity for a selling 
strategy that can be targeted at wider, rather than more niche, markets, and explicitly 
minimised when considered in relation to more attention-grabbing structural elements.  The 
critical impetus has been, it seems, to downplay generic features and references, rather than 
to tease them out more expansively.  
 
Smart cinema did begin to display its attributes more self-consciously as audiences for it 
consolidated.  Ten years later, the poster campaign for Eternal Sunshine Of The Spotless 
Mind would make cautious references to its own generic liminality, with its hero and heroine 
pictured in one poster in a conventional romantic pose, but with a backdrop of fracturing river 
ice, and in another more explicitly ‘daring’ image, in a bed on a snow-covered beach which 
emphasises the more distinctly unconventional, narrative thematic, and visual elements of the 
film.  That said, the poster as a form is one which can restrict interpretation to a more narrow 
range of references. By contrast, the original trailer for the film takes a range of positions 
heavily loaded towards conventional generic interpretations.  Starting out framed in strictly 
romantic terms, it highlights courtship and love, utilising text inserts which declare “when 
you first fall in love…everything is perfect”, but signals a move towards rupture of the idyll 
with the words “until the day…you want to forget…you ever met”.  From here, while darker 
elements are hinted at when Joel and Clementine fight, these are swiftly elided via a switch to 
self-consciously ‘quirky’ music, in favour of a mode references science fiction, but privileges 
comedy.  Here, grinning slapstick takes prominence in the shot selection and rapid-fire 
editing style, as well as a clear call on the bumbling comedic star persona of Jim Carrey.  
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The more existential elements, or questions of identity, which the film raises are minimised 
or rendered invisible, and the last textual intervention is in the form of the words “when it 
comes to love…some things can’t be erased”, returning the text’s position squarely to that of 
romantic quest, despite the somewhat other-worldly nature of the mind-erasure conceit.  The 
one note of generic transgression is the final exchange of the trailer between Joel and 
Clementine, as he, dressed as a child, calls “I want my mommy”, receiving the reply “This is 
sort of warped.”  The trailer signals clearly that the desired interpretive frame for viewers is 
that of ‘romantic comedy’, in spite of the text’s darker view on matters.  This is not 
necessarily a successful positioning strategy; it is worth noting that top rated comments on a 
Youtube channel which hosts this trailer include: “Horrible trailer for an amazing film” (user 
NEKAL1) and “This trailer makes this movie seem much more lighthearted and happy than it 
actually is.” (user walruspower60).  So we can see here the idea that (as well as illustrating 
Neale’s conviction that genre is a matter of process as much as anything else – that generic 
regimes succeed, dominate and change each other) there is a sense in which the marketing of 
any Smart film can be tethered, either successively or in parallel, to both its more 
conventional generic and its more ‘art-house’8 attributes. These strategies may be more or 
less successful in attracting audiences, but primarily we should note that they are strategies 
which evolve according to the extent to which previous iterations have been seen to succeed. 
 
The final clarification, then, relates to my choice of films.  As my initial exposure to the 
Smart film as a theoretical construct came through Jeffrey Sconce’s work, I was certainly 
mindful of his perspective, and many of the films and filmmakers he analyses, I too have 
chosen to investigate: the work of Todd Solondz, Wes and Paul Thomas Anderson, 
Alexander Payne, Quentin Tarantino, Being John Malkovich, Fight Club, American Beauty 
and Donnie Darko, to start with.  I have also included works from that period which he does 
not mention (Pi, in particular) and those which I feel certain would have interested Sconce 
had he been writing after their release: Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Lost in 
Translation, I ♥ Huckabees, and Brick. I have also attempted to extend Sconce’s grouping by 
including texts which he might not perhaps have considered – The Matrix and Dark City – 
but which seem to me to present enough similarities to be worthwhile in engaging in the 
debate.  However I do not intend to defer to Sconce’s definitions at all points, and feel a 
debate on the field should be able to stand some differences of opinion on categorisation.  
Where I have made textual selections, I have done so in some ways by triangulating the work 
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of Sconce against that of King, Tzioumakis, Newman, MacDowell and others, and with a 
view to extrapolating on the basis of common characteristics. 
 
I exclude work from outside of America which might conceivably have qualified on textual 
grounds (such as that of Tom Tykwer, Michael Haneke or Chan-wook Park) in order to 
produce a more focused industrial picture.  Some filmmakers, such as David Lynch, Jim 
Jarmusch, Gus Van Sant, Robert Altman and David Cronenberg, I consider ‘father figures’ to 
Smart, on the grounds that they had significant prominence prior to the period I analyse, 
which I have chosen to restrict to 1990-2005 as this is where the Smart film came to 
prominence, with its peak probably between 1997 and 2001.  However, certain of their films 
(The Player (1992) and Short Cuts (1993) for Altman, eXistenZ (1999) for Cronenberg, the 
Coen brothers’ The Big Lebowski (1998)) could just as easily have been included.  For these 
filmmakers, I consider it likely that the emerging popularity of Smart cinema created a 
reception context in which, in some cases, their work was retrospectively re-evaluated by 
audiences, and in others, new production opportunities (and audiences) presented themselves 
as a result.   
 
Additionally, I exclude work from the broad hinterland occupied by those films which are 
independent but not Smart films.  By this I mean that while they may be characterised by a 
marginal industrial-discursive position, or be embedded within certain of the discourses of 
auteurism or prestige of which Smart films also avail themselves (see Chapters Four and 
Five), they adhere strongly to classical narrative structure without incorporating the generic, 
narrative-structural, formal or tonal play which characterises Smart cinema.  These films 
(such as Gas, Food, Lodging (Allison Anders, 1992), Before Sunrise (Richard Linklater, 
1995), My Big Fat Greek Wedding (Joel Zwick, 2002) or the work of Nicole Holofcener) 
adhere more to a tradition of classical realist fiction across a variety of genres and modes, and 
to include them here would, I believe, confuse rather than clarify.  There are a number of 
other individual films of the period, clearly, which I could have chosen: Ang Lee’s The Ice 
Storm (1997), Cameron Crowe’s Vanilla Sky (2001, itself a remake of Abre Los Ojos by 
Alejandro Amenábar), Living In Oblivion (1995) by Tom DiCillo, Crumb (Terry Zwigoff, 
1994), the films of Neil LaBute or of Steven Soderbergh (excluded primarily on the grounds 
that I feel I would be merely re-treading Geoff King’s 2009 analysis of his work).  Some I 
excluded (Harmony Korine, Larry Clark’s Kids (1995), the films of Hal Hartley) simply 
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because I believe their work tends more strongly towards the ‘independent’ than tends to be 
the case with Smart cinema, which has pretentions to popularity even when these are not 
realised in practice.  At the same time I have included analyses of two films by the almost as 
independent-leaning Todd Solondz, which I feel is justified by the extent to which his work is 
representative of work occupying the more ‘marginal’ end of the Smart continuum.   
 
I am conscious that there are several filmmakers whose works feature disproportionately 
(Wes Anderson, those written by Charlie Kaufman), and accordingly I have attempted to 
explore some of the complications the discourse of auteurism brings to Smart in Chapter 
Four.  I am equally conscious that there are several films in this selection (Fight Club, The 
Matrix) whose industrial underpinnings would often exclude them from consideration, but 
which serve to illustrate the way in which Smart operates at the higher-budget end of the 
spectrum as well as at the lower.  In short, I am conscious that no selection is ‘perfect’, and 
each path chosen implies another rejected, but I hope that the choices I have made in 
compiling this group of films serve to illustrate both the industrial and the textual aspects of 
Smart which make it most interesting as a research topic, and justify my approach of 
combined textual and industrial analysis.       
 
In Chapter Two I undertake a review of some of the most relevant literature on the field.  
Chapter Three attempts to unpack the industrial processes and conditions which gave rise to 
Smart cinema. Chapter Four explores the way in which ideas of auteurism and cult cinema 
influence and are implicated by the rise and reception of Smart film. In Chapter Five I look in 
more detail at the prestige industry in relation to Smart, and how the films concerned engage 
with the evaluative mechanisms which bestow prestige upon texts and industry alike.  
Chapter Six examines the industrial contexts of particular Smart texts and how these relate to 
their positioning as well as their textual strategies. In Chapter Seven I analyse a 
representative sample of Smart films and make the case for their classification as a trans-
generic mode. Chapter Eight takes two films and explores them in even more depth, engaging 
textual and industrial factors.  In Chapter Nine I discuss my findings in more detail, and make 
some recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter I review some of the extant writing covering the field; a significant proportion 
does not utilise the term ‘Smart’ specifically, but relates to industrial categorizations of that 
liminal zone in which this cinema is often located.  I use terms like ‘independent’, ‘indie’ and 
‘indiewood’ throughout this chapter in the same way these books’ authors do; the fact that I 
tend to use ‘Smart’ elsewhere (as I think it captures more clearly the textual strategies and 
particular trans-industrial nature of the work more clearly) should not, I hope, lead to any 
confusion.  This dissertation is indebted in several ways to the work of Jeffrey Sconce, whose 
work I discuss below. My usage of the term, however, diverges from Sconce’s sociologically-
grounded conception of Smart film as a generational outcropping, which foregrounds irony 
not as nihilism, but a practice of resistance to explicit constructions of social and political 
identity.  This perspective, while vital in its own right, particularly in its emphasis on Smart 
cinema as a mode of consumption practiced by the “younger, more educated, ‘bohemian’ 
audiences who frequent the artplexes” (Sconce, 2002, 351) neglects questions of industrial 
and economic power and access, limiting itself largely to questions of tone and taste.  I, 
instead, move towards framing Smart cinema as a textual tendency providing ‘evidence’ of 
the mobilisation of political-economic forces in specific ways.  These forces may be bound to 
and inflected by generational tendencies or cultural trends, but are not necessarily driven by 
sociological factors so much as by industrial ones, for all that these industrial factors are 
mobilised in complex ways which do not adhere to binary independent-mainstream 
distinctions.   
  
More generally, my approach combines a genre-based perspective and that combination of 
cultural studies and political economy research often referred to as ‘media industry studies’, 
and so I review some work in those fields as well as work covering the area more directly.  
There is a tendency for work on Smart cinema to minimise genre as a dynamic textual driver 
in which formal experimentation is embedded, something which I find surprising, given the 
way in which genre links industrial and audience approaches, meaning that we can use “genre 
as a means of mediating the relationship between film and social, political and economic 
contexts.” (Langford, 2010, xv) 
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This is with the proviso that, while no theoretical structure will provide a ‘perfect’ 
explanation of texts and contexts, genre theory is particularly prone to accusations of 
vagueness and lack of definition.  As per Stam’s summary of the problems of genre analysis 
(2000, 128-129), some generic labels are too broad to be of analytical use, while others are 
too narrow, and there is a danger of conceiving of genres as monolithic, when in practical 
terms they merge and mix continually.
9
  Crucially, there is a danger of “normativization, of 
having a preconceived a priori idea of what a genre film should do” (ibid., 128); and yet this 
essentialist view is at the heart of genre theory, given its central problem: that genre can only 
be ‘created’ retrospectively. This “empiricist dilemma” (Tudor, 1973), has been explored by 
many scholars (a sample includes Altman, 1984; Neale, 1980, 1990, 2001, 2002; Staiger, 
2000; Sandler, 2002) and constitutes a larger theoretical debate than this work can 
encompass.
10
  Indeed, it can be argued (Brown, 2013), that genre theory does not constitute 
“a theory as such” (Maltby, 2003, 501) but has historically functioned as a broad scholarly 
framework within which to academically legitimate explorations of film which were not 
rooted in an auteurist or other ‘high culture’ matrix.   
 
With those caveats, Stam’s conclusion that “[a]t its best, genre criticism can be an 
exploratory cognitive instrument” (Stam, 2000, 129) is relevant: I do not argue for its position 
as ‘grand theory’, instead working from Tudor’s proposal that the only realistic solution to 
this potential theoretical dead end is to “lean on a common cultural consensus as to what 
constitutes a [genre] and go on to analyze it in detail.” (Tudor, 1973, 5)  I draw primarily 
from Neale (1980, 1990, 2001, 2002), in particular his contention that   
[g]enres can be approached from the point of view of the industry and its 
infrastructure, from the point of view of their aesthetic traditions, from the point of 
view of the broader socio-cultural environment upon which they draw and into which 
they feed, and from the point of view of audience understanding and response. (Neale, 
2002, 2) 
 
 As Altman (1984) points out, prior to the development of anything that could be described as 
‘genre theory, generic definitions were produced from within the industry itself, highlighting 
the importance that the institutions of production have in constructing formulations of genre.  
But they do not do so in isolation; ‘genre’ is, as well as an industrial construct, an audience 
construct, a textual construct, and a product of the intertextual relay (Lukow and Ricci, 1984). 
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It is, above all, a construct of the discourses between the text, various publics including but 
not limited to actual audiences, critics, and so on.  Audiences are vital to the discursive 
process which produces genre: genres are not simply groups of films with similar formal 
characteristics, however classified, but constituted from audience expectations as well as 
from texts. As per Neale,  
genres are not simply bodies of work or groups of films, however classified, labelled 
and defined…they consist also, and equally, of specific systems of expectation and 
hypothesis which spectators bring with them to the cinema, and which interact with 
films themselves during the course of the viewing process (Neale, 1990, 46).  
 
That is, genres consist of systems of “fluctuating series of signifying processes” (Neale, 1980, 
19), or “systems of expectation” (Neale, 2002, 2) assisting audiences in recognising, framing, 
and producing significance from texts: systems to which audiences bring their own 
preconceptions and experiences.  Common to these ideas of genre is the notion that one 
cannot regard the selection of a fixed corpus of films, a ‘generic canon’, as the goal of genre 
analysis, as this denies the (as per Neale, 1990) processual nature of genre.  Key here is not 
just the idea that generic hybridity is a significant feature of Smart cinema, but also the idea 
that this hybridity is part of the process of generic development:   
[t]hese processes may, for sure, be dominated by repetition, but they are also marked 
fundamentally by difference, variation and change.......Each new genre film 
constitutes an addition to an existing generic corpus and involves a selection from the 
repertoire of generic elements available at any one point in time.” (Neale, 1990, 56) 
 
Finally, I lean on genre theory in much the same way that Tudor does when he classifies the 
‘art film’ as a genre, saying  
genre is a conception existing in the culture of any particular group or society; it is not 
a way in which a critic classifies films for methodological purposes, but the much 
looser way in which an audience classifies its films. According to this meaning of the 
term, ‘art movies’ is a genre. (Tudor 1973, 9) 
Tudor’s notion here that critics are “mediating factors” (ibid.,) in such a development has 
resonance for the way in which I discuss Smart cinema as being embedded within discourses 
of prestige, and for the way in which the ‘fluid’ critical descriptions which attend it as a mode 
are largely born of a tendency to background questions of genre in its discussion.  
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I also draw on ideas of political economy, in particular the contention that “the 
communications industries play a central double role in modern societies, as industries in 
their own right and as the major site of the representations and arenas of debate through 
which the overall system is imagined and argued over.” (Wasko, Murdock and Sousa, 2011, 
2)  Political economy perspectives complicate the way in which contemporary visions of 
convergence, and of consumption as the locus of meaning, elide the importance of “the rise 
of marketization, the consequent consolidation of corporate power, and the expansion of 
strategies for incorporating popular creativity into revenue generation.” (ibid., 4) and instead 
ask questions which foreground power dynamics as expressed through industrial practice.  In 
this sense I find particularly useful McDonald and Wasko (2008), and Wasko’s position that 
political economy research “seeks to understand Hollywood specifically as an industry that 
produces and distributes commodities within a capitalist system, as well as the political, 
social, and cultural implications of that process” (Wasko, 2011, 308).  This is exemplified by 
the work of Schatz (2008, 2009, 2011), whose linking of texts, industries and audiences 
within a political economy perspective leads him to a vision of the contemporary American 
film industry as characterised by “symbiosis of sorts, a dynamic tension that has become 
integral to the ‘studio system’ in its current configuration.” (Schatz, 2011, 33)   
 
At the same time, the interlinking of political economy frameworks and cultural studies has 
led to the growth of ‘media industry studies’ as a distinctive academic territory, in particular 
through the work of Holt (2001, 2011) and Perren (2001, 2004, 2012, 2013).  Specifically, 
Perren’s emphasis on integrating industrial, aesthetic and discourse analysis perhaps locates 
my work most strongly in that field, seeking to blend “political economy’s critical approach 
to the production and distribution of culture with cultural studies’ concern with the power 
struggles that occur over the value of and meanings within specific texts.” (Perren, 2012, 5)  
This is a backdrop which adds complexity and depth of vision to explorations of territory 
which originated in a largely aesthetic and sociocultural framing, that is, in Jeffrey Sconce’s 
2002 article “Irony, nihilism and the new American ‘smart’ film”.   
 
Largely disregarding industrial factors, this piece remains significant for its commitment to 
linking textual structure and sociological concerns, through Sconce’s use of ‘sensibility’ as a 
framing device, without immediately calling upon a independent-mainstream binary.  Sconce 
makes a case for this mode of filmmaking as a significant branching from both Hollywood 
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methodology, and the ‘independent’ ethos which is frequently cast as that model’s opposite.  
Sconce does identify certain structural aspects of Smart cinema, and categorises them loosely, 
describing films linked firstly by irony, and more frangible, by a “shared set of stylistic, 
narrative and thematic elements” (Sconce, 2002, 358) he classifies as: 
1) the cultivation of ‘blank’ style and incongruous narration; 2) a fascination with 
‘synchronicity’ as a principle of narrative organisation; 3) a related thematic interest in 
random fate; 4) a focus on the white middle-class family as a crucible of 
miscommunication and emotional dysfunction; 5) a recurring interest in the politics of 
taste, consumerism and identity. (ibid.) 
For Sconce, not all Smart films share these characteristics, or mobilise them in similar ways. 
The idea of ‘blankness’ is a key concern, conveying “dampened affect…authorial effacement 
and blank presentation achieved not through a feigned verité but through a series of stylistic 
choices mobilized to signify dispassion, disengagement and disinterest.” (ibid., 359) and “the 
tactical use of incongruity” (ibid., 361).   
 
Citing the work of Ang Lee, Neil LaBute, Todd Haynes, Todd Solondz, Atom Egoyan, Spike 
Jonze, Richard Kelly, Wes Anderson, Hal Hartley, Alexander Payne, Richard Linklater, 
Terry Zwigoff, and Paul Thomas Anderson,
11
 Sconce links these creative strategies with what 
he describes, reframing Bordwell (2002), as a tendency towards ‘de-intensified continuity’, 
achieved through long shots, still or static framing, and slower-paced editing.  He also notes 
Smart’s alternative approaches to narrative causality, often favouring interlocking episodes: 
not inherently character-driven, as in the classical Hollywood form, but centred on a more 
‘postmodern’12 synchronicity, a coalescence of seemingly random events and loosely-linked 
characters.
13
  Here, Sconce argues that the ‘loosening’ of cause and effect and “the workings 
of an impersonal and unknown causality” (Bordwell, 1985, 206) which had become prevalent 
in the European art film from the 1960s onwards, were being replicated and extended in 
Smart cinema.   
 
Sconce’s sense that Smart cinema used specific textual strategies in differing configurations, 
and displayed tendencies relating more to ‘the art film’, rather than of necessity arising 
directly from a linear history of American independent film, is worthy of note.  Structurally, 
however, we can see the restrictions of Sconce’s piece; he begins but does not complete the 
task of teasing out the formal elements of Smart into a systematised, coherent picture.  For 
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example, many Smart films do not share the fixation with long-shots, static composition and 
sparse cutting to which he refers.  Contrarily, many Smart texts disrupt concepts of classical 
space and time, not by de-intensifying continuity, but by complicating or re-intensifying it, 
such as Memento, Fight Club, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Adaptation.  These are 
films which may not foster “clinical observation” (ibid. 360), but use different strategies to 
divide audience and storyworld, by foregrounding their narrative manipulations, or veering 
off into deliberately fantastic, ‘non-realistic’ directions (as with I ♥ Huckabees, and Eternal 
Sunshine).   
 
Sconce acknowledges that ‘blank’ narrative style is not always confined to films which utilise 
static framing, but links it with “the tactical use of incongruity” (ibid., 361) as a constituent of 
irony: juxtaposing mismatched elements of form and content within a text to create 
unexpected, unsettling contrasts which contribute to tone.  I concur with him on its relative 
importance; however, where he sees this as simply “[a]nother operative principle in blank 
narration, found in practitioners of irony across the ages” (ibid.), this position neglects the 
importance of genre to considerations of Smart.  For me (see Chapters Seven and Eight in 
particular), tactical incongruity functions as much to create and complicate generic 
expectations as it does to serve ‘blankness’ or indeed ‘irony’.  It is also interesting to note that 
he regards the blankness of many of these films as conveying a sense of “authorial 
effacement” (ibid., 359); this is a simplification of the strategies at play, and neglects the 
importance of auteurial considerations in framing and positioning this work (see Chapter 
Four).   
 
Sconce’s argument centres on the cultural politics of representation, in particular the 
dramatisation of social and familial alienation within the white American middle classes, a 
focus so “obvious and relentless” (ibid., 364) that it almost renders itself invisible.  Smart 
could indeed be regarded as a somewhat glib intervention within popular culture – a cinema 
of shallow emotional dysfunction – were it not for the attention it pays to what Sconce 
himself calls “a more subtle critique of the politics of identity within consumer culture...from 
playful derision of various ‘taste cultures’ to more complex considerations of the links 
between identity and consumerism.” (ibid., 365)  Sconce regards this as a generational issue, 
with supposedly hypocritical sell-out “baby boomers” and an apathetic, cynical “Generation 
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X”14 increasingly at direct odds with each other, and argues that it is exemplified in the 
American ‘uncertainty’ about irony to which he refers.    
 
Smart cinema therefore, for Sconce, manifests an underlying seam of tension between 
generations who are in “competition for prestige and legitimization.” (ibid., 357), and 
‘position-taking’ becomes a consumerist task performed by a younger generation in order to 
distinguish themselves culturally.  This engagement with the ‘deadening’ nature of consumer 
culture is a preoccupation of much of Smart cinema, and Sconce’s conception of irony in this 
context rests on the principle that it can be used as a way of ‘seeing through’ consumerism.  
In this sense he regards Smart as both “a popular point of identification for an educated white 
middle class in search of victim status” (ibid., 356) and “a transition rather than an 
abnegation of political cinema” (ibid., 367).15    
  
Primarily for Sconce, the common denominator is ‘tone’, informed broadly by Raymond 
Williams’ conception of ‘structure of feeling’: he argues it is used as a way of critiquing 
contemporary taste and culture, while formally maintaining the broader configuration of the 
classical Hollywood narrative.  Understandably, the difficulty with this broad perspective is 
that by evacuating deeper industrial contexts, the link he posits seems vague.  Focusing on 
tone and irony limits deeper considerations of political-economic context, narrative structure, 
thematics, genre, or more nuanced aesthetic analysis, and restricts his field to work which he 
considers broadly “ideologically sympathetic” (ibid., 350).  Therefore, while Sconce’s 
conclusion that Smart cinema is inextricably linked with the socio-cultural conditions of its 
emergence seems correct to me – his desire to place the form in an explicitly social field16 – 
this framing tends to view it as the product of a simultaneous creative outpouring by a select 
generational group, rather than as an industrially-grounded tendency.  His attempt to locate it 
in a wider socio-cultural world is significant, but more so is his contention that Smart film 
exists as a kind of intersectional practice, “an American school of filmmaking that survives 
(and at times thrives) at the symbolic and material intersection of ‘Hollywood’, the ‘indie’ 
scene and the vestiges of what cinephiles used to call ‘art’ films.” (ibid., 351).   
 
However, Sconce was clearly not alone in attempting to describe this tendency: much of the 
work I explore here comes from efforts to clarify distinctions between independent cinema 
and studio work.  Academically there has been a focus on analysing individual films from 
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within the Smart canon to use in service of micro-specific theories (Carol Vernallis’ 
exploration of sound in Eternal Sunshine, or the many pieces on Fight Club and masculinity, 
such as Gronstad, 2003, or Ruddell 2007), or to explore more broadly related ideas, as in 
Ramirez Berg’s (2006) detailed taxonomy of contemporary narrative structures, which is 
relevant to Smart’s narrative play.  These are useful analyses, indeed, but they do not provide 
an over-arching view of the field; self-limiting in many ways, they constitute individual 
jigsaw pieces, rather than the completed puzzle. 
Much contemporaneous writing on the area was not strictly academic, but ‘journalistic’ work 
which, in a somewhat cavalier manner, identifies Smart (if it does so at all beyond the casual 
label of ‘new indie’) as an outcropping of ‘Generation X’, a trend focused around the urban 
‘hipster’ crowd’s beloved Sundance Festival.  Peter Biskind’s Down and Dirty Pictures: 
Miramax, Sundance and the Rise of Independent Film, James Mottram’s Sundance Kids and 
Sharon Waxman’s Rebels on the Backlot provide gossipy ‘rags-to-riches’ tales of Quentin 
Tarantino and Spike Jonze; not rooted in film theory so much as applying a kind of casual – 
and on occasion hagiographic – auteurism, and rooted more in celebrity culture than in 
academic theory.  The subtitle of Waxman’s book, “Six maverick directors and how they 
conquered the Hollywood studio system”, gives a flavour of the tone of this writing; these 
books trade on the idea that they are providing a glimpse into the ‘hidden’ world of the 
Hollywood system. 
The effect is to construct a mythic narrative in which unknown directors are seen to ‘make it 
big’ within the system by virtue of their unique vision and unconventional attitude.  
‘Hollywood’ itself functions most clearly as the dominant force within this strand, the books 
evincing a nostalgia for the New Hollywood of the 1960s, which the newer independent 
directors are challenged to recapture: these works constitute both an attempt to describe the 
emergence of Smart, and part of the cultural discourse which made it prominent.  Hollywood 
itself is seen at a structural level as the ultimate originator of these films, and working within 
the Hollywood system the logical pinnacle of these filmmakers’ careers (provided, of course, 
that they are seen to retain the supposed ‘unique vision’ which brought them to the attention 
of the studio system in the first place). 
Whether by charting the progress of one-time independent distributor Miramax as a tale of 
personal ego writ large (the Weinstein brothers featuring alternately as quasi-mythological 
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heroes and villains), or by simplifying the American film industry into a corporate machine 
which attempts to crush deviation from the blockbuster norm, these books are as keen to 
provide a sense of drama and of ‘inevitable’ narrative causality as much they are to examine 
the nature of this kind of cinema.  These accounts, then, focus more on valorising individual 
directors (or screenwriters in the case of Charlie Kaufman) as ‘quirky geniuses’ or ‘off-beat 
visionaries’ working within a particular ‘scene’ than on a methodical appraisal of the 
characteristics of Smart cinema, its industrial underpinnings, and its implications as cultural 
and social form.   
 
In the 1990s and into the early 2000s, much of the work relating to Smart cinema came 
directly from considerations of independent film.  However, in some cases attempts to chart 
this territory result in a broad sweep that, problematically, assumes that independent and 
quasi-independent cinema experience broadly the same conditions of production and 
reception.  For example, Levy’s Cinema of Outsiders straddles the gap between popular and 
academic accounts, and takes an extremely wide view of the field of ‘the American 
independent film’ in the 1990s.  On the one hand this serves as an expansive survey of the 
field, including work on African American, gay and lesbian, ‘female/feminist’ (Levy’s 
designation) cinemas, examining work geographically (what he terms the New York School 
as well as regional cinema), the auteurial heritage of independent cinema, and thematic 
preoccupations within drama and comedy.  On the other, the scope of projects of this nature 
militates against drawing detail or nuance from any individual element.  
 
Levy, for example, delineates what he regards as the conditions which gave rise to the late 
century’s rise in independent cinema:  
1. The need for self-expression. 
2. Hollywood’s move away from serious, middle-range films. 
3. Increased opportunities and capital in financing indies. 
4. Greater demand for visual media, driven by an increase in the number of theatres and 
the adoption of home video as a dominant form of entertainment in the United States. 
5. Supportive audiences: the Baby-Boom generation. 
6. The decline of foreign-language films in the American market. 
7. The proliferation of film schools across the country. 
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8. The emergence of the Sundance Film Festival as the primary showcase for indies and 
the rise of regional festivals. 
9. The development of new organizational networks. 
10. Commercial success – the realization that there’s money to be made in indies.” (Levy, 
1999, 20-21)  
However his point rests on the idea of ‘self-expression’ – an overtly auteuristic perspective 
which somewhat contradicts the industrial history; for all this, his conclusion is industrially-
based, that the 1990s were characterised by “institutionalisation. Indies now form an industry 
that runs not so much against Hollywood as parallel to Hollywood.” (ibid., 501)  
 
As the first decade of the new century moved on, work exploring the nature and industrial 
position of independent cinema emerged which was more likely to contain references to what 
we might describe as Smart cinema, and attempted to locate it within both the cultural 
framework and the political economy of cinema.  Yannis Tzioumakis provides a thorough 
account of the works which charted this progression, in two literature reviews of the field, the 
first exploring 1980s accounts and noting that “attempts towards a comprehensive definition 
of the label independent film [are] destined to remain futile.” (Tzioumakis, 2011a, 108)  The 
second provides an account of the most pertinent pieces of the 1990s, and concludes that  
the academic discourse on American independent cinema has been also far from 
unified……American independent film’s own trajectory, which moved progressively 
closer to Hollywood cinema (especially from the late 1980s onwards), in tandem with 
the expansion of Hollywood cinema courses in university curricula, inevitably made 
the discourse that saw American independent film as related to Hollywood more 
visible and therefore dominant…….American independent film and cinema had 
become part of the same academic discourse that came to characterise Hollywood 
cinema studies. (Tzioumakis, 2011b, 335-336) 
However, this position is, of necessity, one achieved through retrospection, and much of the 
work produced during the period reflects what Tzioumakis describes as the division of the 
territory into ‘smaller’ discourses.  
 
This tendency to explore micro-trends rather than take a wider view is seen in Jon Lewis’s 
2001 collection The end of cinema as we know it, which circumnavigates a great deal of 
territory over the 1990s: trends and technologies, reconsiderations of Hollywood history, 
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independent cinema, and the changing role of corporations.  Attempting to unify the disparate 
strands of the period, in that he does not ‘segregate’ independent from mainstream work, 
Lewis entertains the possibility that the decade was “a transitional period from one new 
American cinema to another.” (Lewis, 2001, 8)  Foregrounding industrial concentrations of 
power (particularly trans-industrial alliances leading to convergence), international markets, 
new technologies in production and exhibition, and a decline in cinemagoing, Lewis 
pessimistically concludes that “[w]hat made certain films and filmmakers important in the 
nineties had less to do with relative quality than with success in the marketplace…The 
important films were those that seemed to use filmmaking technology best, films that 
declared in their very form and format their status as contemporary, new, or different. (ibid., 
3)  
 
Of particular interest in this collection, historically speaking, is James Schamus’s piece, in 
which he states that “today the economics required to make oneself heard even as an 
‘independent’ are essentially studio economics.” (Schamus, 2001, 254), and that films with 
‘meaning’ “can now be found both within the studio system…as well as ‘outside’ the 
system.” (ibid., 255).  Legitimate fears surrounding monopoly, antitrust enforcement and 
intellectual property notwithstanding, for Schamus the developments of the 1990s 
represented “[t]he successful integration of the independent film movement into the 
structures of global media and finance” (ibid., 259) Here, Schamus’s own status as a figure of 
scholarly, creative and industrial importance is noteworthy, perhaps accounting for the 
accuracy of his prediction of future entwinement of independent and mainstream industrial 
contexts, and for the impression the piece produces of a call to integration, for creative 
practitioners more than industrial figures. 
  
This sense of integration is reinforced in Hillier’s American independent cinema (2001), 
which contrary to its title emphasises the interconnectedness of the industry when it includes 
– along with sections on ‘Pioneers’ (Cassevetes, Brakhage and Warhol), ‘African Americans’ 
(Spike Lee, Marlon Riggs, Julie Dash) ‘Queers’ (Rose Troche, Gregg Araki, Kimberly 
Peirce, Gus Van Sant, Todd Haynes), and ‘Minimalists’ (Jim Jarmusch and Hal Hartley) – 
the works of only tangentially independent filmmakers like Spike Jonze, Quentin Tarantino 
and Paul Thomas Anderson.  Noting that Hollywood’s history constitutes it as, originally, an 
independent outcropping in itself, he argues that independence has usually implied work 
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different from the mainstream “whether this relationship is defined primarily in economic 
terms…or in aesthetic or stylistic terms” (Hillier, 2001, ix).  
 
He elides more nuanced arguments about the bases of production, although acknowledges 
that rather than marking the advent of American independent cinema as a distinct economic 
force, 1989’s sex, lies and videotape may in retrospect “represent the assimilation of that 
cinema.” (ibid., xv), and that the career trajectories over the period of filmmakers such as 
Soderbergh, Tarantino and Van Sant would appear to reinforce this impression of 
“incorporation into the mainstream” (ibid., xiii).  Hillier is left with only questions, asking if 
we should regard the form as “alive and well, but living in sin, a sign that the spirit of 
independence has permeated some levels of the mainstream?” (ibid., xvi).  By 2006 Hillier’s 
outlook had solidified into a pertinent but under-theorised position that the work under 
discussion could best be described as taking “centre ground in a continuum that runs from a 
much earlier period and from frankly experimental avant garde work to movies 
indistinguishable from mainstream studio product” (Hillier, 2006, 249). 
 
Holmlund and Wyatt’s 2005 Contemporary American independent film: from the margins to 
the mainstream, I find useful in that it, as its title suggests, emphasises the transition of 
independent styles and contexts towards the mainstream.  Refusing to be drawn on strict 
categorisations, Holmlund states in her introduction that “[w]hat’s at stake is a continuum, 
not an opposition…….Neither ideologically nor economically are [independent and 
mainstream films] purely antithetical” (Holmlund, 2005a, 3) and argues that “in the last 
fifteen years key sectors of independent films have indeed migrated towards the mainstream, 
from the margins, with attendant effects.” (ibid., 4)  Their work therefore prefigures accounts 
of the field attempting to chart this ‘migration’; the volume briefly chronicles the industrial 
and technological changes which shaped the 1980s and 1990s independent scene (surging 
costs, conglomeration, the advent of cable television and home video, the strengthening of 
festival culture, and the advent of the ‘major independent’ and ‘mini-majors’,17 citing the rise 
of New Line and Miramax as of particular significance).  Holmlund’s note that filmmakers 
like Soderbergh, Tarantino, Russell, Aronofsky and the Andersons have “capitalized on the 
buzz surrounding their indie debuts to move into studio productions or to move back and 
forth between studio and independent productions” (ibid., 9) illustrates the fluidity of 
independent/mainstream boundaries, something I find relevant to my own research.  
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However, the task of producing a volume which contextualises historical antecedents of the 
auteurist and economic kind, symptomatises certain quasi-independent practices (such as 
Diane Negra’s analysis of the positioning of Parker Posey), explores a diversity of topics 
ranging from pornography and the avant-garde (Capino) to digital technologies 
(Zimmerman), is so large that the result is conceptually disjointed. 
 
By 2005, Geoff King’s American independent cinema had moved towards a framing of the 
field minimising the casual auteurism which tends to pervade accounts of Smart cinema.  He 
notes the intersectionality of independent and mainstream modes of production, saying that 
“[t]he centre of gravity of American independent cinema has certainly shifted closer to 
Hollywood since the upsurge from the mid 1980s” (King, 2005, 262).  This emphasis, 
usefully, moves closer to describing a Smart – rather than ‘independent’ – frame of 
operations, making the book’s title slightly misleading.  For King, independent cinema 
“exists in the overlapping territory between Hollywood and a number of alternatives: the 
experimental ‘avant-garde’, the more accessible ‘art’ or ‘quality’ cinema, the politically 
engaged, the low-budget exploitation film and the more generally offbeat or eccentric.” (ibid., 
2-3).  Therefore, in contextualising independent cinema in its industrial, formal/aesthetic, and 
socio-cultural aspects, King attempts an intersectional approach.   
 
King also relates genre to his consideration, noting that “[i]f familiar genre location is 
sometimes abandoned, complicated or undermined in the independent sector, it also forms an 
important point of orientation in many cases.” (ibid., 166) – although the films he explores in 
relation to it tend, predictably, to lean to the independent side, rendering his analysis of them 
somewhat tangential for my purposes.  King cites a variety of factors as contributing to the 
rise in prominence of indies and subsequent intervention of studios: the establishment of 
indie infrastructures, including independent festivals and distributors; the conservative 
tendencies of Hollywood which concentrated their efforts on a limited slate of expensive 
films, pushing more adventurous viewers elsewhere; developments in home video, an 
increase in cinema screens and the expansion of cable television; and the increased 
availability of investment capital at specific periods since the 1980s (ibid., 21-27).  The 
search for audiences is foregrounded, and the success of companies like Miramax and New 
Line “has been based on their ability to achieve a crossover into larger audiences” (ibid., 32).   
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However, King regards this crossover as problematic, as per his argument that to maintain 
competitiveness, independents had to get bigger, with larger operations and higher overheads 
resulting in independent sector overproduction, and increasing competition within a limited 
market (ibid., 36) making ‘the breakout hit’ a matter of necessity rather than aspiration.  The 
move of major studios into the distribution of independent features meant that “the majors 
increased their ability to share in the very high levels of profit enjoyed by specialized/indie-
type features that break out into the mass audience.” (ibid., 45), as a result of which “the lines 
between the independents and Hollywood can become blurred” (ibid., 47), and independent 
film’s success “has turned the notion of independence into an exploitable marketing 
angle…confected deliberately in an attempt to gain ‘indie’ cachet” (ibid., 56).  Therefore 
King argues that “[o]wnership by the majors…has tended to polarize the market.” (ibid., 44), 
meaning that “[t]he relationship between the commercial mainstream and various different 
degrees of independence is dialectical and dynamic rather than fixed” (ibid., 57). 
 
In a similar vein, Tzioumakis’ 2006 American independent cinema: an introduction 
foregrounds historical context, noting that confusion regarding use of the term ‘independent’ 
stems largely from its use in a variety of different contexts throughout the history of 
American cinema – the history of ‘Hollywood’ being a history of various attempts at 
achieving independence – and the ideological idealism in which many of its uses are 
embedded.  He emphasises the importance of rooting textual approaches in industrial 
considerations, noting that “these distinctions are not clear cut in the current state of 
American cinema, certainly not in terms of economics.” (Tzioumakis, 2005, 6)  Additionally, 
he argues that “an approach that sees independent filmmaking as different from mainstream 
in terms of aesthetics or use of film style produces equally, if not more, problematic results.” 
(ibid., 7) as independent films do not possess a monopoly on the textual strategies which 
might at first be seen to characterise it, giving rise to the possibility that a broadly ‘post-
classical’ style may have been emerging in both sectors.   
 
For Tzioumakis, the 1970s wave of conglomerations constitutes a transitional period 
following which, initially at least, distinctions between independent and mainstream seemed 
clearer, in that the success of independent film of the period “demonstrated that the 
oligopolisation of American cinema…was impossible.” (ibid., 210).  However, the 1980s 
advent of the mini-major or major indie set the scene for what he describes as the 
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“institutionalisation” (ibid., 225) of independent cinema, intensifying in the 1990s to 
constitute a “symbiosis” (ibid., 246), and indicating that “independent cinema has become a 
category of filmmaking practised mainly by the majors” (ibid., 247), a move he describes as a 
transition “from independent to ‘specialty’ cinema” (ibid., 281).  His contention that 
independent cinema forms  
a discourse that expands and contracts when socially authorised institutions 
(filmmakers, industry practitioners, trade publications, academics, film critics, and so 
on) contribute towards its definition at different periods (ibid., 11) 
seems pertinent to me in light of my own research.  This is largely because of his placing of it 
within a context involving questions of power.  Here, if the term ‘independent’ is applied to 
texts with a degree of fluidity, the implication is that an equal fluidity can be attributed to the 
process by which studios and quasi-independent autonomous units exert their industrial 
power in order to mobilise textual strategies traditionally associated with ‘independence’.  
 
The mobilisation of ‘independence’ in different contexts is the subject of Declarations of 
independence (John Berra, 2008), a curiously stand-alone piece which fails to engage deeply 
with scholarship on independent cinema history and theory. Berra’s casual use of the term 
‘independent’ is not based within solid definitional terms and therefore covers a wide variety 
of films of different industrial origin.  However, I include this on the basis that it presents a 
case for not maintaining distinctions between mainstream and independent cinema, a 
perspective I feel brings it more squarely into the territory of Smart film, as well as for 
including research into Smart audiences.  Although Berra’s arguments are sweeping and 
sometimes without obvious evidentiary basis
18
 his contention that independent cinema exists 
“somewhere between a method of physical production and a form of popular thinking” 
(Berra, 2008, 71) usefully illustrates the liminal nature of the Smart field.  This framing 
foregrounds the assimilatory nature of the studio system, arguing that filmmakers do not exist 
independently of the workings of economic power, and that therefore “the film-maker is 
always in a compromised position.” (ibid., 15)   
 
Here, independent cinema is “not so much an opposition to the Hollywood mainstream, but 
an alternative version of it, telling similar stories but placing a different emphasis on key 
elements as a means of distinguishing itself.” (ibid., 90) and as such the studio system is 
strongly dependent on independent film, not least as a means of “discovering the shifts in 
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popular sentiment that will shape the next direction, or at least the next trend…[and] a way to 
discover young talent” (ibid., 22).  In addition, independent films form an important source of 
cultural capital for American cinema as a whole, as despite their lack of economic 
significance, they “are more valued by the critical establishment…making them more 
intellectually prominent examples of America’s cinematic output.” (ibid., 19) – something I 
see as relevant to my work on prestige and Smart cinema. 
 
Berra sees the mode as existing “somewhere between the ‘popcorn picture’ and the ‘prestige 
picture’…[in a] market niche as a middlebrow entertainment” (ibid., 27) combining high 
production values, broadly recognisable forms, and star presence with “some novelty value 
and the cachet of being ‘independent’.” (ibid.) Idealistically, he sees this as potentially 
liberatory, arguing for a synthesising position on the basis that “to divide [filmmakers]…into 
these two culturally opposing camps would be a mistake…Many ‘independent graduates’19 
are trying to forge a third form of production, one that is financially sustained by the 
economic power of the corporate giants, but artistically progressive and free of compromise” 
(ibid., 111).  Berra’s work on audiences is also of interest for the suggestion that independent 
and mainstream audiences are not separate, but intertwined; insofar as the independent sector 
is integrated into an overall system of studio dominance, for him their audiences are “are one 
in [sic] the same” (ibid., 24) Although I do not feel he proves this point conclusively,20 his 
note that the advent of multiplex cinemagoing created a demand for screen-filling product 
which “‘legitimized’ [independent films] for the non-cinephile audience.” (ibid., 184)  has 
merit, as does his contention that they “are as well attended as Hollywood ‘blockbusters’, 
providing they receive blanket promotion.” (ibid., 193): his empirical rationale is thin, but the 
conclusion foregrounds the importance of media profile and positioning.  
 
Arguing that cinephile audiences are particularly significant in demonstrating initial support 
for individual films and spreading word of mouth, Berra contends that mainstream and 
independent audiences frequently coincide,  particularly when “commercially identifiable 
attributes as stars, genre, and Academy Awards can be ably exploited by marketing teams” 
(ibid., 182).  His point is also that this crossover has diluted the meaning of the term 
‘independent’ in position-taking, having “come to mean a certain type of film, as opposed to 
a certain method of production…used to succinctly sum up the core attributes of the films 
themselves, not their production backgrounds…….[and] characterised by its aesthetic 
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choices” (ibid., 127).  Berra’s conclusion is that independent film is embedded as a parallel 
practice within the wider industry, as a  
‘marginal Hollywood cinema’…a cinema that sustains itself through the cultivation of 
a niche audience by exploring subject matter that is out of the intellectual reach of the 
summer blockbusters…with the aid of recognizable Hollywood characteristics such as 
genre and movie stars and a reliance on industrial resources and institutional 
bodies…to an audience that is so eager to accept the existence of a form of 
‘alternative’ media, that it will largely ignore the corporate origins of such films and 
accept them as doctrines of independence.” (ibid., 202) 
 
Geoff King’s Indiewood, USA (2009) takes a more holistic view of production and 
distribution, explored through textual analysis of individual films and case studies of studio 
subsidiaries, and through perspectives of consumption, linking the field to an implied 
audience through the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  Moving from binary distinctions between 
studio- and non-studio-produced work in a consolidatory way, King conceives of Indiewood 
as a relational concept, with films drawing from arthouse and independent as well as classical 
antecedents occupying a 
region characterized primarily by a form of studio/indie 
hybridity….distinctive…without being subject to any single detailed definition.  Its 
most clear-cut ground of demarcation is industrial-institutional, in the form of the 
output of the studio-owned specialty divisions, but this also includes some films that 
remain more distinctly ‘indie’ in character and Indiewood can also be taken to 
embrace some work produced on occasion from within the main studio operations 
themselves. (King, 2009, 271) 
Therefore his definition encompasses a wide range of work, and one for which “[i]t is 
doubtful that anything as specific as a distinct set of Indiewood norms can be identified” 
(ibid.).  Acknowledging that economic and ideological tensions can work to romanticise indie 
production and devalue Indiewood work on the grounds of its industrial origin,
21
 King argues 
that “[t]he fact that Indiewood… exists as, or has become, a largely marketing-driven niche 
need not mean that it is only that…Some of its products might be quite cynically targeted at a 
particular blend of niche and cross-over potential, but that does not mean they are as a result 
evacuated of any interest or significance beyond their commercial status.” (ibid., 274) 
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Linking audiences and films, King’s textual analyses investigate the kinds of appeal that 
Indiewood texts provide to their viewers, in some cases by contextualising user comments 
from www.amazon.com alongside, illustrating the ways in which audiences self-position – 
and award or deny themselves and others cultural capital – in relation to their chosen texts.  
Using Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ to orient this in the context of “Indiewood…as part of 
a tendency of mainstream industry (not just the marginal) to buy into and exploit aspects of 
what is understood to be the ‘cool’, ‘hip’, and ‘alternative’.” (ibid., 15), he looks at cultural 
consumption choices as a way of establishing difference, and hence taste cultures.  Locating 
concerns with taste status in the middle- and upper-middle-class cultures from which 
Indiewood is considered likely to seek its audiences (ibid., 16), King suggests that different 
audiences will invest in texts in different ways, and that while it is not possible to directly 
identify them in class terms, “films produced/distributed from a particular part of the 
spectrum are designed, if only implicitly at some levels, with specific kinds of audiences 
broadly in mind” (ibid., 23). 
 
If more cultural capital is required for the consumption of more ‘difficult’ works, King 
argues, for Indiewood “some markers of distinction often remain present but in combination 
with more mainstream/accessible characteristics than might generally be associated with 
examples of art or less conventional indie film” (ibid, 21). Therefore, while Indiewood 
products remain based on largely conventional emotional appeals (those of plot and 
character), their implied audience is one which also desires engagement with more self-
consciously challenging material, and “receptive to the presence of some markers of 
difference or distinction within the context of frameworks broadly familiar from the 
Hollywood mainstream….[and] able to find pleasure in the specific difference constituted by 
examples such as…complex or self-referential narratives…or…stylized touches” (ibid., 35)  
 
An Indiewood implied audience may therefore take pleasure from the combination of 
classical emotional appeals and reflexivity, non-linear structure, and metafictional play in, for 
example, Charlie Kaufman’s work,22 where these are integrated into classical narrative and 
character structures; “‘contained’ and made-sense-of, in a manner which locates the work at 
the more conventional end of the wider alternative/conventional spectrum” (ibid., 78).23   The 
combination of ‘mainstream’ pleasures and markers of distinction can also function in 
somewhat political ways.  American Beauty,
24
 a film King sees as almost designed for a 
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combination of critical acclaim and a multi-demographic youth/adult crossover, and Three 
Kings both take positions which have “overtly (rather than just implicit) social/political 
resonance, a dimension that distinguishes them from the norm for Hollywood” (ibid., 205), 
for all that the former’s politics are constrained by the individualism of American cultural 
ideology.  Regardless, while different films target different audiences, each “offers a range of 
points of access that require the mobilization of differing degrees of cultural or subcultural 
capital…[reaching] beyond smaller niches and towards the broader, mainstream audience.” 
(ibid., 135)  
 
Therefore, for King Indiewood film forms a “significant zone” (ibid., 236) – a vague term, 
but which indicates the balancing of challenging and commercial appeals, in which “some 
degree of formal departure from Hollywood norms is found…but…generally quite limited 
and balanced by other factors that keep the films located relatively close to the commercial 
mainstream.” (ibid., 237) It is, crucially, an industrial zone, with two separate strands of 
Miramax’s activities exemplifying the differing poles of the Indiewood tendency.  These 
were, respectively, the drive to colonise space in the prestige film marketplace (as illustrated 
by Shakespeare in Love), and the desire to produce ‘mainstream’ cult cinema, primarily 
through Tarantino, whose status “enabled the Miramax brand to maintain something of its 
earlier associations with ‘cool’ and ‘edgy’ as well as more ‘elevated/prestige’ production, 
appealing in general to a younger demographic.” (ibid., 112)  
 
Other filmmakers negotiate Indiewood territory in individual ways. Where Kaufman’s work 
brought him an unusual degree of recognition for a screenwriter,
25
 and King argues for 
Russell’s “relative autonomy” (ibid, 220), he regards Soderbergh as a particularly Indiewood 
auteur, whose movement between mainstream and indie work (some films dominated by star 
power and genre considerations, others by more marginal tendencies) has for King created a 
particular kind of “brand identity……in which style is said to follow content” (ibid., 178).26  
More significantly, this demonstrates the “ability of some filmmakers not just to move 
between Hollywood and the independent sector, but to produce hybrid features that occupy 
the ground between the two.” (ibid., 141), and illustrating that Indiewood textual qualities are 
not specifically ‘indie’ but “can be found in the orbit of the main arms of the studios as well 
as the semi-autonomous realm of their specialty divisions.” (ibid., 226)  
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King emphasises the importance of individual studio executives in – while working from a 
base circumscribed by their own personal and political capital, itself dependent on previous 
projects’ performance – facilitating this kind of production, thereby “widening the bounds of 
what was permissible, to some extent, within the studio machine.” (ibid., 192).  In this sense, 
Indiewood’s development is strongly linked to the evolution of the wider industry during the 
period, and King emphasises that much of this work also comes from inside the major 
studios, thus visualising Hollywood “as something other than an entirely seamless monolith 
of impersonal heteronomous business practices.” (ibid., 227)  He also links the rise of the 
‘indie subsidiaries’ which account for much Indiewood output to a shift in emphasis towards 
post-Fordist production (or at least marketing): positioned to exploit the possibility of 
crossover hits and emerging filmmaker potential (American and international), with smaller 
films serving as ‘practice runs’ for larger projects, and maintaining star relationships by 
providing attractive vehicles (ibid., 6-7). In addition, they provided a means to “buy into 
the…award-garnering prestige achieved by a number of indie features during the 1990s.” 
(ibid., 192) and to create or strengthen brand images for studios.
27
 
 
King contrasts the ‘middle market’ Focus with Sony Pictures Classics, which he finds 
distributed films of “a much wider scope…including more challenging art-cinema-oriented 
works” (ibid., 258), and Fox Searchlight, and concludes firstly that they embrace a range of 
work (including those films more identifiable as ‘indie’ or arthouse than Indiewood, and 
imports), and secondly that “the divisions that have proved most successful are those in 
which the studio has interfered least and where longer-term stability has proved possible.” 
(ibid., 259)  His perspective is that while prestige-accrual is a related factor, it is so more for 
in the way it which prestige can be marketed to audiences, than in its own right: this prestige 
is of a particular kind, however, given Indiewood’s “tendency to play safe, ultimately, to rely 
on proven templates and to combine material that might be challenging in some respects with 
more easily marketable components such as stars, ‘name’ filmmakers and strong, broadly 
familiar narrative and emotional hooks.” (ibid., 270)  Fundamentally, for King, while 
Indiewood was not an entirely new phenomenon, and not one whose significance should be 
overstated, it was the result of a particular set of circumstances which “created a certain 
amount of space for particular kinds of relative departure from what are usually understood to 
be the dominant norms of Hollywood.” (ibid. 195)  Predicated as much on the desire to be 
seen as a cinema of distinction as to appeal to wider audiences, he regards it as “a careful 
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balancing in which degrees of departure from the norm are kept within the bounds provided 
by more recognizably familiar routines.” (ibid., 163)  
 
By contrast, Alisa Perren’s Indie, Inc. focuses on political economy, making a detailed case 
for Miramax as not simply exemplifying, but (both before and after its link with Disney) 
providing a template for a larger industrial drive towards the studio co-option of the 
independent form.  Her approach integrates industrial, discursive and aesthetic analysis in a 
way which makes this a key text for media industry studies, seeking to blend political 
economy analysis with cultural studies while emphasising historical specificity and empirical 
research.  Perren makes three central arguments. The first is that the Miramax-Disney 
partnership “helped alter the structure of the industry, the marketing of low-budget films, and 
motion picture aesthetics” Perren, 2012, 3), in particular in developing techniques for 
appealing to niche audiences, and exploiting discourses of independence.  The second 
(contrasting with accounts such as Biskind’s, which suggest that Miramax helped to make 
independent film mainstream) is that Miramax’s history needs to be seen “as part of a much 
larger process: the restructuring of global Hollywood.” (ibid., 12) The third is that the media-
discursive practices in which Miramax and the press were engaged and implicated did not 
simply reflect practices within the industry, but assisted strongly in shaping them. 
 
Perren contends that the Weinsteins recognised, ahead of other independent distributors, that 
low-budget films could be sold through “a combination of exploitation marketing tactics and 
an emphasis on quality and difference.” (ibid., 23).  Initially, at least, steering away from in-
house production meant that Miramax’s economic position was stronger than their 
competitors’, particularly given their emphasis on retaining merchandising, publishing and 
music rights, and their aggressive pursuit of investors and finance partners.  Soderbergh’s 
breakout hit sex, lies and videotape became an exemplary Miramax text, in demonstrating 
that marketing tactics could be use “to appeal to several distinct niches through one 
advertisement.”28 (ibid., 34)  These niches were, Perren argues, “united by the film’s status as 
a quality independent – an identity that, in later years, would evolve into a subgenre of its 
own” (ibid., 36).  In this way, the Miramax model demonstrated the potential profitability of 
low-budget films, foregrounding the importance of viable niche audiences, the importance of 
demographic shifts, and in particular their ability to provide viable competition to summer 
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‘tentpole’ pictures. For Perren, this “laid the groundwork for a realignment of the industry 
away from B-grade genre product and towards American indies.” (ibid., 40)  
Miramax pursued a variety of (sometimes contradictory) objectives throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, and while in the late 1980s their emphasis was on ‘quality’ US indies, their wide-
ranging ambitions led them to appear, Perren notes, to be expanding beyond their means as 
early as the early 1990s.  Therefore, the decision to seek capitalization through Disney
29
 not 
only provided them with the means to expand (which they did, rapidly, in particular through 
the establishing of Dimension Films as a genre picture label) but placed them in a 
compromised situation whereby Miramax “simultaneously presented an image of itself as a 
specialty company that supported small artistic films produced by iconoclastic auteurs 
while…it increased the size and scope of a commercially oriented genre division geared 
toward films widely perceived as trashy or low-brow.” (ibid. 115)  
 
Perren argues that Miramax’s downfall was their devotion to both genre production, and the 
middle-range films
30
 which other studios were abandoning.
31
  Functioning as a diversified 
media company working in publishing, music and television, as well as investing in films 
with ever-larger budgets, meant that Miramax’s “ability to effectively sell itself as 
independent or as a young upstart became less and less tenable…No longer could Miramax 
sustain the myth that it was the ‘little guy’ facing off against big bad media corporations.” 
(ibid., 209)
32
  By the early 2000s Miramax was in peril, and the Weinsteins “were busting the 
indie business model that they played a lead role in forging” (ibid., 225) – drawing them 
away from the mandate of their agreement with Disney: to produce high-quality, low-cost 
films.  Following battles over autonomy, cost, and content, and in the shadow of Michael 
Eisner’s problems at Disney (225-228), Perren sees Miramax’s “breaking point” (ibid., 228) 
as differences over Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, in May 2004. The Weinsteins left 
Miramax in autumn 2005, although the label itself remained with Disney until 2010.  
 
Perren strongly implicates the wider media industries in the evolution of the Miramax 
mythology, and in the creation as well as chronicling of the quasi-independent era. From this 
perspective, just as Miramax was constructing its own mythology, “[n]ewspapers and 
magazines across the country, in turn, repeated this mythology.” (ibid., 106) and, as 
significantly, parlayed it into a public narrative about ‘independent film’.  She notes both that 
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“the attention paid to the indie film sector was disproportionate to its economic impact” 
(ibid., 7), and that Miramax was made “central to discussions about autonomy, authenticity, 
and creative freedom.” (ibid.) – something the company frequently exploited for the purposes 
of marketing and product differentiation.  Not only that, but Perren attributes a degree of 
myopia to media accounts of the field, which presented the increasing intervention of studios 
into independent production, in an unproblematised way, as independent film.
33
  This was, 
she argues, largely related to the way in which “stories about a new wave of American indie 
auteurs provided strong press hooks and an easy means by which to differentiate low-budget 
films from effects-driven event films” (ibid., 80) 
 
As Miramax moved towards a “cinema of cool” (ibid., 94), this encouraged a discursive 
tendency “to conceptualize the low-budget film scene within ever-narrower terms…[which] 
further marginalized discussions of other types of filmmakers” (ibid. 79).34  While economic 
prospects for independent films did not appreciably change, press accounts pursued a 
Miramax-centred view, whereby “little had changed for most of those unaffiliated with the 
major Hollywood system and large conglomerates. The mythology of the ‘little film that 
could’ grew, but their box office returns did not.” (ibid., 163) Simultaneously, Miramax and 
its products “were still being hyped by the press into the independent category…. aided by 
the larger narrative being promulgated by the mainstream press at this time – namely that 
Hollywood was out of touch and that ‘outsiders’ now made the quality films.” (ibid., 169)  
Where questions about the profitability of independent and quasi-independent film were 
raised, she states that rather than interrogating the involvement of the bigger studios, indie 
companies were blamed “for releasing too many films, many of questionable quality…the 
underlying logic driving the industry toward the creation of indie subsidiaries was never 
called into question.” (ibid., 180) 
 
What faultlines did emerge were elided, such as when controversy over Kids (Larry Clark, 
1995) drew attention to the increasing entwinement of the studios with low-budget 
production; this was framed not as an industrial issue, rather as raising questions “about the 
ways that the incorporation of small companies into publicly held global media 
conglomerates posed a threat to artistic expression, individual autonomy, and the exercise of 
free speech.” (ibid., 114)  This framing avoided problematising Miramax’s brand identity: as 
she argues, many accounts of Miramax “have greatly overstated its role in distributing 
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controversial content.” (ibid., 116) for all that the company’s image depended on reinforcing 
this perception.
35
  Miramax’s response in supporting the film helped to publicly contradict its 
industrial position; at a time when its budgets were rising and its films becoming more 
strongly middlebrow, it could be seen as reassuring the creative community.  To have 
relinquished Kids would have confirmed “that the low-budget landscape was changing, that 
from now on, institutional forces would overwhelm individual efforts” (ibid., 121-122).36  
Therefore, Perren’s argument is that “[t]he tale of Miramax is ultimately the tale of the 
reorganization and reconstitution of the film industry during the 1990s…Tapping into 
journalists’ and critics’ discourses about ‘independence’, Miramax facilitated this industrial 
reorganization.” (ibid., 230)  
 
While she recognises the development and importance of a distinct taste culture which 
brought this form of cinema to prominence, the reorganization of the film industry is at the 
root of Perren’s work.  In this analysis, “the rise of indie film was part of a broader, industry-
wide reorientation…only one component of a much larger process.” (ibid., 76) Where 
Miramax led, media conglomerates followed, using practices she argues were “modelled 
largely on Miramax’s production and distribution strategies” (ibid., 4), and signalling a 
wholesale structural transformation whereby “indie divisions became the primary means 
through which conglomerates financed, produced, and distributed a diverse range of niche-
oriented films.” (ibid.) These were utilised as talent development sites, and to experiment 
with new business models. 
 
Here, the rise of indies  
can be seen as intersecting with the global media conglomerates’ increasing focus on 
producing and distributing niche products to specific demographic groups...within the 
context of a shift from a model of mass production and consumption that dominated until 
the 1970s, and toward a late twentieth-century model of specialization and ‘just-in-time’ 
production and consumption. (ibid., 6) 
It was not that conglomerates moved away from mass production, but that they restructured 
operations to include niche-oriented film within a wider strategy of investment and 
acquisition which also included niche-oriented television, and reflected a broader industrial 
shift.  In this, studio engagement within the field of independent production signals an 
emerging consciousness that greatest profits could be derived from “high-budget, high-
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concept franchises that had broad international appeal, or low-budget films that could be 
targeted to a number of audiences and promoted inexpensively through festivals, word of 
mouth, and positive critical response.” (ibid., 37)  
Perren argues that subsidiaries were better-equipped than studios
37
 to deal with low-budget 
releases in an environment in which long-term deals and relationships had become 
paramount, particularly library rights for video and cable and international rights, and that 
while press discourse incorrectly framed the industry as a two-tier division between “the 
Hollywood majors and an imprecisely defined group of independents” (ibid., 153)38 it had in 
fact solidified into three (occasionally overlapping) tiers by 1996.  This was, vitally an 
industrial rather than cultural issue, as “producers and distributors began to reconceptualise 
the studios’ mid-range films as indies. This involved lowering films’ budgets by employing 
non-union labour or asking well-known talent to work for less” (ibid., 159).  In this framing, 
the industry was divided into  
the majors (tier 1), the studio-based indies (tier 2), and the true independents (tier 
3…)…each tier increasingly focused on particular types of films with specific 
budgetary ranges; employed distinctive production, distribution, and marketing 
strategies; and was covered – and valued – differently by journalists. (ibid., 155)39 
The intervention of the studios meant that budgets rose, and competition for rights to films 
increased; problematically for Miramax, who were moving more to the centre even as “a 
rapidly expanding set of competitors proceeded to occupy the niches that Miramax had begun 
to neglect.” (ibid., 217)  This was illustrated by the release schedule of summer 1999, which 
was packed by indie films
40
 – the returns from some of which, she argues, both “obscured the 
ever more hit-driven nature of the specialty business…a growing number also made only 
negligible amounts at the box office.” (ibid., 220)  This made vulnerable films which did not 
fit a specific formal-aesthetic mould, and “contributed to a further solidification of the 
narrative and aesthetic traits of indie films that received support from specialty divisions.” 
(ibid., 150)
41
  
 
In summary, for Perren, Miramax were for a period genuinely innovative in marketing and 
acquiring films which appealed to under-served niches, some of which crossed over to the 
mainstream.  However, they were simply the most initially visible instance of the process by 
which “specialty companies and low-budget films became an important way for 
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conglomerates to reduce labour, production, and distribution costs and expand their 
libraries…[and] for new talent to break in.” (ibid., 230), and fundamentally, the success of 
quasi-independent film after their advent resulted from “the intersection of their distributors’ 
substantial financial resources and influence with the increased emphasis placed on targeting 
a diverse array of demographic groups.” (ibid., 76)  Similarly, Miramax’s decline was simply 
a high profile – and more personality-driven – example of the wider decline that would 
follow.
42
             
 
Having reviewed a selection of major works on the field, most of which foreground the 
importance of industrial processes to the development and prominence of Smart film, in 
Chapter Three I turn my attention to a more detailed industrial history.  
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Chapter Three: the industrial history of Smart cinema 
 
Where in my previous chapter I reviewed literature on the field, much of which takes a 
sociocultural perspective as well as an industrial one, here I unpack the industrial-historical 
contexts which gave rise to Smart cinema, considering its rise from the wider industrial 
circumstances of the conglomerated entertainment industries.  My proposal that Smart 
cinema is a ‘trans-generic mode’ implies directly that it is an industrial construct, and 
therefore cannot be discussed without looking more closely at industrial factors.  In fact, as 
Neale points out when discussing the work of  Tino Balio (Neale, 2002, 4), the terms 
‘production trend’ and ‘genre’ are often used interchangeably, in a way that highlights the 
inextricable links between the economic contexts and contradictions of production, the 
economic contexts of consumption, and the form that a text itself takes.  This is by way of 
suggesting firstly that there is no such thing as ‘innocent’ production or consumption, but 
secondly, that when we take a historical view of the emergence of genre, the industrial 
circumstances of production reveal themselves textually.  This is because, in economic terms, 
films are  
aesthetic commodities, commodities demanding at least a degree of novelty and 
difference from one another…it is necessary to explore the analogies and the 
distinctions between cycles and genres in the cinema, on the one hand, and models 
and lines in the field of non-artistic commodity production, on the other. (Neale, 
1990, 64) 
 
When looking at the emergence of Smart cinema from the industrial environment, a vital 
factor to keep in mind is that “an overview of Hollywood’s post-war industrial history must 
emphasize convergence, consolidation and synergy among the audio-visual entertainment 
industries.” (Maltby, 1998, 28) This is particularly clear when we explore the general market 
(and socio-cultural) changes during the period of the 1980s-1990s, which altered the 
economic horizons of the industry.  The factors of greatest importance included demographic 
trends towards a larger youth market, the growth of cinema chains in suburban America, the 
introduction of a coordinated film rating system, the increase in the number of European and 
Far East cinema screens, home viewing, the deregulation of global television markets, and the 
effective end of state broadcasting in many countries.    
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As a consequence of these changes, the eventual outcome was that “by 1990, there were more 
available screens [in the US] than there had been since the height of audience attendance in 
the late 1940s......Between 1984 and 1989, the total world market for filmed entertainment 
doubled in size.” (ibid., 34-35).  In fact, between the mid-1980s and 2005, according to the 
MPA, industry revenues had increased, adjusted for inflation, nearly fourfold (Schatz, 2008, 
36).  Certainly by the end of the twentieth century the structure and scope of the American 
film industry had been transformed, via two decades of  
[c]onglomeration, diversification, transnationalization of ownership, multiplication of 
distribution outlets, escalating production budgets, event movie production, 
exploitation of ancillary markets, the freelance market for creative and craft labour, 
and the global dispersal of production. (McDonald and Wasko, 2008, 4)   
Maltby’s perhaps premature contention that “[g]lobalization and the new markets have made 
the majors increasingly stable, whoever actually owns them” (Maltby, 1998, 37) remains 
subject to dispute at some levels.  For a period during the 1980s, certainly, studio power 
seemed diminished by a series of mergers and acquisitions which drew focus away from 
production, and towards stock market perceptions – the purchase of Universal by Seagram 
just one example, where by 1999 film profits lagged behind those of the spirits and wine, and 
music divisions (McDonald and Wasko, 2008, 1).  However, industry buyouts and mergers 
since then have been largely calculated to facilitate the drive towards media convergence and 
the ‘synergy’ which has become so vital to cross-media operations.43  With this, I believe, has 
come a seemingly paradoxical contemporary refocusing on ‘the text’ of cinema – or 
‘content’, as it tends to be termed, once the text crosses from cinematic exhibition to the 
multiplicity of other delivery systems – as well as its profits and technologies.  
Whether said text is a billion-dollar grossing action blockbuster, the mid-budget product of a 
quasi-independent studio subsidiary, or an independent low-budget production absorbed into 
the mainstream exhibition system, the continual demand for ‘content’ produced by horizontal 
integration across delivery systems has created unprecedented demand; a hierarchy of 
dominance as regards the kind of texts which will feed such demand has not yet been 
established.  Smart cinema’s brief boom came too early to benefit from the proliferation of 
screen systems and delivery channels we see today: and yet perhaps its moderately successful 
reliance on the clustering of ‘small but significant’ audiences can be seen as a harbinger of 
the kind of highly-targeted segmentation of audiences we currently see, where superhero 
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blockbusters share multiplex space with genteel romantic comedies aimed at pensioners, and 
experimental works by celebrated auteurs. It is, it seems, perennially claimed that cinema is 
dead, and yet it persists, albeit continually shifting circumstances. Smart cinema therefore 
usefully illustrates the circumstances under which the entertainment industries have operated 
– and changed – over the past two decades.  
The focus of much work on Hollywood as an industry remains on the importance of the big-
budget high-yielding blockbuster.  In some ways this can be seen as the polar opposite of the 
Smart film, but in others, as an almost analogous industrial ‘type’, somewhere outside of the 
stricter traditional concerns of genre.  While many (even, most) blockbuster texts fit into a 
singular industrial category, their formal elements tend to fit into a specific set of different 
generic categorisations; sci-fi, action, thriller, and so on.  The blockbuster does have 
commonalities with Smart, if we look at it industrially: characterised by textual hybridity, 
defined as clearly in its consumption as in its production, and most clearly delineated by the 
manner in which its industrial elements are made a manifest part of its discursive operations, 
from production context and press treatment to marketing campaigns.  This is one of the main 
reasons I have chosen to concentrate my attention on this specific topic: I believe the 
industrial significance (that is, financial and structural importance, as well as textual) of that 
majority of films which do not fall into the blockbuster category, tends to be obscured by the 
proportional financial impact of those which do.   
 
Schatz argues that during the 1990s a combination of deregulation, globalization and digital 
technology appeared to hand the balance of power back to the studios, but that in reality  
the new rulers of Hollywood – and of the global entertainment industry at large – 
were not the studios but their parent companies……the movie studios, along with the 
conglomerates’ ‘indie film’ divisions, television and cable networks, and myriad other 
holdings, have become players in a game they no longer control. (Schatz, 2008, 14).   
Whether or not that is the case, the globalised media marketplace of the new millennium has 
brought a degree of unprecedented profitability to the conglomerated media industries in a 
wider sense – that is, across the accumulated strands of film, television, internet, cable, 
gaming, and general home entertainment.  Certainly, international recession has had mixed 
consequences for the communications industries where others have experienced pure disaster; 
while cinema attendances may have decreased, profits are not always directly affected.
44
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In this sense, and bearing in mind the fact that US take accounts for only a portion of 
profitability, this fits with Schatz’s position that  
the worldwide movie marketplace was now so lucrative that it was difficult for 
Hollywood-produced blockbusters not to make money…… even mediocre 
films…routinely returned $500 million within a year of their initial release, with cable 
and DVD now assuring the studio-distributor a much longer ‘shelf-life’ than was the 
case even a decade earlier. (Schatz, 2008, 35-36)    
Schatz also makes the point that while studios during 2004-2005 publicly lamented slumping 
box office figures and slowed DVD sales, synergy across the home entertainment industry as 
a whole made their disquiet seem rather feigned, producing as it did unprecedented revenues 
and profits. (ibid.)  At the same time, the nature of the film industry is such that revenue is 
unpredictable, and anxiety dominates present predictions of future profits.
45
  In any case, the 
opening-up of the marketplace has happened in a way that might be said to have broadened 
the theoretical range of opportunities open to those studio executives tasked with green-
lighting movie projects.  This is in line with the manner in which Drake (2008) and Miller et 
al (2005) stress the importance of conceiving of ‘Hollywood’ as an industry where true power 
and profit lie with those who control the rights to a text and its distribution, rather than its 
production, who “maintain their economic power primarily through their access to and 
control over global distribution networks, where these rights are exploited”. (Drake, 2008, 
81) 
 
Of course, despite Hollywood’s post-Jaws insistence on focusing on broad family fare, there 
is nothing particularly new about the idea of using specific marketing and distribution 
strategies not just in order to maximise commercial potential, but as a way of differentiating 
between ‘classes’ of film.  For example, Tino Balio’s history of Hollywood as a business 
outlines the means by which 1930s Hollywood, while popularly characterising itself in terms 
of ‘simple’ entertainment appeal to the largest possible audience, was engaged in specific 
market segmentation and differentiation from very early on, “at every level of production, 
from the humblest B Western to the  most colossal epic. As a general rule, differentiation 
mattered most at the highest level, where a studio stood the chance of gaining (or losing) the 
most money.” (Balio, 1995, 11) While one important means of doing so was the creation of 
the ‘prestige picture’, which I discuss in Chapter Five, it is important too to remember that 
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the studio system has always needed to source additional resources outside of the core 
productive capacities of the studios themselves.
46
   
 
While textually this work would have been quite different to the Smart film, as Hall points 
out (Hall, 2002, 13-15), historically, qualitative distinctions were made at the point of 
production, between films to be ‘roadshown’ and those to be screened via ‘saturation 
booking’.  These distinctions were drawn from notions of ‘quality’, in a way that calls to 
mind contemporary distinctions between the blockbuster, and the smaller quasi-independents.  
Films screened through roadshow distribution from the 1950s to the 1970s were more self-
consciously offered through a commercial framework of limitation and exclusivity; via 
cinemas in major metropolitan areas, often with raised ticket prices, perhaps even in a 
‘specialty’ format like Cinerama or 70mm.   They were frequently presented as events with a 
closer kinship to theatre than cinema, with seat reservations, intermissions, and on occasion 
souvenir programmes – the emphasis being on differentiating specific films, perhaps only a 
select few each year, from the general crowd.   
 
In contrast to a mass booking strategy, dependent on fast release and response, with screens 
dropped after opening weekend to make room for the next potential blockbuster if initial 
response is unfavourable, roadshown pictures were distributed in a slow, controlled manner, 
building on word of mouth, in an attempt to define niche markets within the post-WWII 
Hollywood slump.   The success of Smart cinema would appear, to me, to be broadly 
analogous to this, and illustrative of the cyclical nature of industrial practices: 
[roadshow distribution] was…aimed at attracting back to the cinema that section of 
the population which  no longer attended on a regular basis, but which might be 
persuaded to go downtown for the kind of special occasion or ‘event’ which a 
roadshow offered……. roadshow blockbusters offered the kind of prime product 
needed to entice exhibitors to offer competitive bids against one another, to guarantee 
extended playing time and to pay advances on box-office receipts…the studios could 
remain in control of exhibition even after the formal divestiture of their theatres.” 
(Hall, 2002, 13)  
 
Crucially in relation to its relevance to Smart cinema, as Hall points out, the focus of many of 
the major creative and commercial successes of the late 1960s (he cites such films as Bullitt, 
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The Graduate, Bonnie and Clyde, Midnight Cowboy, Easy Rider, and M*A*S*H) was not the 
mass family audience, which was migrating towards the suburban mall-multiplex wherein the 
viewing experience was explicitly ‘detheatricalised’, but “the up-market adult and college-
educated ‘youth’ audiences, which the studios tried increasingly to cultivate in the early 
1970s.” (ibid., 17; see also Holmlund and Wyatt 2005, Shary, 2002, Hanson, 2002, and 
Drake, 2008
47
)  Schatz (2008) describes the key factors in the emergence of what he defines 
as a “director-driven, youth-oriented, art-cinema movement that defied the conventions of 
classical Hollywood narrative, subverted its genre traditions, and openly challenged that 
studio-controlled mode of production” (ibid., 18) as the increased availability of foreign 
films, the end of the Production Code, and the maturing of the post-war ‘baby boom’ 
generation as filmmakers as well as audiences.  David A. Cook expands on this idea of 
maturity, arguing that as well as being “younger, better-educated and more affluent” (Cook, 
1999, 12) than Hollywood audiences had traditionally been, they had “grown up with the 
medium of television, learning to process the audiovisual language of film on a daily basis.” 
(ibid.)  
    
Schatz notes in line with Hall, that “the studios supported the movement, mainly due to the 
reliability of the youth market, with Paramount, Columbia, and Warner Bros. taking the most 
aggressive tack.”48 (Schatz, 2008, 18) – an instance of corporate culture and (perceived) 
counterculture interacting in a way that prefigures some of the equivalent debates around 
Smart cinema; independence, the co-opting of cultural practice, and ‘authenticity’.  However, 
where Hall takes the view that while ‘prestige’ blockbusters still existed during the 1990s and 
2000s,
49
 “the synthesis between popularity and prestige which the roadshows attempted to 
achieve has disappeared.” (Hall, 2002, 23), others see different outcomes.  Tino Balio (1998, 
2002) argues that while on the one hand the wave of mergers and conglomerations which 
swept Hollywood during the 1990s resulted in a de-prioritising of cinema within overall 
corporate structures,
50
 on the other an increased international demand for product in an era of 
spiralling costs drove an upswing in lower-budget production, thus effectively bifurcating the 
industry.
51
   
 
This, again, could be argued to parallel the post-New Hollywood world; after all, Cook points 
out that the ‘takeover’ of Hollywood by the young auteurs of the late 1960s and 1970s was as 
much to do with their relative cheapness to hire, in a period of massive uncertainty for the 
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studios, as anything else, that their rise coincided with a period during which fewer feature 
films were produced than ever before, and more problematically, long-term, that  
an industry that had been driven almost since its inception by the orderly pursuit of 
profit was gobbled up by new owners who saw it as a locus for high-stakes 
speculation and corporate tax-sheltering…the extent to which film production became 
an investment-specific strategy during the 1970s was unprecedented, and it warped 
the shape of the industry for years to come, driving production and marketing costs to 
hitherto unimagined levels. (Cook, 1999, 34)
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Jennifer Holt links this bifurcation with Hollywood’s return to vertical integration, itself “a 
direct result of the manner in which the [Paramount] consent decrees were (re)interpreted by 
the Reagan administration during the 1980s.” (Holt, 2001, 25)  This is broadly in line with 
how other writers see the manner in which the interlinking of state and economy affected the 
media industries during the period (McChesney, 1999; Meehan, 2008; Christopherson, 2008, 
and Jin, 2012).  As per Jin’s account of horizontal integration in a time of neoliberal 
globalisation,  
[i]n the 1980s, the Paramount ruling, in effect since 1950, was revisited. In a complete 
reversal of its original holding, the New York District Court allowed Loew’s, which 
had restricted itself exclusively to exhibition, to produce and distribute films as long 
as it did not screen any of its own films (United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1980–2 
Trade Case (CCH), 63). The court noted that much had changed in the film industry 
since the last time it visited the Paramount decision: television, home video, and the 
growth of national theatre chains (Gil, 2008).” (Jin, 2012, 414)   
Schatz in particular notes “the importance of the Reagan administration’s free-market 
economic policies and media deregulation campaign, which led to the steady relaxation of 
both ownership restrictions and antitrust activities by the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) and the Justice Department.” (Schatz, 2008, 22)53  
 
For Holt, while conscious of arguments that other avenues of distribution (in particular home 
video and television) were becoming more important than theatrical exhibition “first-run 
domestic exhibition still determines how a film performs in all other arenas: international 
exhibition, television, video, marketing tie-ins, etc.” (Holt, 2001, 28)  She argues that the 
deregulation of the industry (for her, a specifically politicized intervention motivated by 
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Reagan’s Chicago School-influenced economic policy) resulted in a process of vertical 
reintegration (ibid., 26-28).  This process led to a radical recalibration of Hollywood’s 
structures, shifting the balance of power between producer, distributor and exhibitor, no 
matter that all might be constituted in the same media group.   
 
Here, as studios moved back into exhibition from 1986 onwards, and the number of screens 
at any given site of exhibition increased, the ‘saturation’ release schedule became 
commonplace (Acland, 2008), which placed a greater emphasis on a film’s opening 
weekend.
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  The goal became to maximise revenue for the three-day opening weekend, as 
box office figures started to function not only as indicators of predicted success, but also as 
discursive markers in themselves, as ‘signs’ of quality and popularity, both within the 
industry and to the public: as a gauge of “the value of the film in overseas markets and a 
partial determinant of its sell-through price in distribution windows such as television and 
home video…its ‘marquee value’……operating as a signal of value in other media markets.” 
(Drake, 2008, 64).  With a smaller potential time period available for any film to be exhibited 
in, the ‘sleeper’ hit, building on word of mouth over a longer period, became more and more 
difficult to achieve: instead, aggressive – and costly – marketing became a vital part of the 
budget, designed to attract audiences faster, and frequently by turning the opening weekend 
into an ‘event’.   
 
In turn, special-event-based marketing tended to be much easier to coordinate if the film’s 
themes, narrative and iconography lent themselves to commodification via merchandising 
based on simple and convenient ‘hooks’, hence the increasing focus on the ‘high concept’ 
spectacle film, as per Justin Wyatt (Wyatt, 1998).  As high marketing costs became 
increasingly embedded in the practice of all filmmaking, the effect was to place significant 
pressure on work at either end of the financial spectrum.  As Balio puts it,  
no studio had the financial means to produce blockbusters exclusively. Annual rosters 
regularly contained a few mid-range entries and an occasional niche picture budgeted at 
around $10 million or less…only a handful of limited releases crossed over to the 
mainstream market to gross more than $5 million. For this reason, niche pictures were 
relegated pretty much to studios’ specialised production arms. (Balio, 2002, 165)  
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However, using the word ‘relegated’ fails to take cognizance of the fact that essentially 
studios were now obliged to focus their attentions in different directions.  Balio’s most 
pertinent phrase is perhaps his most throwaway one: he cites the studios as, over this decade, 
evaluating their proposed projects “on their potential to reach a specific segment of the 
audience.” (ibid.,) but his conclusion is that the globalisation of Hollywood   
kept production tightly focused on the two main segments of the theatrical market, the 
‘teen and pre-teen bubble’ and the ‘boomers with kids’. Satisfying these segments meant 
that studios devoted their resources to high-concept projects that could easily be pitched 
in national marketing campaigns and released simultaneously in thousands of mall 
theatres.  This is just another way of saying that nothing much changed in Hollywood in 
the 1990s. (ibid., 181) 
 
This is, perhaps, an unnecessarily pessimistic characterisation of Hollywood in the 1990s as a 
whole, as it assumes a somewhat monolithic structure, whereas I argue that ‘Hollywood’ 
functions at a multiplicity of different levels, which together form a matrix of industrial 
circumstances producing work of a widely varying nature.  The American film industry as 
symbolised by the term ‘Hollywood’ is simultaneously (and serially, in that any one of these 
facets can predominate in any given context) a loose industrial organisation, a social peer 
grouping, a creative network, a technological development lab, a skills base, a library of 
texts, a political lobby group, and a public discourse.  It is, above all, a post-Fordist industry 
which seeks to mobilise capital and resources in order to maximise profit and minimise cost; 
while it has done so most visibly and spectacularly in the form of the blockbuster, we should 
not minimise the extent to which the American film industry, by its nature as a capitalist 
enterprise, also continually seeks to develop texts (Smart film among them) which can 
unearth, mobilise, and monopolise new markets.        
 
Balio points out, correctly, that the broad focus of the industry has been, since the 1980s, on 
the teen and pre-teen audience (defined, sweepingly, by Balio as the 10-24 year old age 
group, focusing almost exclusively on the teenage male), followed in a vague and ill-defined 
way by “‘Boomers with kids’, consisting of children, parents and grandparents in the eight-
to-eighty demographic” (Balio, 2002, 165), who would see family films exclusively, and 
‘Geezers’, or those over 50 who attend the cinema irregularly.  It is, clearly, a shallow 
classification that tells us almost nothing about who watches films or why, but it is important 
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to remember that it is based on based on Variety’s ‘Top All-Time Grossers’: films generating 
$80 million or more at the US box office, of which around 150 are from the 1990s and 
subject to analysis. Therefore this look at box office gross illustrates how the financial 
contribution of independent and quasi-independent cinema can get lost in the staggering 
financial figures which define the cinema market.   
 
In a similar manner to Maltby, Balio (1998) cites various factors influencing Hollywood’s 
changing industrial circumstances: economic growth in Western Europe, the Pacific Rim and, 
Latin America, the end of the Cold War, the commercialization of state broadcasting, and the 
development of new distribution technologies and processes.  This gave rise to a market 
wherein “companies upgraded international operations to a privileged position by expanding 
‘horizontally’ to tap emerging markets worldwide, by expanding ‘vertically’ to form alliances 
with independent producers to enlarge their rosters, and by ‘partnering’ with foreign investors 
to secure new sources of financing”. (Balio, 1998, 58)  In this interpretation, the US market 
divided into ‘mini-majors’ (Orion, Cannon, Dino De Laurentiis) and independents (Atlantic, 
Carolco, New World, Hemdale, Troma, Island Alive, Vestron, New Line) filling the demand 
inspired by home video, rather than the major studios, which instead focused on ultra-high 
budget works which  
reduced the risk of financing because (1) they constituted media events; (2) they lent 
themselves to promotional tie-ins; (3) they became massive engines for profits in 
ancillary divisions like theme parks and video; (4) they stood to make a profit in foreign 
markets; and (5) they were easy to distribute. (ibid., 59)  
Particularly crucial was the foreign market.  Linked with a widespread programme of cinema 
upgrading and development by the majors and their European partners, and as a consequence 
of the first wave of mergers in the 1980s facilitated by the Reagan administration’s laissez-
faire perspective on the Paramount decrees, was a massive increase in advertising spend 
outside of the US.
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  And, indeed, not just advertising: another factor was the intensified 
search for international funding, whether through direct investors or co-production deals 
availing of international subsidies. The importance of the ‘ancillary market’ became greatly 
amplified; as Neale and Smith emphasise when discussing the work of Balio, James Schamus 
and Douglas Gomery, “the mass of profits on films are now derived from nominally 
‘ancillary’ markets. While this is true of all films, in the case of the independent art house 
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film, the key ‘back end’ is the foreign market (rather than domestic video etc.).” (Neale and 
Smith, 1998, xviii).    
These markets were inextricably intertwined.  Foreign  markets for quasi-independent film 
relied on the buzz and publicity of a film’s initial American opening in order to create a 
groundswell of enthusiasm, which could then be followed with a platform release (as opposed 
to the saturation release employed in the case of blockbusters, designed to maximise revenues 
for the opening weekend, as discussed previously).
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  Conversely, international festivals were 
and are also used as launching pads or test markets, with critical acclaim and/or popular 
success there parlayed into publicity in the US.  This intertwinement has been perhaps more 
obvious in its latterday disappearance than at the height of the indie boom; as Edward Jay 
Epstein has pointed out, following the closure or studio reintegration of many of the studio-
backed specialty distributors (such as New Line Cinema, Picturehouse, Warner Independent 
Films, Paramount Vantage, Fox Atomic) the value of the US market declined sharply. As 
such “indie producers had to base their ability to borrow money almost entirely on the foreign 
market. Yet, foreign distributors then greatly reduced the amount they were willing to 
commit because they could no longer be confident that indie films would have the 
publicity and hype that goes with an American release.” (Epstein, 2012) 
This emphasis, then, is not necessarily because independent or art-house films will in all 
cases perform better internationally than they do in the US market (although this is 
sometimes the case), but rather because the balance of how and where profit and loss are 
accumulated has radically changed over the last twenty years, with an increasing focus on 
what were once regarded as ancillary markets.  Studios can more easily afford to allocate 
large sums to international promotion and advertising in cases of films with existing brand 
recognition (e.g. superhero franchises), or where generic considerations predicate a certain 
lack of narrative complexity and linguistic difficulty (with subtitling therefore less of a 
barrier to audience comprehension), while spreading their financial risk over a wider 
exhibition field. As Drake puts it: 
The theatrical release has been displaced by other windows as Hollywood’s core 
sector, although…Cinema exhibition retains an important price-setting and marketing 
role for these windows and is the most significant determinant of their success.  
Extensive media coverage about Hollywood means that the opening box-office 
performance is also often seen as a judgement about popularity and 
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quality……theatrical box office may in part be exactly that: theatre, the ‘show’ of 
Hollywood’s business, a marketing platform for a product that reaps its major profits 
in other windows such as DVD, pay television, and network syndication over long 
periods of time. (Drake, 2008, 81)    
 
The ultimate point to be taken from this industrial account is, of course, that as might be 
expected from its historical dominance within the entertainment field, “Hollywood responded 
to globalization by competing for talent, projects and product for their distribution pipelines.  
The competition typically took the form of partnerships with the new breed of independent 
producers.” (ibid., 64). The importance of these production and distribution companies – in 
particular Miramax, and New Line’s Fine Line Features57 – and the second wave of mergers 
involving them, cannot be underestimated.  It is their approach, as facilitated by the 1980s 
and 1990s bifurcation of the Hollywood industry – temporary and statistically insignificant as 
it may have been, in terms of box office grosses – that provided the commercial context in 
which Smart cinema could develop.   
 
Without the polarization of the marketplace that resulted from the vertical reintegration of the 
industry, and its influence on rising costs throughout the 1980s, it is possible that no specific 
conditions would have existed which would have necessitated such a move into the 
‘alternative’ end of the market.  However, following the change in political climate leading to 
an assumption that “[v]ertical integration was...benign: it was perceived as a strategy 
promoting economic efficiency as opposed to anti-competitive behaviour or restraint of 
trade.” (Holt, 2001, 26), I believe two sets of conditions resulted.  On one side, the increasing 
financial clout, proportionally speaking, of the major studios, squeezed independent 
production companies to the point of inability to compete.
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  On the other, spiralling costs, 
and the general volatility of the market during this period,
59
 meant that increasing pressure 
was gradually being exerted within the studio system to ‘go small’ as well as to focus on 
blockbusters.
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  By this I mean, to leverage studio power at a more potentially economically 
advantageous level, by producing lower-budget films of the type which could once have been 
characterized as ‘indie’, but by the early 1990s, were vulnerable in an environment where 
“the necessary conditions for establishing a successful first run at the box office…are subject 
to the limitations imposed by vertical integration” (ibid., 28).  
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Justin Wyatt’s exploration of the ‘major independent’ identifies in more detail how industrial 
structures changed for independent and marginal distributors during the period.  Increased 
demand related to video and cable expansion initially seemed to promise great potential for 
independent producers
61
 but the concomitant rapid growth of costs during the period of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in fact led to the ruin of many independents; for some, where 
initial success had been swift, overextension was a serious problem.
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  Wyatt also cites a 
tendency for audiences viewing at home to be somewhat less adventurous than initially 
anticipated, frequently choosing to rent or buy films which had previously been successful at 
the box office.  This is particularly interesting in light of the complexities of achieving 
successful market positioning when it comes to Smart films. We can see, for example, how a 
film such as Fight Club proved extremely successful in ancillary markets: both in foreign 
markets and particularly via DVD sales following an initial lacklustre performance at the 
cinema.  However, Wyatt may have underestimated the extent to which audiences will seek 
out new cinematic experiences under certain conditions; timing, in particular, seems to have 
been of importance in the industrial positioning of the Smart film.  Tarantino’s debut 
Reservoir Dogs is key here, in that while it received a very limited cinematic release and 
grossed just $2.83 million, DVD sales eventually reached $18.8 million – partially in 
response to the notoriety which Pulp Fiction would later achieve.
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For Wyatt, New Line and Miramax became ‘major independents “by consistently developing 
movies with the potential to cross over beyond the art house market” (Wyatt, 1998, 76).64 
This highlights, to me, the sense in which Smart can usefully be viewed through the prism of 
genre as an industrially-motivated construction.  New Line, Miramax, and later others 
(whether under the direct ownership of major studios or not) in essence developed Smart 
cinema as a liminal model: part-popular, part-marginal, utilising a wide range of generic 
strategies, textually drawing figurative relationships between the classical Hollywood 
narrative, art cinema, and cult film, and – formally as well as thematically – mobilising wider 
societal anxieties about creative work, ‘authentic’ expression, and mass culture.  They did so 
by utilising its narrative and stylistic tendencies, including its tendencies towards hyper-
extended hybridity, as tools of market differentiation, and by engaging enthusiastically with a 
media discourse that found it expedient to simultaneously (or alternately) validate Smart film 
as evidence of a creative ‘movement’, and problematize it as an expression of quasi-
millennial angst.  Textually hybrid, but industrially consistent in its liminal positioning, it 
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constitutes a trans-generic form, or a ‘mode’ in the sense in which ‘art cinema’ or 
‘blockbuster’ are modes, their referential structures grounded more in industrial bearings and 
consumption outcomes than texts; defined in ‘otherness’ rather than as extant unit.  
 
Another factor in the origins of the Smart film – or more particularly, in its filtration through 
to the mainstream – is the way in which discourses of auteurism became prominent during 
the 1990s.  This is another interesting point of similarity between the way in which Smart 
cinema arose and how the New Hollywood of the 1960s and 1970s established itself.  
Corrigan relates the increasing influence of the French position to the end of the studio 
system – a fraught transitional period, during which independent production companies 
attempted to exploit markets ignored by the majors
65
 – and the need to find ways of 
‘marking’ films for distinction, the rise of youth movements, the entry of cinema into the 
world of academia, and the rise of international art cinema (Corrigan, 1999, 40).  Cook posits 
that the linking of auteurs with certain genres or styles – for example George Lucas with sci-
fi, Spielberg with the spectacular blockbuster – and the rise in popularity of the saturation 
booking pattern, meant not only that promotion came to dominate the distribution and 
exhibition parts of the production cycle, but also that “[a]uteurism…became a marketing tool 
that coincided nicely with the rise of college-level film education among the industry’s most 
heavily-courted audience segment.” (Cook, 1999, 35)   
 
While he is cynical about the manner in which this played itself out thereafter,
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 Cook’s 
argument that these auteur directors exercised a disproportionate (although not necessarily 
unwelcome) level of influence, formally and informally, is relevant.  The 1990s iteration of 
New Hollywood-style auterism, in the form of Smart, could perhaps be regarded as a reaction 
against the high-concept franchise brutalism of the 1980s – always bearing in mind that the 
characterisation of the 1980s as such is as much a discursive construct as the supposedly free-
wheeling and experimental decade that followed.  Certainly, the increasing centrality of 
quasi-alternative festivals played a key role in bringing marginal filmmakers to the attention 
of mainstream discourse; if Robert Redford’s goal in setting up Sundance was “to ‘eliminate 
the tension that can exist between the independents and the studios’” (Grainge, Jancovich and 
Monteith, 2007, 505) then its corollary was the associated diffusion of that tension in the 
media.  As Kleinhans shows, this move into mainstream consciousness was swift:  
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By the mid-1990s the low-budget independent theatrical feature film gained enough 
consistent attention in the marketplace and public eye that such films were regularly 
reviewed across the media spectrum…the Sundance Film Festival became so well 
known that Vanity Fair’s April 1996 cover could headline ‘Special Issue: Hollywood 
’96, From Sundance to Sunset.’ (Kleinhans, 1999, 307) 
The recruitment of outsiders has always been a way for Hollywood to periodically refresh its 
creative labour pool.  However, a modal shift occurred in the 1990s which connected that 
labour movement with a nascent celebrity culture, and with a cultural discourse which 
conflated, in a somewhat naïve way, ideas of ‘authenticity’, ‘counterculture’ and 
‘consumerism’ (see Heath and Potter 2004; Newman, 2009; Potter, 2010), perhaps in an 
attempt to express disquiet with the trajectory of late modernism and capitalism.  Under these 
circumstances, the studios were able to utilise these tensions to ‘unite’ indie and mainstream 
film.  Where potential market niches – often described at the time under the catch-all heading 
of ‘Generation X’ – had been tentatively identified at the beginning of the 1990s with films 
like Reality Bites (Richard Linklater, 1991), Singles (Cameron Crowe, 1992), and Slacker 
(Ben Stiller, 1994), the increasing tendency to include film directors in the circuit of 
‘celebrity’ which had previously been reserved for onscreen stars created enhanced 
opportunities for the marketing and promotion of independent-style cinema.
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As the big names of the 1980s began to be seen as out of touch with contemporary trends, or 
simply began looking to expand their range by moving into more ‘serious’ work, studios 
seeking artistic credibility could exploit the ‘hip’ credentials of filmmakers who had 
originally come from the independent sector (see Austin, 2007, 534-536) in search of profits 
as large as those which had – unexpectedly – come Miramax’s way through their 
championing of Quentin Tarantino.  Not only that, but they could embrace the auteuristic 
marketing of films as a low-cost – vital for those studios on the (relative) fringes of the 
industry, such as Miramax – promotional and positioning strategy, insofar as it aimed “to 
guarantee a relationship between audience and movie whereby an intentional and authorial 
agency governs, as a kind of brand-name vision whose aesthetic meanings and values have 
already been determined.” (Corrigan, 1999, 40)  It could be utilised similarly by audiences, as 
a mark of self-positioning and distinction, a means by which to access the (generally defined 
in opposition to the mainstream, that is, as ‘alternative’) signifiers of cool of the period.    
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‘Coolness’, or countercultural prestige, has been equally important to more conventional or 
elitist prestige in the establishment of the kind of evaluative hierarchies by which texts are 
publicly judged and privately consumed, and fan communities developed (see my discussion 
of prestige in Chapter Five). However, one important element during this particular period 
was the new centrality of filmmaking – rather than film consumption – within the discourse, 
as an aspirational activity.  Indeed, Kleinhans argues that the myth of auteurism, and its 
hyping by the media, at this time is intimately linked to two things. The first is the growing 
perception during the period that, with increased demand for content via changes in film 
exhibition and the expansion of communication networks, new opportunities were opening up 
for so-called Generation Xers to become creative practitioners without relying on the 
traditional models of access – film school, ‘inheriting’ a related trade or business links, or 
apprenticeship via some related industry e.g. TV or music.  The corollary to this was that, of 
course, one could notionally start out in indie film and then move to the ‘glamour’ of the 
mainstream; while Kleinhans does not explore this further, it is interesting to note that the 
cult of auteurism formed a highly functional means of obscuring the extent to which 
‘Hollywood’ had become corporatized and hierarchically structured, and was arguably a great 
deal less ‘permeable’ than in the 1960s or 1970s. 
 
The second is the extent to which filmmaking as a culturally-sanctioned creative activity had 
come to dominate traditional means of expression:  
Just as an earlier generation of American intellectuals interested in narrative expression 
aspired to become novelists, by the end of the twentieth century the goal of becoming a 
screenwriter or screenwriter/director (or sometimes independent producer) was an 
important part of many young peoples’ imaginations. (Kleinhans, 1999, 310) 
This idea of a culturally-sanctioned, artistically-legitimated cinema means that the ‘coolness 
exchange’ worked in a variety of more and less complex ways.  One could argue, for 
example, that just as Quentin Tarantino’s official ‘sanctioning’ by France as the home of the 
auteur theory, through the conferral of the Palme D’Or, provided him with a certain amount 
of artistic credibility, equally it allowed the French to refute some of the traditional 
accusations of elitism, hidebound conservatism, and a simple failure to ‘get’ American 
culture, which have been levelled at them.    
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An interesting consequence of the position the Smart period carved out, albeit temporarily, is 
the industrial space within the broader notional ‘Hollywood’ that it seems to have opened 
during the period for two groups.  The first (outside of the direct scope of this study) being 
filmmakers working outside of America in a more distinctly ‘European’ or even art-house 
style (Tom Tykwer, Michael Haneke, Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu).  The second is the 
parallel resuscitation, or movement into the mainstream, of the work of filmmakers who had 
been longtime practitioners of ‘left of centre’ cinema within a Hollywood context.68  
 
Robert Altman’s late career revival with The Player (1992) and Short Cuts (1993) also 
constitutes a clue to the generic origins of the Smart film; as Robin Wood notes about him as 
early as 1975 “[Altman’s] best films are hybrids…products of a fusion of ‘European’ 
aspirations with American genres” (Wood, 1975, 29).  While this revival would be short-
lived, comparisons could be made between Altman’s work and the work of several other 
Smart filmmakers, particularly that of Paul Thomas Anderson.  My conclusion is that the 
critical and, to a certain extent, commercial acceptance of the Smart filmmakers who came to 
prominence during the 1990s and just after (themselves influenced by the progenitors, such as 
Altman and Cronenberg), itself paved the way for a reconsideration of their influences, and 
an associated elevation of their status to that of ‘grandees’ or respected veterans.  While this 
elevation tends to happen as part of any generational transition, I argue that here, prestige 
became the mechanism by which the industrial territory proportionally shifted, allowing 
former outsiders to be recuperated into the mainstream.  
 
This general discussion of the industrial positioning of specific directors’ careers also calls to 
mind Richard Caves’ work on the creative industries (Caves, 2000), particularly the 
sociological notion of the industrial ‘gatekeeper’ within each creative realm (visual and 
plastic arts, the music industry and publishing as well as cinema). That is,  
its set of intermediaries who select artists. Dedication to advancing the arts is often 
present, but profit is usually sought, and the costs of humdrum inputs must be 
covered….many are excluded at the gate, although they would gladly sign the 
contract that the gatekeeper offers to those who pass. (Caves, 2000, 21) 
The question of who may pass, and why, is a large one – Chuck Kleinhans, as I have 
mentioned above, makes some highly relevant points regarding the perception of gates being 
more – or less – tightly closed.  However, one key to the assimilation of Smart filmmakers 
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into the wider Hollywood industry is the perception on the part of Hollywood ‘gatekeepers’ – 
the set of script readers, producers, financial experts and other studio executives who decide 
on the fate of proposed projects – that their work represents a reasonable return on invested 
risk.   
 
While one way of minimising risk is to rely on proven star talent and formulaic output, 
resulting in a certain textual homogeneity (which itself may prove risky), another is to 
diversify, “to form a portfolio of film projects divergent in terms of genre, target market, 
budget size (hence different risks and returns involved) and the phase of production” 
(Kawashima, 2011, 481).
69
  The issue here, as Kawashima acknowledges, is that only the 
majors have the kind of financial and structural clout to successfully do so:  
[t]o sustain such a portfolio requires a vast amount of capital beyond the reach of the 
independents, while the portfolio distributes risks between different film products, 
allows successful ones to subsidise failures and levels cash flow over 
time…Economies of scope seen here, thus, probably help amplify the effects of the 
economies of scale. (ibid.)
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An additional element to be taken into account is that, given that our notional ‘Hollywood’ is, 
as well as an industrial accumulation, also a peer network and professional community or “art 
centre” (ibid. 30), those filmmakers whose early work achieves financial and critical success 
are more likely to be offered a wider range of further opportunities than those whose early 
work does not.  Therefore the industry becomes a self-selecting employment pool, which 
equates past performance with future success (although clearly this is aside from the 
gatekeeping difficulties associated with making and distributing early work in the first 
place)
71
.  The converse also applies, as one box-office failure can ‘taint’ a filmmaker’s 
reputation. ‘Market stability’ then, for the Hollywood industry, may involve a narrowing of 
options for marginal filmmakers with non-traditional perspectives, and a concomitant 
(over)reliance by gatekeepers on filmmakers already defined as established, once the initial 
difficulty of passing by the gatekeepers has been overcome.   
 
Industrial drives to minimise risk, and the sense of established writers and directors as assets 
to position within an overall product platform (the ‘slate’) contribute to a culture of 
solidification, characterised by retention of particular skill-sets (directorial styles, thematic 
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preoccupations) within the mainstream, once they have established themselves as financially 
successful at the margins.  In light of this tendency for filmmakers to move from the fringes 
into the mainstream, one could argue from the examples I have cited above that, influenced 
by the drive to minimise creative risk in the face of high costs, many of the more innovative 
or radical tendencies of smart film have become more ‘flattened’ – or utilised for strictly 
spectacular ends – in an effort to reach ever-larger audiences, as the drive to repeat success 
becomes an apparently inexorable movement towards reassuring generic repetition.
72
  This, 
then, is a function of the fact that Hollywood constitutes a multiplicity of different things: “a 
centralised core of production, and a powerful nexus of economic, cultural and social 
interaction. What appears on the surface as an unravelling spool, on closer inspection is 
revealed as a tight-knit fabric of integrated working relationships, practices and technologies” 
(Harbord, 2002, 98). 
 
To return to the industrial history which gave rise to Smart, it seems clear to me from Wyatt’s 
account of the ‘New Hollywood’ of the 1970s and 1980s that it was the idea of market 
differentiation via niche segmentation which was the primary focus for those companies 
which would become the ‘major independents.’  This is illustrated in the way New Line 
established itself firstly in non-theatrical distribution to, e.g. college campuses with films 
which “mixed foreign, sexploitation, gay cinema, rock documentaries and ‘midnight specials’ 
reserved exclusively for midnight exhibition.  The intent behind these choices was to tap 
markets under-served by the majors, and to maximize the difference of New Line’s product 
from more traditional commercial film.” (Wyatt, 1998, 76) and only later went into 
production via Fine Line Features, with its industrial niche already established, and budgets 
easily split between the more ‘exploitation’ elements of its slate and those projects with 
greater cachet.
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This brings us to Geoff King’s interpretation of the field, and his concept of ‘Indiewood.’  
This suggests a production environment and discursive arena where institutional practices 
and industrial structures mirror those of the major studios, but produces texts that share a 
softened (or indeed neutered) combination of textual and stylistic elements taken largely from 
the independent or art-house sector.  These would be “hybrid forms that draw on a number of 
different inheritances, including those associated with notions of ‘art’ cinema and more 
mainstream narrative feature traditions.” (King, 2009, 5).  This is regardless of strict 
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industrial origin, as King identifies not only those operations which can be acknowledged as 
‘legitimately independent’ (insofar as such a definition is possible) but also, specifically, 
those which can be located squarely within the greater studio-industrial Hollywood 
framework, whether “indie/specialty-oriented distributors and/or producers owned by the 
major studio companies…studio-created subsidiaries…or formerly independent operations 
taken over by the studios.” (ibid., 4). 74 
 
For him, it is “an industrial/commercial phenomenon, the product of particular forces within 
the American film industry from the 1990s and 2000s” (ibid., 2) among which he identifies a 
strong desire within the mainstream system to emulate the box-office success of ‘breakout’ 
independent features from the late 1980s and early 1990s, and of lower-grossing 
independents with strong profit-to-cost ratios, and linking this with the identification and/or 
creation of significant audiences for quasi-art-house fare.  For major studios, particularly 
following the massive cost hikes of the 1980s, there were potentially multiple advantages to 
investing relatively modest amounts of capital in quasi-independent subsidiaries.  Allocating 
such work to a ‘specialist’ division allowed for more effective exploitation of the potential – 
marginal but still financially substantial, were it to be brought within the reach of the majors 
– independent-leaning market, often through recruiting the production expertise of figures 
from the independent sector (such as Harvey Weinstein, James Schamus, and Christine 
Vachon).   
 
These figures were – as what I would regard as a direct result of the corporate co-option of 
the quasi-independent marketplace – all gradually assimilated into the mainstream, whether 
in the case of the Weinsteins’ sale of Miramax to Disney, or Schamus’s position as CEO of 
Focus Features (Vachon still operates largely at the intersection of the mainstream and 
independent worlds).  A similar ‘assimilative process’ affecting executives is involved to that 
involving certain Smart directors, albeit in a much less publicly visible context, and 
complicated by the fact that producers can tend to exhibit a higher degree of variation across 
their projects.  Without wishing to label it as intrinsically more significant than any other 
generational change n Hollywood’s history, this is the period associated with what King 
labels “the rise of a small but significant group of executives committed to creating some 
space for less conventional approaches within or on the margins of the studio system.” (ibid., 
7)
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The ‘old guard’ within was being replaced by a new generation coming of age during the 
period; for example Robert Daly and Terry Semel spent eighteen years and twenty-four years 
respectively at Warner Bros. from the 1980s into the 2000s, but were being followed closely 
by the likes of Bill Gerber and Lorenzo di Bonaventura (without whom films like Three 
Kings and The Matrix would, King asserts, have been unlikely to be made by Warner) and 
Bill Mechanic at 20
th
 Century Fox
76
 (Fox Searchlight having been established during his 
tenure, in 1994); for him similar functions were served by Amy Pascal at Sony, Stacey Snider 
and Casey Silver at Universal (the latter a particular champion of Steven Soderbergh), and 
Mike de Luca at New Line and subsequently DreamWorks.  At the same time, increasing 
costs meant that generally speaking, the financial risk entailed in assigning untested writers 
and directors to large-scale projects had become too great for comfort.  The market 
environment within which a company like Good Machine operated meant that specialty 
subsidiaries could more easily manage the process of developing emerging filmmakers, 
allowing them the luxury of ‘practice runs’ on medium-sized budgets, while also exercising 
an element of risk minimization.  The careers of such filmmakers as Michel Gondry, moving 
from the Smart ‘circuit’ to the $90m budget of The Green Hornet (2011),77 and Steven 
Soderbergh, lend some credence to this theory.  
 
King also notes the way in which studios moved towards co-opting projects and practices 
associated with independence as a way of producing “attractive vehicles for existing star 
performers, enabling the studios to maintain valuable relationships while providing different 
or more challenging work than the roles with which stars are usually associated” (King, 2007, 
6-7).  This is also linked strongly, at an industrial level, with the escalation of economic star-
power during the 1980s.  This period saw an apparently paradoxical contraction of the range 
of acting options available to many of Hollywood’s top stars, or at least the apparent limiting 
of the range of the ‘circuitry’ between genre and star, whereby movement outside of the 
genre within which one had achieved stardom – and inscribed a distinctive star persona, such 
as Tom Cruise’s cocky adolescent charmer – was constrained.  While one might imagine that 
the range of seductions necessary to keep mega-salaried stars compliant could easily be fine-
tuned to include the odd vanity project, an accidental effect of the period’s tendency towards 
horizontal expansion
78
 seems to have been to keep stars (particularly those who traded on 
hyper-masculine hard-bodied action images
79
) more or less continually engaged within 
narrow parameters.  
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This began to change in the following decade, as the power dynamic in which stars were 
engaged began to alter.  Moving away from a kind of ossification of the relationship between 
role and persona, the 1990s began to, at a wider cultural level, privilege a certain shifting or 
fluidity in identity, which I believe began to see its reflection in a resistance to genre-based 
typecasting. As in real life, a ‘softening’ or blurring of gendered roles and racial identities 
came into evidence, in everything from the resurgence of the romantic comedy, to the new 
action hero.
80
  While the top-grossing American film of 1991 was hardbody classic 
Terminator 2: Judgement Day (Cameron, 1991), the hero of Cameron’s 1997 record-breaker 
Titanic provided a very different model of masculinity.
81
  This shift in the territory of identity 
politics coincided with globalisation, the rise of the mega-corporation, and the rise of 
attendant concerns about the nature – and future – of work.   
 
While it is a stretch to compare pampered multimillionaire film stars to the average worker, it 
does seem possible to see echoes of post-Fordist economic logic in the newfound emphasis 
on ‘versatility’ (that is, flexible specialization) in acting circles.   This ranged from 
blockbuster actors taking roles in out-of-the-mainstream films, such as Tom Cruise’s 
memorably against-type cameo in Magnolia,
82
 to respected film actors moving into the 
previously devalued medium of television, as with Kyle McLachlan and Twin Peaks, with the 
goal of seeking status via critical acclaim rather than box office remuneration.  It also takes in 
the idea of career rehabilitation via projects which feature ironic casting; that is, not 
necessarily casting against generic type, but against judgements made by industrial and 
public discourse. The stellar example here is Tarantino’s casting of John Travolta in Pulp 
Fiction – while Travolta’s bankability was never an issue, as demonstrated by the Look 
Who’s Talking series, his persona was so closely associated with several (at this point) 
terminally un-cool cultural moments including disco, that its standing seemed unrecoverable.  
And yet, recover it – albeit temporarily – Tarantino did.   
 
Certainly, during the period there was a sense in which the options available to actors had 
opened up; as John Sayles said in 1996, “‘It never used to be hip the way that it is now to be 
in little independent movies…It was a signal that your career was in trouble’.” (Levy, 1999, 
14)  This increased fluidity of movement between types of role, and the tendency for actors to 
evince a greater interest in parlaying indie roles into ‘high culture’ cachet – and a 
counterbalancing trend for success in indie roles to sometimes harbinger future mainstream 
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success (see Zahed, 1998) –  are also perhaps linked to the intensification of celebrity culture 
during the period.
83
  While this is a tentative link that invites further scrutiny, contemporary 
celebrity culture does not constitute a closed and hierarchical circuit of singular 
representations, closely controlled by the studio system, and dependent on that system for 
good will (and therefore access to celebrities), as might once have been the case.  
 
Instead it involves an uncontrollable proliferation of multiple images, without centre, 
frequently irrepressible, and largely delivered outside of the mainstream (corporatized) 
media.  In this context, it becomes difficult for a star persona to retain an ‘intact’ centre: 
therefore rigid framing, or generic policing, of that persona may be rendered impossible, or 
pointless.  Indeed, one could argue that the ‘real’ individual’s strongest mean of protecting 
their private self lies in an attempt to hide, or disappear, that self via continually shifting their 
persona from mode to production mode.
84
  Therefore we have something of a chicken-and-
egg situation; the presence of star actors in independent and quasi-independent roles helped 
insulate against financial risk, provided free publicity in place of conventional marketing, 
encouraged a culture of investment in similar productions, and added extra dimensions to the 
star’s own persona, which could be useful both professionally and personally (insofar as 
‘celebrity culture’ can be described as ‘personal’).85    
 
However, none of this would be of particular import without a film industry which was 
prepared – again, via a circuitous route of agglomeration, international expansion, and 
vertical integration into all manner of delivery media – to encourage the identification of 
James Schamus’s specific but substantial audiences.  Certainly, by 1998, the movement of 
stars into independent cinema was recognised as being of specific value and relevance to the 
industry as a wider entity, as illustrated by Cassian Elwes, then head of the independent film 
department at the William Morris Agency: “Right now, the only ancillaries that you can 
count on are pay TV in America and foreign sales…Both of these require stars to drive 
consumer interest. It doesn't matter if the film costs $1 million or $10 million.” (Roman, 
1998, 11)   
 
While stars since the early days of cinema have engaged in struggles for creative control with 
the studios, the discursive repositioning of stars is illustrative.  We see a movement from the 
star as figurative, if wildly expensive, ‘cog in the wheel’ during the 1980s – exemplified in 
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the perceived interchangability of action heroes such as Stallone, Schwarzenegger and Van 
Damme – to their symbolic relocation during the 1990s, via the medium of independent 
cinema, to a more officially central position within the creative ‘engine’ of film production.  
This may well be linked to the increasing growth in social and economic importance of what 
Richard Florida describes as “the Creative Class” (Florida, 2002), as well as the fluctuating 
value of ‘prestige’ within the cinematic economy.86  
 
To bring this account back to the economic details, the direct industrial underpinnings which 
brought Smart cinema to its primary period of prominence, I return to Thomas Schatz.  His 
main focus is on positing a three-tier theory of Hollywood during the early twenty-first 
century which takes into account the effects of the changes of the 1980s and 1990s that I 
outline here, and I believe Schatz’s account of the period is the most accurate.  He maintains 
that one feature of the contemporary Hollywood industry is that it now constitutes a three-tier 
system.
87
  The top tier consists of the ‘Big Six’ studios (Warner, Disney, Paramount, 20th 
Century Fox, Universal, Columbia) whose primary focus is the franchise film or more 
generally ‘the blockbuster’, and whose production practices are driven by ‘conglomerated’ 
high-level priorities.   
 
Schatz sees two sectors as operating below this level.  One is the sector defined by 
“conglomerate-owned film subsidiaries” (Schatz, 2009, 25) or “Dependents” such as Fox 
Searchlight, Focus Features, Sony Pictures Classics, and Fine Line, producing “more 
modestly budgeted films in the $30 million to $50 million range for more specialized and 
discriminating audiences” (ibid.) but which, crucially, have a relative degree of autonomy 
from their parent company, as well as significant access to production funding, marketing 
capacity, and distribution power, in comparison with the third tier.  The third ranking is that 
set of ‘truly’ independent production and distribution companies, which, as he points out, 
constitutes  
literally hundreds of companies that supply over half of all theatrical releases, usually 
budgeted in the $5 million to $10 million range (often far less), and that compete for a 
pitifully small share of the motion picture marketplace, due largely to the proliferation 
of the conglomerate-owned film subsidiaries.” (ibid.) 
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This indicates most clearly why the spontaneous eruption of a particular form or style, or the 
intrusion of innovation to within the system, or indeed the systematic alteration of a genre, 
cannot occur without the intimate involvement – the backing, more or less – of the major 
studios, those with access to the distribution and exhibition networks.  This analysis also 
tallies with Allen J. Scott’s mapping and analysis of Hollywood production and distribution, 
which he sees as being founded on a combination of flexible specialisation and systems-
house forms of production.
88
  An important caveat is that the changes in technological 
consumption practices (via home viewing, on-phone access, downloading of the legal and 
otherwise variety) which have come about during the past two decades have the potential to 
allow audiences to challenge this orthodoxy.  In this sense, audiences are enabled to select 
viewing material in ways which free them not just from localised exhibition practices, but 
also in theory from mainstream production (see for example the proliferation of web series 
and individualised content on Youtube).  However, the conglomerates also maintain a 
gatekeeping function in terms of managing information about available content, thereby 
reinforcing the ‘buzz’ of discourse around corporate products: to give one example, lifestyle 
magazine division IPC, gossip and light entertainment magazines People and Entertainment 
Weekly, and gossip website TMZ.com all belong to Time Warner.
89
    
 
King discusses the power wielded by individuals working within the Hollywood system, and 
notes that the high standing attributed to particular projects was “owed to the industrial clout 
of individual senior executives or studio heads and that enabled them to proceed without 
being subjected to the full array of processes usually associated with the operations of the 
majors” (King, 2009, 227): I would argue that King perhaps overestimates the level of 
significance that individuals can hold within a highly codified industrial system.  Although he 
notes that it is a specific reprioritisation of the studios that has facilitated this, my argument 
is that the thrust to, at a systemic level, prioritise one type of project over another is born of 
industrial-structural factors rather than personalised or individualised ones, and it is these 
factors which enable the ‘mavericks’ to move to the centre of the industry, rather than the 
other way around.  I believe only industrially-centred analysis can account for the move to 
prominence of particular filmmakers during this period, as outlined previously.  In this I 
concur with Scott, who shows that throughout the transition to ‘New Hollywood’, while the 
majors still dominate “they also rely more and more on smaller subsidiaries and independent 
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production companies in order to spread their risks, to diversify their market offerings, and to 
sound out emerging market opportunities.” (Scott, 2002, 963) 
 
Therefore, while the likes of Christine Vachon and James Schamus had worked towards 
opening space within mainstream markets for many years, the change here was not within 
independent cinema, but within the Hollywood industry itself.  As King’s case studies of 
films such as American Beauty, Three Kings, and Solaris
90
 show (King, 2009, 141-230), 
during the period 1990-1995 the majors themselves, rather than even the specialty divisions, 
were providing what King described as “‘protected’ status” (ibid., 227) – in terms of 
production, distribution and marketing budgets and expertise – to films which a few years 
previously might have been relegated to the industrial margins. Essentially, for King, 
Indiewood is characterised not by what might be understood within genre studies as textual 
hybridity, but alternatively, by an industrial hybridity:  
 distinctive...without being subject to any single detailed definition.  Its most clear-cut 
ground of demarcation is industrial-institutional, in the form of the output of the 
studio-owned specialty divisions, but this also includes some films that remain more 
distinctly ‘indie’ in character and Indiewood can also be taken to embrace some work 
produced on occasion from within the main studio operations themselves.” (ibid., 
271) 
 
King acknowledges that the case for isolating Indiewood is somewhat tenuous, but takes the 
position that it is characterised both textually, and as an institutional model of production, 
with a significant, and in his opinion causal relationship between the two.  As he emphasises, 
“Indiewood is used at the textual level to distinguish examples in which such an aim or 
strategy [crossing over from art-house to commercial market] appears to be embodied more 
fundamentally in the fabric of the production itself.” (ibid., 5).  This, too, aligns with King’s 
characterisation of Indiewood as a broadly industrial hybrid, and suggestion that the Smart 
film functions as a ‘hybrid industrial practice’ as much as hybrid form.  By this I mean not 
that Smart fails to display significant textual hybridity, as clearly it does, but that as textual 
hybridity has become as dominant a feature of mainstream cinema as it has any other kind,
91
 
there may not be a specific diagnostic value at an industrial level in arguing for the existence 
of textual hybridity itself as a definitive feature, whatever about the value of attempting to 
draw distinctions around specific textual manifestations within that hybridity.    
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This is not a new position; Perren argues that 1990s independent cinema “could be 
considered a hybrid of the studio system’s A picture and the post-studio era exploitation 
film.” (Perren, 2001, 37)  For her this emphasises the importance both of wider public 
(including press and industry) discourse to establishing the ‘credentials’ of quasi-independent 
cinema, and also the extent to which the idea of ‘independence’ itself became an important 
discursive marker, eliding the extent to which supposedly marginal or maverick figures were 
imbricated within the system itself.  In her industrial analysis and framing of the importance 
of extra-economic factors, I agree, but feel that she here underplays the textual elements. In 
addition to industrial underpinnings, I would point too towards the importance of the textual 
interplay of genre, tone, theme, and formal experimentation in establishing Smart cinema as a 
category upon which these discursive processes act, however loosely that category might be 
constituted.      
 
The tendency also exists, as Thomas Austin points out, for film theory to focus on the results 
of the moment of viewing, without adequately contextualising the manner in which “patterns 
of reception are anticipated by the industry and feed back…into financing, production, and 
marketing decisions; and how practices of consumption are informed, but never simply 
determined, by such strategies.” (Austin, 2002, 2)  For Austin, putting film production (and 
indeed film theory) in a context which acknowledges the inter-discursive nature of the 
industry, and triangulates the relationships between texts, the contexts in which those texts 
are produced, and audiences, results in acknowledging the “industrially motivated hybridity” 
(ibid., 114) of the contemporary film text.
92
  Therefore, to regard Smart cinema as an 
industrial formation is to foreground the fact that its industrially hybrid form is purposeful; its 
industrial purpose is to siphon off the ‘small but significant’ audiences for art-house cinema, 
and also to act as something of a training arena for mainstream audiences willing to be 
nudged towards a wider variety of formal and thematic practice.    
 
Here, Smart cinema becomes the textual expression of a recognised feature of the economics 
not just of Hollywood, but of any marketplace dominated by a few major players – after all, 
“product differentiation is an important strategy for monopolists and oligopolists to 
discourage new entry.” (Kawashima, 2011, 485)  To link Austin and Perren in a more 
elaborated way, the notional characteristic of ‘indie/studio hybridity’ itself also becomes an 
important extra-textual referent, as part of both public discourse and the industrial power 
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dynamics which dictate production slates and marketing strategies.  The notion of 
‘independence’ or quasi-independence thereby becomes part of the intertextual relay, via 
“such apparatuses as advertising and promotional materials (posters, lobby cards, commercial 
tie-ins, etc.), motion picture magazines, review articles, and academic film criticism.” 
(Verevis, 1997, 12)   
 
Conclusions  
 
From a political economy perspective we can come close to what might constitute a 
definition of ‘Smart cinema’: an intersection of mainstream and independent American film 
that is, crucially, distributed by and exhibited within the mainstream.  Whether produced by 
strictly independent production companies, by major-owned specialty film subsidiaries, or 
some combination thereof, it can be considered to have arisen and briefly flourished during 
the period 1990-2005.  This group of films, illustrating an apparently paradoxical (during a 
period in which the action blockbuster dominated worldwide markets) tendency for the major 
studios to gravitate formally towards the margins as well as for the independent sector to 
move to the mainstream, was the result of a combination of a variety of factors.  
 
First was the politically-motivated neoliberal deregulation of the wider media industry during 
the Reagan regime, resulting in a massive drive towards international conglomeration, and 
the unifying of previously stratified media production and delivery channels (cinema, 
television, internet, telecoms).  This, combined with increasing economic and media 
globalisation (through international free trade agreements, the deregulation of capital and 
labour markets) produced wider, more internationalised markets which could be exploited – 
arguably monopolised
93
 –via a variety of production strategies.  Within this context, rising 
costs necessitated a drive towards market expansion, and a strategy of mobilising resources in 
service of product diversification has been utilised in order to achieve this.  Major studios 
could appeal to broad, mass markets with big budget, dialogue-light action spectaculars 
designed to easily cross borders.  They could also diversify through low- to medium-budget 
production, with an emphasis on the ‘long tail’ of post-cinematic exhibition, thereby 
developing small, high-value niche audiences of the type likely to base purchasing decisions 
on notions of prestige, quality, and impressions of independence, auteurial creativity, stylistic 
81 
 
innovation, and even counter-cultural authenticity, regardless of whether these impressions 
were justified at an industrial level.  
 
We may regard it as a hybrid form, industrially; produced and marketed in ways which 
indicate a kind of cohesiveness, but characterised also by a tension at the textual level, in how 
its formal elements adhere to or deviate from this industrial cohesion.  Here it is the extent to 
which a film is marketed – or needs to be marketed to, in order to recoup higher production 
costs – to a broader rather than narrower audience, which most accurately determines the 
extent to which its textual features tend to be constrained within a matrix or discourse of 
‘accessibility’.  In the case of Smart cinema, then, we have an illustration of how market and 
industry factors (rising costs, increased star power, the rise of globalisation, changes in focus 
at a regulatory level, and an expanded range of delivery media) resulted in an agglomerated 
corporate structure which employed intensive marketing and promotion in a close-to 
monopolistic system
94
 to expand into all markets, co-opting the ‘indie’ film, along with 
notions of ‘quality’ and ‘originality’ in order to corner substantial niche audiences.  This set 
of circumstances was bolstered at a discursive level by a Hollywood-focused popular and 
industrial media itself intricately entwined with the self-same industrial structures, and keen, 
for its own purposes, to narrativise this process of market segmentation into the idea of a 
‘New New Hollywood’.  Here, industrial elements were parried into a story of innovative and 
revolutionary auteurs infiltrating or breaching the system from without, rather than one of the 
industry widening out to assimilate them in search of identifiable, small but significant, 
markets.  Crucially, this narrative was seen as embodying particular values which the wider 
discourse of the 1980s, with its wide focus on spectacle, blockbuster, and mass audiences, 
had been seen to neglect.  It is this quasi-auteurist perspective which I hope to unpack in my 
next chapter.    
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Chapter Four: Smart film, the auteur as commodity, and cult cinema 
 
As a theoretical construct, while it has fallen out of academic fashion, auteurism (or more 
accurately its popular shadow) has, as seen in the previous chapter, steadily been co-opted by 
the film and associated entertainment industry over the past thirty years.  In this sense it 
functions as a discursive element which can be harnessed for positioning purposes, in ways 
which help to reinforce the stratification of the industry and its products.  Certainly, as John 
Caughie points out, while superseded in academic accounts by an almost archivist keenness 
to give filmmaking its institutional and collaborative due 
the auteur is everywhere else – in publicity, in journalistic reviews, in television 
programmes, in film retrospectives, in the marketing of cinema. Sometime around the 
point at which Film Studies began to be embarrassed by its affiliation to the author, 
the film industry and its subsidiaries began to discover with renewed enthusiasm the 
value of authorial branding for both marketing and reputation. (Caughie, 2008, 409)   
 
This can particularly be seen in the manner in which, while certain films are discursively (by 
which I mean not just in industry publications, but also in popular publications and in public 
dialogue) judged by the contemporary obsession with box-office figures
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 others play on the 
concept of the auteur as a sales tool; one reaching beyond simple marketing, and well into 
audience conceptions of what kind of films are ‘for them’.  In essence, the idea of auteurism 
serves to frame film texts and the work of individual filmmakers in the way it permeates 
through multi-faceted engagements with, and relationships between, the media industries (not 
simply the studios, but also the press), the audience, filmmakers, the academy, and texts 
themselves. 
 
Auteuristic framings traditionally functioned to add complexity to questions of genre and, in 
a quasi-Romantic sense, recuperate film work from its institutional ownership and into a field 
defined as more clearly personal and ‘artistic’.  They still do so, and in a way that affects 
discussion of Smart filmmakers, in that one element frequently called upon in discursive 
references to them is the classical auteuristic position that it is in “the transcendence, not the 
comfortable inhabitation, of genre that marked the auteur” (Langford, 2005, 10).  This of 
course also links, modally, Smart cinema with the art film, an interpretation which privileges 
the perspective that sees Smart films as located outside of the mainstream.  Therefore, 
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auteurism in this context works to elide industrial considerations, and harnesses the discourse 
of prestige – in service of films themselves and for their producers – in a manner which 
supports Smart’s claims of distinction even as it negates the (often strictly commercial) 
territory within which it operates.   
 
Additionally, references to auteurism are used to disguise generic play; the implication being 
that where a filmmaker’s body of work – or even a single film – cannot be easily categorised 
in generic terms, auteurism can be (explicitly or implicitly) evoked as a kind of default, a 
catch-all categorical reference.  Therefore, auteurism is a term that is not used to complicate 
questions of text and genre, but to avoid them entirely – to remove genre from the field of 
discussion, whether for journalistic ‘shorthand’ purposes in conveying to potential audiences 
that less generically-accessible work is under discussion, or to co-opt the often unspoken link 
popularly made between auteurism and prestige.  The larger question here is, of course, “in 
what service are these discourses of auteurism mobilized?”, particularly in the context of 
restriction implied by King’s assertion that “Hollywood is willing to embrace only a limited 
quota of genuine novelty, and then only when underwritten by the guarantee provided by a 
‘star’ director’s name, or by the stars attracted by the presence of such figures” (King, 2005, 
262).   
 
I contend that auteurism, as a discursively-constructed idea (distinct from the academic 
framework of ‘auteur theory’), performs a variety of roles, and serves a number of industrial 
positioning functions, within the context of Smart cinema.  The point here is not to search for 
ways of classifying or excluding filmmakers on the basis of ‘auteuristic’ attributes or 
tendencies, but to look at the way in which the notion of the auteur functions in constructions 
and interpretations of the Smart corpus, and the filmmakers which produce it.  The first 
element of interest relates to how I have conceptualised the idea of genre here, as a ‘gateway’ 
or identificatory trope for audiences looking to orient themselves in a media environment 
characterised by a proliferation of options, and to self-position their consumption and 
engagement practices along a continuum running from work discursively located as 
‘independent’ to that identified as ‘mainstream’.   
 
Within this context, the idea – the accumulated cultural accretion – of auteurism functions as 
a kind of stand-in or placeholder for genre, in cases where generic classifications for specific 
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texts are elusive or unhelpfully broad.  This would be the case with, for example, the 
generically hybrid but tonally distinct quality of Wes Anderson’s work; or where the relative 
cultural position of the generic references which offer themselves for comparison presents 
complications relating to prestige, as with Paul Thomas Anderson’s evocation of 
‘unfashionable’ generic tropes (family melodrama, pornography – see Chapter Six).  
Auteurism can also be used to mitigate specific instances of – industrial or cultural – 
boundary-transgression, as is the case with David Fincher’s Fight Club and Todd Solondz’ 
Happiness, which I discuss in Chapter Eight.  For the former, quasi-auteuristic framings 
(some created and perpetuated by the paratexts Fincher himself had a hand in generating) of 
Fincher as uncompromising creative visionary, facing off against a cowardly conglomerate 
(‘too radical for the studios’) drew attention away from the film as a box office failure and 
towards its later discursive position as a cult favourite.  In the case of the latter, sympathetic 
framings of Happiness as a serious art film, and Solondz as its auteur by association, 
converted what might have been a (relatively) simple distinction of ‘taste’ into something of a 
cause célèbre in the field of artistic censorship. 
 
Here, that fluid mythic construct ‘the auteur’ may be invoked in order to encircle Smart films 
within a theoretical perimeter – often linked to, or created by, paratexts as much as by texts 
themselves – of cultural legitimation.  The cumulative effect is to produce a kind of 
industrial-cultural category we might describe as ‘the auteur film’, but this should not be seen 
as automatically synonymous with ‘art cinema’.  While theories of art cinema do lean on 
conceptions of auteurism, my conviction is that, although Smart cinema may adopt some of 
its strategic approaches, textually it tends not to adopt art cinema’s ‘sincerity’ or earnestness 
of perspective, and industrially it tends not to be positioned as ‘art’.  However, similarities of 
approach do occur, in ways which blur the boundaries, and in particular, ideas of prestige and 
quality are most likely to be drawn upon.  This blurring can be seen in the process by which, 
throughout the 1990s, Smart films began to infiltrate festival culture outside of the US, where 
considerations of cinema as art have traditionally been foregrounded.   
 
Secondly, the idea of auteurism now clearly functions not simply as a cultural category, but 
as a positioning and branding tool: both for texts themselves, and for their creators, as per 
Adrian Martin who asserts that “this is the era of the auteur as commodity, as brand name.”  
(Martin, 2004, 95), or Claire Perkins, who points out that  
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[the] ‘celebrity’ auteur figure necessarily changes auteurism as a process insofar as 
the practice of decipherment is entirely eluded: directors now openly reveal their 
‘desire’ in interviews, profiles, DVD commentaries, trailers, and advertisements. The 
commerce of auteurism has meant that auteurs are now hyperaware of themselves as 
an abbreviated image. (Perkins, 2008, 19-20) 
This tendency, then, actively supports and facilitates the reading – for filmmakers themselves 
and within the industry, as much as for audiences and the wider media – of Smart cinema 
through a lens which views it as part of a narrative of creative succession.  In this way, the 
emergence of Smart filmmakers is distanced from industrially-based historical analysis, and 
instead naturalised as an inevitable, irrepressible creative invasion, embedded within a mythic 
structure which hides its industrial underpinnings.  
 
This of course greatly minimises the extent to which Smart cinema constitutes a recouping of 
independent stylistic and creative frameworks by and for the dominant Hollywood studios, by 
creating a ‘narrative of succession’ in which, for example, the likes of Tarantino, Fincher, 
Jonze, and the Andersons are viewed as successors to the presumed cultural inheritance of 
Scorsese, Robert Altman, Sidney Lumet or John Cassavetes.  This is not simply a matter of 
generational decay and renewal, but points directly to the way in which, as Shyon Baumann 
(2007) emphasises, during the period of the 1960s and 1970s, the Hollywood industry began 
to offer more conceptual space to directors keen to think of themselves as ‘fine artists’.  The 
transition of the classical studio system into a rather more post-Fordist ‘New Hollywood’ 
incarnation instituted not just a material and productive shift of great magnitude, but also 
discursively solidified the impression of the maverick or countercultural auteur.
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The replication of this impression in the 1990s did not simply, therefore, attempt to secure 
legitimacy for contemporary texts and filmmakers, but also worked to retrospectively convey 
a kind of historically-based legitimacy on ‘Hollywood’ itself in its function as a creative 
institution as well as an industrial one.  To be able to discursively narrativise the emergence 
of the Smart filmmakers as the passing-on of an imagined ‘historical burden’ of creativity, an 
assumed inheritance of cultural significance, facilitated the viewing of ‘Hollywood’ – at this 
point more globalised than ever, following merger after international merger – as retaining a 
certain degree of control over its own historical narrative or image, and as culturally relevant 
beyond the multiplex.  In short, positioning the filmmakers of the 1990s and 2000s as part of 
a narrative-historical through-line, as inheritors of the cultural mantle of the ‘great’ American 
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directors of the 1960s and 1970s,
97
 allowed Hollywood to extend and reinforce the 
mythological aspects of its own history (itself a powerful positioning and marketing tool), as 
well as to manufacture prestige.  
 
Although he does not specifically link his work to national cinema, Adrian Martin may have 
inadvertently identified another factor when he writes “[u]ltimately, I suspect that the doubt 
implicit in ‘looking for the auteur’ is symptomatic of a larger shift or problem in global film 
culture…When world cinema is in a flux…then the auteur becomes obscured, lost, uncertain, 
put into question.” (Martin, 2004, 96)  Smart cinema’s emergence may also relate to the ways 
in which auteurism and national cinema can be strongly linked (see Elsaesser, 2005; Perkins, 
2008). If, for example, as in Elsaesser’s example, Ingmar Bergman comes to exemplify 
Swedish cinema, or more specifically the international identity of Swedish cinema, for 
several decades (Elsaesser, 2005, 15)
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 then it is equally consistent to posit that Smart cinema 
– or at least the work of those who incline more easily towards ‘indie auteur’ interpretations – 
may function as a kind of de facto American national cinema.  This aligns with Newman’s 
contention that “indie cinema in the United States has functioned as an alternative American 
national cinema……indie culture is to some significant extent a national culture, even if it is 
not essentially concerned with thematizing national identity.” (Newman, 2011, 16-17)  
 
This perspective is coloured by Newman’s thesis that indie cinema is legitimised through 
institutions of American culture such as film festivals and the urban social networks of the 
art-house, in the same way that the products of other national cinemas tend to be in their own 
countries.  However he fails to point out the internationalised tensions at work: it is the global 
dominance of the American studio film in those markets, too, which may have the effect of 
restricting exhibition of national cinema to festivals and arthouses.  In addition, at various 
points Smart cinema – in its most transgressive moments, formally or thematically – appears 
to function visibly as an oppositional practice: however, it must be remembered that it is 
rarely industrially resistant even where it is so textually.  Therefore the sense in which indie 
cinema appears to function ‘as’ a national cinema is paradoxically due to the globalised 
nature of the American studio system, rather than due to any intrinsically oppositional 
characteristics of it.  That the appearance of oppositionality is so easily conflated with its 
actuality is as a result of the international dominance of the studio system.  
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The American film industry as exemplified by the Hollywood blockbuster is transnational, as 
much by virtue of its patterns of capital and production as its model of international 
exhibition.  While its cultural trappings and the texts it produces are almost always 
distinctively American,
99
 there is no sense in which it can be seen as accommodating 
America ‘itself’; there are many ‘missing Americas’ from which the big-budget Hollywood 
film can be seen as alienated.  To explore this idea would require more space than can be 
allocated here, but if we acknowledge that national cinema is often associated with auteurism 
and prestige, international cinephilia and film festival culture
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 and not necessarily with 
alternative visions of a nation, we can see some of the ways in which the concept of Smart 
film mobilises these ideas in some of its characteristics.  This allows Smart to be positioned – 
when viewed deliberately through the narrow prism of the Hollywood industry, and 
excluding the body of actual independent American film which really should be characterised 
as ‘American national cinema’ – as a kind of unconscious or symbolic American national 
cinema.  Seen to work in opposition to ‘American cinema’ as defined by bigger-budget work, 
and linked to the auteurs of the New Hollywood through assumptions of cultural inheritance 
which play on the fluidity of boundaries between high and low culture during Smart’s 
evolutionary period,
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 these assumptions link to the perception that the Smart filmmakers are 
a particular generational grouping, sharing a background of popular culture heritage, in order 
to depict them as a more or less unified group.  
 
This turn towards prestige (as exemplified here by the fetishisation of the auteur) was 
prompted by a number of different factors which I discuss elsewhere, including the industrial 
drive to resolve the bifurcation of the marketplace by colonising previously under-exploited 
niches, demographic changes, the radical restructuring of viewing channels and opportunities, 
and so on.  However an additional element may have been the symbolic ‘de-auteuring’ of the 
industry in the 1980s.  By this, I mean the (albeit simplistic) perception that post-classical 
Hollywood was focused to such an extent on the spectacle of the high concept blockbuster – 
including the industrial spectacle of spiralling costs and mammoth box office returns – that 
work which privileged ‘adult’ themes, formal experimentation, and narrative play had 
become antithetical.  However, certainly by the 1990s, auteurism as a framing device had 
returned, if (as per Caughie) more in a popular context than an academic one.   
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Certainly, for the industry, this shadow of auteurism serves a variety of functions, not all of 
which are related to the accrual of prestige.  It can be used as shorthand to communicate a 
variety of sales messages about upcoming releases to potential audiences, whose almost-
guaranteed media immersion in the prior history of cultural auteurism means that they believe 
they can know immediately what “a Woody Allen film”, “a James Cameron film” or, indeed, 
“a Quentin Tarantino film” will involve (whether the filmmaker reinforces their own auteur 
image with this work is of course a separate question).  In certain cases, the discourse of 
auteurism can almost serve as a replacement for a marketing budget, as can be seen in the 
strategic placement of lower-budget Smart films at festivals, where “auteur status is the fuel 
in the workings, the clearest power source for the entire machinery.” (Andrews, 2012, 48)  
While this deserves further separate study, I think it conceivable that the renewed importance 
of auteurism has a link with the relative ‘uncontrollability’ of contemporary media 
(particularly internet) life, as symbolic control of texts moves away from the filmmaker and 
studio and into the grasp of audiences themselves, whose various fandoms and textual 
manipulations reduce the ability for the industry to ‘systematise’ the intellectual reach of their 
products.
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The discourse of popular auteurism also functions in service of filmmakers themselves, 
whose reputation as such is a frangible thing, dependent on a tenuous circuit of critical 
approbation and definition as much as the texts themselves.  Philip Drake underlines the 
importance of what he describes as “reputational capital”, a fluctuating condition that 
“depends upon an individual’s performance in the business, critical and commercial reception 
as well as their embeddedness within key industrial, institutional and social networks” 
(Drake, 2013, 145).  He distinguishes it from academic auteurism in its lack of attention to 
textual intentionality, but notes particularly that “[r]eputation, it seems, is important to 
maintaining creative independence.” (ibid., 150)  Here, the circuit in which auteurism is 
embedded functions not simply to create reputational credit for a Smart filmmaker, but to 
increase the likelihood that this credit will enable them to create similar work in the future; 
either that, or to parlay it into a move towards work of a different nature – most frequently, a 
move towards the mainstream.  
 
As Tim Corrigan says, “auteurs and theories and practices of auteurism have never been a 
consistent or stable way of talking about movies……auteurism has been bound up with 
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changes in industrial desires, technological opportunities, and marketing strategies.” 
(Corrigan, 1999, 40) Indeed, the career trajectories of Smart filmmakers illustrate the 
apparent tendency within the industry not just to view small-to-medium-budget works of the 
sort under discussion as ‘training investments’, to be recouped at a later date via other means, 
but also to utilise the cross-training of directors as a means of broadening audiences for even 
the most popular genres.  In this sense, by engaging with auteurist discourses and combining 
them with larger ‘franchising’ considerations, Hollywood harnesses the dual drivers of 
prestige and populist appeal, in a manner which recuperates the (periodically regarded as 
wasted, debased, undervalued or exhausted) blockbuster form.   
 
So, for example, we see Christopher Nolan move from Smart-inflected medium-sized 
(budgets of under $50 million) precision pieces Insomnia (2002) and The Prestige (2006) to 
the behemoth Batman franchise which would provide Batman Begins (2005), The Dark 
Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight Rises (2012), with budgets ranging from an estimated 
$150 million to $285 million.
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  Nothing illustrates so well as this the transition of Smart 
filmmakers from the fringes to the mainstream, whether retaining their Smart perspective or 
not.  Nolan, in light of the temporally complex and yet wildly popular Inception (2011), 
critically lauded and grossing $825 million internationally, has perhaps been the most 
successful at maintaining a certain continuity of approach, while still fulfilling the very 
particular requirements of franchise blockbuster production.  Similarly, Sam Mendes moved 
from the $15 million American Beauty to the $80 million Road to Perdition (2002).
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Interestingly, 2009’s Away We Go was the kind of small character-based drama one might 
associate with the earlier Mendes, and although it failed, with box-office takings of $9 
million to show for its $17 million cost, this has been no barrier to his engagement as director 
of the most recent instalment of the Bond franchise, the $200 million Skyfall (2012).  In this 
sense, Smart’s primary legacy to filmmakers within the studio system may not have been the 
introduction of quasi-independent production practices or textual strategies, but rather, an 
increase in the instance of creative mobility for filmmakers, particularly those at the higher-
value end of the market.  Therefore, the extent to which the practitioners of Smart cinema 
have become embedded within the mainstream cannot be underestimated.  While at one time 
involvement with independent or quasi-independent film might have been seen as an 
indication of limited horizons, it has come – via this assimilatory process – to function as a 
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means of producing cultural legitimacy for a creative practitioner, while simultaneously 
demonstrating their professional capability and economic bankability.
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While the last two characteristics would, logically, be the minimum requirement for 
‘graduation’ to the ranks of blockbuster filmmaker – the sums of money involved being too 
vast to entrust to anything other than proven talent – the element of ‘cultural legitimacy’ also 
serves a particular function outside the narrow confines of the Smart arena.  It would appear 
that certain kinds of prestige associated with middlebrow-to-high culture (in the form of 
awards and critical acclaim), and conferred upon a filmmaker by the intersection of popular 
and industry discourses, can be successfully parlayed into a more mainstream career.  This, I 
believe, can be seen as directly connected to genre and generic play, as, via the persona of a 
Nolan or a Mendes, attempts are made to revitalize a genre or franchise – one could argue in 
a sense that Batman and Bond are each big enough brands to constitute ‘their own genre’ – 
by way of producing an impression of, or association with, ‘quality’, itself facilitating  the 
mobilisation of rhetoric designed to foreground novelty, and position the latest franchise 
episode as ‘a new departure’ or new direction.106 In this way, genre and prestige can be linked 
through the mechanism of auteurist framing, without being seen to compromise populist (or 
cult) appeal.   
 
Relevant too is the extent to which filmmakers have become implicated in the cultural circuit 
that is celebrity culture; Corrigan’s description of Tarantino as “the quintessential 1990s’ 
American auteur……from one point of view, a confrontational individual succeeding in 
Hollywood despite an uncompromising trash-art vision, and, from another, a showman 
quickly cashing in on an image that may be gone tomorrow” (Corrigan, 1999, 39) refers to 
but does not explore the extent to which auteurism is enfolded within celebrity culture.  This 
culture itself forms a paratext or commentary on film, and one which reinforces the mystique 
of the auteur even as it minimises the work which produces such designations: Rennett’s 
designation of Tarantino as ‘the director as DJ” (2012) may have more resonance in its 
evocation of the figure of solitary celebrity ‘bricoleur’, centre stage in front of his audience, 
than in its textual analysis.  
 
Discursive references to ‘the new Tarantino’ or ‘the next Tarantino’ have abounded in the 
period following since that director’s emergence.  The phrase calls upon assumed links 
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between novelty, innovation, and creativity, as well as the way in which Tarantino’s 
flamboyant public persona complicates and even erodes distinctions between filmmaker and 
star: the phrase’s persistence implies that ‘Tarantino’ has become a signifier in and of himself 
– a synecdoche for the industrial and structural processes which facilitated his emergence, 
and one which obscures the manner in which these processes frame production practices.  
This extends beyond Tarantino’s own work: the use of the phrase ‘Tarantinoesque’ in 
describing a film, for example, signifies that the presence of certain kinds of textual practice 
– such as the deployment of violence in a highly ironicised fashion – can frame a text itself as 
having claims to Smartness or produce the effect of a condemnation of it as derivative; either 
way, it retrospectively claims Tarantino as an auteur.  
 
 
Charlie Kaufman as auteur 
 
Clearly this functions in different ways for different filmmakers.  The contemporary cultural 
obsession with not just media products, but the workings of the media industries themselves, 
has been well documented, for example by Desmond Hesmondhalgh (see Curran (ed.), 2010).  
It also includes the way in which auteuristic framings have impact at a wider level for 
filmmakers.  Charlie Kaufman – who as King points out has not just cultivated a level of 
recognition (perhaps even notoriety) unusual for a screenwriter, but has also parlayed this 
into an unusual degree of creative autonomy (King, 2009, 47-91) – constitutes an interesting 
case study of auteuristic positioning.  Looking at the manner in which Kaufman’s presumed 
relationship to his work is represented within the quasi-public discourse highlights the 
contradictory perspective that characterises the liminal (or, to be glib, almost subliminal) 
marketing/anti-marketing of Smart cinema; at times it seems to resemble a perpetual motion 
machine, resting on the paradoxical strategy of utilising an anti-Hollywood position to sell 
Hollywood films.  
 
Kaufman is a useful example, particularly in that, while a casually auteuristic approach is 
common to many media accounts of films in which prestige is mobilised as an element of 
discourse (in contrast with mass-appeal films, where talk of financial returns dominates), the 
film’s director is usually identified as the auteur.  By contrast, the conventional cultural status 
of a screenwriter is lower, their position often made invisible; the ‘elevation’ of Kaufman to 
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auteur, at the level of media discourse, renders this rhetoric transparent.  King, for example, 
describes Kaufman’s attitude in interviews and promotional work as one of keenness to avoid 
being seen to create ‘a product’ or attract a specific demographic – indeed, tropes of ‘real’ vs. 
‘ersatz’ creative process feature prominently in his films.  However, the symbiosis of industry 
and media is such that discussions of Kaufman as an ‘individual’ are in their own way 
indivisible from promotion of Kaufman as a ‘brand’, and as a constitutive element of the 
work he produces.   
 
By virtue of the manner in which he writes himself into his work, he is a material part of the 
fabric of Smart cinema; but he also has multiple locations within the discourse. ‘Kaufman’ 
(making a distinction between Kaufman as figure and as individual seems both theoretically 
appropriate, and textually apposite, given his tendency to write himself into his films) acts as 
a floating signifier for a particular kind of quasi-experimental narrative film. He also 
functions as an interactive sales tool which seeks to guarantee the prestige of the particular 
text being sold, emphasising the qualities of independence, innovation, and creative 
transgression which supposedly create a distinction between his work and the work of the 
putative mainstream: even where both share the same industrial (major studio-funded) 
origins. 
 
Kaufman disavows this relationship, as for example noting that “I can recognize that [his 
work is different] without thinking of myself as a brand.” (Tucker, 2008, 45)  This disavowal 
may be personally sincere; however it has no power to derail the discursive meaning of 
‘Kaufman’, but reinforces his supposed status as maverick, and theoretical guarantor of 
independence from the ‘Hollywood system.’  Because the communicative norms of mass 
media tend towards narrativisation and limited psychological characterisation, it is easy to see 
how attractive ‘Kaufman’ is as a signifier, in the way his behaviour is offered as an easy link 
to the texts with which he is associated.  Descriptions of him (Lyman, 2000a; Luscombe, 
2002; Leigh, 2003; O’Hagan, 2003; Tucker, 2008; Ide, 2008; Young, 2009) emphasise 
particular behaviours – alone, out walking, declining to pose for pictures, failing to be 
recognised or served by waiters, declining to confirm what variety of car he drives – and 
presume particular emotional states – nervous, melancholy, quirky, awkward, idiosyncratic, 
uncomfortable, shy, offbeat, reclusive, opaque, obsessive, mysterious.  Many or most of these 
are clearly interpretations made by writers themselves, and may or may not bear the slightest 
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relation to the reality of being Charlie Kaufman. And yet, the desire to construct an 
acceptably eccentric ‘Kaufman’ is sufficiently strong, that even behaviour challenging the 
constructed image is framed within a context which continues to reinforce it.
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Separately from big-budget advertising and promotional campaigns, the strategic placement 
of auteurial figures within the public discourse encourages a self-selecting audience to 
constitute themselves as a kind of paradoxical ‘non-audience’, or even ‘anti-audience’, who 
are presumed to self-define as resistant to more conventional strategies of commercial 
engagement.  It is the auteur’s self-avowed disengagement from the Hollywood system which 
is being sold to the public as a marker of his films’ quality and innovation.108 And yet, the 
extent to which Focus Features sought to emphasise the more orthodox features of his work 
in many contexts – placing greater emphasis on Jim Carrey than Kaufman in their advertising 
plans, for example – indicates that these are niche films which are still expected to function 
like mainstream texts.  As Jack Foley, at the time head of distribution for Focus indicated, 
their strategy for Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind enfolded the Kaufman brand with 
play on the equally ‘edgy’  director Michel Gondry’s work in innovative music video, and 
with a focus on Jim Carrey as “the most influential comedian in America right now” (King, 
2009, 83).  He notes, vitally, that “we looked at where America is in its willingness to access 
smart films...Jim brought a sort of commercial accessibility to the film that spoke outside of 
the confines of the Charlie Kaufman brand” (ibid.).  However, at the level of assessments of 
distinction and prestige, these appear to accrue to Kaufman and Gondry, rather than Carrey, a 
marker perhaps of which has been the lasting position.
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Here, the thrusting-forward of Kaufman is both a gesture of explication as regards his 
(admittedly complex) creative work – allowing him to take prominence within the discourse 
in order to clarify it, or at least mystify it in an intriguing manner, for potential viewers – and 
a form of subtle marketing of what King calls “an idealized notion of both the artist and the 
discriminating viewer as free individual subjects, untrammelled – or resistant to being 
trammelled – by the marketing/packaging system dominant in Hollywood and increasingly 
applied to parts of the indie sector since the mid-1990s.” (King, 2009, 56)  It is, so, the 
discourses of marketing – promotional interviews being nothing other than marketing, for all 
that they are not (always) paid for – which are employed to, by invoking the spectre of 
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auteurism, tacitly constitute Smart cinema as a genre in an almost oppositional manner, by 
calling upon its specific audience to self-position.   
 
 
Wes Anderson as auteur 
 
The early anointment of Wes Anderson as an ‘auteur director’ is more straightforward, in that 
the tonal and stylistic register he employs emerged quite early as a distinctive element.  As I 
argue in Chapter Six, Anderson’s framing as an auteur is also related to the elusive nature of 
his use of genre, particularly when compared with his intense focus on mise-en-scène; 
comparisons have been made between his work and that of Powell and Pressburger, Jim 
Jarmusch (McMahon, 2009, 23-24), or Preston Sturges (Olson, 1999, 12). McDowell, whose 
work on the notion of ‘quirky’ (2010, 2013) is useful in its emphasis on sensibility and tone, 
but limited by its focus on comedy, describes his work as “the most consistent, as well as 
probably the most extreme, embodiment of the quirky sensibility.” (McDowell, 2010, 4) 
 
Orgeron places Anderson’s industrial persona in relation to that of Truffaut’s (or perhaps 
Hitchcock’s) in its meticulously ‘constructed’  nature and the intricate way it is imbricated 
within Anderson’s films (Orgeron, 2007).  Regardless of his supposed auteurial heritage, 
certainly Anderson’s idiosyncratic style appears to have crystallised by the time of Rushmore 
(1998), just his second feature, followed by The Royal Tenenbaums (2001), and The Life 
Aquatic With Steve Zissou (2004).
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  Using a kind of deadpan heightened realism 
(McMahon, 2009), privileging cinematic stillness, particularly in the use of tableaux vivant 
(ibid.; Gooch, 2007), an emphasis on the materiality and symbolic agency of objects 
(Baschiera, 2012), and camera angles which assume a ‘God’s-eye’ framing (Zoller Seitz 
2009)
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 Anderson cultivates a distinctive visual style, which can be positioned either within 
the irony-centred framework common to readings of Smart cinema, or, contradictorily, as 
unusually un-ironic in comparison with his contemporaries (Olsen, 1999).
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Recurring motifs in his work include nostalgia (Baschiera, 2012); family and fatherhood 
(ibid.; Gooch, 2007); the auteur as character (Dorey, 2012; Orgeron 2007), and the role of the 
– fictional and real – auteur within the community (ibid.). A motif that is rarely interrogated 
or problematised by him, the mechanics and function of class and racial privilege, is also 
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quite dominant – Rachel Dean-Rusicka scathingly critiques Anderson’s representational 
approach, noting that “[i]n a culture where people often disavow the continuing existence of 
racism Anderson’s films are the perfect example of how white privilege is reinscribed at the 
expense of others.” (Dean-Rusicka, 2013, 28)113  This is consistent with accusations that 
Smart cinema is fundamentally the cinema of the white middle classes, and indeed with 
Anderson’s own privileged background.  This focus on the auteur as character is of particular 
interest, illustrating the extent to which, and manner by which, discourses of auteurism are 
mobilised both textually and paratextually to position Anderson’s work. 
 
Dorey and Orgeron provide comprehensive accounts of the ways in which Anderson’s 
auteurial persona is constructed.  The former highlights the emphasis in paratextual materials 
such as DVD commentaries on Anderson’s tight or even ‘fanatical’ control over the 
production process,
114
 which becomes a marker of prestige within the discourse of auteurship, 
a token of Anderson as ‘exacting, single-minded visionary’. This can then be mobilised at 
will in different contexts – print advertising, web content, trailers and videos, both in industry 
and public media – to construct a strong and saleable auteurial image, within “a sort of 
spectrum along lines of assumed audience engagement, the amount of information about the 
film transmitted and the audience’s interactivity with the material.” (Dorey, 2012, 173)115  
 
While public audiences may differ from industrial audiences there is little practical difference 
between the highlighting of Anderson’s ‘dictatorial’ control within a context of technical and 
professional evaluation, and the way in which it is constructed, for example, within the 
Anderson fan community.
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  Largely, this is a question of prestige, and the way in which 
what we might describe as ‘the technology of auteurism’ is simultaneously ‘the technology of 
prestige’. By this I mean the manner in which paratextual materials such as DVDs and their 
related commentaries and interviews, ‘director’s cut’ releases, reviews and media reports, and 
so on, function: not simply to promote, contextualise, or convey ‘added value’ to a text, but to 
construct an auteur-image, and to confer a degree of assumed credibility on that image which 
engages it with the ‘culture of prestige’ in ways which may or may not bear material relation 
to the text itself.  This is as outlined in the example of Anderson’s involvement with the 
Criterion DVD collection, to which both Dorey and Orgeron refer.   
 
96 
 
Within the American context, the Criterion Collection catalogue occupies a privileged 
position in the canon-formation process (see Kendrick, 2001; Schauer and Arosteguy, 2005) 
and plays a major role in legitimizing the work of particular contemporary filmmakers, of 
which Anderson is one,
117
 and in legitimizing the consumption of film as art. As Orgeron 
points out,  
Anderson’s Criterion Editions are ‘loaded’. They contain tome-like and lionizing 
essays. Both The Royal Tenenbaums and The Life Aquatic contain documentaries by 
Albert Maysles on Anderson and company at work. They always include a variety of 
interviews and are full of ‘extras’, as they have been designated by the menus. They 
are, in other words, appealingly packaged books to be judged, purchased, and coveted 
on the basis of their covers. (Orgeron, 2007, 58-59) 
In addition, in his paratextual involvement, Anderson himself engages in play on the idea of 
auteurism, and/or ‘credibility’; a fluid construction which has a complex relationship with 
notions of prestige and authenticity (see Newman, 2009).  For example, Anderson has created 
‘fake’ television interviews for his most recent Criterion Editions, which as Orgeron points 
out both “creates an at least public spectacle of Anderson’s own authorial scepticism…[and] 
is also, however, perhaps the most deeply authorial move he might make.” (ibid., 60)118   
 
Here, auteurism is constructed, via paratexts as much as through texts themselves, to produce 
the effect of an imagined ‘relationship’ with the auteur, through a technologically-facilitated 
culture of auteurism, which has evoked in audiences an “unparalleled faith in the authority of 
their directors” (ibid., 58, italics author’s own).  The auteurial image is not confined to 
specifically filmic texts and paratexts, however; one fascinating example is the way in which 
one of Anderson’s television adverts, one of a series for American Express,119 simultaneously 
invokes and parodies ideas of Anderson as auteur.  In doing so, even as it emphasises the 
communal aspects of filmmaking
120
 (Anderson has historically worked with a small pool of 
collaborators) it clearly presents Anderson as the all-guiding hand, the cumulative effect 
being to locate the director as a cultural leader – an identifiably ‘authentic’ creator within a 
potentially treacherous world of ironic consumption, where ideas of celebrity, creativity, 
power and authenticity are inextricably linked.  
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Smart film and cult cinema 
 
If auteurist discourse serves to orient audiences – critical, academic, and public – in relation 
to these films, so too does the idea of ‘cult’ cinema.  We might presume that there are a 
variety of reasons, professional and personal, why a filmmaker – voluntarily or otherwise – 
might move more into the mainstream, resist opportunities to make more than infrequent 
incursions into ‘Hollywood’, or choose to work exclusively within an industrial model which 
precludes real engagement with the mainstream.  Filmmakers who choose the range of 
activities implied by the second two categories often find the word ‘cult’ employed to 
describe their practices, and the term ‘cult cinema’ has often been casually employed as a 
placeholder for Smart film (see Bal et al, 2003; Lawrenson, 2005; Amsden, 2007; Martin, 
2009).  However, while ‘difference from the mainstream’ is one characteristic which both 
Smart and cult cinema are assumed to share, another is the tendency to elide questions of 
industrial origin.  It is interesting to note that Sconce has written on both paracinema and 
Smart film (Sconce, 1995; Sconce, 2002), and sees in both a search for subcultural capital: 
one which rests on audiences’ self-identification as distinctive, marginal, perhaps 
marginalised, without directly interrogating the (industrial) nature of the texts’ origins.   
 
Jancovich is clearer on the structural genesis of the term, asserting that “cult movie fandom 
emerged not as a reaction against the market or the academy, but rather through their 
historical development” (Jancovich, 2002, 306), and “while cult audiences often present 
themselves in direct opposition to both the academy and the market, the emergence and 
development of cult movie fandom is intimately related to both” (Jancovich, 2003, 3).  
However, while he acknowledges that industrially, terms such as ‘mainstream’ are indistinct 
and sometimes even contradictory, Jancovich ultimately locates the definition in the moment 
of consumption, via the cult audiences who “confer value upon both themselves and the films 
around which they congregate.” (ibid., 2)  There are clearly issues of bourgeois taste, power 
and cultural authority at play for both the Smart and the cult film, and they share a common 
history, which is evident for all that ‘cult’ covers an even wider range of formal and thematic 
variations than ‘Smart’ does.121   
 
Mark Betz (2002) convincingly argues in his analysis of the American marketing of the 
European art film of 1950s and 1960s – an antecedent of the Smart film – as an alternative to 
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the more classical exploitation film.  He cites the 1960s-1970s ‘levelling’ of ground (within 
the academy and public discourse) between ideas of high and low culture, and argues that 
they experienced an ‘inversion’ during this period; he also notes that film historiography, if it 
deals with art cinema of the period outside of national cinema or auteur contexts, “has 
generally considered and represented its object as a heroic, modernist response to Hollywood 
global domination in economic and/or aesthetic terms” (Betz, 2002, 203) and emphasises 
stylistic differences without looking at the manner in which these were being incorporated 
into American film.  In short, for Betz, the academic tendency in exploring the ground 
between art cinema and mainstream film has been to emphasise difference, and most 
particularly stylistic difference, over similarity.   
 
In similar ways, the perception that cult film is primarily centred on extreme, excessive, or 
actively ‘bad’ film, has obscured some of the parallels between it, as a mode, and Smart 
cinema, which might usefully be regarded as an attempted modelling of cult characteristics 
(via textual and structural practices as well as industrial ones such as marketing and 
distribution) within a resolutely mainstreamed industrial context – one which allows enough 
interpretive space for consumers to experience the cult-like thrill of discovery of something 
outside of the mainstream, but without the kind of commitment to subaltern position-taking 
that appears to characterise the serious cultist. We can perhaps best view Smart, then, as a 
kind of mirror image of cult film; one where the definitional moment lies within the 
production context rather than that of audience consumption.  This relies to a certain extent 
on the audience reading the text as if it were ‘authentically’ cult, or independent – relying on 
audiences assuming an oppositional positioning which largely cannot be substantiated by the 
texts themselves, in their industrial contexts.   
 
In this, the Smart film is, industrially, double coded as both mainstream and marginal. 
‘Othering’ the notion of mainstream, insofar as the texts themselves adopt the formal and 
stylistic techniques of the margins, it can do so only partially, given that the Smart film is 
usually marketed, distributed, and exhibited by ‘the mainstream’: however as a discursive 
construct, that ‘otherness’ can be prevailed upon as needed.  Where cult privileges a kind of 
active repurposing, redemption from obscurity, or critical re-evaluation of texts, and with 
sub-culturally-motivated self-definition a frequent related factor, Smart could be, harshly, 
viewed as constituting a kind of lazily corporatized alternative.  In this framing, Smart would 
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have to be regarded as an industrial mobilisation of a set of ideas around non-conformity,
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for audiences which may self-define as marginalised (whether from the ‘elitism’ of art-house 
cinema, the ‘brutalism’ of mainstream cinema, or both) but for whom the highly codified and 
hierarchic – or, indeed, overwhelmingly masculinised – cult communities do not appeal.     
 
Access, then, and the fact that access has a relationship with status that is often characterised 
by diminishing returns, also pertains.  ‘Cult’ implies commitment – perhaps to a particular 
worldview, to a specific genre, to the amassing of trivia used to demonstrate (often gendered) 
mastery, and often to the seeking-out of related materials, obscure references, and vanished 
texts.  While that commitment is not antithetical to mainstream film audiences – although 
perhaps availability of information is what distinguishes ‘fandom’ from ‘cult’ – it is less 
likely to be characteristic of what John Fiske has described, awkwardly, as “more ‘normal’ 
popular audiences” (Fiske, 1992, 30).  The amendment of what we might understand as cult, 
or indeed its dilution by virtue of the increased accessibility of once-rare texts, has placed 
cultists in something of a dilemma as regards subcultural capital; while this is now less likely 
to be gained through tracking down obscure film work, the sense of cultural community once 
realized only through cult fanzines or fan conventions is now easily attained by means of 
internet forums.  For those audiences who stand somewhere between the cultists and the 
classical mainstream, access to information – and particularly the availability of the text – 
will not necessarily result in a loss of status or cultural capital; what may result in a gain in 
cultural capital is the sense of discovery rather than mastery; of being a cultural ‘early 
adopter’.  
 
In the sense in which genre can be regarded as the intersection of text, audience and industry, 
it is therefore perhaps the development of a newly-amorphous, in the light of more easily 
available texts and paratexts, audience territory somewhere between ‘cult’ and ‘mainstream’ 
which allowed Smart to emerge as an industrial category during the period in question.  
Indeed some writers on cult regard the term as being very specifically historical in nature; 
Jeffrey Sconce notes that to the extent cult can be described as a constitutive unit of cinema, 
it “was very specific to a finite window in the history of cinephilia and exhibition. ‘Cult’ 
thrived when film culture itself was growing in the 1970s/’80s and yet access to certain films 
remained somewhat limited.” (Sconce, 2008, 48)  From this perspective, Smart emerges as 
cult’s corporatized offspring, repackaged and repositioned for an audience no longer overtly 
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concerned with achieving access through effort and subsequent mastery, so much as with 
ease of availability; a kind of  ‘convenience cult’.   
 
The question arises too as to whether, in the context of the industrial history of 
conglomeration and vertical as well as horizontal expansion, it may have been almost 
inevitable.  Here, then, we can see Smart as part of a (conscious or otherwise) strategy of 
expansion of industrial control of the cinema market in its widest sense. If the cult text is a 
text ‘out of control’ by virtue of the fact that its distinctiveness and perceived cultural power 
lie in the hands of the specific audiences which valorise it, one can see within the logic of late 
capitalism that there must also exist a strong institutional urge to reintegrate that very 
distinctiveness into the system as a centre of profitability.  However, rarity and distinction are 
sociocultural markers for both cult and Smart film; industrial attempts to systematically 
produce these characteristics are fraught with representational difficulty for text and industry 
alike (as can be seen in the case of Fight Club, and the ease with which ‘innovation’ becomes 
cliché).
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As Joe Bob Briggs points out, “[by] the time Quentin Tarantino made Reservoir Dogs, being 
a cult auteur was a ticket to fame and stardom.” (Briggs et al, 2008, 43), a remark which 
indicates the extent to which auteurism and stardom have become linked, as well as the extent 
to which these can be and are employed as vital components of the positioning matrix 
surrounding any text.  If fans of any cult film are an explicitly self-defining group, we might 
perhaps argue that Smart fans are a group encouraged (or pushed) towards self-definition as 
much by the studios, through their marketing, distribution and exhibition strategies, as by the 
films themselves – as part of the process through which, argues Damien Love  
[t]he surface tics and exploitation excesses of old cult movies are commodified, have 
any dangerous edges knocked off, and get resold in the mainstream in much the same 
way as has always gone on in the music industry. (ibid., 2008, 45)
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I also see Smart’s emergence as being influenced by the discursive contexts of the period, in 
particular the growing legitimation of cult cinema through the 1980s and 1990s, by the 
academy, and by mainstream and film-fan press – as Jancovich points out, “cult movie 
fandom and academic film studies have often walked hand in hand and successive waves of 
‘radicalization’ within the discipline have been directly related to transformations in cult 
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movie fandom.” (Jancovich, 2003, 3), and critics have a vested interest in the maintenance of 
their own critical reputation. This can be enhanced or damaged by positions taken on specific 
texts; indeed the critic legitimates their professional practice and future reputation through the 
text.  As Ernest Mathijs indicates, how a film is discussed by critics within the discourse 
matters, and is part of the process by which that discourse reinforces its own boundaries, as 
well as contextualising the film for audiences: “[b]y helping Shivers [(David Cronenberg, 
1975)] receive a cult reputation, these critics secured their own relevance.” (Mathijs, 2003, 
122)  This is with the caveat that, by ‘relevance’, Mathijs essentially means ‘relevance to cult 
film fans’ rather than anyone else.    
 
This brings us to the most significant difference between cult cinema and Smart cinema (all 
the while acknowledging that some Smart cinema has itself become cult cinema for specific 
audiences, such as Fight Club or – as noted by Hoberman (Briggs et al 2008, 44) – Donnie 
Darko), which is that the perceived discursive and cultural worth of each is constructed in a 
different manner.   While both modes are associated with niche markets, and to a certain 
extent with fandom, Smart is, industrially, an attempt to combine the potentially 
transgressive, ‘cool’ underground appeal of cult cinema with – the key difference – a call to 
ideas of high culture and artistic status which can be related to both the art-house tradition 
and the middlebrow.  Here, the aura or image of alternative culture is appropriated by way of 
thematic transgressiveness or formal experimentation, becoming not quite an empty signifier, 
but close to; always (unlike, necessarily, cult cinema) just within the bounds of ‘taste’, and 
continually subject to the “[n]egation and denial [which] are especially likely when indie 
culture treads too closely to mainstream media.” (Newman, 2013, 79) 
 
Transgression, as in the case of Happiness, American Beauty, Pulp Fiction, or Boogie Nights, 
may be signalled within a framework of black comedy, overdetermined sincerity, playful 
irony, or unsettlingly blank tone, but it is highly unlikely to be framed by any of the 
crassness, extremity, campness, exploitation, or excess which tend to characterise cult.  Smart 
operates in a much more liminal field; a given text may produce tonal, structural or stylistic 
appeals to, variously and simultaneously, mainstream critics, niche or specialist critics, niche 
or cult audiences, but it does so with the allied promise of mainstream accessibility through 
its generic drivers.  These are the direct result of its embeddedness (in the case of the studio 
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films) or structural indebtedness to (for the more independent-produced works) the 
mainstream industry.   
 
In addition, as Mathijs and Sexton have argued of cult cinema,  
[c]ult films largely stand outside what James English (2005) has called ‘the economy 
of prestige’: the framework of valuation through award [sic], ceremonies, and 
prizes……Because it occupies a marginal position within the market of official 
culture, [cult film] mostly falls outside of the economy of prestige. (Mathijs and 
Sexton, 2012, 36)  
whereas the Smart film is deeply embedded within that very economy, located between the 
art cinema and festival circuit, and the edge of mainstream taste cultures. The media hysteria, 
for example, which greeted Tarantino’s 1994 Palme D’Or win could not have existed without 
both a strong emphasis on the assumed value and merit of such cultural awards, and a sense 
that such awards are generally outside the boundaries of what would be expected for a film 
like Pulp Fiction; this illustrates the liminal, part art-cinema, part genre-pic nature of Smart 
film.     
 
Despite counter-currents which may question the value of such awards, or equate them with 
‘selling out’, the use of these systems of validation as cultural markers which are then 
explicitly converted into revenue, and even their self-inscription as a celebrity-filled meta-
discourse all of their own, means that awards continue to serve as “the most bankable, 
fungible assets in the cultural economy.” (English, 2005, 22)  Smart is therefore differentiated 
from cult by being confined within an overall rhetoric of cultural prestige and academic or 
quasi-academic validation, often signalled by an emphasis on auteuristic concerns within the 
discourse around the film, for more explicitly bourgeois or middlebrow niche audiences.  It is 
this element of prestige – sought for, constructed, and dispensed to producers and audiences 
in a circuit of self-referentiality via the text – which is an important industrial characteristic 
of Smart film, and emblematic of the disproportional level of cultural capital enjoyed by 
middle-class audiences.
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Conclusions 
 
Auteurist discourse serves to unify the contradictions implied by Smart’s position as 
simultaneously ‘indie’ and mainstream, by containing it within an overarching narrative of 
creative innovation which often evacuates generic framings, and works to provide 
frameworks of critical legitimation for texts and for the critics who produce them.  Where 
individual texts contain thematic, stylistic or structural elements which can be positioned at, 
and interpreted along, a variety of loci on the continuum from mainstream to independent, the 
discourse of auteurism forms a framing mechanism which obscures their sometimes 
contradictory industrial underpinnings, and which calls to ideas of  prestige.  In addition, 
comparisons with earlier filmmakers provide a social-temporal reference point, allocating the 
Smart filmmakers a position or role within an assumed generational grouping. This is not 
presented as ‘simply’ coincidentally age-related, but linked through presumed shared socio-
cultural experiences, and through the overlaying of a presumed shared creative perspective, 
or even the presence of a wider or more coherent cultural movement.   
 
This serves not only to construct or reinforce the discourse of auteurism, but to provide 
cultural legitimation for Hollywood, implying that this strand of American cinema is part of a 
wider retrospective cultural inheritance, and that it is both directly produced from, and 
evocative of, a notional zeitgeist.   At a time of industrial flux, auteurist discourse constituted 
a branding and positioning tool both for individual texts and their directors (particularly for 
those films at the lower-budget end of the market), and relocated the locus of symbolic and 
ideological power regarding them, to within the industry itself.  This also worked to obscure 
the industrial origins of Smart cinema by mobilising discourses around ‘national cinema’, 
itself conceived of as theoretically ‘oppositional’.  Auteurist discourse also operates in 
service of the creation of reputational credit, which may be gained in the arena of Smart film 
but is frequently further mobilised in service of the putative revitalisation of ‘exhausted’ 
mainstream genres or franchises.  This practice continues and extends the manufacture of 
cultural legitimacy for filmmaker and industry into more mainstream production arenas, with 
Smart cinema here taking the form of a ‘training ground.’ 
 
Similarly, the mobilisation of notions of ‘cult’ works to create a sense of distinction for Smart 
cinema, again eliding more industrial interpretations.  Here, while textual similarities can be 
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drawn, the tendency of Smart to shy away from the extremes (textually and in audience 
terms) adopted by cult film facilitates framing Smart more as a parallel form: one which calls 
upon audiences to view themselves as consumers of a less-than-mainstream form, but which 
by remaining generically fundamentally accessible, does not call attention to textual or 
industrial characteristics which contradict this mode of viewing.   The cultural capital gained 
is a dilute version of that which is so vital to cult audiences, and one which appeals to ideas 
of discovery rather than of textual mastery or subcultural intimacy.  As with auteurism, ideas 
of distinction here entwine with the industrial urge to activate new seams of textual 
‘innovation’ as profit centres: this is linked with what I would see as the most significant 
difference between cult and Smart, which is the way in which the cultural value of each is 
constructed.  Where both are associated with market niches (and fandoms), and where cult 
predicates itself on theoretical (and sometimes physical) inaccessibility, Smart cinema’s 
fundamental basis of generic accessibility and mainstream-industrial embeddedness  means 
that attempts to combine cult appeals with references to cultural prestige are always grounded 
in a bourgeois sensibility.  This wider notion of ‘prestige’, and the way in which it manifests 
in and through evaluative mechanisms such as awards, is one to which I turn in my next 
chapter.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
Chapter Five: The Smart film, prestige, and ‘indie’ culture 
 
One element that recurs throughout accounts of the rise of the Smart sector is that of 
‘prestige’ (see King 2005 and 2009, Biskind 2005, Sconce 2002, Tzioumakis 2006, Levy 
1999).  However, academics working within the field of economics argue that frequently, 
‘commonsense’ expectations of how (or even if) prestige results in corresponding financial 
success are thwarted by “problematic data and unexpected empirical findings.” (Hollbrook 
and Addis, 2008, 88)  To this extent, although one may try to quantify the value that prestige, 
measured in awards and reviewer approval, may benefit a film commercially, modelling it 
explicitly remains challenging.  Beyond acknowledging that, regardless of the specific branch 
of the culture industries involved, artistic prestige is “a system of hierarchies of agreed-upon 
social value…it is a quality that people confer upon others but it is also a system inextricably 
bound up with that conferral” (Van Laar and Diepeveen, 2012, 1) it is in the field of cultural 
economics that much of the research in this area is to be found. 
 
Holbrook and Addis reviewed the field just after the height of the Smart period, sampling a 
wide range of work on the area.
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 Outlining a ‘two-path model’, their assessment of the 
statistics available suggests that 
reviewer-and-consumer evaluations and buzz respond differently to a film’s 
marketing clout (production budget, opening screens, and opening box office) and 
that these audience responses contribute independently to a film’s industry 
recognition and market performance along two separable paths. (Holbrook and Addis, 
2007, 87)   
The marketing and positioning of a film has a direct impact on how the film performs along 
two evaluative pathways, the first that of ‘commercial success’ (the commerce path) and the 
other being ‘artistic success’ (the art-related path). While the manner in which a studio 
positions and markets a film may affect both audience responses and industry evaluations of 
success (as measured through awards and ratings), it does not do so in the same manner for 
all films.
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  Not only that, but the interplay of the elements of ‘critical recognition’ and 
‘popular buzz’ may function in a contradictory way (at a commercial level) for different types 
of films, despite the fact that the two paths are by nature ‘uncorrelated’ and as such, no 
automatic relationship can be inferred.  They note in particular, that the more elevated the 
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spending on marketing, regardless of ‘buzz’ along the commerce path, the less likely the film 
is to be evaluated highly along the artistic path.  
 
While the correlation of these two elements suggest further research is needed, the 
implications for Smart cinema are striking, suggesting that lower-budget independent-
produced films such as Pi, Donnie Darko, Brick, Memento, Happiness, and (to a much lesser 
extent, Pulp Fiction) may to a certain extent avail of favourable critical judgements as a result 
of their industrial positioning.  My contention is that their positioning (as low-budget films 
possessed of non-mainstream generic or stylistic features, and marketed more through critical 
discourse and word of mouth than extensive paid-for advertising, characteristics then 
mobilised into tokens of quality) feeds the kind of ‘David and Goliath’ mythology which 
creates prestige-in-opposition. That is, individual films may be valorised for their apparent 
breach of the supposedly monolithic industrial practices of the Hollywood industry, as much 
as for their textual strategies.   
 
Alisa Perren analyses this tendency in her analysis of My Big Fat Greek Wedding (Joel 
Zwick, 2002), stating that media discourse around that film positioned it as an independent 
film ‘beating the odds’ to become massively successful within the mainstream marketplace.  
This representation reinforced conceptions of the film industry as inherently monolithic, and 
restricted the way in the marketing and positioning techniques used to promote the film 
(themselves the direct result of studio involvement) were viewed, as “the ideological power 
of journalistic discourses [around texts] can sometimes be as potent as the ideologies of the 
media texts themselves.” (Perren, 2004, 29)  Additionally, these discourses not only construct 
partial narratives about individual films, but  
reinforced a number of inaccuracies and misperceptions about the operations of the 
contemporary media industries. These stories have had the effect of constructing – 
and reinforcing – certain mythologies about the dichotomies between ‘Hollywood’ 
and ‘independent’ films (ibid., 18). 
 
In this frame, the likes of Lost in Translation, Ghost World, Being John Malkovich, Sideways, 
Huckabees, Eternal Sunshine, and American Beauty – essentially low- to mid-budget studio 
productions – represent a means by which these mythologies can be harnessed productively, 
in order to colonise ‘independentness’ (that is, a set of perceptions of independence, rather 
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than a material condition of industrial independence) in service of box office returns and 
market share.  Here, the continued conglomeration of the media industries is disguised by 
discursive interventions privileging a binary opposition.  The film she discusses is notable for 
its highly conventional generic and formal attributes, and I would argue that this limits the 
way in which discourse around it can be framed, unlike Smart films, which also call upon 
ideas of innovation, transgression, or quality.  As a bigger-budget Smart film with dominant 
(conventional) generic features, The Matrix by contrast mobilises not discourses of 
opposition, but of generic mastery and technical innovation (Maslin, 1999a; Ansen, 1999; 
Bradshaw, 1999), being limited within the prescribed terms of its science fiction and action 
foundations; Fight Club forms a curious liminal case, for the way in which as Fox’s industrial 
experiences led them to position it as a straightforward action film, when adopting a more 
oppositional stance might have been more fruitful.   
 
Holbrook and Addis also argue that “the relationship between evaluative judgements of 
excellence and aspects of popular appeal in the case of motion pictures tends to be 
significant-but-weak, typically accounting for less than 10% of the variance in popularity or 
market performance” (Holbrook and Addis, 2007, 87) although they recognise that part of the 
confusion relates to the presence of a multiplicity of potential answers to the question of what 
‘success’ might constitute within the culture industries.  They conclude that “evaluations of 
excellence by reviewers and consumers influence industry recognition in ways that are 
essentially independent from the manner in which critical and popular buzz contributes to 
market performance.” (ibid., 101)  The “paradoxes of using market forces as a measure of 
cultural value” (Williams, 2001, 9) notwithstanding, there can be considerable differences in 
terms of the extent to which individual researchers assign statistical significance to the nature 
and number of reviews for given films, and these should not be neglected.   
 
However, Holbrook and Addis’ work would appear to indicate that the nature of studio 
attention – particularly in marketing and release strategy – to a small-to-medium-sized budget 
film (similar to many of the Smart films I discuss) is deeply influential, both in setting the 
audience’s expectations, and predisposing it towards being assessed within a particular 
framework of ‘quality’ and its close companion, prestige, in ways which may only 
sometimes, or only tangentially, be related to market performance.
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  Not only that, but their 
conclusion that favourable high evaluations along an artistic spectrum cannot be directly 
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correlated with commercial success suggests that other, less concrete, motives exist for 
studios’ pursuit of critical and creative endorsement, as much related to individual and 
institutional cultural status as to financial return.  
 
Intangible though the notion of prestige may be, it has been a consistent factor in the 
production and positioning of films from the industry’s earliest days.  Tino Balio (1995) 
points out that for the emerging studios, product differentiation became a key economic 
factor, most crucially “at the highest level, where a studio stood the chance of gaining (or 
losing) the most money.” (Balio, 1995, 11)  Balio’s account of the emergence of ‘the prestige 
picture’ of the early studio period, which he argues was the most important and popular 
production trend of the 1930s, is illustrative when compared with the modern context.  The 
prestige picture cycle of the early classical period constituted a set of middlebrow films 
which were often adaptations of literary classics (nineteenth century novels, the works of 
Shakespeare) and ‘socially sanctioned’ contemporary work (Broadway plays, adapted novels 
by Nobel or Pulitzer prizewinners), but could encompass “different genres, several motion-
picture styles and other production trends – musicals, biopics, historical dramas, women’s 
films, and even horror films.” (ibid., 180)  In fact, they could take almost any generic form – 
including upscale comedy, war picture, melodrama, or western – although in terms of shared 
characteristics, they tended to be black and white (due to the expense of colour production), 
to be longer than more workaday productions, to be made with considerably larger budgets, 
to be marketed extensively, and exhibited via roadshow.
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To that end, clearly the prestige picture should be regarded as an industrial formation rather 
than a necessarily textual one, in that the term “designates production values and promotion 
treatment….typically a big-budget special based on a presold property, often as not a 
‘classic,’ and tailored for top stars.” (ibid., 179)  Importantly, the prestige picture was 
proportionally highly significant in revenue terms – but not valuable purely for its financial 
contribution. As Balio says, “[c]ompared to the total output of the majors, prestige pictures 
accounted for a small percentage, but compared to the total production budgets, they 
accounted for a lion’s share. Moreover, prestige pictures played a crucial role in defining the 
public image of a company.” (ibid., 179, italics mine) Here, then, we see a role beyond the 
immediate financial gain signified by box office returns, and one implying that ‘intangible’ 
attributes like prestige may be significant at a wider level, beyond the provision of free 
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publicity via reviews.  I would suggest too that not much has changed tremendously – that 
‘prestige’ is still defined and allocated via the quasi-industrial discursive contexts within 
which the text operates, as much as or more than by audience approbation – when one 
considers Douglas Gomery’s note that “[i]n 1925 product prestige can be thought of as the 
extent to which the films of a studio are perceived to be of ‘quality’ by the contemporary 
moulders of public opinion about films – commentators and critics in the trade and the 
general press.” (Gomery, 2005, 39) 
     
Obviously the ‘prestige cinema’ of the 1930s is not the same type of cinema, formally, as the 
Smart film, calling more to mind what the Nouvelle Vague critics would have described 
disparagingly as ‘cinéma du papa’.  The contemporary equivalent of these sorts of film are 
still financially bankable, and indeed still frequently garner awards from within the system, 
but I believe the status of the type of prestige they carry has, semiotically speaking, altered 
with the contemporary proliferation of evaluative mechanisms (see English, 2005) and in 
particular the increased prevalence of niche awards: awards for accomplishment in specific 
genre, for technical skills, and the use of awards schemes by an increasing variety of art-
house, independent and international festivals.  The traditional prestige film, positioned as 
solid, mainstream mass entertainment, still holds a certain middlebrow standing – often 
related, as with the prestige film of the 1930s, to links with historical events or persons, or 
fiction from the literary canon – but is rarely regarded as holding the type of status associated 
with innovation or creativity.
130
  That is not to say that the model does not ever encroach 
upon the Smart world, as can be seen from Geoff King’s (2009) exploration of Shakespeare 
in Love, which functioned as a kind of play on the prestige film, upholding its status (and the 
status of its subject) even as it poked fun at the conventions of historical representation.   
 
However my case is that a variety of models for attributing prestige to texts can be seen to 
apply, in different contexts, and to different types of film – as we have seen, for example, 
applying the framework ‘cult cinema’ around a text creates a specific context within which 
judgements are made.  In part, as previously discussed, this is due to the economic 
imperatives which dominate Hollywood cinema as a commercial enterprise, in particular the 
requirement for increasingly wide variation within the cinematic product line.  This would be, 
for example, clearly in line with Kawashima’s (2011) contention that profitability is related to 
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scope, or Nicholas Garnham’s more wide-ranging explanation for the continued persistence 
of wide variation within the film market, that:  
survival depends upon economies of scope, the spreading of risk across a range of 
products, to ensure the 10 percent or so chance of the hit that will provide a viable 
average return. Sustainably viable industries are impossible without the level of 
concentration that enables these economies of scope. At the same time, this economic 
model positively requires diversity. Indeed, for this reason there is a constant 
tendency to overproduction. (Garnham, 2011, 50) 
In this context, Smart itself functions as a kind of ‘overproduction’, a proliferation (under, in 
its essentially low- to mid-budget nature, the conditions of ‘acceptable risk’) of broadly non-
classical work within the industry that fulfils the need for product variation as well as the 
industry’s drive for legitimacy through prestige.  
 
Smart cinema’s ‘methods’ of acquiring prestige are also of interest.  Smart’s growth strongly 
parallels the growth of film festival culture in the US and internationally during the 1990s 
and after,
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 particularly those festivals identifying themselves as for, or at least open to, 
independent-framed work (see Tzioumakis, 2013, 35, or Newman, 2011), a growth which 
forms part of the general proliferation of cultural prizes English identifies (English, 2005).  
Their function is not exclusively to bestow markers of prestige and acclaim – they are 
industrial networking events featuring complex sets of power relations, sites of deal-making, 
public cultural events, and serve a variety of purposes “at the intersection of art, commerce, 
technology, culture, identity, power, politics and ideology” (Rüling & Strandgaard Pedersen, 
2010, 319), and at which “symbolic capital accrued from participation in a competition 
program [tends] to be directly capitalized at the market taking place next door.” (de Valck & 
Soeteman, 2010, 294)  However, they often involve the ritualised conferral of prestige in the 
form of awards, which then forms an element within the intertextual relay producing 
discourse around film texts.   Similarly, dedicated awards systems (such as the Academy 
Awards) function both as entertainment-based events, and as relays of industrially-grounded 
approbation. 
 
I do not at this point wish to engage in an extended investigation of the nature of prestige in 
the discourses of cinema, for all that this is a fascinating topic and one which warrants more 
extensive research.  I here limit myself to noting that prestige in the form of festival 
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participation and awards constitutes a basis both for reinforcing industrial norms, and for 
facilitating the extension of those, according to the texts available – rewarding adherence to 
particular kinds of filmic paradigm, such as the manner in which the evaluative mechanism of 
a science fiction awards system simultaneously reinforces the generic structures which 
‘contain’ science fiction, and extends them by incorporating new texts in each year’s 
selection.  Certainly awards function to not only provide for the possibility of the accrual of 
box-office benefits, but also “as a signal to competitors……[and] function as a means of 
certification…directed towards other actors in the value system, such as distributors and, of 
course final consumer, and also to other certifiers.” (Wijnberg, 2003, 83) 
 
As an attempt to tentatively explore the ways in which awards prestige have constructed 
Smart cinema, and in an effort to establish whether or not the prestige industry functions to 
‘segregate’ Smart, integrate it into the mainstream more explicitly, or ‘hive it off’ in 
interpretational silos, I have conducted a brief survey of the awards and nominations for each 
of the texts I discuss in more detail elsewhere.
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  For each of these films, the type of 
awarding body most likely to bestow prestige is significant; an aggregation of the type of 
awards received reveals material data about theoretical positioning.  That is, awards systems 
provide real information in terms of how films’ individual textual strategies are perceived in 
this quasi-industrial – and sometimes public – context: awards form a symbolic ‘bridge’ 
between the industrial, the textual, and the public.   
 
However, I contend that while awards systems serve broadly discursive and strictly 
commercial functions, the manner in which these intertwine is not statistically stable or easily 
predictable,
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 and different types of award may be seen casually to reward different modes 
and styles of film.  There is also an inherent complication here which must be addressed: that 
is, while interesting patterns may emerge from exploring how films are rewarded for their 
adherence to specific categories, it is that very adherence which performs a pre-selecting 
‘narrowing’ of options prior to any selections being made from those categories.  Therefore 
while I may speak of, for example, Welcome to the Dollhouse being rewarded by an art-
house/independent awards framework, its very selection for participation in that framework is 
an indication of the extent to which it is seen to adhere to prescribed selection criteria.  
Therefore I have chosen to include nominations as well as awards won. 
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Table 1: Arthouse/independent prestige 
Film Generic keys Mainstream  Arthouse  Cult Prestige mode Awards 
Reservoir Dogs 
(Quentin 
Tarantino, 1992) 
Heist; Action; 
Thriller; Crime 
Action; violence as 
display; suspense; 
humour; male 
bonding 
Complex narrative; visual 
stylisation; awards/festivals 
Violence as transgressive 
pleasure; language; 
dialogue; black comedy; 
'new talent discovered' 
Arthouse/independent 
Avignon, Independent Spirit, Sitges-Catalonia, 
Stockholm, Sundance, Toronto International 
Welcome to the 
Dollhouse (Todd 
Solondz, 1995) 
Drama; Black 
Comedy; Teen; 
Coming-of age 
Teen; comedy; 
coming-of-age 
Transgressive paedophilia; 
gender relations; 
awards/festivals 
Black comedy Arthouse/independent 
Berlin, Deauville, Independent Spirit, Stockholm, 
Sundance, Valladolid 
Safe (Todd 
Haynes, 1995) 
Drama; Mystery 
Mystery; drama; 
emotional 
engagement 
Paranoia; crisis; opaque style; 
awards/festivals; auteurism; 
mental instability; cult groups 
Haynes as subcultural 
auteur 
Arthouse/independent 
Independent Spirit, Rotterdam, Seattle, Sitges-
Catalonia 
Happiness (Todd 
Solondz, 1998)  
Drama; Black 
comedy; Family 
drama 
Comedy; 
melodrama; 
possibility of 
emotional 
engagement 
Paedophilia; awards/festivals; 
interlocking structure; mental 
instability; auteurism 
Sexual transgression; 
black comedy 
Arthouse/independent 
BIFA, Cannes (FIPRESCI Prize), Golden Globe, 
Independent Spirit, Stockholm, Sao Paolo, Toronto 
International  
Pi (Darren 
Aronofsky, 1998) 
Sci-fi; Drama; 
Thriller; 
Experimental 
Action; uncertainty; 
mystery; protagonist 
in danger;  
Black and white form; religion; 
mathematics; low-fi 
production; insanity 
Narrative complexity; lo-fi; 
conspiracy; 'new talent 
discovered' 
Arthouse/independent 
Deauville, Gijon, Gotham, Independent Spirit, 
Sundance, Thessaloniki 
Donnie Darko 
(Richard Kelly, 
2001) 
Drama; Mystery; 
Teen; Sci-fi 
Teen; coming-of-age; 
humour; mystery; 
romance; sci-fi 
Hallucinations; mental illness; 
complex narrative; unreliable 
narrator; mathematics; 
philosophy; unstable reality; 
misfit; suburban anomie; 
paedophilia; destruction 
Ironic retro; need for 
repeated viewing; anti-
conformist; teen; coming-
of-age;  
Hybrid indie/arthouse 
Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror, 
Independent Spirit, SFX, Sitges-Catalonia, Sundance 
Primer (Shane 
Carruth, 2004) 
Sci-fi; Action; 
Thriller; 
Experimental 
Action; suspense; 
sci-fi; thriller;  
Formal experimentation; 
complex narrative structure; 
suburban; unreliable narrator? 
New talent discovered'; 
need for repeated 
viewing; complex 
narrative plus 
action/suspense 
Arthouse/independent 
Fantasporto, Gotham, Independent Spirit, Sitges-
Catalonia, Sundance 
Brick (Rian 
Johnson, 2005) 
Teen; Noir; 
Drama; Crime; 
Mystery 
Teen; coming-of-age; 
romance; crime; 
mystery; suspense;  
Formal subversion; self-
referential; self-conscious 
references to film history 
canon; formal experimentation 
New talent discovered'; 
nostalgia; irony; humour; 
play with form; parody; 
unexpected juxtaposition 
of form; teen  
Arthouse/independent 
BFI, Deauville, Empire, Independent Spirit, Sitges-
Catalonia, Sundance 
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Eight of the films (Reservoir Dogs, Welcome to the Dollhouse, Safe, Happiness, Pi, Primer, 
Donnie Darko, and Brick) present themselves with what I would describe as an ‘art-
house/independent’ set of evaluations.  All of the awards here are from international festivals 
associated with art-house or strongly independent production, with Sundance featuring 
heavily among them, indicating its (at least theoretically) strong emphasis on American 
cinema of a particular type.  Here, the while the desire of studios to acquire a ‘breakout hit’ 
has implications for the way in which these festivals function as a marketplace, the stylistic 
characteristics associated with the films militates towards the art cinema end, and the values 
celebrated are those of production context – that is, that these films have been produced 
‘outside of the system’.  When ranked by number of awards and nominations each has 
collected, the minority status of the films is also borne out, the ranking of each placing them 
largely at the bottom end of popular attention.  This evaluation is borne out by their actual 
production context (all of these films, regardless of their distribution arrangements, having 
been made independently).  These are, therefore, the films with greatest material distance 
from the studios in terms of their practical (financial) involvement with them; it should be 
noted that this is a pre-selection criterion for many festivals which concentrate on 
independent cinema, which necessarily skews any analysis.        
 
Here, the presence at, and valuations performed through, these festivals can be seen to 
reinforce perceptions of independent work as ‘auteuristic’ in nature, as does the presence of 
explicitly non-mainstream content, whether in the form of subject material (Happinesss), tone 
– including an oblique, distanced or blank approach (Dollhouse, Safe), complex narrative (Pi, 
Primer, Donnie Darko), transgressive performativity (the violence of Reservoir Dogs) or 
potentially-alienating generic play (Brick). In these cases, while more mainstream generic 
drivers do exist (most strongly for Reservoir Dogs and Pi) they are seen to be outweighed by 
textual elements which privilege the supposedly inaccessible, the self-consciously 
transgressive, and the classically ‘artistic’.  I would note, too, that this tranche is heavily 
weighted towards the earlier part of the period under discussion, with five out of the eight 
films dating to the 1990s, and the three from the 2000s, receiving only a very limited initial 
release; this illustrates the sense in which Smart cinema was still largely considered a 
‘marginal’ form at this point, and had yet to move further into the mainstream from a prestige 
(or indeed audience access) perspective.       
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Table 2: Indie/mainstream prestige 
 
Film Generic keys Mainstream  Arthouse  Cult Prestige mode Awards 
Rushmore (Wes 
Anderson, 1998) 
Comedy; Drama; 
Teen; Coming-of-
age 
Comedy; emotional 
engagement; 
personal growth; 
coming-of-age 
Black comedy; suburban 
anomie; irony 
Black comedy; subculture; 
offbeat; 'quirky'; 'new 
talent discovered' 
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
BFI, Golden Globe, Independent Spirit, Teen 
Choice 
Election 
(Alexander Payne, 
1999) 
Comedy; Teen; 
Coming-of-age 
comedy; teen; 
coming-of-age; star 
power;  
Underage/transgressive 
sexuality; satire 
Underage/transgressive 
sexuality; black comedy; 
homosexuality; irony; 
satire;  
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
Oscar, ACE, GLAAD, Independent Spirit, Teen 
Choice, Writers Guild  
Fight Club (David 
Fincher, 1999) 
Action; Drama; 
Thriller; 
Conspiracy 
Violence as display; 
sex; action; thriller; 
star power; SFX; high 
production values; 
male bonding; politics 
of masculinity 
Unstable reality; unreliable 
narrator; split personality; 
philosophy; insanity; anti-
conformist 
Anti-conformism; gender 
politics; violence; action; 
philosophy; need for 
repeated viewing 
Hybrid indie/mainstream Oscar, Brit, Empire, MTV, Political Film Society 
The Royal 
Tenenbaums 
(Wes Anderson, 
2001) 
Comedy; Drama; 
Black Comedy 
Comedy; family; 
drama; classical 
emotional 
engagement;  
Black comedy; incest; 
depression; terminal illness; 
tone; dysfunctional family 
cult star; black comedy; 
language/dialogue; 
dysfunctional family; 
'quirky'; ironic retro 
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Bafta, Berlin, 
Golden Globe, Writers Guild  
Ghost World 
(Terry Zwigoff, 
2001) 
Drama; Teen; 
Coming-of-age; 
Black comedy 
Teen; coming-of-age; 
romance; humour;  
Suburban anomie; dialogue; 
ironic retro; misfit; anti-
conformist 
Based on cult source; 
ironic retro; teen angst; 
coming of age 
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Academy of 
Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror, BIFA, 
Deauville, Empire, Golden Globe, Independent 
Spirit, MTV, PEN, Writers Guild  
Adaptation (Spike 
Jonze, 2002) 
Drama; Comedy; 
Crime; Thriller  
Action; romance; 
crime; star power; 
comedy; thriller 
Complex structure; auteurism; 
formal play; interiority exposed; 
casting against type; 
awards/festivals 
humour; casting against 
type; formal play; need for 
repeated viewing; casting 
against type 
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Bafta, Berlin, 
Golden Globe, PEN, SAG, Writers Guild  
Lost In 
Translation (Sofia 
Coppola, 2003)   
Drama; Comedy; 
Drama; Fish-out-
of-water  
Humour; star power; 
fish-out-of-water; 
coming-of-age; 
emotional 
engagement 
Cross-cultural exploration; 
tone; uncertainty; 
reticent/withdrawn style; 
philosophical or identity crisis; 
uncertain resolution; auteurism 
Humour; romance; cult 
casting 
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Bafta, Cesar, 
DGA, Golden Globe, Independent Spirit, MTV, 
SAG, Teen Choice, Venice, Writers Guild  
The Life Aquatic 
With Steve Zissou 
(Wes Anderson, 
2004) 
Comedy; Drama; 
Adventure  
Humour; action; 
adventure; 
conventional 
emotional 
engagement; male 
bonding 
Auteurism; formal 
experimentation; irony; formal 
unpredictability 
Cult casting; quirky; 
humour; casting against 
type; auteurism;  
Hybrid indie/mainstream 
Art Directors Guild, Berlin, Broadcast Film 
Critics Association 
I ♥ Huckabees 
(David O. Russell, 
2004) 
Comedy; Drama; 
Mystery; Action  
Star power; comedy;  
Absurdity; philosophy; formal 
experimentation; personal 
crisis; playfulness 
Formal playfulness; 
humour; casting against 
type; need for repeated 
viewing; 'quirky'  
Hybrid indie/mainstream Gotham, Golden Trailer, Satellite, Chlotrudis 
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The second set of films also comprises eight films, and I describe it as the ‘hybrid 
indie/mainstream’ set.  This encompasses all of Wes Anderson’s films, Election, Fight Club, 
Ghost World, Adaptation, Lost In Translation, and I ♥ Huckabees.  The awards systems here 
are more or less equally balanced between the more independent-leaning (such as the 
Independent Spirit awards) and the much more strongly bourgeois or mainstream ones, such 
as the Academy Awards, Golden Globes, and BAFTAs.  I contend that this set of evaluations 
indicates the transitional nature of the Smart mode over this period, in that it describes a 
process of infiltration into the popular consciousness, while limited as regards the extent to 
which it is embedded within the mainstream. This perhaps too is reflected in the wide span of 
the degree of critical attention paid; Lost In Translation is ranked third out of all the films I 
discuss in terms of the number of awards won and nominated for (something which, 
speculatively, may reflect the tendency to regard Coppola as an ‘inheritor’ auteur as much as 
its high degree of audience reach) and Adaptation fifth; Huckabees is last.
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  It is notable too 
that the primary generic driver for each is comedy (for all that this takes a variety of different 
forms), indicating for me that this transition into the mainstream was strongly influenced by 
the increasing adoption of these texts by audiences for whom work more strongly coded as 
‘art-house’ might tend to be inaccessible, and the stronger likelihood of comedic elements to 
cross over.   
 
While mainstream generic drivers dominate, another element that arises is the extent to which 
the youth-oriented or youth-referencing films also feature here (Rushmore, Election, Ghost 
World, and to a much lesser extent Lost in Translation), all of which were honoured by 
awards I would regard as strongly mainstream (in that they are access-dependent): the MTV 
and Teen Choice Awards.  Fight Club also forms a particular case here: most of its on-release 
mainstream awards and nominations were in technical categories; costume design, sound 
editing and so on (although it would later win many awards for its DVD release, reflecting its 
particular place in the form’s evolution) or those popularly regarded as technical ‘consolation 
prizes’.  I include it in this category primarily because of its MTV and Premiere nominations, 
combined with the fact that its other nominations were primarily technical.  To me this 
suggests that the youth audience may form a strong constituency of the early adopters of 
Smart cinema, although clearly this requires further research.  Not only that, but here we find 
a preponderance of the work which MacDowell would recognise as ‘quirky’, suggesting that 
while this work constitutes a marginal appeal in one sense – MacDowell (2010, 2013) and 
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Newman both strongly associate this mode with the ‘hipster’ (2009, 2013) – it is still 
positioned to avail of mainstream prestige mechanisms.  All but one of these films was 
produced by or in conjunction with a major studio, and the bulk of these films come from the 
early- to mid-2000s, which I see as evidence of a (not necessarily coherent) industrial 
strategy, or desire to capitalise on expanding niche markets.    
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Table 3: Mainstream/bourgeois prestige 
 
Film Generic keys Mainstream  Arthouse  Cult Prestige mode Awards 
Boogie 
Nights (P.T. 
Anderson, 
1997) 
Drama; 
Melodrama; 
Period; Biopic; 
Crime 
Sex; celebrity; drugs; 
crime; empathy for 
protagonist; politics of 
masculinity 
Transgressive sex; sex 
industry presented 
neutrally 
Sex; comedy; 
glamour; subculture; 
nostalgia/irony 
Bourgeois/mainstream 
Oscars, SAG, MTV, 
Golden Globe, BAFTA, 
BFI, PEN, Toronto 
International 
Magnolia 
(P.T. 
Anderson, 
1999) 
Drama; 
Melodrama; 
Family drama 
Character-centred; 
romance; comedy; 
family; revelations; stars; 
emotions; politics of 
masculinity 
Complex interlocking 
structures; auteurism; 
awards/festivals 
Casting against type; 
'epic' scope may call 
for repeated viewing; 
mutable reality (not 
strictly realist) 
Bourgeois/mainstream 
Oscars, Berlin, 
Blockbuster, Empire, 
Golden Globe, San 
Sebastian, Toronto 
International, Writers 
Guild  
American 
Beauty 
(Sam 
Mendes, 
1999) 
Drama; 
Melodrama; 
Family drama; 
Comedy; Coming-
of-age 
Suburban drama; 
prestige; star power; 
personal growth; 
emotional engagement; 
politics of masculinity 
Homophobia; 
homosexuality; 
underage/transgressive 
sexuality; rejection of 
societal norms; suburban 
anomie; awards/festivals 
New talent 
discovered' 
Bourgeois/mainstream 
Oscar, Bafta, 
Blockbuster, DGA, 
Empire, Golden Globe, 
MTV, SAG, Teen 
Choice, Toronto 
International, Writers 
Guild, Young 
Hollywood 
Sideways 
(Alexander 
Payne, 
2004) 
Comedy; Drama; 
Fish-out-of-water; 
Melodrama; 
Romance; Road 
Trip 
Comedy; drama; 
romance; road trip; male 
bonding; fish out of 
water;  
Avoids conventional 
character empathy 
(unlikeable); philosophical 
or identity crisis; mid-
life/bourgeois crisis 
Humour; character 
study; 'failure' 
celebrated 
Bourgeois/mainstream 
American Film Institute, 
Oscar, ACE, Bafta, 
DGA, Golden Globe, 
Independent Spirit, 
SAG, Writers Guild  
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The third group – the ‘bourgeois/mainstream’ films – is the set of films which most strongly 
represents the supposed ‘annus mirabilis’ of quasi-independent film, 1999.  This selection 
comprises Boogie Nights, Magnolia, American Beauty, and Sideways, the last two of which 
were respectively the highest and second-highest ranked for overall award recognition. Here, 
the Academy Awards features most strongly, indicating the extent to which these films could 
have been regarded as embraced by the mainstream. They are also the films which most 
minimise cult or art-house associations – they could be described as the ‘least Smart’ – and 
strongly privilege classical formal constructions (all can be straightforwardly or casually 
described as ‘drama’), an ‘epic’ scope (in particular P.T. Anderson’s work), the 
melodramatic, and the mid-life crisis (American Beauty, Sideways); in addition, all of them 
engage with the politics of male sexuality.  Therefore I would regard this grouping as a strong 
example of the way in which mainstream prestige mechanisms privilege the bourgeois, the 
middle-class, and the masculinist, and award most prestige to those films which least 
transgress formal classical expectations.  
 
All of these films are also budgeted at the higher end of the scale (although not the highest) 
and come from studios which were attempting most strongly to colonise territory during the 
period; New Line diversifying from its niche genre comedies and horrors, Fox Searchlight 
working to consolidate its position as dominant producer within the quasi-independent arena, 
and Dreamworks SKG attempting to establish itself outside of the animation field. In this 
sense, the high degree of approval shown for these films relates not just to critical 
approbation or box office performance, but also represents prestige granted within the 
industry, by the structural institution that is Hollywood, perhaps as recognition for the 
solidification of its own interventions within the quasi-independent field.  
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Table 4: Generic/cult/technical prestige 
 
 
Film 
Generic keys Mainstream  Arthouse  Cult Prestige mode Awards 
Dark City 
(Alex Proyas, 
1998) 
Sci-fi; Mystery; Noir 
Sci-fi; action; 
production 
values; romance; 
mystery 
Postmodern architecture; 
unstable reality; unreliable 
narrator; ironic noir 
Noir pastiche; irony; 
nostalgia; unstable 
reality; conspiracy; 
fascist kitsch; failure at 
box office; need for 
repeated viewing; 
Proyas himself 
Cult/generic/technical 
Saturn, Bram 
Stoker, BIFFF, 
Hugo, Int. Horror 
Guild 
The Matrix 
(A. 
Wachowski 
and L. 
Wachowski, 
1999) 
Sci-fi; Action; Adventure 
Action; violence; 
martial arts; male 
bonding; star 
power 
Philosophy; unstable reality; 
position within film history 
(i.e. references other 
styles/Asian cinema etc.); 
innovative style (bullet time - 
has particular status within 
innovation context 
Unstable reality; heavy 
stylisation; 
action/martial arts; need 
for repeated viewing; 
anti-conformist; 'new 
talent discovered' 
Cult/generic/technical 
Oscar, Academy 
of Science Fiction, 
Fantasy & Horror, 
Bafta, 
Blockbuster, 
Empire, Hugo, 
MTV, Nebula 
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Two films – The Matrix and Dark City – are notable for the way in which the prestige they 
are granted through awards mechanisms almost entirely reflects their generic drivers. The 
Matrix’s Academy Award and BAFTA nods are all in technical categories (editing, visual 
effects and sound), which to me illustrates the tendency of bourgeois awards systems to, 
where generic drivers are specifically embedded in ‘lower-status’ models such as action and 
to a lesser extent sci-fi, endow credit in technical categories rather than in higher-prestige 
‘creative’ categories.  In this context, the drive to produce an industrial acknowledgement of 
the film’s financial success is in conflict with generic drivers which reduce its perceived 
prestige, therefore a kind of ‘compromise agreement’ is produced.  This is not the case for 
more populist evaluative mechanisms such as the Blockbuster Entertainment and Empire 
awards, voted for by the public.  Similarly, Dark City’s awards were exclusively generated 
within the more ‘cult’ arena of science and speculative fiction evaluative mechanisms, 
reflecting both the film’s limited box office appeal and the intensity of its generic 
imperatives, which worked to obscure the tonal and thematic markers of Smartness which it 
employs.  I would argue, additionally, that it appears here as if the dominance of perceptions 
of science fiction as an explicitly popular (or even low-prestige) genre has militated against 
interpretations of the films as being of a ‘quality’ nature; in this sense, their Smartness is 
obscured by genre.   
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Table 5: Strongly hybrid prestige 
 
Film Generic keys Mainstream  Arthouse  Cult Prestige mode Awards 
Pulp Fiction 
(Quentin 
Tarantino, 
1994) 
Crime; Thriller; 
Gangster; 
Buddy 
Action; 
violence; 
comedy; 
glamour; male 
bonding 
Unreliable narration; 
unconventional 
structure; auteurism; 
awards/festivals 
Violence; 
language; 
dialogue; black 
comedy 
Strongly hybrid 
- all 
represented 
Oscar, Academy of Science Fiction, 
Fantasy & Horror, Bafta, Palme D'Or 
Cannes, Cesar, DGA, Edgar Allen Poe, 
Golden Globe, Independent Spirit, MTV, 
SAG 
Being John 
Malkovich 
(Spike Jonze, 
1999) 
Comedy; 
Drama; 
Fantasy 
Comedy; star 
power;  
Unstable reality; 
interiority; auteurism; 
complex narrative; 
casting against type; 
awards/festivals 
Unstable 
reality; complex 
narrative; 
comedy; 
casting against 
type; need for 
repeated 
viewing; 'new 
talent 
discovered' 
Strongly hybrid 
- all 
represented 
Oscar, Academy of Science Fiction, 
Fantasy & Horror, Bafta, Cesar, 
Deauville, DGA, Empire, GLAAD, Golden 
Globe, Hugo, Independent Spirit, MTV, 
SAG, SFFWA, Teen Choice, Venice 
(FIPRESCI Award), Writers Guild  
Memento 
(Christopher 
Nolan, 2000)   
Mystery; 
Thriller; Drama  
Action; murder; 
thriller; 
mystery; star 
power;  
Unreliable narrator; 
fractured narrative 
structure; paranoia; 
awards/festivals  
Mystery; 
violence; 
complexity; 
need for 
repeated 
viewing; 'new 
talent 
discovered' 
Strongly hybrid 
- all 
represented 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Academy 
of Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror, 
ASA, Bram Stoker, BIFA, Deauville, DGA, 
Poe, Empire, Golden Globe, Independent 
Spirit, MTV, Sundance 
Eternal 
Sunshine of 
the Spotless 
Mind (Michel 
Gondry, 2004) 
Romance; 
Comedy; 
Drama; Sci-fi 
Comedy; 
romance; star 
power; sci-fi  
Formal experimentation; 
complex narrative 
structure; suburban 
anomie; unreliable 
narrator; auteurism;  
Romance; 
quirky; casting; 
against type; 
'new talent 
discovered'; 
comedy; need 
for repeated 
viewing 
Strongly hybrid 
- all 
represented 
American Film Institute, Oscar, Academy 
of Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror, 
Bafta, Bram Stoker, Cesar, Empire, 
Golden Globe, Hugo, People's Choice, 
SAG, Writers Guild  
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The final group is of the films which demonstrated a strongly hybridised tendency to garner 
prestige in the form of awards and nominations across all of the categories I have so far 
described. These are, Pulp Fiction, Being John Malkovich, Memento, and Eternal Sunshine of 
the Spotless Mind.  For these, the wide range of awards involved – from Teen Choice and 
MTV, to Oscars, to Independent Spirit, to those bestowed by high-status international 
festivals like Cannes and Deauville – demonstrates several things.  The first is that clearly 
each of these films demonstrated an ability to appeal to multiple audience constituencies 
(inside and outside of the film industry as an institution) simultaneously.  The second is that 
each tended to harness formal characteristics – narrative experimentation, shifts in the nature 
of diegetic ‘reality’, and temporal play – traditionally seen as associated with ‘high art’ 
values.   
The third is that for each, those experimental formal characteristics were based in strongly 
classical generic frameworks, featuring ‘star’ actors, which I would argue militated against 
the reading of that formal experimentation as unfamiliar, providing instead a comparatively 
reassuring base from which to experience those features.  In addition, all but Eternal 
Sunshine – which itself cost a comparatively low $20 million – came from the lower-budget 
end of the spectrum, and all bar Memento came from the quasi-independent sector rather than 
the independent.  Pulp Fiction’s presence here, as the most formally conventional of the four, 
might seem oddly juxtaposed with three other such strongly boundary-breaching texts; 
however to me this – and certainly its somewhat unexpected receipt of the Palme D’Or at 
Cannes – suggests that its quasi-mythological discursive place as the first breakout Smart hit, 
or first emergence of it as marker of an industrial and audience zeitgeist, is perhaps 
justifiable.    
 
Interestingly this grouping also incorporates what for me might mark the last fully Smart 
breakout, Eternal Sunshine, as the films following it were either released on a much smaller 
scale (Primer, Brick), were box office failures (Huckabees, Zissou), or are so marked by 
classical tendencies that they appear right at the ‘mainstream’ end of the continuum 
(Sideways).  Textually and industrially these four films are what must be regarded as 
‘breakout hits’, able to transcend apparently contradictory formal bases – functioning as 
strongly art-house, and simultaneously as strongly mainstream – in order to appeal to 
multiple audiences.  They also constitute the group of films which combines in most equal 
measure that combination of sophisticated narrative-textual ambition, clear generic drive, 
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idiosyncratic tonal play, call to auteurist mythologies, and impression of textual novelty, 
which seems to me to most clearly define the field. 
 
From this (of necessity limited) study, I would make a several conclusions. The first is that 
the type of prestige awarded comes in a variety of forms, each strongly embedded within 
formal-generic-economic contexts, and the dominance of any one form governs the type of 
prestige bestowed.  Secondly, awards prestige constitutes a call for internal industry 
recognition as much as public recognition. Related to this, the industrial origins of an 
individual text appear to have an impact on the type of prestige awarded, as the more 
industrially independent films are more likely to be valourised by the independent and art-
house festivals and awards into which they are ‘channelled’ than the more mainstream 
evaluative systems.  Thirdly Smart films avail of prestige in ways which illustrate the manner 
in which ‘Smartness’ operates along a continuum from independent (including here, art-
house) to mainstream.  The kind of prestige bestowed strongly reflects the nature both of an 
individual film’s generic-structural-thematic preoccupations, and the esteem within which 
those strands are individually held by a specific evaluative system; at its most dynamic and 
expansive, Smart can appeal to a multiplicity of them simultaneously. 
 
Historically, amended contemporary conceptions of prestige might be regarded as linked with 
sociocultural changes over the past fifty years; the societal upheaval of 1960s and the decades 
that followed radically altered the perspectives from and through which ideas like ‘prestige’ 
and ‘quality’ could be evaluated.  Successive struggles for women’s, black and gay rights, the 
increasing centrality of popular culture to academia and journalism, the sense of subcultures – 
or simply the fashionable trappings of subcultural practices – moving to the mainstream, the 
commodification of niche styles, the increasing accessibility of cultural and aesthetic models 
from European art-house to manga to punk chic, have all contributed to a shifting of the 
grounds from which evaluative decisions can be made.   
 
This is of course, all underpinned by the drive of late capitalism to identify, isolate, and 
monetize niche practices and cultural outputs.  John Hartley, in citing how the (at one time 
socially marginal) tastes of baby boomer subcultures moved to the mainstream, notes that “in 
the turbulence and churn of identity formation in the commercialized public sphere there 
have clearly arisen business opportunities.  They are most pronounced where personal and 
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consumer tastes have led to new publics.” (Hartley, 2005, 108) This can be seen in the way in 
which European art cinema of the 1960s ‘produced’ audiences for the New Hollywood of the 
same period, as much as it can be seen in the way Smart calls to new or newly-mobilised 
audiences: the way in which some Smart texts draw upon cult tropes, others to art cinema 
values, and some seem designed for Newman’s ‘hipsters’, whose focus is on “the fashioning 
of idiosyncratic personal identity within a subcultural milieu.” (Newman, 2013, 80).  
 
A few particular elements may be relevant in the case of the period under discussion, from 
the early 1990s to the mid-2000s.  I believe it is important to consider how the concept of ‘the 
culture industries’ encompasses the socio-cultural environment which gives rise to the work 
under discussion, as well as more strictly economic factors.  Many writers discussing the 
concept of prestige and quality in the field of Smart, quasi-independent, or niche cinema 
invoke Bourdieu (King, 2005 and 2009; Sconce, 2002; Berra 2008; Mathijs and Sexton 2011; 
Wilinsky 2001) and hence focus their attentions at the level of audience consumption and 
textual interpretation, as opposed to production itself.
135
  If “Bourdieu argues that cultural 
production (and consumption) are influenced by a struggle between groups and institutions 
over recognition, reputation and financial reward…[and sees] cultural work as being strongly 
shaped by the wider environment.” (Curran and Morley, 2006, 195) then we must also take 
into account that the ‘wider environment’ encompasses the ebb and flow of position-taking 
on the meaning and nature of cinema – and cinematic prestige – within the studios.  
 
I concur broadly with King’s 2005 statement that  
[a]ssociation with ‘quality’, arty, edgy or ‘cool’/alternative features is good for the 
image; that of individual executives with pretensions to something more than noisy 
blockbuster productions, and that of branches of large corporations often subject to 
criticism for their business practices and much of their not-so-creative output. (King, 
2005, 46) 
something he reaffirmed in 2009, saying that studios “sought from the 1990s to buy into 
some of the currency gained by the term ‘independent’ at a time when it had come to signify 
something of greater cultural worth than what was usually associated with the Hollywood 
mainstream.” (King, 2009, 8)  A combination of factors led to the impetus to colonise ideas 
of independence, the identification (or creation, one might argue) of this specific gap in the 
market, and the realisation that one could ‘work both ends’, as Harvey Weinstein phrased it. 
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(ibid., 94) The idea of ‘working both ends’ essentially means that producers could issue 
presumptive appeals to different audiences simultaneously on behalf of a single text, even 
where these were logically contradictory (something my analysis of awards above appears to 
bear out). 
 
For example, Miramax could emphasise the supposedly socially-transgressive violence of 
Quentin Tarantino’s work while saluting the institutionally-canonised solidity of his 
reputation as a new auteur; Focus could centre discourse on the ‘maverick’ formal 
experimentation of Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind while simultaneously selling it as a 
romantic comedy.  This multiple-positioning tendency also includes adopting an ambivalent, 
loose, or ‘free-flowing’ attitude to studio branding, as with American Beauty, which was 
positioned as a small indie pic, complete with hybrid/platform release, despite being the pet 
project of senior DreamWorks executives.
136
  It is also illustrated in the manner in which the 
largely audience-generated positioning of Fight Club – as an anti-establishment industrial 
aberration, rather than the big-budget studio film that it actually was – prevails within popular 
discourse, an interesting reversal of the film’s original positioning as a bare-knuckle-fighting 
action movie.
137
   
 
These strategies are largely related to what one might describe as the ‘self-image’ of studios, 
given that ‘Hollywood’ functions as an evaluative construct at a discursive level not only to 
those who consume its products, but also to those engaged in it, as well an industrial location 
and presumptive mode of production.  There is something of a risk here of 
‘anthropomorphizing’ what is, after all, a set of competing multinational conglomerates. 
However, as I have mentioned elsewhere, Hollywood is an organizational network, and one 
that works as a powerful lobbying group in its own interests, whether through the MPAA, 
MPA, or more informally.  In that sense, we can in some circumstances write of Hollywood 
as if it were a single entity; we can also note that ‘it’, that is separate studios acting together 
in their own interests, or acting singly but along parallel lines, can act in ways which have 
lasting impacts for all – as when Douglas Gomery notes that the major studios of the classical 
period “worked closely together to keep out competitors. But the majors did not want to 
appear to be monopolists, so they always tolerated minor studios operating on the margins.” 
(Gomery, 2005, 2) 
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Here, a focus on quality or prestige can be seen at some points as converting into financial 
success, but I believe is also engaged at the site of production as a partial end in itself; in a 
somewhat self-aggrandising search for the cultural prestige of being seen to produce more 
‘elevated’ work than had become considered the norm, at a more public level.  This 
constitutes itself as a drive to construct a modern canon of Hollywood films which can be 
read as establishing a creative legacy, while simultaneously achieving financial success and 
professional power and dominance.  This is broadly in line, given the nature of ‘Hollywood’ 
as a highly networked industrial society, with the argument made by Levy that the pursuit of 
awards has much to do with the sociological concept “cumulative advantage” (Levy, 2003, 
307). By this he means – and he refers particularly to the Academy Awards – that the awards 
system “creates and maintains inequality within the film industry…the rich and famous get 
richer and more famous.” (ibid.)  
 
The 1960s and 1970s loom large here, too: not just from a simple generational perspective, in 
the sense that many of the figures within and outside of the studios during this period were 
likely to have had their formative cinematic experiences within this period, but because the 
concept of ‘New Hollywood’ became a structuring mythology.  Here I believe, the internal 
drive to mitigate accusations of the trivialisation and shallow spectacularisation of studio 
cinema became inextricably linked with the idea that a ‘New New Hollywood’ could be 
created; one which, even if it did not always reward financially, would exonerate all involved 
of being party to a progressive decline in quality, however that might be measured.
138
  
Therefore, while awards form part of the industry’s publicity machinery, they also constitute 
an important part of a highly codified set of dominance displays; vitally important, too, when 
looked at as part of the social nature of the industrial network.  This also recalls Bourdieu’s 
(1993, 1996) emphasis on legitimation struggles; the position-taking and – often antagonistic 
– power dynamics within the networks which form the field of cultural production – the 
“sociological struggles over position, power and prestige that underpin the production of 
textual forms and reputations, and how the specific networks of power relations orient the 
strategies of artists.” (Negus, 2006, 205) While some of this struggle for creative legacy is 
centred on box office figures
139
 and some around the classical pleasures provided by the kind 
of solid, middlebrow films which a 1930s audience would broadly recognise as ‘prestige’ 
pictures, another portion of it is linked to the effort to seek legitimation by being seen to 
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produce work of innovation, or work of creativity defined as unusual in its relationship to the 
(assumed to be of less creative distinction) set of mainstream films.  
 
Changes within the television industry during the same period provide a useful analogy or 
model for changes in practice, whereby television companies, faced with similar challenges 
to those at the studios, ‘unpacked’ at an industrial and economic level the potential value of 
‘cult’ television, which might be regarded as broadly analogous to the Smart film.  In 
scholarship on television we also encounter a range of theoretical perspectives which can 
help elucidate some of the issues which surround the discursive positioning of Smart cinema 
generally.  In their exploration of American ‘must see television’140 of the 1990s, Jancovich 
and Lyons set out some clear parallels with cinema viewing and how both audiences were 
courted by the conglomerates: 
during the emergence of ‘must see’ television, the networks that produced these 
shows were going though a crisis in audience demographics not dissimilar to that 
which resulted in the production strategies of ‘post-classical’ Hollywood film-making. 
In other words, these shows emerged at the very moment when network audiences 
were declining. In this sense, these shows might be understood as akin to the 
blockbuster ‘event’ movies to which Hollywood turned (Jancovich and Lyons, 2003, 
2) 
Yet there is a significant difference here. While television may have been seen to turn ‘big’, 
the bifurcation appearing in film markets meant that on the one hand, the blockbuster may 
have been dominant, but on the other, a new perspective was appearing: the idea of ‘more’, in 
audience terms, as being constituted from ‘less, but in more diverse areas’ – both 
geographically (in terms of increasing globalism) and in terms of the range of cultural tastes 
and practices being appealed to: cumulatively, the process of industrial colonisation implied 
in David Linde’s phrase “specific but pretty substantial audiences” (Rooney, 2003, 11).  
 
Here again, in the light of the decline in network audiences (for which we might possibly 
read in cinematic terms ‘the blockbuster audience’141) Jancovich and Lyons discuss the turn 
away from mass audiences, and instead towards attracting “the most valuable 
audiences…affluent, highly educated consumers who value the literary qualities of these 
programmes……[and an] overwhelming preoccupation with the white, affluent, urban 
middle classes.” (ibid., 3)142  This seems to me to parallel the focus which the mainstream 
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film industry similarly placed on co-opting the industrial practices, textual attributes, and 
more general socio-cultural trappings of what we would previously have termed ‘independent 
film’ via their infiltration of the independent studios, or their establishment of quasi-indie 
subsidiary divisions.  It is also important to note that the industrial underpinnings of 
television broadcasting – its increasing globalisation and conglomeration – closely align with 
the same process within cinema, specifically because of the manner in which buyouts and 
mergers have gradually elided almost all distinctions between the two institutions.
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The process by which television has been ‘rehabilitated’ from devalued mass entertainment to 
its contemporary position as a middlebrow cultural pursuit
144
 parallels the equivalent journey 
by which the Smart niche has established itself, and which King refers to extensively, 
invoking the work of Janice Radway (King, 2009, 267-269).  This also complicates any 
potential argument that Smart (or indiewood) is always an industrial aberration, or corporate 
corruption of purist notions of ‘true independence, as this  
can have the effect of denying the extent to which indie/independent is itself subject 
to its own forms of institutionalization and commercialization, shading into, rather 
than being entirely separable from, Indiewood. Such articulations can also be viewed 
as part of a process of defensive distinction-maintenance on the part of those who 
wish to associate themselves with the qualities ascribed to independent cinema” (ibid., 
268-269) 
King’s notion of “defensive distinction-maintenance” is useful for translating how the HBO 
example relates to the production and reception of Smart cinema.  It arises most clearly in 
relation to cult audiences, where we can see it as a kind of psychological praxis, or pattern of 
cultural behaviour in which audiences use their cultural consumption habits as a means of 
establishing identity.  However, we can also see it illustrated in industrial behaviours, where 
studios utilise textual markers or impressions of distinction, and simultaneously obscure 
references to a film’s industrial origins, thereby creating reputational capital.145   
 
Both quality television and Smart cinema seek to distinguish themselves from their respective 
mainstreams by staking textual claims for ‘quality’, which they link strongly to ideas of 
audience superiority.
146
   Both have been historical beneficiaries of, and active agents within, 
a broader cultural re-definition of what quality means in these contexts, particularly as 
regards positioning ‘transgressive’ elements (graphic sex, extreme violence, dark or socially-
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problematic themes) as de facto signifiers of credibility; this is the case regardless of whether 
the mode of credibility being called to is one of social realism, playfully postmodern nihilism, 
or simply of ‘authentic’ maverick creativity.147  These are used as elements of a market 
positioning strategy for which the ultimate goal is a kind of systematic self-replicability, 
where potential customers can be relied upon to make evaluative judgements about a text 
from its position within the discourse by virtue of their previous experience with similar 
texts, as well as discursive cues.  In this sense, and this is the point I wish to emphasise most 
strongly, it is the combination of textual choice (i.e. production decisions) and marketing, 
publicity, and discursive framing of the text or set of texts, which is directed at cuing both 
media tastemakers and potential audiences into particular responses within a pre-determined 
framework of ‘quality’.  
 
The key difference, and one which I believe merits further research, is that by virtue of its 
containment within specific television channels (for all that this mode is continually 
extending its reach), compared with the more industrially-scattered Smart mode, quality 
television forms its own self-reinforcing circuit of branding and positioning.  While a single 
channel (like HBO) can create, extend, manage, control, and amplify its identity, each new 
Smart film must take a singular – and expensive – industrial approach to positioning and 
performance.  Without a casually-accepted discursive category – as, after all ‘Smart’ is a term 
of the academy rather than of the public – available into which to ‘drop’ the text, promotional 
efforts must be by their nature more diffuse, and their results more unpredictable.  In the 
absence of this category, and in an effort to maintain a kind of industrial continuity in 
practices of defensive distinction-maintenance, we frequently find that attempts are made to 
link distinction and difference to another pre-existing discursive category: auteurism (see 
Chapter Four). 
 
An additional category to which Smart is linked is that of ‘indie’ (as distinct from 
‘independent’, which I conceive of more as an industrial term). While this is a term which 
lacks clear definition more now, in the light of industrial tendencies to co-opt its forms, than 
perhaps at any point in the last few decades, it continues to form a popular discursive 
category through which many of these films are casually framed.  In Newman’s conception 
of ‘indie’,148 as “a buzzword, a term whose meanings — alternative, hip, edgy, 
uncompromising — far exceed the literal designation of media products that are made 
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independently of major firms.” (Newman, 2009, 16), the movement of what can be termed 
indie culture from fringe to mainstream, via the kind of industrial agglomeration and 
integration I have discussed above, didn’t dissolve the idea of indie, as might have been 
feared, but amplified its impact.   
 
Essentially, as the mainstream moved into satisfying impulses towards ‘alternativeness’149 – 
the “overproduction” to which Garnham refers above –  it simultaneously enabled greater 
access to ‘indie’ culture, and closed off or restricted the market by producing a proliferation 
of non-independent choices.  Therefore, ‘indie’ is a highly complex and contradictory notion, 
which must be held in continuous tension, and performs multiple roles – functioning both as a 
potentially oppositional culture which holds power to challenge the status quo, and as a taste 
culture of the privileged elite.
150
  To regard indie culture as a simple oppositional 
construction – in which ‘the mainstream’ is constructed as an industrial-cultural monolith, 
and ‘indie culture’ as the set of creative forms and practices which challenges its hegemony 
by virtue of their very existence – would be an inappropriately binary way in which to 
approach a complex field of play.   
 
Indeed, Newman points out that there is a danger, for example, of regarding a particular kind 
of low-budget ‘look’ within independent cinema as intrinsically oppositional, when it is 
simply being utilised fetishistically, as a purely aesthetic approach.  Here, it becomes a 
stylistic choice among many, easily reproduced outside of the independent setting, and I 
believe while the excessively ‘grimy’ urban settings of The Matrix, Fight Club and Dark City 
– some of the biggest-budget work I discuss – are primarily derived from noir, to a certain 
extent they are influenced by the desire to reproduce elements of a low-budget aesthetic, in an 
effort to claim a more ‘indie’ status, as is the gloomy, cold lighting of parts of Eternal 
Sunshine.  While these visual elements may be to a certain extent buried under the various 
generic strategies and (in particular) special effects, I believe they are, again, part of a 
strategic displacement of ‘straightforward’ generic expectations and a tendency to obscure 
the industrial origins of these films.  
  
This is in contrast to the strategic reversal we see in the aesthetic of some of the (lower-
budget) suburban satires; Election’s sunny schoolyards, the glossy sheen of American Beauty, 
Donnie Darko’s lush prosperity, and the clashing pastels of Happiness partly form an ironic 
131 
 
commentary on the darkness beneath.  Either way, the visual aesthetics work to position each 
film along the continuum which runs from ‘indie’ to ‘mainstream’ and through which 
audiences position themselves in relation to their own expectations of the film.  It is worth 
noting that this has been complicated somewhat by the increasing sophistication of lower-end 
camera equipment, as can be seen by the difference in relative aesthetic approaches of 1998’s 
Pi, and Primer, just six years later.  While Aronofsky’s decision to film in black and white 
reversal was a creative rather than a budgetary one,
151
 the final effect makes strong appeals to 
the idea of a low-budget aesthetic as creative intervention, and was referred to continually in 
media discourse about the film (Petrovic, 1999; Weinraub, 1999; Phipps, 1999; Maslin, 
1998a); Ryan, 1998).  By contrast, while Primer (costing almost ten times less) is frequently 
accurately referred to as a “no-budget film” (Muir, 2013; Hoffman, 2013; Porteous, 2012; 
O’Neill, 2006; Romney, 2005; Bernard, 2004), little or no attention (at the time or in 
subsequent mentions, such as in discussion of Carruth’s follow-up) is paid to its understated 
visual aesthetic.  This, I would argue is due to its strong grounding in a highly realist 
framework: the aesthetic elements are subsumed beneath its generic appeals, narrative logic-
games, the repeated framing of Carruth as an auteur, and the film’s status as a prize-winner at 
Sundance and nominee at the Independent Spirit awards.  
  
One can regard independent production as a de facto oppositional practice, or (as I have 
explored elsewhere) as an apprenticeship leading to the mainstream; Newman uses the term 
‘credibility’ in relation to creative practitioners in a very similar manner to that in which I use 
the term ‘prestige’ in relation to creative objects.  That is, not as a casual or tokenistic term of 
approbation, but as a signifier for a complex system of evaluative judgements which 
encompasses industrial, textual, and sociological perspectives. All of this is partially 
dependent on an audience’s approach to position-taking in relation to the text, but also 
depends on the manner in which ideas of credibility can be mobilised (positioned, juggled, or 
even manufactured).  The traditional perspective
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 has been to consider credibility and 
popularity mutually exclusive, but as Newman points out, the notion of ‘selling out’ was 
reworked dramatically during the 1990s.
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As the indie and mainstream industrial worlds became increasingly intertwined, movement 
into the mainstream was reframed within the discourse as an  
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infiltration of the establishment [which] recuperates the credibility of the indie artist.  
Note that this recuperation of the notion of selling out does not challenge the 
construction of indie as anti-mainstream. Rather, it challenges the construction of 
mainstream as anti-indie. (Newman, 2009, 22)  
This works, in socio-cultural terms, to explain some of the inherent slipperiness of Smart as a 
concept; it ‘slides’ between mainstream and independent modes without causing particular 
cognitive dissonance, often in the same manner in which individual filmmakers themselves 
move between independent and mainstream production environments; they are enveloped 
within a rhetoric which lauds this as industrial, cultural or artistic flexibility and adaptability 
– not so much ‘hitting the big time’ as occasionally occupying it for a temporary and strategic 
purpose
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 – rather than one which regards their industrial mobility as a form of ‘selling out’. 
 
Newman does not explore the specific reasons for this transition in wider perspective, 
although my view is that again we come back to a combination of a) the increasing 
consolidation of industrial power within the hands of a small set of major conglomerates 
which could afford to both ‘be their own competition’ and as such were alert to new product 
opportunities and market niches, to seek new talents with which to populate them, and to 
provide a varied set of appropriate distribution channels for them, and b) a (perhaps 
generational) reaction in which the first wave of new cultural distribution channels (music 
TV, specialised radio stations, cable television, music- and video-sharing technology, and 
later the internet) had, at least temporarily, blurred the ways in which distinction could be 
hierarchised between ‘independent’ and ‘mainstream’ pleasures.    
 
In this sense, perceptions of what constituted ‘credibility’ from an indie perspective were 
amended along with this movement towards the mainstream; again, as Newman points out 
“the reality (as opposed to the myth) of indie culture is that despite the rhetoric of opposition, 
there is no real divorce between mainstream and alternative forms of media.” (ibid., 21); how 
could there be, when audiences consume both, and in both ‘innocent’ and ‘ironic’ fashion?  I 
do not agree fully with his assessment – the industrial cooption of the rhetoric of opposition 
does not in itself erase actual opposition, or elements of it, even from within the industrial 
system, for all that it may obscure it – but would link this instead to his later assertion that 
“[i]indie hipsterism is…a culture of appropriation.” (Newman, 2013, 75)  This allows the 
recuperation of ‘selling out’, which thereby becomes de-centred from the circuit of defensive 
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distinction-maintenance, allowing for an even greater visibility of quasi-indie texts, insofar as 
it encourages access to ‘mainstream indie’ texts by both those who would previously have 
regarded them as ‘too mainstream’ and those who would have been alienated by texts 
perceived as too difficult, or elitist in their marginality.  However, the binary construction of 
‘the indie world vs. the mainstream’ is too powerful a mythological construction to abandon, 
not least because it provides ideal conditions for industrial markets performing their own self-
segmentation on behalf of producers, while simultaneously concealing the true narrowness of 
the field of mass culture.      
 
Distinction is, of course, a key element within the construction of the indie trope, and 
primarily it can be seen in the way that distinction has traditionally come directly from 
indie’s status as self-proclaimed oppositional practice.  Newman takes the view that  
[t]he oppositional stance that defines indie culture is one key to its status as a source 
of distinction, a means by which its audience asserts its superior taste. By seeing 
independent cinema as the alternative to Hollywood films, the indie audiences makes 
authenticity and autonomy into aesthetic virtues that can be used to distinguish a common 
mass culture from a more refined, elite one. Techniques employed in sustaining the 
indie/mainstream binary operate on the level not only of production, then, but also of 
consumption. (ibid., 22) 
While broadly he is historically correct, there is an unexplored contradiction implied in the 
presentation of the quasi-indie text as possessed of the qualities ‘authenticity’ and ‘autonomy’ 
which sustain this binary opposition, and the idea that in the contemporary context, ‘selling 
out’ has lost its power as a cornerstone of that same opposition.  Rather, from an industrial 
perspective, we should focus on the phrase ‘aesthetic virtues’, as Newman has identified a 
key factor in the mobilisation of ‘indie’ as a kind of generic identity in its own right, shared 
across different media.  This is the aestheticisation of a particular kind of industrial output (in 
this case, the Smart film), a set of stylistic strategies which obscure the fact that a Smart 
text’s very presence within mainstream exhibition structures militates against the possibility 
of describing it as either oppositional, or independent.   
 
Instead, certain formal and narrative traits which originated within independent and avant-
garde cinema have been aestheticised to the point at which, in combination with the industrial 
double-coding which allows any of these texts to be positioned as either more or less 
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mainstream depending on the audience targeted, it is often no longer possible to distinguish 
between ‘authenticity and autonomy’ as actual markers of independence, and formal 
strategies designed to produce the impression of such.  The fact that there is no great clamour 
to identify the difference between them is related to the loss of significance, culturally, of 
ideas of ‘selling out’, replaced with those of ‘opting in,’ and the increased accessibility of a 
wide variety of different texts.   
 
However it is also related to the manner in which these films are engaged with at the level of 
cultural capital.  If Newman is correct in identifying indie fans and producers as 
fundamentally the middle-class white male bourgeoisie, who utilise taste cultures as cultural 
capital in order to mobilise social difference and perpetuate privilege (ibid., 22-23), then the 
question must be asked whether Smart cinema possesses any capacity to be truly 
oppositional? Perhaps not, but it can still serve the useful function of challenging dominant 
frames of reference and conventional modes of representation from within the Hollywood 
matrix, albeit in a limited capacity and one which depends for its ‘reach’ on the manner in 
which any individual text is presented to its potential audience.     
 
 
Conclusions 
 
From both my secondary readings and primary research into the way in which evaluative 
mechanisms manifest themselves in practice, my conclusion is that the wider body of Smart 
cinema encompasses a variety of different categories, which are themselves perceived in 
different ways by the prestige industry.  The ‘art-house/independent’ films are rewarded less 
for their generic qualities than for their adherence to textual strategies of the non-mainstream 
variety, and for their production contexts (i.e. that they have been produced outside of the 
studio system, regardless of their distribution arrangements): this is also the category where 
the prestige industry is most closely entwined with economic contexts, where festivals also 
function as textual marketplaces.  That the earlier films are most represented in this category 
may illustrate a subsequent movement from the margins to the mainstream.  For the ‘hybrid 
indie/mainstream’ films, I believe the balance between different types of evaluative 
mechanism illustrates the transitional nature (i.e. moving towards the mainstream) of the 
Smart mode during the early 2000s, something also perhaps indicated in the dominance of the 
135 
 
‘accessible’ comedy genre, and in particular the ‘quirky’ variety.  Prestige bestowed by youth 
audiences also features strongly here, perhaps indicating their function as ‘early adopters’.   
Most of these films were studio-linked, indicating a tendency for studios to court expanding 
niche markets.    
 
The ‘bourgeois/mainstream’ films illustrate Smart’s movement into the more mainstream 
cinematic framework. These films minimise cult and art-house associations and foreground 
classical structures and strong generic drivers, as well as displaying a preoccupation with 
strongly bourgeois, middle-class thematics. These originate from within the studio system, 
and for me the prestige bestowed represents an institutional ‘ring-fencing’ of studio 
interventions in the quasi-independent field.  Two films avail only of ‘cult/technical/genre’ 
prestige and popular prestige (audience-awarded), which indicates the extent to which generic 
drivers and box-office response can dominate discursive representations of Smart films, 
effectively obscuring tonal, structural and thematic markers of Smartness.  One ‘strongly 
hybridised’ group of films crosses all prestige categories, demonstrating their ability to 
appeal to multiple audiences.  Here, tendencies towards non-classical form were mitigated by 
strong generic foundations and star presence, producing the ‘crossover hit’ so sought by the 
studio subsidiaries from which they came.  Concluding that the bestowal of prestige is 
determined within formal-generic-economic contexts, and that awards systems function as 
relays of industrially-grounded approbation, I illustrate here the manner in which Smart exists 
and operates along a continuum, as much for industrial-institutional mechanisms as for 
audiences.   
 
I conclude that Smart cinema, in particular in the way it makes appeals to discursive 
conceptions of quality and prestige, is strongly linked to the importance of industrial image.  
Smart cinema functions as part of a drive not just to establish market dominance, but also to 
be seen as establishing a creative legacy, and to reinforce the structural mythologies which 
privilege ‘Hollywood’ as a site of creative as well as economic power.  This is complicated 
by the way in which corporate strategies simultaneously produce texts, and obscure or deny 
the industrial contexts from which they originate.  Smart cinema represents a means by which 
perceptions of creativity, innovation, transgression and quality can be harnessed in service of 
market colonisation and reputational capital.  I conclude that regardless of its industrial 
status, Smart cinema tends to draw upon tacit appeals to ideas of ‘independentness’ (again, as 
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I emphasise, not the quality of industrial independence, but the perception that a work is free 
of an assumed set of industrial/structural restrictions casually thought to limit creativity) and 
indeed the discursive construct ‘indie’.  
 
Smart therefore forms part of an economic-historical process which has recuperated the idea 
of ‘selling out’, and reframed it as industrial flexibility or versatility, a process which may 
have led to the increased penetration of Smart as a mode within the mainstream, but 
simultaneously a process to which the industry is reluctant to draw explicit attention.  In that 
sense, binary constructions of ‘independent’ and ‘mainstream’ are seen to fail, particularly 
when we view the aestheticisation of ‘the low-budget’ and its opposite, the introduction or 
fetishisation of the ‘low-budget aesthetic’ in large-scale studio projects.   This leaves us with 
a body of Smart cinema in which style choices function to strategically displace or 
complicate generic expectations, and to simultaneously obscure the industrial origins of texts, 
leaving audiences to self-position in relation to structural aesthetics and generic drivers rather 
than industrial contexts.  In order to explore in more detail the ways in which industrial, 
structural and cultural concerns intersect at the textual level, my next chapter will investigate 
the industrial underpinnings of some of these texts. 
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Chapter Six: Smart cinema and industrial categorisations 
 
To regard the studio industry as monolithic and in all cases hostile to more marginal 
production is to oversimplify work created in its interstices, and to neglect the impact that 
individuals can have within the system, as “[a]cknowledgement of the potential existence of 
such space, however limited it might be, is important to our understanding of contemporary 
Hollywood as something other than an entirely seamless monolith of impersonal 
heteronomous business practices. The studios are run by individuals” (King, 2009, 227).155 In 
that sense, industrial decisions are rarely made as mechanistically as it might sometimes 
appear from ‘straight’ readings of budgets and box office figures.  However, exploring the 
economic origins of individual films within the Smart ‘canon’ can add to the understanding 
of them as industrial products.  
 
In this chapter, I divide my selection of Smart films into two groups, the first those films with 
budgets of above $10 million, the second those films with budgets below.  It is notable that 
the sums involved are generally speaking still, even at the higher end of the budgetary 
spectrum, significantly lower than the costs for more ‘mainstream’ studio films.  While I 
acknowledge that the borderline of $10 million forms an arbitrary, somewhat mechanistic 
division, it serves to provide a context in which to explore individual works, and to decouple 
the texts from the sense in which ‘independent’, ‘low-budget’ and ‘Smart’ aspects are 
sometimes conflated.  Within these two groupings, too, there is a tremendous disparity 
between budgets: even the lower range here runs from a miniscule $7,000 (Primer) to more 
than a thousand times that figure, but averaging at $3.5-3.9 million, and to provide a full 
reckoning of the ways in which budget and text are linked would require more attention to, 
for example, microbudgeting practices, than can be devoted in this work.  Regardless, here I 
explore some of the industrial production and reception contexts of those films, and examine 
the ways in which these interact with generic and formal strategies within the texts 
themselves. 
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Figure 6. The ‘big-budget’ Smart film 
Film  
Final 
budget 
Major studio 
involved  Film  
Final 
budget 
Major 
studio 
involved 
Boogie Nights  
(P.T. 
Anderson, 
1997) $15 million 
New Line 
Cinema  
Fight Club 
(David 
Fincher, 
1999) 
$67 
million 
Fox 2000 
(later Fox 
Searchlight) 
Rushmore 
(Wes 
Anderson, 
1998) 
$10-20 
million
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Touchstone 
Pictures  
The Royal 
Tenenbaums 
(Wes 
Anderson, 
2001) 
$21 
million 
Touchstone 
Pictures 
Dark City 
(Alex Proyas, 
1998) $27 million 
New Line 
Cinema  
Sideways 
(Alexander 
Payne, 2004) 
$12 
million 
Fox 
Searchlight 
Productions 
Magnolia 
(P.T. 
Anderson, 
1999) $37 million  
New Line 
Cinema   
Eternal 
Sunshine of 
the Spotless 
Mind  
(Michel 
Gondry, 
2004) 
$20 
million 
Focus 
Features 
American 
Beauty 
 (Sam 
Mendes, 
1999) $15 million 
Dreamworks 
SKG  
I ♥ 
Huckabees 
(David O. 
Rusell, 2004) 
$22 
million 
Fox 
Searchlight 
Productions 
The Matrix 
(A. 
Wachowski 
and L. 
Wachowski, 
1999) $63 million 
Warner Bros. 
Pictures  
The Life 
Aquatic With 
Steve Zissou 
(Wes 
Anderson, 
2004) 
$50 
million 
Touchstone 
Pictures 
 
Figures have been compiled from a variety of sources including www.imdb.com, www.the-numbers.com and 
www.boxofficemojo.com and crosschecked with industry sources (including Variety, Hollywood Reporter, and 
Screen International) where possible, as well as industry-adjacent accounts such as those of: Levy, 1999; 
Tzioumakis, 2006; Mottram, 2006; Waxman, 2005.  Each figure has been confirmed by a minimum of three 
different sources.  All figures are estimated, and where any conflict arises between different sources, I have 
noted this where the difference appears significant in the context of my research.   
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For example, looking at the production backgrounds of the films concerned would suggest 
that they fall into roughly three groups. The first – accounting for a full twelve of the films 
selected for examination here – is those films which have been produced with major studio 
involvement (by which I mean at an investment, production, and/or distribution stage), and 
with a ‘large’ budget by independent standards, of over $10 million. By way of context, the 
variation in budget among these films is tremendous, as those films with an intensive focus 
on special effects, such as The Matrix (comparatively inexpensive, given its technical 
innovations, at $63 million), or with star involvement, like Fight Club ($67million) are 
costlier than those which tend more towards contemporary settings (Rushmore, $10-20 
million or Sideways, $12 million).  In exploring production contexts as I do here, in terms of 
my desire to examine these films within their industrial setting, several themes emerge from 
the research.   
 
The first is that the films with strongest tendency towards the classic action blockbuster form 
are present in this group.  Sci-fi films The Matrix and (to a significantly lesser extent, given 
its more subdued qualities) Dark City, and dystopic action thriller Fight Club (see separate 
case study in Chapter Eight) are the films with both the highest overall associated costs, and 
the highest degree of global mainstream appeal in their generic attributes.
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  Certainly, these 
cannot be associated with any conventional definition of ‘indie’ production, based on the 
scale of financial outlay involved, and these films have the clearest apparent mainstream 
positioning hooks; star presence, and action sequences.  However, it is worth noting that 
when compared with broadly generically-related films of the same period, they were 
produced remarkably cheaply, and in some cases constituted extremely good value.  Dark 
City may have hardly broken even ($27.2 million returned on costs of $27 million)
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 but its 
budget was dwarfed by other sci-fi films in 1998; for comparison, we have Armageddon 
($100 million), Deep Impact (an estimated $75 million) and Lost in Space ($80 million, also 
a New Line production).   
 
While Fight Club struggled initially to make its costs, The Matrix was, at $63 million, a 
comparatively low-budget piece in the context of, for example, the same year’s Star Wars: 
The Phantom Menace ($100 million) or End of Days ($80-100m estimated).  While its 
returns – $460 million worldwide – might imply that it had always been positioned as a 
tentpole attraction, its budget suggests otherwise, on the basis that it is cost, not text, which 
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dictates marketing strategy and reach. Therefore, I posit that the studios were here proceeding 
cautiously, assuming only modest risks, and anticipating mid-range success, with a focus as 
much on deferred profits (see King, 2009, 31) as on immediate box office returns.  This is 
also illustrated by the way in which Warner Bros., in the same year, invested $170 million 
dollars in Wild Wild West, considering it their blockbuster platform for the year: its budget 
places The Matrix squarely among Warners’ more solidly mid-range, or their ‘prestige’ work, 
with similar costs, such as Eyes Wide Shut, The Green Mile, or Any Given Sunday.  
 
In this sense, an international success like The Matrix, despite its extravagant profits, still fits 
into the Smart industrial model.  Rather than following in the mould of the post-Jaws 
blockbuster, this is what I would regard as a Smart ‘breakout’ hit in the old-fashioned sense 
of the term. Here its novelty gains from the fact that its textual characteristics are innovative 
relative to its form; that, is, its relative narrative intricacy and intra-diegetic play are 
somewhat unexpected within the context of a sci-fi action movie.  The work which, in a 
positioning sense, can be explicated most easily to a mainstream audience, and therefore can 
be considered only moderately risky from a studio perspective, also tends to feature in this 
sector.  In this I include American Beauty and Sideways, which are strikingly similar in a 
variety of ways, including industrially.  Both are masculinist fables of midlife melodrama 
centred on suburban or provincial anomie.  Both feature moderately well-known actors with 
respected reputations rather than ‘stars’, and both have very similar – large, within the 
context of this specific sample, but still very small from a studio perspective – budgets (of 
$15 million and $12 million respectively).   
 
Both were strongly positioned within a framework of quality and prestige, and heavily reliant 
on representations of their director as ‘coming of age’ in their respective discursive roles as, 
respectively, trans-media wunderkind (Sam Mendes) and promising filmmaker finally 
reaching maturity (Alexander Payne).  Of the films chosen, these are the two which rank 
highest in terms of numbers of awards bestowed
159– and which, perhaps not coincidentally, 
possess the least in terms of formal innovation, representing as they do the aspect of Smart 
film that is expressed in tone rather than structure.  Their proportional return on investment 
for each is also extremely high, with American Beauty returning around $350 million, and 
Sideways in the region of $110 million.   
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The formally experimental Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and I ♥ Huckabees would at 
first glance appear to figure in contrast to these, their textual elements and market positioning 
giving the impression of ‘marginality’ in a way that the more classically-oriented texts above 
do not.  However, each has a comparatively large budget, at $20 million and $22 million 
respectively.  In this sense, the discursive construction of Eternal Sunshine (initially bought 
by Propaganda Films following a bidding war, which itself became part of USA Films) works 
in a contradictory manner, where positioning de-prioritises production spend, and privileges 
instead a ‘handmade’ aesthetic which it links to perceptions of quality, authenticity, and 
independence.  However, Eternal Sunshine was opened in what could be described as a wide-
release style – opening on a large number of screens, to steadily decrease – rather akin to that 
of a ‘tentpole’ film, and outside of the traditional awards season run-up (see King, 2009, 82-
83).  Here, capitalising on both its star presence in the form of Jim Carrey, and its relatively 
accessible romantic-comedy dimensions were clearly deemed of greater strategic importance 
than cultivating the kind of slow-build critical acclaim which tends to lead to award-based 
prestige and subsequent sales: for me, this is an indication that Focus were positioning it as a 
(proportionally) ‘big film’, and yet the framing of it as being of ‘indie style’ militates against 
such a reading, focusing on auteuristic and craft-oriented concerns. 
 
For the blockbuster, a large budget and platform opening form a kind of theoretical indicator 
or promise of quality, where tacit cost-benefit assumptions are discursively relayed into an 
implied promise of more impressive special effects and greater spectacle.  The diametric 
opposite applies here, where a kind of valoristic emphasis is given to in-camera effects over 
digital effects, as if this fetishisation of an aesthetic which gives the appearance of coming 
from a low budget (see Newman, 2009) can guarantee the autonomy of the text itself.  We 
can see the immediate contrast between popular and academic accounts of the film (such as 
Kermode, 2004; Norris, 2004; Christopher, 2004; Covert, 2007) and the perspective given by 
a piece written in a professional technical journal (Feeny, 2004).  In the former, the extent to 
which media representations privilege the ‘manual vs. digital’ representation of Gondry’s 
work, and associate this with an idea of independent-leaning ‘craft’ – and linked with 
Gondry’s past as a video director, itself presented in a ‘craft’ model, unlike the more 
auteuristic framing of film work – in assumed opposition to an ‘industrial’ studio model, is 
striking.
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  In the latter, although it is noted that digital work was post-production-based 
rather than fully integrated into the production process, we are given a detailed outline of the 
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digital work undertaken on the film, and one which largely contradicts the more popular and 
academic accounts of it.
161
   
 
Gondry’s history and ‘manual’ use of special effects is here seen to construct him as an 
outsider to the Hollywood system, regardless of the industrial facts.  Along with the focus on 
Charlie Kaufman as auteur (see Chapter Four for a more detailed consideration of this factor), 
this works to frame the film within a context which elides industrial considerations, obscures 
the origins of the film – a product of Focus Features, itself a division of Universal Pictures – 
and embeds viewers and potential viewers in a discourse of marginality which directs them to 
view the picture as ‘independent’.  At the same time, the more conventional elements – star 
casting, and a degree of recognisability in terms of the classical emotional engagement and 
catharsis offered by its comedic and romantic aspects – were easily prevailed upon in 
marketing and positioning the piece at the intersection of mainstream and fringe audiences, as 
demonstrated by its eventual return of more than $70 million. 
 
I ♥ Huckabees appears to have a more fragmented, even confused, industrial identity.  
Following his low-budget Australian debut with Spanking The Monkey (1994), David O. 
Russell’s career had travelled in a steadily more visible arc with Flirting With Disaster 
(1996) for Miramax Films, and his most recent work prior to Huckabees had been the Village 
Roadshow/Warner Bros.
162
 production Three Kings (1998). This had generated some 
controversy in its approach to the politics of America’s involvement in the first Gulf War, but 
its take of more than $100 million internationally seemed to have proved Russell’s capability 
in regard to large-scale studio production.  However, the response to Huckabees illustrates its 
intriguingly double-coded – but strongly polarising, this being a risk of the multiple-coding 
approach – nature. As pointed out, it is “surely the first Fox film marketed with the tagline 
‘An Existential Comedy’” (Walters, 2004, 34), and yet the marketing in general strongly 
emphasises the more classical elements, placing the film’s strongly philosophical (and 
occasionally difficult) content in a reassuring framework which implies ease of access.  
 
For example, the cinematic trailer strongly emphasises the comedic elements, and in 
particular privileges slapstick, physical, sexual, and broad comedic elements over the film’s 
sophisticated wordplay.  Similarly, Huckabees’ playful interrogation of societal norms and 
big ideas surrounding globalisation, capitalism, the environment, success, and gender, is 
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muted in favour of a focus on the supposed universality of human emotion and spiritual 
connection, set to a folky acoustic soundtrack which again works to signify the piece as 
‘homespun’ and uncomplicated.  The trailer’s most resonant non-comedic lines, from Dustin 
Hoffman’s existential detective Bernard Jaffe, are equally universalised and reassuring: 
“Everything is connected and everything matters. Now isn’t that cool?…We are connected”: 
the film’s sprawling intellectual complexity and off-beat humour may have come as a 
surprise to viewers who based their ticket purchase on the marketing alone.  Therefore, the 
text’s industrial positioning may have had a strongly alienating effect on those mainstream 
viewers who were not cued in by other elements within the discursive relay, such as 
knowledge of Russell’s previous work, or a general consciousness of the quasi-independent 
production context within which he tends to operate.   
 
While many of the reviews and production-related accounts of the piece were favourable, and 
most note not just its complexity but also the strong links between it and the work of Gondry, 
Jonze, Payne and the Andersons (Bradshaw, 2004; Rooney, 2004b; Sarris, 2004; Smith, 
2004; Walters, 2004; Travers, 2004),
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 others signal that it lies somewhere near or on a 
precarious imagined boundary between art-house and mainstream films; the implication in 
several cases is clearly that this marginality automatically assigns it a ‘cult’ status, in a 
pejorative rather than valorising way (Quinn, 2004; Rooney, 2004b; Romney, 2004).  Here, 
as the film has been positioned – and budgeted for – as a mainstream text, its refusal to 
follow its perceived industrial ‘destiny’ and transcend to mainstream success constitutes it as 
a failure.  And yet, the individual box office performance of the film – it eventually broke 
even, more or less – cannot, in the overall context of the somewhat esoteric niche it occupies 
textually, be seen to constitute an epic disaster, rather, merely a mid-range disappointment.
164
   
 
It is also possible that the response to Huckabees relates to its temporal position, coming as 
the film did right at the end of Smart’s most visible period of popularity.  The context within 
which it does function as a ‘failure’ is that of the overall enfolding of a more intellectualised 
and formally-experimental aesthetic into the mainstream; Huckabees is essentially now 
memorable as the last studio Smart film of the period.  Where Eternal Sunshine created a 
specific context through which to mediate audience expectations – largely, I believe, through 
the auteuristic discourse which clustered particular expectations around the work of Charlie 
Kaufman – the positioning of Huckabees privileged a broad comedic generic framing over its 
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more experimental leanings, thereby directing it towards a more mainstream potential 
audience somewhat in contradiction to its textual tendencies.   
 
One particularly hostile review is interesting for the manner in which it points to this 
contradiction.  Regarding it as pretentiously metropolitan and over-intellectualised, the 
Minneapolis Star Tribune describes the film as follows: 
the movie is disjointed and pointless. But its biggest shortcoming is that it’s not 
funny. At least, not in these parts. Perhaps quips about the eternal struggle between 
existential atheists and existential theists have ‘em rolling in the aisles at the Los 
Angeles chapter of the Jean-Paul Sartre Fan Club. But the rest of us will be hard-
pressed to work up a decent chuckle. (Strickler, 2004, 11)  
A solitary quote is insufficient to ascribe some kind of generic exhaustion to film viewers, or 
some kind of intrinsic ‘alienating quality’ to Smart texts themselves.  However it is worth 
noting; clearly the boundaries between the mainstream and the margins are not necessarily as 
permeable as the success of some other films would have it appear.  And where this 
permeability exists, it is deployed as an aspect of the industrial matrix; as part of the rhetoric 
of ‘independent intrusion’ which functions both as an audience-positioning tool, and as a 
structural framework within which to – at both a popular and an academic level – 
contextualise the increasingly complex and intertwined relationship of ‘independent’ and 
‘mainstream’ cinema during the period.165 
 
Some of the films play explicitly on auteurial constructions and considerations in their 
positioning, as can be seen when we look at the manner in which the persona of Charlie 
Kaufman is repeatedly figured not simply into the inter-textual relay surrounding his work, 
but also into the work itself.  Where the films of the respective Andersons are concerned, a 
more classically-framed discourse of auteurism is mobilized outside of the text; that is, in the 
media-industrial discourse, in such a manner as to constitute a strategy of industrial 
positioning of its own, and one which is complicated by the sometimes nebulous or 
contradictory links between genre and auteurism.   To momentarily extend the work of Paul 
Thomas Anderson as an example, even a casual survey of media (and some scholarly) 
accounts shows a clear tendency to discursively position his output as part of a kind of 
transcendently historicized evolutionary process, privileging not an ‘indie breakthrough’ 
perspective, but the ideas of singularity and mastery which accompany auteurist assumptions.   
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Comparisons are made with Quentin Tarantino (Corliss, 1997; Doherty, 1998; Mungo, 1998; 
French, 2000; Olsen, 2000; Wise, 2000), but these refer as much to Anderson’s fixation on 
the emotional geography of the wider Los Angeles area, as they do to any assumed stylistic 
or narrative similarities.  The over-arching comparisons made are between Anderson’s work 
and that of Martin Scorsese (in particular for Boogie Nights) and Robert Altman (for 
Magnolia); all of the above-mentioned articles reference one or both, as do Udovitch (2000), 
Quinn (2000), Klawans (1997) and Maslin (1997, 1999b), and writers working outside of 
strictly review-based contexts, such Levy (Levy, 1999, 116-140).
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  The question is why, 
lacking as his work does the distinctive visual style of a Tarantino, or the focus on 
metaphysical identity of a Kaufman, Anderson should be framed in such a manner.  The 
process of generic double-coding may be more complex where work identified strongly with 
‘auteurism’ is concerned, as the use of genre as a distinguishing factor may be less 
industrially vital in positioning a text in cases where a clearly-established auteuristic identity 
can serve to do so.  However, I would argue that Anderson’s early visual style is not in fact 
particularly distinctive,
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 in which case at a theoretical level we might expect genre to be 
employed – in marketing, as well as in media accounts – in a more prominent way in 
positioning his films.    
 
My contention is that we fail to see a simple deployment of generic ‘gateways’ into these 
texts, not because Anderson was at the time working in impenetrable or hybridised genres – 
his work at this point constitutes relatively straightforward ‘character-based drama’, 
regardless of the narrative intricacy at play in Magnolia – but because his work is embedded 
within (at the time of release) historically unpopular and problematic generic contexts.  
Within these contexts, we see auteurist framings used to position his films, and generic cues 
utilised in comparatively complex ways to de-problematise the question of genre.  This is 
most obviously the case with Boogie Nights, the setting of which – the pornographic 
filmmaking industry of the 1970s and 1980s – constitutes both a fictional world which 
promises transgressive excitement, and a problem of industrial positioning which needs to be 
‘solved’.  In addition, it is a problem which has direct relevance to the film’s industrial 
origins: Boogie Nights marked a further step in the continuing journey of New Line Cinema, 
long associated with exploitation film and cheap horror, but which from the beginning of the 
1990s had been moving steadily towards the mainstream, through its acquisition by the 
Turner Broadcasting System in 1994 and merger with Time Warner in 1996.
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The extent to which the film’s setting may misdirect potential viewers – directing them to 
expect sexual titillation from a film which, by restrictive American standards, is quite 
explicit, but could be more accurately described as ‘domestic drama’ than pornography – is 
clearly addressed in, for example, the film’s trailer, which attempts to move potential viewers 
through a range of generic positions, none of which specifically invoke pornography, and 
many of which contradict porn’s narrative centrality to the film.  Its introduction, with the 
voice of central character Dirk Diggler (Mark Wahlberg) intoning “Everyone’s given one 
special thing…I want you to know I plan on being a star”, invokes the mythology of the 
American Dream, as does the insistent non-diegetic voiceover – always a key tool in the 
industrial positioning of texts – which declares “In 1977, a kid from nowhere had a dream of 
getting somewhere”.   
 
In this reading, the generic code most clearly invoked is that of the biopic, or perhaps even 
the musical, an emphasis on the music of the era pervading the trailer as strongly as it does 
the film’s soundtrack,169and Diggler’s character is identified as strongly with the Disco scene 
as with the world of pornography.  Puns aside, the phrase “A star is porn” is used in 
international press accounts of the film, including headlines and picture captions (see 
Bernard, 1997; Haysom, 1997; Corliss, 1997; LePetit & Huxley, 1998 for examples) in a 
manner which reflects the way in which Diggler is positioned.  That is, his figure and persona 
are employed to explicitly reject the ‘low culture’ associations of pornography.  The ascent 
(and later descent) of this ‘talented ingénu’ is not framed within the context of the screened 
commodification of sexuality, or socially-transgressive exploration of sexual norms and 
boundaries, but as a cultural event, one in which we see the mobilization of all available 
discourses of prestige within pornography as a ‘culture industry’, and which is seen to be 
parallel or analogous to the ‘real’ culture and economy of prestige.  This can be seen in the 
way in which the mechanisms of cultural prestige are invoked, as when a section of the trailer 
is devoted to the reading-out of a porn review “Jack Horner has found something special in 
newcomer Dirk Diggler”, or when the latter is feted for winning ‘best newcomer’ at the Adult 
Film Awards.           
 
A humorous, nostalgic tone prevails – one reflecting distinctly 1990s anxieties about sex, 
leisure and economics in contrast with a time “when disco was king, sex was safe, pleasure 
was a business, and business was booming”.  However, pains are taken to emphasise 
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historical rather than sexual contexts here, presenting the film not as a prurient ‘replica’ of 
pornography, with orgasm displaced by scopophilia, but as a socio-cultural or industrial 
history, calling upon ideas of documentary as much as fiction.  The trailer’s concluding 
voiceover strongly emphasises this, stating “New Line Cinema presents a portrait of two 
decades in the life of a business”.  Similarly, the transition from the 1970s into the 1980s 
(again with music occupying a privileged position as narrative cue) illustrates the prominence 
of ‘history’ as a framing device.  The phrase “the party was over” here is seen as ushering in 
a new era, identified with violence, personal and professional failure, and paranoia.  All of 
this is designed to minimise the intrusion of what Linda Williams described as the seemingly 
gratuitous excess of body genres, like pornography, which is itself identified as, of all genres, 
“the lowest in cultural esteem” (Williams, 1991, 3), and to reinforce the extent to which the 
film can be read as ‘mainstream’.   
 
In the case of Magnolia, the ‘auteur’ label having been solidly established through Boogie 
Nights, the task of positioning the film becomes less onerous.  It is worth noting, however, 
that discursive comparisons with Robert Altman are significantly more pronounced for this 
film than with its predecessor.  In part this is due to structural similarities between their work, 
in particular the entwined narrative.  However, from a perspective which takes into account 
genre as well as auteur theory, it can also be interpreted as an acknowledgement that 
Anderson’s work in Magnolia tends towards the kind of self-conscious sprawling drama in 
which Altman had specialised, but which had become distinctly unfashionable over the 
preceding decade.  From this viewpoint, positioning the work as part of a tradition of wider 
cinematic inheritance could (paradoxically, as one might expect calls to auteurism to figure 
prominently in art-house framing) maximise the potential for mainstream crossover by 
avoiding questions of generic unpopularity or indeed exhaustion, directing attention instead 
to matters of prestige, quality, and cultural inheritance.  For each film, therefore, questions 
arise regarding the relative efficacy of the use of generic and auteurist framings in industrial 
positioning.   
 
Where generic categorisations can be regarded as industrially ineffective because they are 
potentially misleading as to the nature of the text (in the case of Boogie Nights), or because 
they occur ‘out of time’ of the theoretical genre cycle, at a moment of unfashionability (as 
with Magnolia), the industrial and discursive tendency to rely on a generalised auteurism for 
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textual positioning is more strongly pronounced.  If there is a ‘through-line’ in Anderson’s 
work, it is found in the dynamics of his narratives, where a kind of epic emotionalism 
dominates; these dynamics, however, would not have been immediately obvious in his early 
work.  The most immediately-accessible classical generic labels needed to be rejected for 
both these films, in order to enable viewer positioning and textual comprehension, and most 
importantly in order to mobilise the required discourses of prestige.  In service of this goal, 
Anderson’s work was instead wedged into an auteuristic frame, which could simultaneously 
allow potential viewers to ‘make sense of’ his work, and allow critical and discursive 
mechanisms to historically contextualise or ‘ennoble’ it as historical account.  
 
Similarly, Wes Anderson’s output tends to be characterised even in more scholarly work as 
“one of the most original voices in contemporary American cinema.” (Tzioumakis, 2006, 6), 
an interpretation which leans heavily on auteurist ideas.  Thematically, certain preoccupations 
– difficult family relationships, fatherhood, creative and interpersonal failure – emerge 
repeatedly, working to solidify the impression of his status as auteur (See Chapter Four for 
more on Anderson as auteur).  At the same time, I believe this strongly auteurist framing is 
indivisible from the fact that Anderson’s work is what we might term ‘slippery’ as regards 
generic framings; while Rushmore (1998) can be argued for as a Smart addition to the teen 
film canon, the gently absurdist comedy drama (domestically-centred in the case of 
Tenenbaums, more adventure-based for Zissou) of Anderson’s films is less inclined to 
foreground itself than the stylistic strategies he uses to manifest or call tone into being.  For 
all this, his pictures are directly rooted in the heart of the established studio system, coming 
as they do directly from Disney, through their Touchstone Pictures marque, and released 
through their Buena Vista distribution arm.  Again, here the aesthetics function to position the 
work as ‘independent’ or marginal, evoking Leland’s description of hip as “the elevation of 
style and background as narrative and foreground” (Leland, 2004, 10) even where industrial 
circumstances directly contradict this.
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Taken as a group, a few conclusions present themselves.  The films with the largest budgets 
are in all cases produced through the involvement of a major studio, and cannot be described 
as ‘independent’ films, industrially, but as studio investments which present no more than a 
medium-sized risk.
171
  However, they do exhibit some of the same kind of generic play and 
thematic concerns as more industrially independent films, and are still inclined to call upon 
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ideas of independence and authenticity in their positioning, sometimes in ways which obscure 
their actual industrial underpinnings.  Two strands emerge here: on the one side, those films 
which play with more broadly defined generic elements, such as action, sc-fi, romance, or 
comedy, where the focus tends to rest on genres and aesthetic strategies which seem likely to 
translate to wider (international) audiences, whether this in practice happened or not (The 
Matrix, Dark City, Fight Club, Huckabees, Eternal Sunshine).  On the other, we see a strong 
fixation on tonal and prestige elements, in particular representation of middle-class crisis, and 
positioning which embeds work within the culture of auteurism, whether through bourgeois 
prestige culture of the mainstream awards systems, or more informal ‘hipster’ approval 
(American Beauty, Sideways, and the work of the respective Andersons’).   
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Figure 7. The ‘low-budget’ Smart film 
Film Final 
budget 
Major studio 
involved 
 Film Final 
budget 
Major/independent 
studio involved 
(production or 
distribution) 
Pulp 
Fiction 
(Quentin 
Tarantino, 
1994) 
$8.5 
million Miramax  
Memento 
(Christopher 
Nolan, 
2000) 
$5-9 
million
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 Newmarket Films 
Welcome 
to the 
Dollhouse 
(Todd 
Solondz, 
1995) $800,000 
Sony Pictures 
Classics  
Donnie 
Darko 
(Richard 
Kelly, 2001) 
$4.5 
million Newmarket Films 
Safe  
(Todd 
Haynes, 
1995) 
$1 
million 
Sony Pictures 
Classics  
Ghost World  
(Terry 
Zwigoff, 
2001) 
$7 
million 
MGM/United 
Artists 
Pi  
(Darren 
Aronofsky, 
1998) $60,000 
Live 
Entertainment  
Lost In 
Translation 
(Sofia 
Coppola, 
2003)   
$4 
million Focus Features 
Happiness 
(Todd 
Solondz, 
1998) 
$3 
million 
Good Machine 
Releasing   
Primer 
(Shane 
Carruth, 
2004) $7,000 Th!nkFilm 
Election 
(Alexander 
Payne, 
1999) 
$8.5 
million 
MTV 
Films/Paramount  
Brick  
(Rian 
Johnson, 
2005) $475,000 Focus Features 
       
 
Figures have been compiled from a variety of sources including www.imdb.com, www.the-numbers.com and 
www.boxofficemojo.com and crosschecked with industry sources (including Variety, Hollywood Reporter, and 
Screen International) where possible, as well as industry-adjacent accounts such as those of: Levy, 1999; 
Tzioumakis, 2006; Mottram, 2006; Waxman, 2005.  Each figure has been confirmed by a minimum of three 
different sources.  All figures are estimated, and where any conflict arises between different sources, I have 
noted this where the difference appears significant in the context of my research.   
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The industrial aspects of this set of films – those produced for less than $10 million – 
illustrate a different, but related, set of positioning and discursive concerns.  Whether at the 
production or distribution end or both, almost all of the films involved again have strong links 
with major studios; not surprisingly, as a cinematic release of any magnitude is dependent on 
the structural relationships which dominate distribution and exhibition.  However, these links 
provide a picture of the industrial environment of Smart over this period of “the successful 
integration of the independent film movement into the structures of global media and 
finance.” (Schamus, 2001, 254) Pulp Fiction, for example, comes from Miramax, whose 
ambitions during that period (to move from indie cinema to the mainstream, through a multi-
pronged strategy of acquisitions, a risky and not always successful move into production, 
strategic partnerships, and its eventual sale to Disney), have been well-documented both 
within and outside of the academic sphere, most notably, respectively, by Perren, 2012 and 
Biskind, 2005.   
 
Election was produced by MTV Films, founded in 1996: Viacom, who had bought MTV in 
1985, and Paramount in 1993, appear to have seen MTV Films as a way of developing 
synergy between their different divisions (see Hindes, 1999).  Although a controversial 
choice of project
173
 and not a significant commercial success – a factor Holmlund (2005) 
attributes to Paramount’s lack of ability to handle a ‘small’ film – the strategic intent was 
clear in executive Van Toffler’s assertion at the time that  
MTV’s core audience of 12- to 34-year-olds is 25%-30% more likely than the overall 
population to see any given movie. But they are 50% more likely to see a ‘non-
mainstream’ movie, a term he says includes specialized, horror and black-themed 
pics, among others. (Hindes, 1999, 8)   
Similarly aimed at teenage and post-adolescent audiences, Ghost World was a United Artists 
production on the MGM/UA label, and again serves a particular industrial function, as token 
of its new specialty studio ambitions: essentially dormant during the 1990s, MGM/UA had 
returned to production a year before (King, 2005, 41).  This was a short-lived venture, 
however, the label absorbed into the Sony empire by 2006.   
 
Welcome to the Dollhouse and Safe were both given limited release through Sony Pictures 
Classics, the earliest of the studio indie divisions of the era, established in 1992 by Sony (who 
had purchased Columbia Pictures just three years earlier) under former Orion Classics
174
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heads Michael Barker, Tom Bernard, and Marcie Bloom.
175
  Interestingly, it appears to have 
been the only studio indie division to significantly resist the tendency to move into 
production, as acquisition, distribution and marketing costs rocketed during the 1990s (King, 
2009, 2013; Tzioumakis, 2013) and Sony Pictures Classics remains “the most autonomous 
and art-cinema oriented” (King, 2013, 44), a strategy which appears to have given the 
company more long-term stability than its contemporaries.
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  This was certainly the case in 
1995, when marketing focused on traditionally art-house strategies, emphasising prestige 
through film festival positioning and critical response, using this to build from a limited 
release, and banking on attracting those small but significant audiences in opposition to 
crowds defined as ‘mainstream’, with Dollhouse opening against Mission Impossible on 
Memorial Day weekend (King, 2005, 27-28).  In this sense, both films constituted not an 
industrial intervention as such, but part of a continuing corporate strategy to maintain a 
significant art-house presence in the market, and to position these films as art-house pieces, 
rather than aimed more broadly at transitional or mainstream markets.  
 
Several of the films took more distinctly ‘indie’ routes to market; Happiness was eventually 
released through Good Machine (See Chapter Eight for a more detailed analysis); Memento 
and Donnie Darko both came from the small independent Newmarket Films, the former 
earning a remarkable $40 million internationally, and which in 2005 would become part of 
Picturehouse, formed through its acquisition by New Line and HBO Films.  In 2008 
Picturehouse (along with Warner Independent Pictures, which it had joined following New 
Line’s consolidation into Warner Bros.) was shut down, although the company was revived 
in early 2013 following Bob and Jeanne Berney’s purchase of the trademark and logo from 
Warner (see Kay, 2013).  Pi was released through Live Entertainment,
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 which purchased it 
in its first Sundance excursion under a new capitalisation plan from Bain Capital (Cox, 
1998a, 48), and the intent of its positioning was indicated clearly with what Live co-president 
Amir Malin described as “a platform release…to counterprogram against all the mindless 
pictures…[with] a strong P&A commitment” (ibid.) although figures for the spend are not 
available.
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Lost in Translation and Brick were both distributed by Focus Features.
179
  The latter’s 
relative generic opacity and access-limiting dialogue militated towards strategically retaining 
its distinction as a marginal piece – it could not be sold as a straight ‘teenpic’, and its 
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purchase following the Sundance Film Festival at which it won a Special Jury Prize for 
Originality of Vision meant that it could be positioned more directly as an independent film, 
appealing to the attendant discourses of prestige and access which thereby could be seen to 
apply to it.  Lost in Translation functions in almost precisely the opposite way, having several 
factors which make it available to more mainstream positioning strategies in a way that Brick 
does not.  The first is the way that its mood and generic openness privilege both a tentatively 
romantic storyline, and comedic elements, in a setting which is simultaneously ‘exotic’ and 
clearly mediated for us by the experience of the Americans in it – despite its status as a 
Japanese-American co-production, it is a distinctly American piece of work, rather than a 
theoretical ‘foreign film’.   
 
The second is the way in which the film is embedded in a pre-existing narrative of 
Hollywood history and prestige.  Sofia Coppola’s unique position as both a genetic 
descendent of the 1970s New Hollywood and a member of the ‘New New Hollywood’ (her 
husband at the time was Spike Jonze) lent itself to publicity, and to that publicity positioning 
the text squarely within the Smart framework.  This can be seen clearly in the media attention 
generated by the film even before its release, which steps outside the usual boundaries of film 
criticism and into the style pages (an effect intensified by the increasing media presence of 
Scarlett Johansson during the period).  Mentions of the Coppola family (including Jason 
Schwartzman and Nicolas Cage) are parlayed into a dynastic narrative, and other semiotic 
markers of Coppola’s work and life circumstances – Bruce Weber, The White Stripes, the 
Cassavetes family, Sonic Youth, Vogue shoots, Marc Jacobs, Dazed and Confused – are 
referred to in ways which place both her heredity and, sometimes almost secondarily, her 
work within a framework of ‘hip’ contemporary cultural life.  In this sense, and it is one 
which is perhaps gendered as much as related to her comparative inexperience, it is Coppola 
herself who becomes the object of a celebrity narrative with auteuristic inflections within 
which her work features as a token of her celebrity, rather than the other way around (see 
Hirschberg, 2003; Punter, 2003; Waxman, 2003).      
 
The casting of Bill Murray reinforces these threads; his work with Wes Anderson had both 
given him a new – and perhaps rather ‘retro’ – credibility, and reclaimed his (tangential) star 
status, while producing a narrative of rejuvenation.  At the same time, his comedic persona is 
embedded within the texts and related material.  This can be seen clearly in the poster for the 
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US release, where a rumpled Murray, his face somewhere between vulnerability and a wry 
smirk, sits in a dressing-gown on the edge of his bed, feet half-in his slippers, hands clasped, 
with Tokyo at night behind him.  The effect is of displacement, yes – particularly with the tag 
line above his head, “Everyone wants to be found” – but in a more ‘mainstreamed’ reading, 
also of Murray’s comic persona being held in abeyance for action about to happen.  Similarly 
the trailer emphasises the broadly comedic and movement-oriented over the still, 
contemplative tendencies which characterise the film, foregrounding elements of cultural 
misunderstanding – in particular the sexualised ‘lip my stocking’ moment – and action (Bob 
and Charlotte’s hand-in-hand sprint through Tokyo) in a way that recalls the mainstream 
buddy comedy, even where its dialogue suggests a more philosophical bent. 
 
In stark contrast, Primer’s distance from the Hollywood industry was foregrounded in its 
release by Th!nkFilm, a small independent which had produced or distributed a variety of 
strongly art-house-oriented films from its inception in 2001, cultivating space in what seemed 
like vanishingly-small niches.
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   These smaller, independently distributed films were 
obliged to rely more on discursive positioning; without financing for extensive advertising, 
positive critical reviews and word of mouth counted for the vast proportion of the publicity 
available. Indeed, ‘media discourse’ in this context goes far beyond simple recommendation 
(in the form of a good/bad binary distinction), and produces a complex mesh of cues from 
and through which potential audiences position themselves.   Taking Pi as an example, 
lacking as it did any significant advertising budget, a media strategy was required which 
emphasised its low budget credentials and art-house leanings through placement at film 
festivals, reviews, and interviews.  
 
The materials generated in the mainstream press through this strategy perform in a manner 
which is illustrative of the kinds of positioning we find throughout the low-budget sector.  
Surveying a selection
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 of English-language pieces on the film and its creator from the 
beginning of 1997 through to the end of 1999, a number of significant threads emerge.  The 
first is the way in which the piece is located in the first set of articles referring to it, those 
which deal directly with the Sundance Festival. Of these, hybridised generic descriptions 
illustrating the tentative nature of these categorisations dominate the discourse: it is variously 
described as a “science fiction thriller” (Cox, 1998a) “semi-science-fiction” (McCarthy, 
1998), “sci-fi, Kafkaesque B&W religio-mathematical thriller” (Harvey, 1998), “bizarre and 
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ingeniously mathematical paranoid thriller” (Maslin, 1998b), “dark, visually compelling 
psychological thriller” (Kehr, 1998a).   
 
Few art cinema or auteurist references are made at this point; McCarthy is the first to note 
influences from Bunuel, Lynch and Kubrick, calling it a “personal, visionary, hermetic art 
film” announcing “the arrival of an exciting and potentially major new talent” (McCarthy, 
1998); it is described as “brilliantly abstruse” (Maslin, 1998a); as “an artistic and edgy piece 
of mystification” (Turan, 1998). Similarly, few references are made to the film’s extremely 
low budget, but where they are, they refer rather to Aronofsky’s “Socialist” (Cox, 1998b) 
method of financing through friends and family.  Only one piece (in industry paper Variety) 
speculates on Pi’s likely prospects, describing it as “limited in terms of narrative and 
emotional drive – not to mention commercial prospects – by dint of its very 
originality…Wide fest pickup and possible cult status are likelier than much theatrical play.” 
(Harvey, 1998, 67)  Instead the focus is on placing the film within a wider industrial context, 
which emphasises the changing nature of the Sundance Film Festival itself, here framed as an 
event showcasing ever more commercially-orientated work (Maslin, 1998a; Horn, 1998; 
Turan, 1998; Murray, 1998; Jacobson, 1998).  Here, Pi is presented as something of a minor 
attraction within a festival which has itself become the topic of discussion amid questions of 
marketplace over-heating and ‘selling out’. 
 
The next phase of the film’s promotional and release schedule, through the summer of 1998, 
took in the Deauville, Montreal, Edinburgh, Karlovy Vary, Montreal, Edinburgh, and Fant-
Asia (Toronto) film festivals (much of the coverage here is directly reporting on or refers to 
the film’s presence at these festivals), as well as the film’s release in selected American 
cities.  Of the thirty-nine articles which chart this period, attempts to cue the film generically 
are again couched in hydbridised and often tentative or contingent language: it is a “startling 
sci-fi thriller” (Johnston, 1998, 7); an “arcane thriller” (Klady, 1998) “the most intriguing 
thriller of the summer” (Holleman, 1998) a “science-fiction thriller with a metaphysical 
thrust” (Kehr, 1998b), “a downtown noir” (Rea, 1998); “billed as a sci-fi thriller” (Adams, 
1998).  References abound here, in establishing frames of comparison, to David Lynch (Caro, 
1998; Rosen, 1998); Peter Greenaway (Ringel, 1998); The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Zibart, 
1998); Kafka (Devlin, 1998; Rea, 1998) and Eco “this mix of Thomas Pynchon, Umberto 
Eco and Chaos Theory for beginners” (Romney, 1998).    
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Here, Pi is framed within a discourse which does not simply engage with the discourses of 
prestige – almost every piece makes reference to its festival credentials, most particularly its 
winning of the dramatic direction category at Sundance – but one which also points (as 
almost every piece does) to its ultra-low budget as if that, too, were a guarantee of quality: we 
are told “the filmmaker turns financial limitations into artistic inventiveness” (Ringel, 1998); 
“one of the most daring recent attempts to get the maximum kinetic charge out of next-to-no-
budget resources” (Romney, 1998); “surprisingly cinematic for a $60,000 art film about 
abstract mathematics” (Kempley, 1998).  Links, too, are made between prestige, budget, and 
the film’s supposed singularity; the implication is that it is not ‘for everyone’, and that those 
towards whom it is directed are a culturally-educated, cerebral audience, of a particular 
generation.
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We are told “it has a low-budget look that may not appeal to audiences used to more slickly 
produced Hollywood movies” (Rosen, 1998); “cyberpunk cinema [which] could only have 
been made by a film student in the age of ‘The X-Files’” (Zibart, 1998); it is “metaphysics for 
the cyber set” (Kempley, 1998).  This sense of the film as a somehat marginal niche prestige-
based attraction is also tied to an implied – and sometimes explicit – critique of the wider 
Hollywood or mainstream system, “a small but most impressive victory of independent 
imagination over the mundane” (Maslin, 1998c); “a genuinely smart sci-fi movie that costs 
less than a studio executive’s sports car,” (Lacey, 1998); its “appeal will radiate toward the 
cerebral viewer…rises to a dimension of thought and illumination that is far beyond [film’s] 
usual pulp, bad-novel sources” (Byrge, 1998); one critic includes Pi as a high point of the 
year to date while championing “those who cherish art films as a refuge from the mind-
numbing slate of blockbusters” (Ryan, 1998).   
 
We can therefore see how the discursive representation of one film connects ideas of prestige 
and auteurism within a framework emphasising marginality of appeal – this appeal being 
explicitly defined as cerebral, and located within a wider art cinema and cinema history 
trajectory – and a perceived ‘uniqueness’.  While there remains a strong focus on the 
attractions of genre, this is couched in tentative terms, and in language which foregrounds the 
idea of Aronofsky’s work as a highly distinctive, individual piece of work.  This impression 
of singularity is also reinforced in the way in which financial elements – Aronofsky’s 
‘socialist’ funding programme – are emphasised which not only place Pi in a wider industrial 
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environment, but explicitly construct it as part of a narrative where films of this type are 
defined as existing in strict opposition to, and outside of, the perceived mainstream of 
Hollywood cinema. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A picture here emerges of industrial flux across two decades; while the major studios move 
strongly into the distribution and production of independent-styled film, even those producers 
and distributors which start out as independent move gradually towards mainstream 
capitalisation and studio financing (although frequently with key personnel, such as James 
Schamus at Focus and Bob Shaye at New Line, left intact, whether this worked to limit 
accusations of lost autonomy or not
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) or stop trading, a trend that would intensify in the 
decade after the period of this study.  During this process, which also strongly illustrates the 
globalised nature of modern film capitalisation and production, each of the emerging 
autonomous units utilised the increased availability of capital to push smaller films more 
intensively through to the mainstream from the fringes of distribution and exhibition, in a 
process of territorial market colonisation which effectively ‘squeezed out’ those smaller 
independents which could not compete on a financial basis, or which could not be absorbed.  
Here I concur with Tzioumakis in his conclusion that: 
from the mid-1990s [studio-owned subsidiaries old and new] turned their attention 
primarily to production. By concentrating on the more conservative, star-led 
properties…these studio divisions privileged further the commercial elements that 
characterised indie film production for most of the 1990s. [Later years were] marked 
by the domination of the studio divisions and their increasing emphasis on film 
production.  As subsidiaries of global entertainment conglomerates, these divisions 
are by definition integrated into the structures of global media and finance and 
therefore are fully equipped to play ‘the independent film game’ better than the 
traditional stand-alone distributors. (Tzioumakis, 2013, 37) 
 
They did this through a variety of tactics including tactical releasing and strategic publicity 
generation, but primarily positioning was a function of the interplay between various 
(occasionally competing) discourses of prestige – particularly in the form of auteurism and 
the awards industry – and genre.  The positioning and reception of texts either focused on 
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assumedly mainstream generic values (The Matrix, Fight Club); were embedded within 
strongly bourgeois prestige discourses (American Beauty, Sideways); availed of value 
judgements linking them with the ‘hip’ and contemporary (the work of Wes Anderson, Lost 
In Translation); or issued appeals to audiences on the basis of strongly art-house, 
occasionally transgressive values (Happiness, Safe, Welcome to the Dollhouse).  Hybrid 
combinations also appear, which form a more complex picture: the work of Paul Thomas 
Anderson has generic, transgressive, prestige and auteurial framings; Pi is both a hipster 
attraction and an art-house film; Eternal Sunshine carries strongly mainstream and strongly 
art-house references, respectively softened and unified by the star presence of Jim Carrey and 
through the auteurial figure of Charlie Kaufman.  Moving beyond industrial aspects, each of 
these films also mobilises particular structural and thematic preoccupations in its broader 
cultural field, and for this reason I turn in my next chapter to matters of textual analysis.  
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Chapter Seven: Double Coding and the Smart canon 
 
Given my contention that Smart cinema functions as a trans-generic industrial mode, it is 
important to establish how, textually, it does so. This chapter explores a selection of Smart 
films, outlining how their attributes – thematics, structure, visual references, and more – 
create simultaneous calls to action to multiple audiences.  Genre is a textual attribute often 
elided or taken as a ‘given’ of mainstream cinematic practice, and therefore tends to be 
evacuated from discussions of individual Smart texts which privilege a framework of 
‘independence’.  This is changing, as in Tzioumakis’ acknowledgement that over the 1990s 
“an increasing number of indie films did not hide their affinities with Hollywood 
cinema…[including] strong generic frameworks” (Tzioumakis, 2013, 35), however genre is 
rarely foregrounded.  As an example of how this manifests in practice, Gallagher contends 
that Pulp Fiction aided in “industry acceptance of non-linearity in later genre films.” 
(Gallagher, 2013, 92), a perspective which points to the assimilatory capacity of the industry, 
but which neglects the ‘operational mechanics’ of genre.   
 
Newman argues that “narratives like these might seem to be devoid of genre conventions 
such as those found in more recognizable popular entertainment forms...this lack of generic 
framework is a significant part of their appeal.” (Newman, 2011, 89), thus rendering genre 
invisible – as I demonstrate below, Smart is not characterised by a ‘lack’ of generic 
framework, but instead a desire to complicate and reconfigure generic expectations as an 
aspect of novelty or innovation.  King takes a broader view, acknowledging that “more 
familiar models are most likely to be combined with departures from established mainstream 
convention.” (King, 2009, 265) but without specifically addressing genre at a more expansive 
theoretical level, for all that he explores individual manifestations of genre and generic 
play.
184
  Perren points clearly to aesthetic and taste judgements made in this field by critics 
and academics, when she discusses the way in which discourses diverge when Miramax is 
related to its ‘lower-status’ Dimension label, stating that this  
suggests a great deal about the ongoing attitudes toward film and popular culture at 
large. Both critics and scholars have remained unsure of how to categorize genre 
films, and thus (if discussing them at all) have placed them in a separate box – one 
that is almost always perceived to contain inferior product (Perren, 2012, 142). 
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However, for many of these films, the interplay between generic structures or references, and 
the way a certain degree of distinction is maintained from both ‘mainstream’ and ‘art 
cinema’, is key.  Primarily, they draw on concepts such as ‘art cinema, ‘cult’, and ‘prestige’ 
at varying positions along a theoretical continuum from ‘indie’ to ‘mainstream’.  This is done 
at a textual level via a process of what I describe as ‘double-coding’ to ensure multiple 
generic ‘entry points’ for audiences; that is, ways into the text which attract divergent types 
of viewer.  Where King (2009) uses the term largely in the context of Bourdieu’s ideas of 
habitus and distinction, I instead use it to unpack the more material elements of textual 
positioning.  However, the process might more usefully be described as multiple coding: my 
central conviction is that Smart cinema utilises a multiplicity of generic codes and textual 
attributes, creating a spectrum or continuum, from those films which display extensive formal 
experimentation to those which privilege more classically-driven narrative, in order to create 
simultaneous calls to multiple audiences.
185
   
 
 
The function of this chapter is to assess the means by which individual films create a 
combination of generic appeals, and calls to notions of art-house, cult, and independent 
production.  I have selected a range of films for analysis, which I discuss in chronological 
order; taken as a body, they illustrate a tentative trajectory, and one in which a degree of 
parallelism applies, given that independent producers and studios were both producing this 
type of work.  Pulp Fiction in 1994 constitutes a particular coalescence of independent and 
studio industrial practices which intruded into the mainstream; Welcome to the Dollhouse, a 
year later, illustrates that Smart strategies were still largely the domain of the independent 
film. Pi and Dark City from 1998 mirror each other in focusing on the life of the mind, but 
come from distinct industrial positions: the former seen as exemplifying independent practice 
and the latter, from New Line, the product of a major independent which had only four years 
earlier been taken over by a studio, Warner. Rushmore represents the ‘quirky’ aesthetic as 
well as the gradual movement of studios into the field (through Disney’s Touchstone 
Pictures).   
 
Three films written by Charlie Kaufman feature due to his overall significance, the earlier 
(and darker) Being John Malkovich alongside Adaptation and Eternal Sunshine. American 
Beauty and The Matrix constitute distinct studio interventions into the territory, and Donnie 
Darko is a cult favourite, displaying the tendency of Smart films to cultivate audiences in 
161 
 
their post-exhibition life.  Lost in Translation and I ♥ Huckabees illustrate in their varying 
ways the continued prominence of the indie subsidiary during the period, and Brick, finally, 
marks something of a return to more marginal practices.  My primary focus in analysing these 
films is to foreground the combination of generic deployments, thematic preoccupations, and 
narrative structure strategies which characterise them, and it is the distinction between Smart 
characteristics as embedded in, as opposed to diverging from, generic concerns which I most 
wish to emphasise.     
 
Prefigured by sex, lies and videotape in 1989 and Reservoir Dogs in 1992, two films which 
illustrated the wider economic potential of independent cinema, and came to function as a 
kind of ‘origin myth’ for Smart cinema, Pulp Fiction in 1994 marks the real entry of Smart to 
the mainstream, and signalled Miramax’s ambitions of achieving major-studio status.  
Quentin Tarantino’s dense, narratively-complex script and appropriational, bricolage style 
mean that at first sight, the film is characterised primarily by self-consciously ‘postmodern’ 
temporal generic games, where Nouvelle Vague, buddy-comedy, blaxploitation, noir, martial 
arts, western, action, and gangster elements rub together indiscriminately, ‘compressed’ over 
time.  These temporal-generic games are tacitly referred to in one scene, at the ersatz 1950s 
diner Jackrabbit Slim’s, which gangster Vincent describes as “like a wax museum with a 
pulse”: the temporal collapse Vincent experiences186 is emphasised by Tarantino’s swooping 
camera action – he is disorientated from heroin use, but also overwhelmed with the intensity 
of his experience. 
 
However, the film’s stylistic and formal play is complex, refusing access through classical 
viewing strategies, in ways which position it more strongly within an art-house framework 
than its mainstream success would suggest.  These include: an unconventionally-looped 
timeline; the ‘protagonist’s’ mid-narrative death; transitions which unsettle and distance the 
viewer from the text; deliberate incongruity (particularly in the use of music); repeated 
switching of the narrative’s point of view – sometimes mid-scene; self-consciously artificial, 
or dated, shot choices and special effects (incongruous fades, misalignment of voice and 
image or timeline, screen flares, intertitles, captions, 360° shots, unexpected periods of 
silence,
187
 intrusions of graphic design, imaginary sequences).  These are more than retro 
‘period’ details or stylistic distractions.  Instead, they form strategies through which the 
audience is embedded in a process of intellectual engagement, as well as a visceral 
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experience – Pulp Fiction provides a myriad of routes ‘in’, not least the distinctly art-house 
sense that it forms a kind of palimpsest upon which film history is gleefully (re)inscribed.  
 
The flamboyant transgressiveness – and in particular graphic violence (including sexual 
violence) and explicit drug use – which gained the film much press attention can be coded 
both as art-house and as mainstream. The former is the case in its confrontation and 
destruction, through its combination of the playful and the grotesque, of the theoretical norms 
of on-screen ‘acceptability’. The latter is seen in the way that these aspects – such as Mia’s 
tensely comedic overdose, Marsellus’ rape by “hillbillies”, or the gory accidental death of 
Marvin and its humorous aftermath – are treated as points of (blackly comedic) 
spectacularised narrative engagement, and as elements of highly conventional cinematic male 
bonding rituals.  Its use of racially-problematic language also marks it out as treading a 
complex line between the mainstream and the fringes: repeated use of terms such as ‘nigger’, 
‘gook’, ‘slope’ and so on are made somewhat more complex by the strong formal relationship 
the film has with 1970s exploitation film, and the moral relativism – or enthusiastic nihilism 
– at play throughout.  Captain Koons’ monologue to young Butch, outlining the history of his 
family as it relates to the gold watch he has come to deliver from Butch’s dead POW father, 
illustrates this.  Moving from over-the-top tenderness to racist haranguing, Koons tells how 
Butch’s father would “be damned if any slopes were gonna put their greasy yellow hands on 
his boy’s birthright”.  The problematically racist elements are immediately undercut by 
Koons’ presentation of Butch’s ‘inheritance’, both pompous and comedically scatological;188 
this does not render them non-racist, clearly, but focuses attention more on the remarks’ 
‘eccentricity’.  
 
These verbal flourishes are as much a Tarantinian trademark as his formal bricolage and 
grand guignol styling, and again provide multiple entry points to the film, through dense 
dialogue which repays repeated viewing – a factor which accounts strongly for the film’s cult 
success.  Characters articulate their desires in complex ways, particularly hitman Jules, who 
uses his verbal dexterity as a weapon, admitting that he prizes the stylistic flamboyance of 
biblical passage Ezekial 25.17 over its meaning, a comment which forms meta-commentary 
on the film itself.  The film’s many verbal set-pieces are florid, highly dextrous, and 
frequently irreverent, and even taciturn boxer Butch expresses his affection with an inventive 
variety of endearments.   
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Here we see an appealing reformulation of masculinity – where men interact emotionally, 
symbolically joust, engage with masculine heritage, and assess and exchange status through 
verbal as well as physical display – which also produces a symbolic sense of emotional 
grouping, or community, which contributes to its cult credentials.  It is the textual density of 
the way in which these elements – art-house, mainstream, and cult – are intertwined which 
results in its strongly double-coded nature and attendant celebration as a prestige text, and its 
eruption into the mainstream marked the formal entry of Smart cinema as a mode.  However, 
its transgressive elements are strongly embedded within generic codes which either minimise 
them (black comedy) or create a sense of generic verisimilitude within which they can be 
safely contained (gangster), creating as strong a drive towards accessibility as to distinction.        
 
By contrast almost stereotypically ‘independent’ in its industrial aspects and the extent to 
which it seeks to mark itself out as transgressive, Welcome To The Dollhouse (Todd Solondz, 
1995) points to the expropriation of indie structures and themes which would later become a 
hallmark of Smart.  Stubborn, plain Dawn Wiener is marginalised both within her suburban 
family – sandwiched between brother Mark, focused on escape to college, and winsomely 
manipulative sister Missy – and at school, humiliated and abused by students and teachers.  
While its narrative structure is classically uncomplicated, and its comedic elements 
pronounced, it is the film’s generic concerns which strike the most mainstream note. It 
functions both as a coming-of-age drama, and a high school teen-pic of a particularly brutal 
kind – one which calls to mind that other Smart teen-pic of the period, the distinctly lighter in 
tone Election.   
 
Here there is none of the solidarity-in-adversity which characterises many teen films; Dawn 
is excluded, taunted as “lesbian”,189 “Ugly”, “Dogface” even by those whom she defends, 
tortured via spitballs and insults, all attempts at retaliation backfiring.  Her powerlessness is 
emphasised at every turn, even as her mother angrily asks “Who ever told you to fight back?” 
after she is sent to the principal. The idea of teenagers constituting a separate social universe 
to that inhabited by adults, familiar from mainstream high school films like those of John 
Hughes, here takes on a more sinister aspect; threats of a blackened ‘college transcript’ mean 
nothing in the context of Dawn’s ongoing torture and invisibility to the adults around her.  
Where conventional teen-pic elements intrude, such as the exclusion of Dawn and 
disadvantaged delinquent Brandon from a party, they do so within a broader context of 
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humiliation and lack of autonomy which only emphasises the bleakness of Dawn’s situation. 
That the film wreaks such black comedy from the horrors perpetrated on Dawn speaks, too, 
to its more cultish elements; while there is no sense of the ‘triumph of the underdog’, the film 
elicits a strong sense of empathy for her subordinated position, which seems to call to 
‘kindred spirits’ – in many senses this is a film which foregrounds the apparently unspeakable 
and is transgressive primarily for its lack of conventional moralising. 
 
However, its preoccupation with – and especially its treatment of, either in a tonally distanced 
fashion or as material for black comedy – ‘transgressive’ and problematic material such as 
adolescent sexuality, paedophilia, and the gendered dynamics of adolescent power, status, 
and violence, as well as its aggressively adult language, means that it is difficult to imagine 
the film having been made within the studio system.  In this sense, Dollhouse leans most 
strongly towards the art-house form, with its deliberately downbeat ending,
190
 and elevation 
of the trials of suburban life to a kind of epic status.  The film becomes more ‘Smart’ in the 
manner in which it problematises its own art-house tendencies by taking a strongly ironic 
position on them.  This can be seen, for example, in the way it uses music as a counterpoint to 
visual action to exaggerated effect, such as the use of determined, percussive guitar music to 
accompany Dawn’s night-time Odyssey to New York, lounge-lizard vocals to emphasise 
Steve’s naive posturing, or the sickly-sweet Tchaikovsky theme which reflects Missy’s 
compliant charm.
191
  
 
Its comedic but sophisticated treatment of complex gender issues and the pressure of 
gendered expectations forms the backbone of its art-house appeal.   The confusion Dawn 
experiences regarding her emerging sexuality is complicated at every turn by the strongly 
gendered expectations governing sexual propriety.  She becomes entwined in an abusive 
dynamic with Brandon, whose dysfunctional models for (controlling, violent) male sexual 
behaviour, and warped expectations of women, dictate his highly sexualised taunting of her, 
including threats of rape which turn to guarded affection.  Her plaintive “Why do you hate 
me?” is responded to with a simple “Because you’re ugly”, revealing the gender issue which 
here forms one of the keys to Dawn’s ongoing torment not just regarding boys, but also her 
relationship with the ‘perfect’ Missy: the idea that the only reason for women to exist is to be 
beautiful.  This is echoed in the repeated implication that sexual predators only target the 
conventionally attractive:
192
 through the film’s tone, which I would argue is not blank or 
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unsympathetic, but ironically distanced, in that it invites actions to ‘speak’ to the audience 
without interventionist commentary, we may read these as victim-blaming, or as evidence of 
cultural structures which insist on Dawn’s entrenched invisibility to all those but sexual 
predators.  
 
Alternately aggressive and seductive, Brandon uses Dawn to play out fantasies of adult male 
violence and control.  These seem rooted in his immediate role models – when Dawn goes to 
Brandon’s house she encounters his father who asks the clearly pubescent girl, semi-jokingly 
“Did he knock you up?” – but also mirror more broadly cultural patterns, such as when he, in 
a grotesque parody of romantic fiction, tells her “Get off of me. I’m the one that makes the 
first move”.  It is Dawn’s acquiescence which is transgressive to mainstream cinematic norms 
here. Starved of attention and acceptance, and yet drawn to explore her nascent sexuality, she 
accepts his attentions in a compliant manner which complicates conventional cinematic 
identification.  It also confounds the Madonna-whore construct which informs not just 
Brandon’s sexual development, as he frustratedly asks her “Why do you always have to be 
such a cunt?”, but also the structures of heterosexist representation in classical film narrative 
which tend to confine and contain female characters.  
 
Similarly, Dawn’s crush on Mark’s popular, handsome bandmate Steve – whom Dawn first 
encounters while performing the symbolic act of sawing the head off a doll – is strongly 
informed by the weight of conventional gender expectations.  Although their engagement 
remains innocent, Dawn quickly understands that the only way into Steve’s (limited) 
affections would be to trade sex for them, a route blocked to Dawn not because of her age but 
because of her lack of conventional feminine beauty and sexuality.
193
  Instead, in a parody of 
gender expectations, she performs an ‘appropriate’ approximation of gendered servitude for 
him: serving him food and drinks which he eats gracelessly as she watches in adoration.
194
  
Here, sexuality is a contested site, characterised by fear, power, control, and battles for status, 
and it is Dawn’s invisibility within her family which makes her vulnerable to its darkest 
aspects; the real and symbolic sexual violence Dawn faces are ignored.
195
  One of the darkest 
of the films, its complex interplay of comedy and dampened trauma, and bleak but 
sophisticated take on gender expectations, mark the film as inherently Smart.  However, it is 
the embeddedness of these within familiar generic tropes – the teen comedy, the coming-of-
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age drama – which facilitates its opening-out into a certain degree of wider audience 
accessibility.        
 
Illustrating how the independent film was textually reconfigured to be more accessible for 
what we might describe as ‘the techno generation’, Pi (Darren Aronofsky, 1998) combines 
multiple generic drivers, a visual style closely associated with art-house or independent form, 
and a generationally significant soundtrack.
196
  Several of the thematic concerns which would 
come to dominate Smart, notably those of identity crisis and collapse, and the search for 
meaning in a world characterised by uncontrollable, unknowable forces, also feature.  The 
dominant generic driver here is that of the paranoid or surveillance thriller, but insistent noir 
elements also feature (not simply the use of black and white film stock), such as heavily 
skewed framing, strong tonal contrasts between stark whites and deep blacks, and the 
hardboiled tone of the voiceover.  Thriller elements abound: all characters around number 
theorist Max Cohen, searching for a way to predict the fluctuations of the NYSE – for him an 
intellectual challenge, not a matter of greed – are equally treacherous.   
 
Max, dependent on painkillers and anti-psychotics, is paranoid to an extent that makes his 
vision of the world unreliable and plays in to generic expectations: an elderly man on the 
subway appears to be following him; his landlady may be conspiring with sinister forces led 
by Marcy Dawson of stock market “predictive strategies” firm Lancet-Percy.  His fears lead 
him to a (signalled as ‘classically’ thriller-orientated, with its banging soundtrack, dead ends 
and re-sightings) chase through the subway after which he threatens an innocent photography 
student.   However, Max’s fears are not groundless; Dawson seeks to use his skills for 
financial advantage, and the exchange Max makes with her, of processing power in the form 
of a high-performance “Ming-Mecca chip” in exchange for information, forms an archetypal 
‘bargain with the devil’, setting up oppositions and comparisons between God and Mammon 
which are developed throughout.   
 
Gestures towards the thriller form recur throughout, in dialogue and incident. Max’s 
abduction by Marcy and two suited agents is accompanied by heavily genre-grounded 
language: “Let’s go for a ride, Max...We had a deal, Max. Now let’s get in the car...Didn’t 
your mother ever tell you not to play with matches?”  Marcy reveals herself as a classical 
thriller antagonist, threatening him with a gun while saying “I only care about what’s in your 
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fucking head.”   In a thriller-style character reversal, wisecracking Hasidic Jew Lenny, part of 
a group working to decode the Torah, appears to be Max’s saviour but is also looking for the 
numeric secret hidden in his brain.  Here all is constructed of double bluffs and hidden 
intentions: even Max’s mentor, retired mathematician Sol, appears to wish for Max to lead a 
more rounded life, but is actually withholding information. 
 
Science fiction and horror tropes feature prominently, in the film’s repeated emphasis on 
scientific method, such as the (albeit unreliable) ‘scientific log’ approach of Max’s own 
voiceover, and the visual evidence of his growing detachment from reality; he appears to find 
a human brain in the subway, and another in his bathroom sink.  Socially-phobic Max is an 
archetypal ‘mad scientist’ figure, his dingy apartment/lab a Heath Robinson nightmare. The 
bizarre protrusion from his skull of a Hebrew letter which causes him renewed headaches is 
never explained; merely contained within the narrative as an element of body horror. The 
film posits knowledge, power, madness and death as inextricably linked, and the horror 
ending in which Max drills into his brain to relieve his agony here functions as a kind of 
triumph; if this thriller is an attempted heist of Max’s knowledge, he achieves victory by 
losing it for himself, but also denying it to others. 
 
However, this is not simply a hybrid genre piece. At every turn the explicitness of its art-
house and film history references seek to mark it out as possessed of a particular seriousness 
or artistic credibility.  This is seen in its self-consciously experimental and hallucinatory 
qualities – human brains and strange men whose hands drip with blood erupt unpredictably 
into the diegesis – and black and white stock.   It is also seen in the sense of the film as a 
palimpsest onto which notes, numbers and diagrams are inscribed, its undercranked tempo, 
disorientating and at times disruptive handheld camera, play with the synchronisation of 
sound and image, and abrupt shifts of pace from frenetic cut-and-paste sequences to long, 
uncannily slow shots: the cream in Max’s coffee, Lenny’s cigarette smoke swirling.  
References to other films seem calculated to intensify the sense of the film as an accretion of 
cultural references, through which viewer access (and cultural capital) may be granted, with 
visual and sonic references to Eraserhead (David Lynch, (1977), and the mythic Arrival of a 
Train at a Station (Auguste and Louis Lumière, 1895).  Multiple references point to surrealist 
piece Un Chien Andalou (Luis Bunuel, 1928): the opening close-up on Max’s face, centring 
on his eye; the repeated use of iris effects and emphasis on doors and other barriers; the use 
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of stark bleached-out whites and flattened detail; the repeated intrusion of ants; and even the 
strong visual resemblance the wild-haired Max bears to Pierre Batcheff, its star.  Pi wears its 
historical antecedents visibly, and emphasises its art-house leanings even where it is playing 
out more conventional generic concerns.   
 
In its play with the larger themes of the power and place of religion and money as ‘competing 
systems’ forming irreconcilable opposites, and which inspire equally rabid devotion, and its 
emphasis on the mystificatory qualities of knowledge, Pi has much in common with Umberto 
Eco’s 1988 postmodern novel Foucault’s Pendulum.  Here, maths functions as a universal 
language through which hypotheses can be made regarding the interconnectedness of things.  
Max states his assumptions: “One: mathematics is the language of nature. Two: everything 
around us can be represented and understood through numbers. Three: if you graph the 
numbers of any system, patterns emerge. Therefore there are patterns everywhere in nature.”  
For him this means that the “organism” of the stock market can therefore be predicted; it also 
means that for Max, apostasy is the act of abandoning the search for meaning through 
numbers, as Sol does.  Where Sol, Daedalus to Max’s Icarus, emphasises the limitations of 
human ability, warning “As soon as you discard scientific rigour, you are no longer a 
mathematician. You are a numerologist” Max looks to history to rationalize his obsessional 
search for the 216-digit number he believes holds the key to all knowledge.   
 
Max himself constitutes the territory in which most of the film’s concerns about identity and 
knowledge are played out, his mind figured as a site of disruption and contestation.  Marked 
as an outsider by his mathematical skills – which he displays for a neighbour child in his only 
real moments of communication with others – as well as the headaches which have plagued 
him since a childhood incident in which he stared into the sun, the veracity of his experience 
is always at issue.   An Icarus figure, Max is seduced by knowledge; he is “not interested in 
[Lancet-Percy’s] money.  I’m looking for a way to understand our world.”  Voiceover is our 
main access to Max’s interior state of chaos, primarily signified sonically, through the 
electrical static sounds and screeching industrial noise accompanying his headaches.  In some 
ways, this links Max more strongly to the machine than the human world.   
 
Rejecting imperfect humanity in favour of the precision of mathematics, he is something 
more or less than human, disgusted by the messy intrusion of nature in the shape of the ants 
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which invade his mainframe Euclid, and distanced further from others by the sexual noises 
which periodically disrupt his investigations.  Eroticism and disgust are mixed here; the 
lovemaking of neighbours Devi and Farrouhk intrude as Euclid calculates; their generative 
noises accompany Euclid’s attempts at creation, but Max’s moan is not one of orgasm, rather 
of creative perfection or climax interrupted.  Here, sex is linked with loss, death, madness, 
and oblivion, and the penetrative act of drilling into his own brain is what finally saves Max 
from his own obsession.  These wide-ranging textual strategies, utilising art cinema stylistics 
and self-consciously intellectualised themes, while simultaneously grounding them in a 
strongly accessible generic framework, locate Pi within the Smart canon.  
 
Dealing with similar thematic concerns but diametrically opposed industrially, in that it 
constitutes an interesting early studio intervention in the Smart canon, was New Line’s 
uneven, ambitious, and financially largely unsuccessful Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998).  
While science fiction tends towards self-conscious questioning of ideas of ‘humanity’, here 
sci-fi and mystery elements were fused with a deliberately chaotic noir aesthetic and 
occasional eruptions of action.  Perhaps too abstract for initial cinema audiences, positive 
critical reception earned it a significant cult after-life on DVD, and while something of an 
aberration on release, in retrospect its links to succeeding films such as Memento, The Matrix, 
Fight Club and Eternal Sunshine seem clear.  Key to the deliberate, labyrinthine strangeness 
of Dark City is the manner in which it links style and theme by foregrounding its major 
concerns – the fragility of identity, memory, and sanity – in a queasy neo-noir cityscape 
which references Metropolis, Edward Hopper, Jeunet and Caro, Terry Gilliam, and Nietzsche 
as much as The Maltese Falcon.   
 
The purposeful artificiality of the set is dominated by low-tech mechanics
197
 and fluid 
architecture; the city is physically mutable, amended each night as part of a grand social 
experiment by a hive-like alien species.
198
 This is conducted on an artificial ‘satellite’, and 
only suspected serial killer John Murdoch appears resistant to the aliens’ mind control.  This 
sense of deliberate instability – of the city collapsing under Murdoch’s feet – is mirrored in 
Murdoch’s own confusion, as he struggles to solve the mystery that his identity has become. 
Awakening in a bathtub with amnesia, his fear that he may be a psychotic serial killer, and 
eventual discovery that his memory has been erased, constitutes the film not just as a 
variation on the metaphysical detective story, but one which “implicate[s] ‘contingent 
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existence; as the culprit” (Swope, 2002, 222).  The quest to recover (or create) ‘John 
Murdoch’ by dismantling the physical mechanisms which both support and disguise his true 
nature is ironically paralleled by that of his guide or mentor, Dr. Daniel Schreber, whose 
Lorre-esque cringing seems calculated to resist conventional identification.  It is Schreber, 
whose own personality has been deleted by the ‘Strangers’ (with the exception of his 
technical skills), who posits what seems the film’s thematic conclusion, his assertion that “it 
is our capacity for individuality, our souls, that makes us different from them”; an assertion 
which also recuperates the film’s more uncanny elements into a more comfortably humanistic 
science fiction moral structure. 
 
This reassuringly conventional affirmation of American-style individualism is one way in 
which the film makes multiple claims on what might be described as ‘mainstream’ values, 
essentialising as it does the fundamentally enlightened (as in, possessed of superior 
knowledge) humanity that is seen to invest John Murdoch with the assumed moral authority 
to remake the city.  Other calls upon classical or mainstream values are more technologically 
or textually rooted than thematically: high production values (retro mechanical style 
notwithstanding); the presence of action elements, including a climactic battle of wills calling 
to mind manga classic Akira; references to the classical genre forms of noir mystery and sci-
fi; the highly conventional subplot which relies not simply on heteronormative concepts of 
romantic love but also on stereotypical ‘good vs. bad girl’ constructs.199  It also calls upon 
more art-house formal constituents – a complex narrative structure which necessitates close 
reading; a highly unstable diegetic reality; an unreliable narrator; a self-conscious generic 
hybridity which strategically prioritises formal play; a visual style which consciously invokes 
complex cultural references, such as debates on architectural postmodernism;
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 and a 
strongly positive critical reaction.  
 
Other aspects draw on elements of cult and prestige, and how audiences interact with these: 
the film’s box office failure providing a sense of discovery and ownership for home viewers; 
Proyas’ position on the cult spectrum as director of graphic novel adaptation The Crow201 
(1994); the complex narrative structure which repays repeated viewing; its intense generic 
hybridity; a strongly positive critical reception including multiple festival and award 
nominations; ‘ironic noir’ styling which produces a kind of ‘fascist kitsch’ effect, drawing as 
it does on 1930s and 1940s references; an overall tone of paranoid conspiracy which lends 
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itself to group or subcultural adoption. Fundamentally, Dark City’s strongly hybrid nature 
and grimy aesthetic may simply have been ‘out of time’ within its context as a big-budget 
studio piece, its Smartness too strange for its original intended audience: while it embeds its 
metaphysicality within classical generic framing – indeed the mixing of noir and science 
fiction is nothing new, with Blade Runner occupying a particularly canonical place in that 
field – the metaphysical tone is not accompanied by textual strategies designed to widen its 
appeal.  In contrast, just a year later The Matrix would replace its lo-fi ironic noir with a high-
octane mixture of martial arts and spectacular camera effects, to unprecedented box office 
success.     
 
Just as science fiction forms a generic category broad enough to encompass wide internal 
variation, so does the teen picture.  Playing with generic conventions and tone, rather than 
explicit stylistic or structural experimentation, in order to establish its Smart credentials, 
Rushmore (Wes Anderson, 1999) contains elements of downbeat comedy but is 
predominantly a classical school teen picture. It sites protagonist Max Fischer squarely within 
a world of private-school privilege and wealth, then transposes him into an unfamiliar (and to 
him, hostile) public school system, through which process he must achieve his coming-of-
age.  From a class
202
 perspective a blue-collar outsider, lying about his barber father’s career 
as a ‘neurosurgeon’, Max occupies a liminal space within the conventions of the teen film – 
both nerd and outsider, he satisfies neither stereotype.  Intellectually under-achieving but not 
rebellious, Max is one of life’s enthusiasts, intensely involved with the extra-curricular 
activities of the school,
203
 and although he aspires to the sophistication and independence of 
adulthood, he is primarily driven by his reluctance to move on from adolescence, identifying 
with his school to a personally stifling extent: being put on sudden-death academic probation 
(again a stock teen pic trope) and his subsequent expulsion from Rushmore are an intense 
shock to Max’s identity.  This crisis of identity is what drives the film, behind the crises of 
romance and masculinity which are narratively privileged.   
 
In his relationships with the object of his romantic fantasies (Miss Cross), and industrialist 
Herman Blume, with whom he has both a father-son and a romantic-rival relationship, Max 
is, crucially, performing an ersatz version of adulthood.  The film punctures this inflated 
vision by the end, restoring Max to what is seen as a more ‘authentic’ – and importantly, 
more limited – teenage identity.  Max’s ambivalent figure is embedded in a narrative enacting 
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generically-classic themes, but in a manner that is largely mutated by the quirky tonal 
perspective adopted.  While the generic ‘gateway’ to the film is that of the teen picture, 
Anderson’s whimsical stylistic approach, where black comedy, irony, and winking nostalgia 
privilege the interpretation of an adult rather than teenaged audience, means that the film 
mobilises an adult perspective, both ridiculing Max and knowingly indulgent of the naivety  
beneath the veneer of his faux sophistication.  Max is both legitimate generic protagonist, and 
a figure of psychological projection for adult audiences, who must view his self-conscious 
pretention through Anderson’s aesthetic framework, which simultaneously mocks and 
fetishises Max’s artifice, and thereby their own adolescent fumbling. 
 
This nostalgia can also be seen as linking the film with classically-oriented teen cinema, 
particularly that of the 1980s: Max functions as the outsider
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 who must be recuperated into 
adolescence by simultaneously accepting and transcending his position within the teenage 
hierarchy (his acceptance of Cross and Blume’s relationship marks victory for Max, in that it 
constitutes an acceptance of his temporary adolescent powerlessness).  However, the almost 
heroic status imputed to Max’s stubbornness, precocious pretentiousness, and continual 
struggle for reinvention carries a strongly Smart-inflected link between identity, irony, and 
loss of innocence.  Max’s romantic competitor Herman Blume (whose perspective is 
privileged equally to Max’s), occupies a similarly liminal position. Introduced to Max via a 
notably class-oriented speech,
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 he is a working-class interloper within his own family, 
whose privileged state as an industrialist seems to provide him with no satisfaction.  The self-
loathing Blume adopts a number of conventional teen picture positions by turn; surrogate 
father, romantic rival, adult driven to ‘lower himself’ to petty revenge by the machinations of 
a (comedically) vengeful teen
206
 – and indeed the film links these at several points, as when 
Blume compliments the ingenuity of Max’s attempt on his life.   
 
However, Rushmore’s emphasis on the limited (indeed, limiting) nature of adult autonomy, 
and the falsity of tokens of material achievement – emphasised in Blume’s misery, which he 
eventually assuages not just through romantic success with Miss Cross, but also by divesting 
himself of his suburban lifestyle, grasping and unfaithful wife, and children to whom he 
cannot relate
207
 – also shows links with the bourgeois self-scrutiny of American Beauty, I ♥ 
Huckabees, and Fight Club.  Therefore, we see several recurrent Smart themes: a crisis of 
identity indentified mainly as philosophical (but with elements of exploratory sexuality
208
 and 
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class) and linked to a liminal state or life-stage, here adolescence; and the adoption and 
abandonment of self-identification strategies in a search for personal ‘authenticity’.  
Combined with the generic play also outlined, Rushmore problematises the conventions of 
teen film in a distinctly adult way, and for a distinctly Smart audience, willing to engage with 
tonal play and positional ambiguity. 
 
Being John Malkovich (Spike Jonze, 1999) blends genre – incorporating science fiction, 
romantic comedy, and even thriller elements – in a much more complex way, complicating 
traditional expectations of realistic diegesis in a manner which foregrounds human identity – 
and the culture industry – as a location of instability and fluidity.  It is particularly interesting 
for the way it melds play with genre with debates about the function of culture, using the 
body and persona of actor John Malkovich as a cipher. However, it certainly contains enough 
straightforwardly genre-based material to generate wider appeal.  In some aspects it is a 
mystery, wherein undermployed puppeteer Craig Schwartz’s response to an enigmatic help-
wanted ad finds him engaged in a surreal business enterprise, and in which each of the 
characters (Craig himself, his marginalised wife Lotte, romantic object/business partner 
Maxine, and boss Dr. Lester) withhold vital information – and their own motivations – in 
order to achieve their objectives.   
 
Its primary plot device – Craig’s discovery of a portal into the brain of actor Malkovich, 
through which Dr. Lester/Captain Mertin has been moving from ‘vessel’ to vessel, effectively 
rendering himself immortal – is explicitly a science fiction trope, albeit one harnessed 
primarily for comedic effect.  The language used, and the visual style of a book which Mertin 
at one point shows to Lotte, calls upon ‘retro’ sci-fi programmes such as The Twilight Zone 
or The Outer Limits and body-horror, with its vocabulary of “ripe” and “larval” vessels, and 
attendant biological diagrams. So too does the ending, in which Craig is trapped in the body 
of the next ‘larval vessel’, Lotte and Maxine’s daughter.         
 
The film also contains ‘intrusions’ of thriller style throughout, in the language used (with 
Maxine
209
 describing the easily-manipulated Craig as her “man on the inside”) as well as the 
narrative action. Craig, infuriated by Lotte and Maxine’s relationship, ambushes his wife with 
a gun and subsequently cages and gags her, in a largely non-comedic scene which also 
introduces parodic thriller references; asked by Lotte “Is that [gun] real?” the self-entitled but 
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ineffectual Craig replies “And I don’t know how to use it very well, so don’t make any 
sudden moves”.  There are several chase sequences, characterised by fast cutting and a tense 
soundtrack, with Malkovich stalking Maxine to discover the source of his unexpected sense 
that he is ‘not himself’, and Dr. Lester and Lotte’s kidnap of the heavily-pregnant Maxine, 
whose escape into Malkovich’s subconscious via the portal takes the form of a thrilling and 
occasionally dangerous chase set-piece.    
 
Romantic elements also dominate, in the competition between Craig and Lotte for Maxine’s 
affections, and consequent betrayals by each of the other, here that the film finds itself in one 
sense at its most conventional.  However, its willingness to at first complicate and then 
breach heteronormativity is one of the most transgressive elements, for all that its gender 
fluidity
210
 is framed comedically.  Maxine’s unexpected affection for Lotte constitutes both a 
queering of onscreen heteronormativity, and a deconstruction of the star system, in that 
Cameron Diaz’s ‘unattractive’ Lotte directly contradicts her sex symbol persona.  This 
queering is played out more or less comically, with Lotte chiding Craig for “stand[ing] in the 
way of my actualisation as a man.” 
 
The primary generic driver is comedic, the shambling Craig, with his aspirations to 
popularising puppetry as a serious art form, presented as a risible figure.  So is the eccentric 
Lester, with his inappropriate sharing of pornographic fantasies and his resolute (and 
unfounded) insistence that he has a speech impediment as diagnosed by assistant Floris, with 
her “doctorate in speech impedimentology”. Along with the company orientation video’s 
grotesque faux-naive presentation of the 7½th floor’s supposed history – built for Captain 
Mertin’s dwarf wife, as a place “where ye and yer cursed kind can live in peace”, this mild 
surrealism signals that Craig has found himself in a lunatic environment, outside of ‘normal’ 
boundaries of behaviour and in which phenomenological reasoning must be discarded – along 
with the viewer’s expectations of realist fiction.    
 
The emphasis here is on comedy in absurdity and excess, whether in Malkovich’s 
performances of the character of himself as inhabited by the various other characters, Lotte’s 
collecting of animals, or the much-mentioned scene in which Malkovich goes through the 
portal, finishing up in his own brain.  This scene – perhaps described as being meta-self-
reflexive – is the apogee of the film’s surreal excesses, a restaurant in which every diner has 
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Malkovich’s face, and every written or spoken word is his name; the comic aspects are 
reinforced by his response:  “I have been to the dark side, I have seen a world that no man 
should see!”  However, there is nothing simple about the way in which the film combines 
these elements of generic access for viewers.  
 
One key to its status as a Smart film is the way in which it melds them with elements 
emphasising a more self-consciously high art framework: one referring not just to art cinema, 
but to the culture industries generally.  From the opening sequence, where an orchestral score 
accompanies an operatic puppet ballet coded as serious, niche, or esoteric art (immediately 
contrasted with Craig’s reality; drinking beer while ‘playing’ puppeteer at home), the film 
appeals to high culture perspectives repeatedly.   These are figured in complex ways, some of 
which implicate the viewer themselves as complicit in the process of generating cultural 
capital, it is implied, for ersatz or ‘inauthentic’ art, and with a focus on its commercialisation 
that functions as an additional comment on Smart cinema itself.  This emphasis on links and 
divisions between high art and commercialism recurs throughout, whether in Craig’s jealousy 
of ‘Derek Mantini’ whose Belle of Amherst, complete with 60-foot Emily Dickinson has 
“thrilled onlookers”, or the violent reception of his explicit “Abelard and Heloise, A Love 
Story”.   
 
It is in the figure of Malkovich that this emphasis, and in particular the question of what 
constitutes ‘authentic’ creativity, is most strong.  Reciting lines from Chekov’s The Cherry 
Orchard, or rehearsing Richard III, high culture is both valorised through him, and made 
ridiculous by the comedic context of the film.  This is explicitly the case in two scenes. The 
first is where a post-coital Maxine requests that ‘Malkovich’, at this point inhabited and 
controlled by Craig, perform a puppet show.  In this, he performs the same  ‘Dance of 
Despair and Disillusion’ which introduced the film, but this time amusingly and perplexingly 
trebled by the combination of Craig and Malkovich performing precisely the same 
movements as his wooden puppet.  The second is the pseudo-documentary of “American Arts 
& Culture Presents John Horatio Malkovich “Dance of Despair and Disillusionment”.  
Complete with portentous voiceover on the “enigmatic” Malkovich, “the man who reinvented 
how we view puppeteering...the man above the strings, and the woman behind the man”, this 
forms a satire on the vagaries of the culture industries.   
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Malkovich, now long-haired and dressed like C, spouts platitudes such as “There’s the truth 
and there are lies, and art always tells the truth, even when it’s lying”, as the documentary 
outlines Malkovich’s “rise to stardom” as a puppeteer, complete with scenes of ‘paying his 
dues’ to uninterested onlookers in the Catskills.  From the puppetry master class he gives at 
Juilliard, to the over-the-top reception of his “Abelard & Heloise World Tour London 
Premiere”, the film presents the niche art of puppetry as having equal cultural valence with 
more established popular arts, and in a manner which deliberately complicates ideas of what 
‘niche’ and ‘popular’ art might constitute.  Mining clichés and myths around personal 
investment in creativity – in particular where ‘Malkovich’ berates a student with the words 
“You’re making him weep, but you yourself are not weeping. Don’t ever fuck with your 
audience”, moving an audience member to tears, the film reinforces that Craig has not 
changed, simply the context in which his work is received.   
 
The implication is that Malkovich’s existing ‘embeddedness’ within the culture industries is 
what has made puppetry popular, not the work itself.  The way in which celebrity and 
visibility are conflated with cultural value is approached most strongly through the 
Malkovich persona.  The assertion that “Malkovich shows us a reflection of ourselves, our 
frailties, and our...desperate humanity. That’s what makes him one of the most relevant artists 
of our time” contrasts with the varying personae created by and for Malkovich.  His niche 
status as a celebrity, and the bizarrely contingent nature of celebrity itself, is played on in the 
repeated misidentification of him as having played, variously “a jewel thief” and “a retard”. 
Craig’s response to Maxine’s uninterested “Who the fuck is John Malkovich?” may be “One 
of the great American actors of the twentieth century”, but we see him engaged in such 
humdrum activities as catalogue shopping and eating leftovers from the fridge.   
 
The narrative’s playful disregard for him as an individual – exemplified in the ending, with 
Malkovich inhabited by Lester/Mertin and a host of elderly people – reinforces the sense that 
celebrities are primarily a projection of, or to use the film’s language, “vessels” for, the 
public’s personal concerns.  The fictional friendship between Malkovich and Charlie Sheen 
(who greet each other as “Ma-Sheen” and “Malkatraz”) reinforces this; the idea that celebrity 
exists in a self-contained, self-referential universe. So too does the figure of Malkovich’s 
agent Larry, who greets Malkovich’s (or rather Craig’s) desire to make his name 
“synonymous with puppets” with the response “Sure, no problem, you’re a puppeteer. Let me 
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make a couple of calls.”  The satirical effect is strong; the sense that creative power and 
visibility, access to culture, and texts themselves, are produced industrially rather than from a 
more auteurist ‘creative’ framework, is inescapable.  In this sense, Malkovich functions as a 
satire of the fame industry and the kind of industrial ambiguity which produces Smart cinema 
itself: the film is at once distanced from and implicated in the processes of production, as is 
the Smart audience themselves, the film forces a consideration of the power structures 
underlying creative production.  
 
Craig’s inhabitation of Malkovich positions the work for which he is lauded as inauthentic – 
the authentic puppetry is that which cannot be revealed, Craig’s invasion of Malkovich – but 
valorised through association with credibility and ‘the academy.’211  Malkovich’s work and 
its widespread acclaim are here framed as ludicrous pretention, through the faux-
documentary: as the voiceover states, “To quote the Bard, he’s got the world on a string” – a 
pun not only clichéd but factually inaccurate;
212
 in order to elevate this work to the status of 
‘high culture’ Shakespeare must be fictitiously invoked.  Similarly, Malkovich’s 
misquotation of William Faulkner’s 1950 Nobel acceptance speech – which he attributes 
simply to “the poet” illustrates that one of the film’s key drivers is the satirical decoupling of 
material from its original context,  rendering it ‘useless’, comedic, or ironic by this process. 
 
Clearly, to interpret this material in this way implies a degree of cultural access or investment 
on the part of viewers in high (or arguably middlebrow) art, an assumption the film makes 
which places it strongly in an art-house framing.  In this sense, the notion of cultural capital 
itself forms a means of access to the film on the part of the viewer, as much as any of the 
generic drivers.  However, Malkovich implicates viewers in a doubled system of 
simultaneous appeal to, and condemnation of, their artistic interests.  Performing at the 
American Ballet Theatre, his work is impressive – but compared to the dexterity of the 
human dancers, his puppet has a golem-like imposter quality.  The audience’s response is 
half-baffled, half-bewitched; the question raised but left unanswered is whether the rapturous 
applause is genuinely felt, or merely a result of the placing of the work within a high art 
context – a case of the Emperor’s New Puppet.   
 
Similarly, the documentary voiceover “he was the talk of the town, from the Beltway to 
Broadway” combines with a poster reading “John Malkovich and Philip Glass present Johann 
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Wolfgang Goethe’s Die Lieden Des jungen Werthers” to question who these audiences 
constitute and how they might function.  The viewer is made complicit in parochial cultural 
snobbery (the implication that ‘Beltway’ audiences would clamour for this event presented as 
ludicrous), and the availability and authenticity of popular culture simultaneously satirised.  
In short, a strong subtext within Malkovich is the questioning of ‘who is the audience?’  
However, the film’s generic drivers are sufficiently dominant to hold in productive tension 
the wide-ranging intellectual challenges posed by its themes.  
 
Approaching bourgeois crises of identity in a very different way, and preoccupied mainly 
with middle-class angst, is American Beauty (Sam Mendes, 1999), where the problems of 
privilege are explored through the identity crisis of middle-aged white man Lester Burnham.  
Moderately successful if unfulfilled in his career, Lester is married to estate agent Carolyn, 
lives in a suburban dream home complete with non-metaphorical white picket fence, and has 
a stereotypically disaffected teenage daughter, Jane.  His crush on her friend Angela causes 
him to re-evaluate his position within his family and workplace, and this self-conscious 
tragedy of the bourgeoisie plays out through a variety of thematic engagements – primarily 
with work, marriage, youth and nostalgia (particularly related to sex and drugs) – which seem 
calculated to signal, if not explore, rifts within the ‘American Dream.’213  
 
The film’s world of work is an ambivalent one, initially appearing to champion strategies of 
resistance to the commodification of personal labour, and the ‘inauthentic’ game-playing with 
which the film associates middle-class labour in particular.  Work constitutes first a site of 
oppression, and later liberation, for Lester, defeated by clashes with ‘efficiency expert’ Brad.  
Reduced to sarcastic deference, Lester is pictured isolated in a sea of featureless cubicles, or 
framed as spatially overwhelmed by Brad’s spacious office.  Resentful of his role as a “whore 
for the advertising industry”, Lester’s blackmail of the company (as well as threatening to 
expose corruption – the failings of one individual are here what threatens Lester, not the 
structural inequalities of capitalism – he intimidates them with the threat of a fabricated 
sexual harassment suit) succeeds financially, but fails to convince as liberatory strategy.
214
  
For all that Lester congratulates himself on being “an ordinary guy with nothing to lose”, his 
job at “Mister Smiley’s” fast food restaurant reveals the complacent, inherently bourgeois 
heart of the film.  Lester’s supposed downward mobility is merely class-tourism for a man 
who, with the patronising words “I’m looking for the least possible amount of responsibility”, 
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dismisses the real struggle of the working classes (here represented only by a succession of 
bored-looking, conventionally unattractive adolescents).  American Beauty evacuates the 
gesture of abandoning middle-class labour of any philosophical meaning, associating it 
instead with regressive baby boomer nostalgia for a more ‘liberated’ past.   
 
The casual disrespect evinced for paid work is evident too in the figure of pompous real 
estate ‘king’ Buddy Kane, with whom Carolyn begins an affair after he demonstrates his 
difference from Lester by dismissing his former girlfriend’s assessment of him as “too 
focused on my career...as if being driven to succeed is some sort of character flaw”, and most 
strongly in its treatment of Carolyn herself.  Mocked for her supposed obsession with status 
and appearance, signalled repeatedly as castrating and controlling, she becomes a grotesque 
parody.  The film seeks primarily to marginalise her – or more accurately, the suburban 
lifestyle which she is seen to represent – as seen in (classically Smart as per the Sconce 
definition) scenes of stilted, strained family dinners: awkward tableaus of commodity 
fetishism which expose deeper resentments and battles for status.  Indeed, the treatment of the 
Burnham family dynamic opens the film up to a wide range of potential readings depending 
on how a viewer positions themselves with regard to gender or class privilege, bearing in 
mind that some of these possible readings might be counted as more progressive than others.   
 
A ‘preferred’215 reading of the film might be that a combination of family and work pressure 
has induced a mid-life crisis in Lester, during which he tests the boundaries of his family’s 
love, explores the nature of his own sexuality and his roles as a man (particularly as father, 
husband, friend).  Through a rejection of predatorial sexual behaviour and the development of 
a personal moral/philosophical framework which holds his different roles and characteristics 
in a more holistic balance, Lester, whose character is flawed but fundamentally decent, 
achieves personal fulfilment, whereupon he is tragically murdered.  Here, the emphasis is on 
individual rebellion – physically, as in Lester’s abandonment of work, use of drugs, and 
reshaping of his musculature, and psychologically, as in his rejection of his wife in favour of 
sexual fantasy – as a means of escape from a repressively bourgeois suburban culture.  The 
difficulty with this desired reading is that while Lester’s diminished status in the family is 
one of the film’s principle themes, the film fails to provide evidence that he has been 
marginalised in any significant way.   
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To read the film from a feminist perspective
216
 (as Erica Arthur, 2004, does) renders this the 
story of a distant father who prioritises libidinal impulses over the psychological damage he 
knowingly inflicts on his daughter, and who is repeatedly threatening and emotionally 
abusive to his wife, in order to maintain a narrative of white middle-class male victimhood.  
Rejecting Carolyn in order to pursue his fantasy courtship of Angela, he emotionally abuses 
her in order to assert his dominance, not in the relationship, but as a man; as when, denying 
that he cares about her affair, he manufactures a scene of public humiliation in order to 
reinforce that she doesn’t “get to tell me what to do. Ever again.”  Masturbating beside her at 
night, the list of euphemisms he reels off is played for comedy, but the abusive nature of his 
engagement with her is clear, in that his needs must be considered dominant to hers: when 
she correctly points out “This is not a marriage”, he replies “But you were happy as long as I 
kept my mouth shut. Well guess what. I’ve changed. And the new me whacks off when he 
feels horny.” Following this with a threatening diatribe in which he rejects her claim that she 
will divorce him (“On what grounds? I’m not a drunk, I don’t fuck other women, I don’t 
mistreat you, I’ve never hit you, I don’t even try to touch you”), we are directed to interpret 
his threats – including a threat to take half her business – as a personal victory with which we 
should identify, rather than as the vitriolic outburst of an abuser.  Similarly, his accusation 
that she “keeps [his] dick in a mason jar under the sink”, plate-throwing dinner tantrums, and 
evident enjoyment of her distress are all coded as symbolic victories in which viewers can 
share.  
 
The misogyny is heightened in the way the film constructs the character of Angela.  In the 
heightened symbolism and visual lushness of the film’s fantasy sequences, Lester’s crush on 
Angela is given the texture and tone of depersonalised desire; this clear signalling of unreality 
is the film’s distancing strategy, its schema for avoiding accusations of quasi-paedophilic 
tendencies. This ‘Angela’ is simply a creation of Lester’s ego,217 nubile, perpetually available 
and willing.  The reality of Angela’s character is much more complex, as she demonstrates 
that she has rationalised her own early vulnerability to sexual predators by colluding in her 
own exploitation.  In theory, this complexity should provide for a subtle exploration of 
gendered expectations – however, the film is dominated by Lester’s sense of entitlement and 
victimhood, which works to deny a voice to Carolyn, Jane or Angela.  The film thereby 
legitimises the culture of exploitation, objectifying Angela as a sexualised (adult) figure 
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throughout; in an effort to recoup its objectification of her, the source of symbolic victim-
blaming moves from Lester to Jane and Ricky.   
 
Shaming her for her desire to have sex with Lester, something she believes will allow her to 
achieve adulthood by complying with the social structures which dictate that she only ‘exists’ 
when seen as sexual object (as Lester puts it, she is “the most beautiful thing [sic]” he’s ever 
seen), Ricky says “you are [ugly]. And you’re boring. And you’re totally ordinary. And you 
know it.”  Angela can function only as fantasy figure, compliant with patriarchal demands, or 
as figure of shame, rejected for her ‘slutty’ desire to comply with those demands, as much as 
for her status-obsessed rejection of Ricky.  Patriarchal visions of femininity are here enforced 
as natural law; masturbatory fantasies and sexually-predatory behaviour are unproblematic 
despite Angela’s youth, even if they must be later rejected to reinscribe Lester’s credentials 
as a ‘good father’; however the suggestion that Lester and the teenaged Ricky are sexually 
involved is seen as so transgressive it leads to (redemptive) climactic death. 
     
The misogyny perpetuated here must either ‘eject’ the female viewer, or induce her to 
become compliant with her own symbolic destruction in a Mulveyan sense.  Therefore, in 
order to read the film as anything other than a tale of misogynist suburban horror – to 
‘convert’ it into the kind of middle-brow prestige piece suggested by its multiple awards and 
significant mainstream box office – it must be contained within a bourgeois, anti-feminist 
viewing framework.   The film’s Smart tendencies – its flirtation with rejection of intellectual 
labour-for-hire, its focus on non-heteronormative sexuality and rejection of homophobia, its 
engagement with underage and transgressive sexuality, its apparent rejection of relational and 
social norms and exploration of suburban anomie, its diegetic visualisation of the interior 
fantasies of its protagonist – are founded in fundamentally reassuring mainstream structures; 
soft drugs, liberal sexual attitudes, and a choice to reject sexual exploitation in favour of 
‘father role.’  The film’s mainstream tendencies therefore remain dominant: its focus on 
classical emotional engagement (centred on Lester’s ‘personal growth’); its casual 
reproduction of misogyny; its use of generic elements from melodrama, comedy and 
misdirectional thriller; and finally Lester’s death, functioning as a mechanism by which to 
propose his personal transcendence as well as to obviate the philosophical challenges posed 
by his alteration.    
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American Beauty, then, signifies an industrial co-option of Smart strategies, tailored for 
middlebrow audiences.  The impression of Lester’s rebellion – the valourisation of his 
masturbatory objectification of a vulnerable teenage girl, and his subsequent misogynistic 
‘overthrow’ of his supposedly oppressive family – is prized over actual challenge to capitalist 
or gender-based ideologies, and his death functions to truncate the narrative at a point where 
his death can mythically ‘redeem him’ without further interrogation.  Producing on the 
surface the impression that it is ‘challenging’ in its thematic strategies (as opposed to its 
formal strategies, which are strongly classical in orientation), the film is in fact resolutely 
patriarchal and capitalist, failing to challenge prevailing ideologies and reinforcing the 
bourgeois hegemony, despite its apparent non-conformist slant.  These impressions are 
strongly anchored within a quasi-melodramatic ‘family drama’ genre, one which itself tends 
to produce and reinforce heteronormative and socially reassuring conclusions. It is also 
therefore fundamentally suited for the prestige market, inhabiting and dramatising the 
fantasies of the wealthy and secure; the transgressive thrills involved in rejection of bourgeois 
values and supposed female domination are symbolically redeemed by Lester’s death.   
 
A film which similarly managed to cultivate a dominant presence in the mainstream 
marketplace was The Matrix (Andy Wachowski and Lana Wachowski, 1999).  Its financial 
success in some ways served to foreground more traditionally ‘blockbuster’ features, such as 
the film’s spectacular fight scenes, at the expense of its (albeit subtle) resemblances to more 
easily-identified Smart films.  To be clear, this is a film very much at the mainstream end of 
the spectrum; it is an action blockbuster which mobilises certain Smart preoccupations in 
ways which serve to problematise that mode.  The film provides many initial points of 
engagement, many of which are explicitly generic.  Paranoid thriller, noir, martial arts, 
superhero, and psychological drama (particularly in the more messianic aspects of Neo’s 
awakening, which form a kind of ‘vision quest’218) elements are called upon throughout, 
although it is the science fiction and action elements which dominate.  These multiple generic 
elements are signalled as clearly through the visual aesthetic as they are through narrative 
action, with a murky green cityscape which recalls both Dark City and Fight Club, and nods 
to an eclectic mixture of noir, classical Asian martial arts,
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 and biker style.  
 
This deliberate, and often contradictory, stylistic eclecticism is emphasised in much the same 
way that generic hybridity is emphasised – not as pastiche, but as an unheimlich compression 
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of aesthetics and time periods designed to reveal the artifice of the Matrix itself (as with Dark 
City, which also takes place in an ‘impossible’ location).  It can be seen in the way the film 
employs aesthetic contrasts throughout, such as that between the dilapidated grandeur of the 
abandoned house in which Morpheus offers Neo his choice of enlightenment or blissful 
oblivion, and his crew’s quasi-futuristic clothes and technology, or in its emblems of 
‘futuristic noir’ such as their old-fashioned car with ultra-modern front-opening doors.  This 
scene, in which the crew removes Neo’s ‘bug’, links the contrast with ‘body horror’, its 
dystopian fusing of technology and flesh instinctively repellent. The (part steampunk, part 
Heath Robinson) machine with which they withdraw Neo’s parasite, revealing its hybrid 
flesh-and-metal nature, provides us with a clue to Neo’s ‘real’ existence: confined, hairless 
and foetal, to a metal and glass womb whose tubes sustain him on liquidised corpses, a probe 
penetrates his brain and feeds him images of the Matrix.  It is Neo’s struggle to negotiate his 
newly-liminal state – freed from physical prison, and as yet unable to master the Matrix – 
with which the film is concerned, and which gives it some of its (partial) claim to Smartness.    
 
The environmental style, therefore, relies largely on creating a sense of aesthetic imbalance 
between the monotonous physics of the natural world, and the dizzying possibilities available 
to those ‘liberated’ from the Matrix.   This imbalance, too, gives the film some of its 
Smartness, in that it deliberately destabilises the terms of audience engagement and 
identification, all the while maintaining its momentum as an action/sci-fi picture – evidenced 
in the thrill of horror we experience the first time the physics of natural world truly go awry, 
when Neo’s mouth spontaneously seals shut during his interrogation by Agent Smith.  These 
elements, with their focus on generic, narrative, and stylistic play, are arguably more Smart 
than what one might at first glance describe as the film’s ‘clever’ use of philosophy.  On the 
whole, the film’s philosophical outlook is a combination of undergraduate phenomenological 
solipsism
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 and half-baked Gaia theory.
221
  At the same time, its inclusion of serious 
philosophical questions on the nature of humanity not simply as narrative rationalisation or 
tool of exposition, but as what we might call the ‘deep structure’ of the film – the foundation 
on which narrative, characterisation, structure and aesthetics all stand – is itself a marker 
which distinguishes it as considerably more Smart than its action counterparts.
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As importantly, the film successfully integrates philosophical engagement with action and 
thriller elements, performing two functions. The first is to utilise the asking of philosophical 
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questions, in and of themselves, as elements of narrative play and innovation both within the 
diegesis (for example we are unused, outside of the framework of art cinema, to a 
protagonist’s primary motivation, and almost all their dialogue, being concerned with the 
deeper questions of human existence) and within the broader generic framework (that is, the 
action/thriller elements which dominate, although indeed science fiction is often concerned 
with philosophical questions).  The second is the way in which this multiple generic coding 
and integration of philosophy make the film accessible to several audiences which might not 
generally engage with this type of work.  This includes the notional audience for action films, 
who might under other circumstances reject explicitly cerebral material on the grounds of it 
being solely ‘fit for’ a more prestigious mode.  It also includes audiences which might be 
more inclined to engage with higher prestige ‘art house’ cinema than with action, but for 
whom the philosophical framework deployed by The Matrix provides more ‘acceptable’ 
terms of engagement.   
 
In this sense, the film manages to move beyond the ‘small but significant audience’. It does 
so by appealing to mass market – and international – attractions such as action, presenting the 
integration of a philosophical framework as a mark of formal innovation; it also appeals to 
prestige audiences on the basis of the same philosophical framework, but by positioning itself 
as an action sci-fi ‘clever’ enough to view without any associated loss of cultural capital.  
This is also the case in the way in which visual technology is used as an ‘attraction’ or 
innovatory thrill within the film, such as the ‘bullet time’ technique which forms a key appeal 
here, playing with time and space in a highly spectacular way.  The extent to which the film 
privileges spectacular action above all else means that it cannot be regarded as being as Smart 
in the same way that, for example, Dark City is, but it still approaches metaphysics in a more 
cerebral way than the average action blockbuster, in particular in the way in which the 
audience’s knowledge of the (un)reality of the Matrix provides for extravagant play with 
material conventions and physical or spatial barriers.   
 
This includes fight scenes and martial arts techniques, but also the fetishisation of artificiality 
and excess, such as when Morpheus freezes ‘the Construct’, allowing him and Neo to walk 
around in it, or when Neo’s request for “Guns. Lots of guns” is answered by an impossible 
array of weaponry, sweeping past him in racks.  Several spectacular set-pieces emphasise this 
knowing perspective, such as that in which Neo and Trinity rescue Morpheus from the 
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agents.  Here, knowledge that the Matrix is ‘unreal’ absolves the pair of moral responsibility 
for the massacre they unleash
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 and fetishisation of the spectacular is foregrounded, with 
wildly excessive gunfire resulting in an accumulation of bullets, deaths, and spectacular 
debris.  Slow-motion and bullet time are used as ‘showcase’ techniques, often so heavily 
stylised as to appear almost art-house in their formalism.  This is particularly the case in the 
many slow-motion shots of water droplets or bullets hitting water, which appear to show 
considerable pleasure in formal visual organisation, but retain their ‘spectacular’ quality 
through inevitable associations with Asian ‘wire-fu’ style. 
 
Many of the film’s themes also link with Smart strands which emerge elsewhere: the search 
for human identity (both as an individual and within – or more specifically in resistance to – a 
social context) and the struggle to develop an ‘authentic’ self; the futility of paid work 
without meaning; and the importance of resistance to authority.  This is expressed in Neo’s 
relationship to the bureaucratic minutiae of paid work; he is rebuked by his boss, who says, 
“You have a problem with authority, Mr. Anderson. You believe that you are special, and 
that the rules somehow do not apply to you. Obviously you are mistaken.”  The resistance he 
displays by refusing to accept Agent Smith’s contention that Morpheus and his group are 
“terrorists”, and subsequent actions, establishes the “Thomas Anderson” identity as the 
fraudulent one, and hacker alter ego “Neo” as his authentic self.  Related to this proposed 
‘authentic identity’ is the insistence throughout on establishing and maintaining distinctions 
between Neo and the rest of the resistance, and the (still oblivious) general populace, in a 
kind of fetishised cultishness.
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With its continual privileging of the need to ‘believe’ over the requirement to think, socially 
progressive tendencies are somewhat undercut.  Therefore, when for example Morpheus 
asserts that “many of [the Matrix’s prisoners] are so inert, so hopelessly dependent on the 
system, that they will fight to protect it”, the implication is not that a call to socio-political 
action is being issued.  It is that ‘we’ are being appealed to as a cult all of our own, the 
enlightened audience who cannot be fooled by “the world that has been pulled over your eyes 
to blind you from the truth...that you are a slave, Neo...born into a prison that you cannot 
smell or taste or touch. A prison for your mind.”  In this sense, the strongest call from the 
film is for the audience to self-position: as an audience superior to the ‘normal’ action 
audience, which again casts it within a more Smart framework than might have been thought.  
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Key to this is the way in which the film integrates diegetic elements (including the uncertain 
physics of the Matrix, and the use of technological innovation as spectacular display), generic 
drivers of a strongly mainstream nature, and metaphysical themes through the central 
organising principle – the film’s philosophical underpinning – in a way which calls upon 
mainstream, cult and to a lesser extent art-house concerns, as well as nodding to specific 
cultural concerns of the period, such as anxiety regarding increasing technological 
interconnectedness, and the problems of the emerging ‘networked society’.   
 
Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001)
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 focuses in a different way on the contingency of its 
protagonist’s experience, but generates a great deal of textual tension in the similar ‘gap’ 
between its at times conflicting generic requirements.  It is important, too, to note that this is 
a film which found itself a strong cult following through its original releases, DVD release, 
and subsequent director’s cut DVD, and has a network of paratextual material surrounding it, 
including a somewhat pioneering website, all contributing to its cult nature.
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  So too does its 
‘retro’ soundtrack, which itself became a separate and distinct route of access into the film.227  
In many ways it is a nostalgic teen film, set as it is during the 1980s, a period of enormous 
cultural traction for the teen picture.  Its disturbed and ultimately doomed protagonist Donnie 
is a classical teen hero: rebellious, unconcerned with convention when it conflicts with his 
personal ethics, and disinclined to bow to authority.   However, in his uncertain status as 
troubled visionary or paranoid schizophrenic, or both, he is also a tragic figure who can most 
clearly be seen as such through adult eyes, and therefore this is not a film specifically 
directed at teenagers – for all that it speaks to the experience of marginalised youth228 – so 
much as a quasi-nostalgic vehicle for the exploration of generic codes, and in ways which 
collide fruitfully with these, some strikingly Smart themes, including the gulf between adult 
hypocrisy and a presumed ‘authenticity’ of youth, and the nature of fate or predestination.  
 
Set in an idyllic suburb on the verge of the 1988 American presidential election, Donnie 
Darko’s world is one where the trappings of a carefree middle-class lifestyle – from 
trampolines and Halloween carnivals to lawn sprinklers
229– are given an almost epic framing 
by being filmed in slow-motion. This also serves to enhance the way in which Kelly 
fetishises the plentiful period elements, from the soundtrack to Donnie and friends’ extended 
discussion of The Smurfs.
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  The Bush-Dukakis election is presented as historical curiosity, 
and evangelical teacher Kitty Farmer’s crusade against the teaching of Graham Greene’s The 
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Destructors in Donnie’s Catholic school echoes the actions of groups such as PMRC during 
that era.
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  The ambivalent representation of prepubescent dance group ‘Sparkle Motion’ 
illustrates the sense of the period recalled ironically at a distance; their routine to Duran 
Duran’s ‘Notorious’, and the rapturous applause with which it is greeted, is both childishly 
innocent and quasi-sexualised in a manner which would have been considered unproblematic 
during the 1980s, but hardly since.   
 
A narrative of suburban apocalypse rather than anything more straightforward, Donnie Darko 
harnesses many of the classical tropes of teen film.  Donnie himself is strongly coded as an 
outsider or ‘trickster’ figure in many ways,232 but one whose bluntly anti-authoritarian 
tendencies earn him the respect of his peers, particularly in his conflict with Farmer and self-
help guru Jim Cunningham.  The ‘ineffectual head’ and ‘nemesis teacher’ figures are also 
strongly linked with the teen film, and here feature in the comedic sense, such as in the scene 
in which Farmer, outraged, notes that he “asked me to forcibly insert the lifeline exercise card 
into my anus,” or the scene in which Donnie’s act of vandalism233 results in the head and 
janitor bemusedly observing (to a jaunty flute soundtrack) water pumping uncontrollably 
through the school in and out.  This is of course complicated by the tension between humour 
and more sinister intrusions: Donnie’s scrawled “They made me do it” is less a cry for help 
than a warning.   
 
The hierarchical nature of high school society is also foregrounded.  Outsiders united by 
trauma, Gretchen’s misunderstanding of Donnie’s awkward courtship “You want to go with 
me?” – to which she replies “Where do you want to go?” – emphasises not just the tribal 
nature of teen slang, but also the isolated nature of carless suburban teens.  The lonely figure 
of Cherita, taunted with “Go back to China, bitch”234 and destined to eat lunch alone, marks a 
particularly potent manifestation of teenage alienation.  Seth and Ricky, with their sexual 
taunting of Gretchen, surreptitious drug-taking, and switchblades, are classic teen-film 
bullies, whose attempted robbery of Roberta Sparrow’s “gem collection” triggers the film’s 
climax: along with Donnie and friends’ bicycle-riding, this calls nostalgically to mind 
children’s adventure film The Goonies (Richard Donner, 1985).  These links to classical teen 
tropes, as well as the Hallowe’en party, a key ‘trickster’ location, and its romance and 
(presumed, rather than illustrated) sexual encounter between Donnie and Gretchen, 
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referencing the relinquishment of virginity as a rite-of-passage seen in many teen films, are 
played upon repeatedly. 
 
However, these teen cinema references are positioned in such a way as to imply not just a 
nostalgic framing, but a self-consciously ‘adult’ one, of teenaged feelings and events recalled 
at an ironic distance, providing a means of entry to multiple audiences.  This can be seen in 
the set-piece introduction to the school itself and the film’s significant characters, set to a 
period song (Tears for Fears’ Head Over Heels).  Here, swirling cameras, and formally 
experimental play with slowed-down and speeded-up footage, highlight the sense of time 
elapsed, fleeting, contrasted with the temporal immediacy of most teen film.  The camera’s 
refusal to privilege any one character, not even Donnie himself, produces a sense of the 
school as a ‘community’ of viewpoints: terminating in the soundtrack line “time flies”, this 
serves to complicate any sense of the film as a straightforward teen genre piece, and 
highlights its sense of generic (and audience) intermixing. 
 
Donnie Darko is as much science-fiction film as teen picture, with its obsessive focus on time 
travel and impending apocalypse, even where the science-fiction framing is complicated by 
the possibility that Donnie is experiencing psychotic hallucinations.  The grotesque figure of 
rabbit-suited ‘Frank’ with his ‘messages from the future’, the ‘tubes’ protruding from 
characters’ chests acting as visual representation of the spatio-temporal paths on which 
humans move, and Donnie’s conversations about time travel with his physics teacher 
(touching on philosophy and religion as well as Stephen Hawking), all code it as such.  
However, the film also contains elements of horror, whether in Donnie’s grinning, absent, 
face – calling to mind Kubrick – or the hallucinogenic quality of his sleepwalking.  Here, the 
science is sublimated to the demands of the fiction, and the eroding barriers dividing Donnie 
from the ‘real world’ (for all that we are led to expect that it is nothing of the kind) are coded 
as psychological barriers, with the apocalypse located as much in Donnie’s mind as anywhere 
else.  This is illustrated clearly in the scenes where he attempts to breach the screen with a 
knife; the physics of this on-screen universe are too tenuous, too breachable, to be coded as 
realistic, but the knowledge of Donnie’s mental crisis renders them unstable as ‘pure’ science 
fiction.   
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The dominant tonal driver is, rather, that of the paranoid mystery or thriller, whether in 
Donnie’s theft of a gun (which we ‘know’ must be used) from his parents’ wardrobe, the 
mysterious origins of the engine which falls through the Darko house, or even the anxious 
voicemail Donnie’s therapist Dr. Thurman leaves for his parents.  However, these feed into 
thematic elements which serve to signal the film as Smart, including an existentialist 
preoccupation with ideas of fate and predestination, in which Donnie functions as a sacrificial 
figure who cannot escape his destruction, for all that it will serve to save Gretchen from 
death.
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  The contrast between Donnie’s ‘authentic’ (albeit psychologically suspect) actions 
and adult hypocrisy also features.  Several separate strands illustrate this, in particular Kitty 
Farmer’s anti-intellectual crusade to ban the “pornography” of The Destructors, resulting of 
the dismissal of empathetic English teacher Karen Pomeroy.
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  Another is the manner in 
which the well-meaning Dr. Thurman tries but fails to assist Donnie via hypnotherapy, 
resulting in several amusing scenes among the underlying horror, where Donnie variously 
masturbates, and bemoans his parents’ failure to get him “Hungry Hungry Hippos” for 
Christmas as a child; the effect is a critique of the drive to pathologise what might be termed 
‘rational’ existential crises.   
 
The primary vehicle for this, however, is in Donnie’s resistance to evangelical self-help guru 
Jim Cunningham, whom Donnie later inadvertently exposes, by burning his house down,
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as leader of a paedophile publishing ring.  Cunningham’s assertion that “life is absolutely too 
important, too valuable, and too precious, to be controlled by fear” may in fact dovetail neatly 
with the theme of many Smart films, but here is undone by Cunningham’s criminality and 
profiteering.  For Donnie, Cunningham, with his platitudinal rhetoric of ‘love’, fear’ and 
“lifeline exercises” is “the antichrist”, selling empowerment and self-acceptance but (we later 
discover) leading a sordid secret life.   The self-consciously retro-styled videos which Kitty 
Farmer shows function as a satirical critique of self-help culture; with their split screens and 
zooming frames, and cod-Freudian references to “ego reflections”, they highlight 
Cunningham’s cynical jargon-peddling.  Donnie’s advice to teens searching for guidance – 
“next time he tries to [shove your head in the toilet] you kick him in the balls” may lack 
maturity, but is, crucially, practical, and signalled as authentic.  His frustrated protestation 
that “You can’t just lump things into two categories....There are other things that need to be 
taken into account here, like the whole spectrum of human emotion. You can’t just lump 
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everything into one of these two categories and then just deny everything else” may lack 
subtlety, but it is more ethically functional than the options Cunningham offers.  
 
It is also Donnie Darko’s refusal to allow a traditional resolution of its generic imperatives 
which marks it out as Smart. As a teen film it denies Donnie a traditionally triumphant 
emotional resolution, sacrificing him instead.  As a science fiction film, it refuses to clarify its 
theoretical underpinnings, or obey the contemporary coding of science fiction as a genre 
preoccupied more with action than introspection.  As a thriller it refuses to retain the 
discovery of Jim Cunningham’s paedophilia, this being erased from the timeline by Donnie’s 
acceptance of his fate.  Therefore, it is in the space required by viewers to negotiate the at 
times contradictory generic demands that the film generates its Smartness as well as its cult 
appeal, resisting as it does the drive towards conventional narrative-generic resolution. 
 
Also utilising fractured narrative, albeit with a stronger degree of playful self-referentiality, 
was Adaptation (Spike Jonze, 2002), a feature which appears to locate it much more strongly 
on the ‘art-house’238 end of the Smart spectrum.  Prefaced with a scripting credit to the 
fictional ‘Donald Kaufman’ as well as real writer Charlie Kaufman, it opens in the hand-held 
style of a behind-the-scenes feature on the location of Being John Malkovich, in what could 
be described as an eruption of meta-paratextuality, invoking as it does that work as well as its 
screenwriter’s peculiarly potent auteur-image.  While firstly working to naturalise the 
appearance of Nicolas Cage as ‘Charlie’, this opening also situates the viewer within a 
diegesis centred on the film industry as creative industry: on creative block as identity crisis, 
on the unstable, artificial nature of film, and the Hollywood industry.  Charlie delivers an 
early manifesto, one that registers as almost ‘anti-cinematic’ in the context of mainstream 
Hollywood film: “I don’t want to cram in sex, or guns, or car chases, or characters learning 
profound life lessons, or growing, or coming to like each other, or overcoming obstacles to 
succeed in the end...the book isn’t like that, and life isn’t like that.” 
 
Moving between incidents from Susan Orlean’s (Meryl Streep’s) book The Orchid Thief,239 
Charlie’s imagined version of those events, Charlie’s ‘real’ life as a screenwriter along with 
aspiring screenwriter brother Donald, and his fantasised sexual encounters with women, its 
emphasis on the mutable, unreliable status of film is not expressed strictly verbally or 
visually, but through the repeating, intertwining patterns of the narrative.  It intersperses 
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much more classical or conventional generic elements throughout, rather than maintaining a 
singular focus on the psychological drama of identity crisis.  These elements are 
predominantly comedic (in particular the cultivation of comedy in the gap between voiceover 
and onscreen action), but also include romance (between Charlie and violinist Amelia, 
between Susan Orlean and obsessive orchid hunter John Laroche, as well as in less 
substantive senses between Charlie and his fantasy conquests, including Orlean and studio 
executive Valerie as well as Amelia) and action,
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 with the film culminating in a chase 
through the Florida swamps, a fatal car accident, and death by alligator.   
 
The doubling component of the film presents the ‘odd couple’ of buddy comedies as an 
antithetical pairing seeming to reinforce stereotypes both of the Smart fan
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 and the dumb 
consumer of blockbusters.  Charlie is a masturbatory, self-flagellating figure, paralysed by his 
inability to engage with the opposite sex as much as with his own creative instincts; by 
contrast Donald’s naively enthusiastic espousal of ‘Hollywood values’ in his patently 
unworkable serial killer script, are made fun of initially.  Yet while Donald may regard 
Charlie as a genius, Donald is the ‘successful’ one: creatively fertile (on his own terms) 
socially functional, flourishing romantically, and engaged with life.  If the relationship 
between Charlie and fictional twin Donald functions for Kaufman to interrogate both his best 
and worst creative impulses, here are played out some of the film’s dilemmas about itself.  
Donald’s approach (for Charlie a venal, anti-artistic one) emphasises that structure, and the 
establishment of generically appropriate expectations, are paramount; Charlie feels contrarily 
a writer makes a journey into the unknown, that film is art and should mirror the messy, 
frequently un-dramatic ‘real world’.  
 
In this sense we see a comment on Smart film itself; how can one work within, and rework, 
the classical format?  Or from a personalised perspective, does Donald’s dumb optimism 
(later revealed as a knowing choice to look away from others’ contempt), make him better-
adapted for the world than Charlie’s clever inertia?  The film’s eventual symbolic integration 
of the two characters takes the form of a playfully deliberate mis-step; Kaufman ‘kills’ the 
film’s art-house tendencies by ironically foregrounding its conventional generic attributes and 
emotional pathos.  After a moment of emotional redemption in Charlie’s apology to Donald, 
and Donald’s subsequent (cathartic) death, the film simultaneously sacrifices Donald and 
symbolically integrates him into Charlie and/or ‘Kaufman’.  Adaptation’s psychoanalytical 
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games are complexly doubled with the pleasure of knowing we are being manipulated as 
viewers, with structural in-jokes deployed to foreground at every turn the mutability of the 
film text: voiceovers, cuts from one version of reality (or fictionalised reality) to another, 
subtitles reinforcing the unstable character of Charlie’s vision, and montage sequences which 
move ever faster – all displaying Charlie’s fractured take on both the subject of his 
screenplay and his own life. 
 
However it is in its gradual evolution into crime thriller, indeed, into almost precisely the 
drug-running thriller – and/or parody of one – which Charlie had so wanted to avoid, that 
Adaptation reveals its most Smart characteristic: its melding of art-house and mainstream 
conventions into a kind of double helix of cinematic playfulness.  Diegetically, the film’s 
climax follows from Donald’s deduction that Orlean’s elegiac story of passion and loss – of 
the search for a ghost orchid never glimpsed, “wonderful to imagine, easy to fall in love with, 
but a little fantastic, and fleeting, and out of reach” – fails to reveal a deeper secret.  This 
turns out to be that Orlean and Laroche have been conducting a clandestine affair, as well as 
cultivating dozens of ghost orchids for psychotropic purposes – indeed we see Orlean as 
paranoid gangster’s moll, dancing provocatively and snorting lurid green lines, before having 
sex with Laroche – and the climactic section is filled with the structural and iconographic 
concerns of many a detective film: tense music, late-night stakeouts, car chases, Donald’s 
shooting, the eventual death of he and Laroche, and Orlean brought low.
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The film can at one remove be seen as, simply, taking a turn away from the introspection of 
the first two-thirds and towards a more actively genre-inspired and narratively fast-paced 
climax.  In that sense, it enables access at a very simple level, forcing no particular 
interpretive position on the audience.  Of course, to read the film in this way would be to treat 
the multiple references throughout, to film culture generally and the requirements of a 
notional Hollywood film in particular, as mere thematic or emotional placeholders, and not 
what they are, which is deep-structure ‘cues’ for narrative action.  Hired for his “unique 
voice”, Charlie wants to “let the movie exist rather than be artificially plot-driven”.  He does 
not know what that means, other than that his explicitly anti-Hollywood position requires that 
the film not involve characters “learning valuable life lessons”, or turn into a heist or drug-
running film, as “the book isn’t like that, and life isn’t like that”; Valerie’s suggestion that 
Laroche and Orlean fall in love
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 is greeted with a blank, contemptuous stare.  Yet the film’s 
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ending appears to betray his creative ambitions – although we are never sure that Charlie 
does so, given that our assumption that Kaufman’s film is Charlie’s film is not corroborated 
for every scene; the ‘interpretive gap’ between our understanding of Charlie as a fictional 
character, and Kaufman as the actual writer of the piece, is continually mystified for our 
pleasure. 
 
Both within the immediate diegesis and from a more distanced perspective, the viewer is 
exquisitely aware that Charlie has signed on to adapt the almost un-adaptable, his frustration 
leading him to seek advice from screenwriting guru Robert McKee (Brian Cox, another 
fictionalised version of a real person), who pours scorn on Charlie’s desire “to create a story 
where nothing much happens, where people don’t change, they don’t have any epiphanies. 
They struggle, and are frustrated, and nothing is resolved.”  McKee advises him to “go back 
and find the drama….Wow them in the end, and you’ve got a hit. Find an ending, but don’t 
cheat, and don’t you dare bring in a deus ex machina. Your characters must change, and 
change must come from them.”  McKee’s words therefore lay out the precise trajectory for 
the film’s unfolding.  Significantly, it is Donald’s encouragement (the ‘Donald’ figure 
representing a level of active engagement with the world, and crucially, with classical 
narrative and genre, which Charlie feels incapable of) which prompts Charlie to follow 
Orlean to Florida, whereupon the film mutates towards its action-adventure climax.   
 
McKee’s ‘big ending’ is forthcoming – the film is retrospectively revealed as a palimpsest of 
failed attempts, desperate imaginings, hallucinogenic and psychological fantasies, with 
Donald’s detective-style intervention as structural deus ex machine along with a fatal car 
accident and alligator, and an ending structurally plausible only as parody, but given the 
emotional depth of classical character-centred narrative.  Here, the structural fluidity is such 
that diegetic reality is subordinated to the structural demands: the diegesis alters itself to fit 
with what McKee ‘tells’ Charlie the film must become, which is in itself the creative process 
inscribed by Kaufman himself, at multiple distances.  Here lies the satirical nature of the film, 
rather than in any of the more gentle commentary in which it indulges; not what the film says, 
but the means by which it turns the ending into that which it has pretended to resist all along.  
At every turn the film has inscribed reasons for us to distrust its veracity, or rather, to 
experience a particular kind of pleasure in negotiating its complex, doubled nature.  
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To understand, for example, that Kaufman exists as a real screenwriter with a particular 
auteur image, within a specific industrial context, is to interpret the doubled character(s) 
Charlie and Donald not simply in a different way than would a viewer who was not familiar 
with his work, but in a way which foregrounds an entirely different set of artistic and 
narrative concerns – those of artistic identity, and the exigencies of creative success within 
the Hollywood environment, rather than those of, for example, sibling rivalry and the 
attainment of narrative ‘completeness’ through the investigation and subsequent exposure of 
Susan Orlean.  Pointed commentaries on Kaufman’s new real-life status at the time, that of 
specifically genre-bending maverick script innovator, recur throughout, such as when Donald 
compares Charlie to McKee, saying “He says we all write in a genre, and we must find our 
originality within that genre…It turns out there hasn’t been a new genre since Fellini invented 
the mockumentary…My genre’s thriller, what’s yours?”  This continual wry referral from the 
diegetic world of the struggling auteur to Kaufman’s real-world rise to prominence, and in 
particular the widespread generic confusion which attends Kaufman’s work, forms a distinct 
thread throughout the film.  In that sense, while Adaptation mobilises the generic strategies of 
more classically-structured films, it is viewer knowledge and perspective which governs 
access to and engagement with the film, both in its generic elements, and in its wider claims 
to – and play with – the idea of experimental or art cinema.   
 
In contrast, for all that its directors were at the time strongly linked within a particular social-
industrial network, Lost in Translation (Sofia Coppola, 2003) is in its structural aspects a 
straightforward narrative, albeit one which stakes art cinema claims.
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  The story of two 
alienated people who make an uncertain but profound connection of romance and friendship 
in the unfamiliar surroundings of Tokyo, it is characterised by its incomplete resolution,
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comparative stillness (with a slow cut rate and long takes occasionally disrupted by hand-held 
camera), intermittent backgrounding of dialogue, and self-conscious concentration on 
formally pleasing visual elements (such as its luminescent use of natural light, and colour 
palette of soft blues and muted neons).  Generically, it harnesses multiple appeals of a 
classically conventional nature; part travelogue or road movie, embedded though it is in one 
location, it also functions as a coming-of-age narrative for displaced protagonist Charlotte, 
and a drama of identity crisis for middle-aged film star Bob.  Both find themselves ‘fish out 
of water’ in an odd-couple romance providing elements of observational comedy; the hang-
dog Murray’s battered face and world-weary delivery are a specific driver of much of this 
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humour.  I would argue that two other separate extra-generic or tonal appeals exist. The first 
is that of Sofia Coppola’s distinctly ‘feminine’ narrative approach,246 which centralises 
Charlotte’s experience and perspective, distinctively within the Smart context.  
 
The second is almost extra-textual, centring on the soundtrack.  With five songs from Kevin 
Shields of cult band My Bloody Valentine, this produces specific appeals all of its own, ones 
which invoke particular kinds of cultural capital, marking as it did the first widely-accessible 
work Shields had done
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 following the group’s disbandment in 1991.  Shields’ contribution, 
along with those of quasi-underground artists Squarepusher, Phoenix, Air, and Death In 
Vegas, and consciously retro songs from The Pretenders, Roxy Music and Elvis Costello, 
works to position the work squarely in the kind of ‘indie’ framework that Newman (2009, 
2011) outlines.  Music here – taking an unusually prominent narrative-diegetic place – 
constitutes not just a specifically ‘hip’ attraction, but also a cross-generational appeal, given 
the hiatus in Shields’ career which it concludes.  This links with the extra-textual associations 
between Coppola and indie music generally
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 to create a sense that the film is directly aimed 
at a certain ‘hipster’ audience.   
 
The film’s tentative romance is characterised by a combination of highly restrained erotic 
flirting and quasi-paternal care which is neither sexualised nor Platonically figured – physical 
contact is minimal, right up to the conclusion in which Bob kisses Charlotte – but instead 
demonstrates the recognition of each by the other as ‘outsiders’.  It is the disorientating 
strangeness of their jetlagged introduction to Japan which initially unites them, and this 
cultural clash
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 dominates the comedic elements, as well as being a key element of the 
framing of both as ‘lost’ in some sense.  Bob experiences continual disorientation as he 
struggles to make the Suntory ads which have brought him to Tokyo, his director’s detailed 
guidance reduced to abrupt phrases in translation, is discomfited by the flamboyant television 
show on which he is interviewed, and fails to negotiate even the hotel’s gym equipment with 
its Japanese instructions.  Similarly Charlotte, repeatedly framed as distanced from Tokyo by 
the massive glass windows of the Park Hyatt hotel, finds the city chaotic and unreadable 
when she ventures out, with its exotic amusement arcades, and hentai-reading commuters.  
 
However, it is not simply Japan from which Bob and Charlotte are alienated, but themselves, 
and those around them.  They share a sense of loss, Bob apparently as attracted to Charlotte 
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by the youthful potential she represents as for her place in his “mid-life crisis” (exemplified 
by his unflattering camouflage t-shirt and admission that he has considered buying a 
Porsche), and alienated from his wife by the grind of negotiating the roles of parent, lover and 
household administrator.  Unable to communicate his spiritual loss, he resorts to babbling 
about “eating better” and “getting healthy”, and has a one night stand with a singer which 
contrasts in its vacuity to his link with Charlotte.  Recent graduate Charlotte is, as she puts it, 
“stuck... I just don’t know what I’m supposed to be”, unwittingly neglected by workaholic 
husband John, with whom she cannot communicate honestly: he thinks of Charlotte as 
“snotty”, and awkwardly flirts with shallow actress Kelly (with whom a more complex 
entanglement is occasionally implied).  It is not John’s work of which Charlotte is jealous, 
but his engagement with the world, and sense of purpose.  Therefore, in common with most 
of the other Smart films, we are presented with bourgeois characters in identity crisis
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 and 
with the added complication of finding this impossible to communicate to their loved ones.   
 
This crisis of communication – each metaphorically hermetically sealed away from the 
world: by language, headphones, glass, or the succession of taxis and chauffered cars in 
which they navigate the city – is breached only by two strands of interaction. The first is 
through the international language of commerce,
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 in which Bob’s celebrity functions as a 
dual token of business and culture, and which renders Tokyo itself, its public spaces 
dominated by grand-scale advertising, alternately ‘othered’ and utterly familiar in its post-
globalization economic landscape.  In what amounts to a mild critique of the excesses of 
capitalism
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 the international language is that of advertising and branding, and the bar of the 
Tokyo Hyatt becomes the (con)temporary agora, a locus for the postmodern collapse of 
culture and capital. This is seen in the performance there of an English folk song 
(Scarborough Fair), as a jazz standard, by a red-haired white Australian fronting a band 
named after a Californian city (Sausalito) to international business people.  
 
This sense of culture as an inextricable but problematic linking of capital and material 
seduction is emphasised by the Suntory ad Bob shoots: in front of watchful executives, each 
glass of whisky (actually iced tea) is ‘wrangled’ for visual perfection.  All is artifice, whether 
Bob’s suit, clipped unnaturally behind to fit perfectly on camera, or his $2 million fee, which 
constitutes the moral failure of ‘selling out’ – another eruption of the Smart preoccupation 
with ‘authenticity’.  However Bob retains his innocence, as his slightly awed response to the 
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sight of himself on billboards indicates.  Bob’s self is not compromised, largely because his 
‘self’ is leached from the ads, replaced at his director’s request by laconic impressions of the 
Rat Pack and 007 – here significantly embodied in lacking-in-cachet Roger Moore, not the 
more virile Sean Connery.  In this symbolic bricolage the post-globalisation world is 
constituted of displaced signifiers, adding up to a presumed sophistication to be sold by the 
face of a reluctant actor, to a country in which he is just another ‘western’ signifier.  
 
The second communicative strand emphasised is that of popular culture (and specifically 
music) as a unifying force, providing the moments of greatest interactivity and jouissance.  
As a post-globalisation narrative, it is notable that American culture is here defined as 
‘international’ – Charlotte’s friend acquires the name “Charlie Brown” and discusses his 
surfing teacher; a partygoer has hair like Jimi Hendrix – but the primary focus is on the 
relationship between music and pleasure.  Indeed, it is arguably not in the enigmatic ending 
that the film finds its moment of deepest emotional engagement, but during Bob and 
Charlotte’s karaoke performances, which find them lost in the pleasure of singing and gentle 
flirtation.   
 
As mentioned, the soundtrack forms an additional (paratextual as well as textual) attraction, 
and it links too to the film’s repeated concerns with authenticity: in many ways, these take the 
place of play with genre and form, which are significantly underplayed by comparison to 
many other texts, in establishing a sense of ‘Smartness’.  As John points out the band he has 
been photographing are, without the ersatz ‘rock and roll’ clothes supplied by the label, 
“skinny and nerdy...so much better”, and the self-absorbed Kelly is repeatedly mocked for the 
shallowness of her interactions with others.  This is figured in something of a dual manner, 
both textually and extra-textually; while Bob and Charlotte are concerned with authenticity of 
experience and identity, the film itself is engaged in reworking contemporary paradigms of 
coolness or hipsterism, and the way in which appearance and cultural consumption are linked 
to them.  
 
A film in which hipster identity crises are played for comedic effect is I ♥ Huckabees (David 
O. Russell, 2004).  Here Smartness is created not from the interplay of generic demands – 
formally it is a farcical, occasionally slapstick comedy with flashes of parodic noir – but from 
the way it treats its thematic concerns.  Post-boomer anxieties and mid-youth identity crises 
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centred around corporatism, the environment, and the objectification of women, are satirised 
in a manner foregrounding philosophical enquiry and questions of ‘authentic’ existence, for 
all that these are also problems of privilege.  These themes are played out through the 
engagement of characters with their own personal crises and experiences of the world.  
Textually literalising the existential and philosophical crises of Smart cinema through special 
effects – wonky jump-cuts, cartoonish Freudianism, and lo-fi cut-out animations used to 
illuminate characters’ internal processes – its formal play marks it as Smart.  Huckabees also 
assumes a certain amount of pre-existing knowledge of, or at least openness to, philosophical 
exploration on the viewer’s part; despite its broad, frequently slapstick comedic 
underpinnings, the dialogue and ideas contained within it are sophisticated, and make high 
demands of the audience.   
 
Albert Markovsky (Jason Schwartzman) is a socially-engaged version of the Slacker 
stereotype.  President of the local chapter of the Open Spaces Coalition, a group fighting 
urban sprawl, his political actions are limited to writing environmentally-themed doggerel, 
and planting trees – destined to die, impotent even as PR gesture – in the tarmac of shopping 
mall carparks.  Coincidental encounters with an unknown “African guy” lead Albert to hire a 
team of “existential investigators” to winkle out what he believes is a deeper meaning behind 
them, while fighting usurpation at the Coalition by ‘nemesis’ Brad Stand (Jude Law), a rising 
executive at Wal-Mart style department store conglomerate Huckabees.  Albert’s central 
problem is the search for meaning in his own life, as evidenced by his opening monologue: 
“What am I doing? I don’t know what I’m doing…I’m doing the best that I can. That’s all 
that I can ask of myself. Is anyone paying any attention? Is it hopeless to try to change 
things?...I don’t know what the fuck I’m supposed to be doing any more.”   
 
A heightened, comedic version of the agonised bourgeois, he serves both as identificatory 
figure, and as satirical butt of the film’s often ambiguous attitude to middle-class crisis.  
Albert’s identity crisis is sincere, but played so comedically that it appears a kind of indulgent 
excess, which must be reined in by the conclusion of the film, in which he achieves peace 
through synthesising the conflicting philosophical positions of existentialism and nihilism.   
These are ‘channelled’ through the film via, respectively, ‘existential detectives’ Vivian and 
Bernard Jaffee,
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 through whom Albert initially seeks to resolve his coincidence/identity 
crisis, and their rival and one-time protégée, nihilist Catherine Vaubon – whose business card 
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reads “cruelty, manipulation, meaninglessness”.  As much a parody of the search for 
enlightenment – of self-help culture – as an adventure in it, here the self is a puzzle to be 
explored – through comically impenetrable riddles like “Have you ever transcended time and 
space?” “Yes. No. Time, not space. No, I don’t know what you’re talking about.”  This 
creates a deliberately defamiliarised sense of moving from the interpersonal traumas and 
physical dilemmas of the mainstream movie to the Smart territory of the mind as the engine 
of human existence.  Bernard, with his philosophy that “everything is the same even if it’s 
different…We are all connected…We need to learn to see the blanket truth all the time, even 
in the everyday stuff” wishes for Albert to dismantle his identity and fears, so that he can 
‘remake’ himself with a more synthesised worldview.  Vivian is the pragmatic investigator, 
spying on the minutiae of Albert’s daily life while acknowledging “Most people prefer to 
remain on the surface of things.” 
 
Albert’s ‘nemesis’ Brad, who also hires the Jaffees, uncovers unpleasant truths about his own 
inauthentic existence as a corporate executive: he is “exhausted from charming everyone but 
[doesn’t] see any alternative…because that’s how you get ahead”; Brad’s identity is 
constructed not through self-investigation, but defined in the reflected glory of a celebrity 
encounter (as Vivian says, “you’re so impressive because you know Shania [Twain], and so 
strong because you can put one over on her.”)  Brad maintains the façade; staying in an 
unhappy relationship with Dawn (Naomi Watts), the ‘Voice of Huckabees’ because his self-
image requires that the fantasy of suburban splendour remain intact.  “How am I not myself?” 
is the question the Jaffees repeat over and over after Brad first asks it; he has been so seduced 
by ‘the system’ he has absorbed its goals as his own, but in doing so has lost his own identity.   
 
Similarly, Albert’s “Other” Tommy Corn (Mark Wahlberg) is a tightly-wound firefighter 
traumatised, following 9/11, not by what Vivian refers to as “that September thing” but by his 
inability to cope with America’s petroleum-based culture.  Examining the political and 
economic structures which control his country, Tommy draws the logical but uncomfortable 
conclusion that “You use petroleum, you’re a murderer.  That’s a fact.”  For Tommy, the 
links between oil, unethical corporate activities (including the sweatshops where, as he tells 
his small daughter, children like her made her clothes), environmental damage, and the 
military-political machinations of capitalist America, render his position as a privileged first-
worlder philosophically untenable; either life is controlled by unseen forces and everyone is 
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powerless, or life is an illusion, and all is chaos.  Here, the juxtaposition of that modern all-
American mythic figure, the firefighter, with the rejection of contemporary globalised 
capitalism, is semantically loaded.   
 
The film also looks tangentially at the beauty myth and its place in the corporatisation of 
modern life.  Once Huckabeees model Dawn realises her sense of personal worth comes only 
from perceptions of her attractiveness, she begins eating with abandon (a powerful gesture in 
the context of conventional femininity) and dressing “like an Amish bag lady” in an attempt 
to ‘dismantle’ her self.  However, opting out of the conventional standards of beauty does not 
breach them, and Huckabees replace her.  Without an alternative narrative of self to draw 
upon, Dawn breaks down, whimpering “Wake up, pretty girl, the joke’s on you…Don’t look 
at me, I’m sick of people looking at me…Look at me, everybody look at me.”  While her 
rejection of patriarchal-corporate constructions of femininity costs her job and relationship 
with Brad, it is eventually with Tommy – who values the spiritual search over the material, in 
his own way – that she finds a more equal relationship.   
 
In that environmental and anti-globalist activities appear to have replaced Left-Right politics 
for this generation, the film produces a mesh of differing viewpoints. Here the individual as 
activist is vital; these environmental crises are not ‘natural’, but as a result of self-interested 
human intervention.  Alternatively, personal activism is shown as predominantly futile, as per 
Brad’s comment “You don’t go through the back door with a poem and a bonnet, you go 
through the front door with a suit and you own the marsh.”  Huckabees’ expansionist 
tendencies cannot – without bringing down capitalism itself – be halted; Tommy’s anti-
petroleum standpoint is untenable as long as people like the family who have taken in 
Sudanese refugee Steven (“the African guy”) ignore their complicity in the structures which 
produce social and environmental crises all over the world.  As Tommy points out “How did 
Sudan happen? Could it possibly be because we support dictatorships?”, the family respond 
(in what seems a very explicit critique of America’s Blue State/Red State religious, political 
and social divide) that “God gave us oil”, dismissing him as “crazy.”   
 
Brad and Albert are each trapped by the treacherous forces of image and expectation.  Brad 
breaks down and admits, that despite his material trappings of success, “I don’t even know 
who I am.”  Albert discovers that at the root of his crisis is the weight of parental expectation: 
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his mother clips articles on marketing internships from magazines to give him, and remarks 
derisively that he “couldn’t even hold down a poetry job”, while his father is more interested 
in his sound system than his son.   As Catherine remarks when his mother says “This is my 
home, I can tell him what I want….I gave my life to this selfish bastard”, it was “so he could 
be an ornament to you.”  This is where the meaning, if it can be described as such, of the 
coincidental appearance of ‘the African guy’ is revealed, for Catherine: “He was orphaned by 
a civil war, you were orphaned by indifference”.  In this way, Huckabees simultaneously 
mobilises the crises of the middle-class, and satirises them through Catherine’s pretentious 
nihilism.    
 
Her question, “Do you want to lead a fake life?”, is answered: Tommy finds meaning in love, 
saving Dawn from a fire, and Albert in realising that a synthesis between the apparently 
warring philosophies of Catherine and the Jaffees will bring him a workable ethics of 
existence.  When Catherine hands Albert the picture she has taken of him after the fire, 
Brad’s face has been partially replaced by Albert’s own. They are each formed and forced by 
expectations to live in a way that suits neither of them, and hemmed in by prescriptive 
philosophies – hence Albert’s remark to Catherine and the Jaffees that they should work 
together, as “You’re too dark and you’re not dark enough…[these are] two overlapping but 
fractured philosophies.”   
 
Tommy and Albert realise that while they both “saw some truth,” which is “amazing”, “But 
it’s also nothing special”: the battle for personal identity cannot be definitively won, only 
fought on a daily basis. “No manure, no magic.”  Human drama is inevitable. Suffering 
cannot be avoided.  These are ideas which underpin the ethics of many mainstream film 
narratives, yet are rarely made explicit; the resolution may be a conventionally hopeful 
synthesis of conflicting positions, but their use as direct narrative driver is unusual, and 
militates against reading this as a mainstream text, regardless of the generic coding of the 
material as comedic. Therefore, while all of the generic elements work to position the text as 
mainstream, it is the parallel intellectual investment required by the viewer, in order to 
position it on the terms which it sets out for itself – an intellectual investment which must 
predate the experience of watching the film – to place themselves in a position of full 
comprehension, that works to directly undermine its generic tendencies, and therefore 
position the text as Smart.    
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Even more flamboyant in its textual play is Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel 
Gondry, 2004). Generically speaking, this takes the form of a romantic comedy, in which 
heteronormativity is reinforced, along with the prospect of personal reinvention through 
romantic love.  However, strong science fiction elements are present, emphasised in contrast 
to their location in what initially promises to be a realistic diegesis. After their relationship 
goes awry, Joel and Clementine sign up with Lacuna, a company which, through an 
inexplicable (and unexplained) process, removes their memory of each other; afterwards they 
struggle to reconcile daily experience with the fragmentary remains of what the viewer 
understands as memories of their ‘true’ desires.  Introspective Joel254 is the typical socially-
awkward middle-class white male of Smart; Clementine appears his polar opposite; 
bohemian, confrontational.  The rooting of their conflicts in their clearly very different 
personalities functions here not as insurmountable obstacle, but as ‘proof’ of their love, 
thereby basing it in the tropes of conventional romantic comedy.
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The promised magical cure instead results in a technological violation, chipping away at their 
identity, and the film becomes a quasi-psychoanalytical chase through Joel’s brain. As he 
relents mid-erasure, trying to ‘hide’ Clementine in the recesses of his mind, he becomes 
protagonist and battlefield.  Much of the film’s action therefore takes place in Joel’s 
unconscious, with the audience positioned as a kind of mediated subject on a ‘tour’ of their 
relationship.  Generically, this section of the film forms a chase sequence, with Joel pursued 
by the predatory forces of Lacuna.  This strong thriller tendency is compounded in the ‘real 
world’, as Lacuna employee Patrick tries to steal Joel’s identity in an attempt to court 
Clementine.   Joel and Clementine’s relationship unfolds ‘backwards’, played out through 
firstly revisiting, then finally amending Joel’s memories of it (all subsequently erased).  Far 
from an assured romantic trajectory (within the bounds of the genre
256
), it confronts us with 
the dissolution of Joel and Clem’s partnership amid drunkenness, accusations of infidelity, 
bitterness and recrimination.  Here is the darker side of long-term love; stilted dinner 
conversations, Joel disapprovingly noting that Clementine will get “drunk and stupid now”, 
Clementine’s frustration at their lack of emotional intimacy.     
 
The film’s inherent temporal instability complicates the way in which romantic elements are 
drawn out and generic expectations elided.  That is, as its hybridity is of varying and 
intersectional kinds (temporal, structural, and combining realist and fantastical diegesis, as 
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well as generic), viewer expectations must be continually re-set, and moved outside of the 
classical-conventional framework.  As well as complicating its generic expectations, the film 
displays many elements which would normally be associated with art-house film: a nightmare 
of invasion and erasure, its fractured narrative and complex diegesis reflect and explicate the 
psychological struggles of characters who wrestle to construct and retain their own sense of 
identity.  Without clear boundaries between internal (Joel’s) vision and external (ours in 
watching it), Eternal Sunshine blurs past and present, memory, imagination and reality, 
marking our viewing experience as unreliable.   Scenes disappear and remake themselves as 
fast as we can see them, part-sharp, part-blurred frames a dizzying mix of focal lengths; 
figures are physically erased passing through Joel’s mind, memories fold in on each other as 
they disappear.  The film’s structure is not a chronological sequence with events occurring 
within defined parameters of cause and effect, but rather a palimpsest.   
 
Behaviour and emotions are overwritten, and subject to structural dictates foregrounding 
uncertainty and unreliability, at an interpretative as well as thematic level.
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  ‘Impossible’ 
transitions between scenes are made visible, insisting on contingency and unreliability.  
Memories are displayed as they are evacuated from Joel’s mind: a car falls, shop fronts and 
hoardings collapse and decay around him, book covers lose their crisp delineation, fading to 
blank.  The process of erasure is therefore identified as an ‘unnatural’ and risky one, creating 
a high degree of psychological and emotional tension in Joel, and his struggle for mastery 
over the process forms the structural and narrative heart of the film.  These images cannot be 
trusted; they are copies, potentially unfaithful reproductions – the erasure process itself, its 
machine-nature, is ‘inauthentic’.  At the thematic heart of the film is a concern with identity, 
and the idea of the ‘authentic self’. Joel struggles to avoid his erasure; Clementine suffers a 
post-erasure crisis of identity, lamenting “I’m lost, I’m scared, I feel like I’m disappearing, 
my skin’s coming off, I’m getting old, nothing makes any sense to me. Nothing makes any 
sense”; Patrick attempts to become Joel’s doppelganger; Lacuna employee Mary, erasing her 
own memory following a disastrous affair with boss Dr. Mierzwiak, becomes a diminished 
version of her pre-erasure self. 
 
The transformation offered is Joel’s; only in relation to her childhood perceptions of herself 
as ugly is Clementine transformed, displacing her fears onto the doll she wishes to transform: 
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“If I could transform her, I would magically change too.” This diverges from Clementine’s 
previous mentions of physical appearance, which link appearance to ‘personality’ (as in “I 
apply my personality in a paste”) rather than to ideals of beauty.  Here Eternal Sunshine 
makes any obviously gendered reading slippery.  While Clementine can be seen in this 
instance as traumatically affected by the cultural preoccupations which stress ‘beauty’ as an 
ideal for girls, the doll here seems to reference not any particular ideal of beauty or aesthetic 
dissatisfaction, but Clementine’s ongoing preoccupation with transforming herself.  The 
implication being that as Clementine has developed into an adult, she has indeed been 
transfigured or “magically changed” but only through confronting her fears. For all that she 
frequently displays ‘childlike’ behaviour throughout the film,258 the implication is that she 
has transformed, into an adult; therefore we are positioned to understand that it is Joel, rather 
than Clem, who needs to undertake the transformative struggle.  
But to speak of her at all, we must of course bear in mind that most of the ‘Clementines’ we 
encounter (the fragmented, distressed, daytime-drinking Clementine apart) are merely re-
vivified memories, or fantasy extrapolations of aspects of her.  At times Joel’s interior 
conception of Clementine seems crucially different to her own conception of herself.  This is 
explicable in the context of (the real) Clementine’s own personality having been ‘amended’ 
by her memory erasure and its implied diminution of her self.   However it is as Joel’s 
imaginary guide through his own psyche, the catalyst for his renewed appreciation for love, 
that she features most strongly.  She becomes a kind of internal ‘other’ in the context of 
Joel’s mind, his doppelganger.  This is interesting not just in itself, but because so many other 
Smart films adopt a curiously complex position with regard to the ‘other’.259  Clementine 
becomes in this context a cipher, not a character – and ironically, given that her most clearly-
expressed wish is that she be seen for herself, rather than projected onto by men.
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  Her 
existence as a fictional construct is predicated on the erasure process manufacturing a kind of 
‘out-of-body’ experience for Joel: therefore Clementine’s interaction with him must be 
regarded as a phenomenon by which Joel speaks to himself, and by which he (or 
Kaufman/Gondry) speaks to the audience. 
Joel’s explicitly Freudian ‘therapeutic process’261 is central, placing certain pressures of 
intellectual investment on the audience.  In revisiting his memories, it is only through 
mastering his own childhood fears and humiliations, and curing himself of the delusion that 
Clementine can save him from himself
262
 that Joel can gain the adult maturity needed to 
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conduct a successful relationship.   Only by losing his memories (in the therapeutic context of 
their re-visitation) can he form a new and viable self.  Once he starts to do so, Joel’s 
memories symbolically collapse together: the rain of a childhood recollection begins to fall 
inside the room of his adulthood; his hallucinated childhood Clementine helps him to come to 
terms with his own trauma and fearfulness.  With the (coded as comedic) memory of being 
caught masturbating by his mother, Joel’s progress is couched in explicitly psychoanalytic 
terms.
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It is in the symbolic house of Joel’s memory of his first encounter with Clementine at 
Montauk that his ‘last stand’, his final reckoning with his memories of her, takes place.  Here 
he reconnects with his original fascination with Clementine, whose transgression of the 
normative social order in the shape of both her breaking-and-entering, and her fluid breaches 
of conventional interpersonal behaviour,
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 can be seen to represent more active, even 
rebellious, aspects of his own self that he cannot access.  Admitting that her dismissal of his 
fears constituted painful rejection of him (“So go”, are her words), he confronts the aspects of 
his identity which led him to abandon the Montauk house on the night of their first encounter.  
Joel confronts his regrets, saying “I wish I’d stayed.  I wish I’d done a lot of things”, and 
attempts to integrate his fears with the more functional adult self he has developed as a result 
of this forcible confrontation with his past.  
The structural logic sustaining the film is a conventional romantic one: that Joel and 
Clementine’s love is so profound and ‘true’ that it can survive any crisis, even complete 
erasure of each other.
265
  Joel’s last memory of Clementine (or hallucination, as he is by now 
‘re-making’ his memories in light of their impending loss) is of her whispering “meet me in 
Montauk”.  Both a climactic narrative point near the film’s conclusion and the starting point 
for the temporal play which characterises it, Joel does, indeed, meet Clem in Montauk; 
however the ‘real’ Clem could have no specific knowledge of Joel’s presence there; indeed 
neither does Joel, whose memory of that hallucination has also been wiped.  It is, therefore, 
an act of ‘synchronicity’ (as per Sconce) that brings them together at the beginning of the 
film (after the end of their relationship and its erasure), and the audience alone which bears 
witness to the ‘inevitability’ of their love, as with more conventional romantic comedies.  The 
surrealistic imagery and experimental narrative structure are therefore softened and indeed 
‘contained’ by the generic borders of conventional romantic logic.266  
 
206 
 
Loss is explored in a more marginal sense in Brick (Rian Johnson, 2005), a film whose 
mainstream leanings are complicated at every turn by the opacity of its communicative 
strategies.  A labyrinthine journey through the social underbelly of drug dealing and teenage 
pregnancy, Brick is a hybrid of two forms, noir and the teen film. Characterised by a 
distinctive visual style, it is reminiscent of the classic gumshoe narratives of the 1940s, 
foregrounding its jazz soundtrack, stark blue palette, modernist architecture, and quirky 
interiors.
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  Stylistically the effect is to create a sense of knowing mystification; long shots 
which refuse a sense of identification with young detective Brendan intermix with jump cuts, 
fades, a flat tableau-style framing, and an at times extremely slow pace.
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  This stylistic 
experimentation is a strong aspect of the way in which Brick constitutes itself as a Smart 
(adult) film, excluding or displacing the teen viewer in favour of the adult audience;
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 for all 
that the narrative strands are teenage-oriented, the elements of thriller and melodrama here (in 
particular Emily’s ‘tragic’ pregnancy and subsequent death), as well as tangential references 
to Nouvelle Vague style, work in opposition to the visual aesthetic, making complex or 
‘closing off’ more mainstream tendencies.  
 
A frantic phone call from ex-girlfriend Emily, referring to a mysterious ‘brick’, functions 
here as a classical thriller introduction to Brendan, who seeks to first find Emily, and then her 
killer, leading him to explore the hidden networks behind the supply of drugs to his school. 
Here, all relationships (bar the one with his classically bespectacled nerd sidekick, “Brain”) 
are potentially treacherous, in a manner which intimately links the dangers of the criminal 
underworld with the duplicity of teenage interactions, in friendships and love affairs.  
Education is absent here; as with the classical teen film, the ‘real’ action is outside of the 
pedagogical setting, and the classroom must be escaped in order to achieve an ‘authentic’ 
education outside of its restrictive setting.  The film is populated by classical teen film types 
– the rich girl, the aggressive jock, the socially manipulative drama queen, the out-of-control 
delinquent, the refusenik-rebel.  In all cases, however, the strong linkage of each with their 
respective noir types – the femme fatale, the muscle, the showgirl, the heavy, and the 
informant – lends narrative and generic weight to otherwise thinly-drawn characters.  
 
Here, we are given to understand, while drugs are of no particular danger, unguarded 
emotions towards peers are potentially fatal. The self-possessed, resourceful Brendan adopts 
a highly adult outward aspect in his function as detective, but the social hierarchy displays 
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similar characteristics to any more classical teen film; Brad, the loud-mouthed football 
player, and Laura, the rich girl femme fatale
270
 are dominant social figures, the predatory 
Kara accumulates and scatters adolescent minions, and Brendan is marked out as a loner by 
his choice of lunch venue.
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  ‘Lunch’ becomes a potent social marker, referred to 
continually: the question “Where you been eating?” [sic] tracks hierarchical and network 
interactions as much as physical location, serving much the same function as the ‘dive bar’ of 
classical noir. Searching for Emily, Brendan’s first question is always “Who’s she been 
eating with?” Laura, seducing Brendan, offers him not just (untrustworthy) affection, but also 
a sense of illicit hierarchical dissolution, courting him with the words “You think nobody 
sees you. Eating lunch behind the portables…I always seen you.” 
   
This sense of impenetrably codified teenage hierarchy, breachable only in extremis, is 
augmented by the complex language employed, which carries experimental or art-house 
overtones.  It renders the text somewhat opaque, in its combination of 1940s formality and 
reclaimed slang, but also has the ring of authentic teen argot, in its clarity to its desired 
audience and contrasting impenetrability to those outside.
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 ‘Outside’, too, are authority 
figures: parents are entirely absent from this world, with the occasional reference to a ‘mom’ 
and none at all to fathers, until the film’s conclusion.  The one clearly adult figure (aside from 
eccentric drug trader The Pin
273
) is assistant vice-president, Gary Trueman, whose quasi-
conspiratorial relationship with Brendan marks a rupture of the barriers between genres.
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  In 
classical noir style Brendan methodically exploits his knowledge of the relationships and 
activities of others in order to gain tactical advantage, reveal the killer (who is then himself 
killed via Brendan’s often cold-blooded manoeuvring), and expose senior players within the 
drug ring to the authorities.  
 
The outcome of the film, however, does not display any of the simple moralising or 
pedagogical impulses one might associate with the classical teen form, adhering more to a 
fatalistic, Smart and noir tendency to refuse resolution in the form of a ‘happy ending’.  
Brendan exposes the manipulations of femme fatale Laura, revealed as having engineered 
Emily’s death in order to deflect attention from her own activities.  Unmasked, she reveals 
that Emily was pregnant with Brandon’s baby at the time of her death, and the film ends to 
the abrupt cessation of the atmospheric jazz soundtrack, replaced by the sound of passing 
traffic.  This has the effect of leaching the film of its historical and mythic contexts and 
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references, leaving us with a much more sordid and tragic – but contemporary, as opposed to 
anchored in a kind of quasi-noir historical hinterland – conclusion.   In this sense we can 
regard Brick as a film which adopts much of the generic play of the Smart film, but which 
shies away from the kind of philosophical questioning which characterises the others.  I view 
this as an indication of the gradual infiltration of Smart’s formal experimentation into 
contemporary film practice, but perhaps too a sign that the mode’s questioning of identity and 
epistemological boundaries was being replaced with more formalised generic play.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The differing generic, thematic and tonal considerations of the films result in each expressing 
its combination of generic play, thematic preoccupation, and references to notions of ‘cult’, 
‘art-house’ and ‘mainstream’ in a singular way. Here, double-coding forms part of an 
embedded position-taking process which occurs at the level of writing and production, 
whereby these films are constructed to appeal to multiple audiences on the basis of both 
mainstream and marginal tendencies.  The extent to which each investigates common themes 
also varies; however a strong preoccupation appears with questions of personal identity, and 
identity lost or in crisis – many of these narrators are not simply ‘unreliable’, they are 
psychotic or threatened by forces which promise to render them psychotic – and the place and 
function of creativity, and the importance of practical philosophy, also emerges.   
 
As can be seen from the examples I have used, there is a strong sense throughout that each 
uses play with – sometimes multiple – generic conventions, in combinations and narrative 
frameworks which show a tendency to work against classical expectations of narrative 
resolution, something which I would regard as a marker of Smartness.  However, it is not a 
simple marker, in that for each the generic demands and structural formations also work to 
produce a certain level of familiarity – accessibility – to audiences which grounds it in more 
mainstream contexts than certain of the textual strategies might initially suggest.  
Additionally, the interpretation of these films tends to necessitate a high degree of intellectual 
or cultural investment on the part of the viewer.  The hybridity which emerges is not a simple 
matter of textual play, in which what we might describe as ‘classical’ generic framings are 
mystified and complicated in the search for textual novelty.   
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In this sense, films which produce strongly experimental narrative or visual effects (Pulp 
Fiction, Pi, Dark City, Malkovich, The Matrix, Adaptation, Huckabees, Eternal Sunshine, 
Brick), or deploy non-mainstream or highly contingent identificatory contexts for their 
characters – whether through the unreliability of a narrator (Donnie Darko), the adoption of 
multiple tonal perspectives towards them (Rushmore), or authorial distancing from moral 
position-taking, (Dollhouse) – can also be seen to produce appeals to mainstream audiences 
by virtue of their strong generic underpinnings.  The reverse also applies, as in the two films 
where classical generic concerns are seen to dominate (American Beauty and Lost in 
Translation), and the effect of Smartness is seen as being produced more by the appearance 
of, respectively, ideological position-taking, and an assumed link with the generational 
concerns (specifically those surrounding ideas of ‘authenticity’) of Smart audiences.   
 
Individually, therefore, each film takes its place along the continuum from the more 
‘alternative’ to the more squarely ‘mainstream’, and many of these films also mobilise 
quality- or prestige-based audience expectations via textual strategies (see Chapter Five) and 
extra-textual references, most frequently to art-house or independent cinema, or in a 
generational sense through musical soundtrack.  Collectively my conclusion is that Smart 
films are characterised by a productive tension between classical generic structures, art-house 
and independent textual strategies such as narrative and diegetic play, and a tonal register 
which stretches from the observationally distanced to the dynamically ironic. In order to more 
deeply investigate how this process operates at the combined levels of textual, industrial and 
discursive interplay, in my next chapter I undertake two detailed case studies.  
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Chapter Eight: Smart inside and outside the system – two case studies 
 
This chapter explores two texts more closely in their industrial and discursive contexts as 
well as their textual ones, in an effort to highlight the complex relationships between genre, 
tone, industrial practice, and discursive positioning. 
 
Case Study: Fight Club – a major (cult) Smart film  
 
Fight Club initially stakes what appears to be a claim as a noir
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 black comedy, in which 
‘Jack’276 vies for verbal supremacy against Marla Singer, the femme fatale whose appearance 
in the self-help groups he stalks as an antidote to insomnia has caused him renewed 
sleeplessness.  However, the film’s remarkable degree of hybridity soon begins to emerge; it 
repeatedly miscues us generically, turning briefly into a kind of buddy comedy which 
threatens to erupt into a love triangle, then begins to take the form of an action thriller, 
featuring spectacular and frequently violent set pieces – and a spectacularly fantasised plane 
crash – complete with stylish special effects and high production values, sex, and a strongly-
emphasised element of male bonding, itself presented as potentially threatening, as we 
discover that Jack’s apartment has been blown up by the ‘somebody else’ we later understand 
to be his alter ego, ‘Tyler Durden’.   
 
Some elements are presented as strongly comedic; from the opening in which Jack wonders 
how clean the gun in his mouth is, to Marla’s concession that he should take their 
tuberculosis support group as “my smoking doesn’t go over at all”, to the comedy sequence 
where Fight Club members must start a fight which they lose, in which one tries to start a 
fight with a priest.  Even apparently ‘straight’ statements are here invested with a blackly 
comedic tone, such as the cynical way in which the insurance adjuster investigating a car 
crash describes burned human remnants as “very modern art.”  Along with the star element 
provided by the casting of Brad Pitt as the charismatic Tyler, these all call strongly to 
mainstream positioning.   
 
The film’s subsequent turn towards highly a ironised psychodrama of mental collapse – itself 
treated in an almost slapstick fashion – would seem jarring in a film which adhered more 
strongly to a singular generic framing, but here the intense hybridity (and its perceived 
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relationship to mental instability) works to internally rationalise the   swings in tone, for 
example when Jack tries to get himself arrested for his part in Project Mayhem: as the police 
are also involved, their move from “I really admire what you’re doing” to “Get his balls…It’s 
a really powerful gesture, Mr. Durden. It’ll set quite an example” appears both farcical, and 
as a surreal hyper-masculine nightmare.   Fight Club therefore functions at one level as a 
black comedy in which Jack’s fantasy of masculine mastery runs amok into mutilation and 
self-destruction, and he must be contained or ‘redeemed’ by Marla’s love. 
 
However, the strongly ironic tone with which the film frames every element undercuts 
straight readings, in particular through the ‘literary’ tone and sarcastic voiceover of Jack 
himself, and the contradictory nature of the film’s politics.  Apparently anti-conformist, 
interrogating consumer society, they move to a more nihilistic plane where authenticity and 
consumerism may be presented as antithetical but no alternative is offered, apart from a 
quasi-fascistic
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 mayhem, itself framed as masochistic submission to a cult of personality.  
The mixture of nihilism and spiritual longing which pervades the film means that more art-
house – although perhaps less ‘indie’ – values begin to emerge, one after the other.  These 
include a questioning of gender roles and norms; a focus on the philosophy of the individual 
and the epistemological problems of existence; a highly unstable narrator
278
 with a split 
personality; and an ironic lightness in the handling of ‘insanity’, placing the film much more 
directly as a parody (Gronstad, 2003).   
 
The somewhat noir visual aesthetic – black exteriors and sickly green interiors – is 
contradicted by the action-oriented mobility of the camera, which is often not an 
observational eye, but a highly engaged, highly mobile supplementary point of view; it 
swoops in and out of the deep cellular structure of things: the contents of a waste bin; the 
internal workings of a bomb.  The film is also strongly fragmented and reflexive in its styling 
and structure from the very beginning, when its music video-style credits and stand-off 
opening are interrupted by Jack’s “No, wait, back up.  Let me start earlier.”  Its frame-freezes 
and speeches to camera are pointedly non-classical, as is the extended sequence in which 
Jack’s IKEA furniture ‘assembles itself’ in-frame, and it is the film’s generic fluidity and 
ironic tone which allows these to embed themselves relatively unobtrusively in the fabric of 
its narrative in a manner which effectively forces them to function in a mainstream manner.   
Above all, this is one of a group of contemporary ‘puzzle films’, which as per Buckland 
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blur the boundaries between different levels of reality, are riddled with gaps, 
deception, labyrinthine structures, ambiguity, and overt coincidences.  They are 
populated with characters who are schizophrenic, lose their memory, are unreliable 
narrators, or are dead (but without us – or them – realizing). In the end, the 
complexity of puzzle films operates on two levels: narrative and narration.  It 
emphasizes the complex telling (plot, narration) of a simple or complex story 
(narrative). (Buckland, 2009, 6) 
 
This holds the key to its adoption as a cult film.  While an initial viewing produces the effect 
of revelation, with Jack’s alter ego ‘unmasked’, subsequent viewings move the viewer’s 
position from a more classically-sutured narrative experience to a separate kind of problem-
solving structural engagement.  Here, a pleasure which combines classical narrative 
engagement and a more alternative-coded enjoyment of the breach of those structures arises 
from (re)viewing the film in the context of the clues scattered throughout.  Jack and Marla’s 
conversations now appear evidently ‘doubled’, and motivate us to re-evaluate the characters 
themselves; the comedy sequence in which Jack blackmails his boss by beating himself up 
illustrates the structure’s playful mechanics with the freeze-framed clue, “For some reason I 
thought of my first fight, with Tyler.”   A scene from the film’s midpoint illustrates this 
stylistic and structural play clearly: the frame is breached by shifts and shivers, the film slows 
and sound goes out of synch; ‘sprockets’ veer in and out of frame (highlighting the unreliable 
nature of film, its palimpsest quality) as Tyler speaks directly to camera.  
 
On first viewing this serves to emphasise the breach of social and political normativity 
implied by his rhetoric and actions, but on repeat view, functions as a signal of the 
fragmentation and rupture of Jack’s sanity; indeed, as a clue, it is resolved through a 
recurrence towards the end, but this time with Tyler replaced by Jack.  Repeat viewing
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 also 
clarifies the way in which the film’s themes are first explored and then discarded in favour of 
generic-structural play.  These primarily engage with three inter-related themes, of 
masculinity, spiritual loss, and consumer culture as linked to both.  The first (to which much 
attention has been paid; see for example Baertson, 2003) is a perennial classical theme, 
mobilised across almost all genres, whereas the latter two place the film more directly in 
Smart territory.   
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Jack’s crisis is painted explicitly as one of masculinity, of the “thirty year old boy(s)” 
abandoned by fathers for other family “franchises”.  What begins as an investigation into the 
question “How much can you know about yourself if you’ve never been in a fight?” becomes 
a popular movement which taps into a vein of perceived masculine displacement, in which 
mastery (initially of self, later of others) and secrecy are linked; as is the homoeroticism 
identified by writers such as Brookey and Westenfelhaus (2002, 2004).  This foregrounding 
of violence as a presumed basic characteristic of masculinity is in itself problematic, but here 
the clandestine, ritual nature of socially-proscribed pleasure is framed as an arena of 
productive self-discovery.  This too adds to its cult pleasures; the principle that “Who you 
were in Fight Club was not who you were in the rest of the world”, with its promise of 
exclusivity and hidden (indeed underestimated) power, produces much the same type of 
mainstream appeal as does the figure of the superhero.  
 
It is complicated, however, by the way in which perverse endurance is here as much a part of 
masculine display
280
 as aggression; when bar owner Lou threatens Tyler, his response is to 
provoke him into beating him repeatedly.  Tyler then enacts a masochistic display of 
calculated submission, relishing in his beating, bleeding into Lou’s mouth, unnervingly; this 
turns on its head the classical masculine trope of the physical fight for supremacy, and turns a 
performance of extreme non-classical submission into an exhibition of superiority.
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However, this subtle critique cannot, by the logic of the film’s action underpinnings, be 
retained; a much more conventional (though nightmarish, from a masculine perspective) 
display is performed when the militia takes the police commissioner hostage, and performing 
a mime of castration, threatens to send his genitalia to newspapers, “press-release style”.  
This retreat into more conventional masculinist tropes continues as the militia expands, and 
the film’s physical aggression becomes less about self-mastery than directed towards a more 
narcissistically atavistic (and fascistic) goal, the mastery of others – or a cultist abnegation of 
self.
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Mastery of a different kind is sought at the support groups Jack stalks; the grief their 
members experience is genuine, but framed harshly, as overly-indulgent, through the ironic 
viewpoint of Jack’s performative adoption of their pain: he is an imposter, and therefore their 
‘authentic’ pain is sidelined in favour of a comedic reading.  This is also seen in the treatment 
of terminal cancer patient Chloe, who has come to terms with her impending death but not 
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with the desexualisation assumed to come with it; her pleading tone as she promises 
“pornographic movies in my apartment, and lubricants, and amyl nitrate” and is shooed from 
the microphone by a group facilitator presents self-help therapeutics as superficial, ineffective 
in combating the darker truths of living and dying.
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  The film’s mixture of nihilism and 
spiritual longing is captured more clearly in Jack’s assertion that Fight Club was “like at a 
Pentecostal church…when the fight was over, nothing was solved. But nothing mattered. 
Afterwards, we all felt saved.”  
 
This spiritual loss is connected both with a perceived abandonment by the father/god
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 and 
with a wider malaise; the conversion through the logic of late capitalism of the citizen to the 
consumer – something Lizardo touches upon when he describes it as an “attempt to craft a 
transcendental ‘counter-myth’ capable with dealing with the cultural and societal 
contradictions of post-industrial capitalism in the context of the transition to a service 
oriented economy.” (Lizardo, 2007, 221) Tyler’s lengthy speech on this – “Slaves with white 
collars.  Advertising has us chasing cars and clothes, working jobs we hate, so we can buy 
shit we don’t need.  We are the middle children of history, men.  No purpose or place.  We 
have no Great War, no Great Depression.  Our great war is a spiritual war.  Our great 
depression is our lives” – touches on all these issues, but the final (heavily ironic) solution to 
this finds him producing a militia in which the search for meaning becomes a fascistic 
devotion to submissiveness.  The classical American individualist trope of the questing hero 
is therefore subversively annihilated in Tyler’s dictum that “you are not a beautiful or unique 
snowflake.  You are the same decaying organic matter as everything else” – deliberately 
calling attention to a perceived distance between this film and the mainstream – and Project 
Mayhem’s activity is placed in (pleasurable) contrast to the cigar-chomping city officials 
spouting platitudes such as “The streets are safer now…there is hope in the inner city.”285   
 
However, the call to action their vandalism and culture jamming activities represents is 
limited, and presented as philosophically futile; shaving monkeys and feeding laxatives to 
pigeons outside car showrooms are satirical, but ineffective, gestures.  Tyler’s anti-
consumerist stance – “the things you own end up owning you” – may be radical in terms of 
its positioning, smuggled as it is into the heart of a studio film, and indeed contrary to many 
of the other Smart films I examine, but is finally redeemed for capitalism in a highly 
conventional way through our discovery that Jack/Tyler is psychologically damaged.  The 
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growing consciousness that his militia members have abdicated personal autonomy in favour 
of slavish devotion to a cult leader frames Project Mayhem as a failure, regardless of how 
many buildings they blow up in the finale – something the film is at pains to emphasise, 
treating its conclusion as a straightforward restoration of heteronormativity, the explosions 
viewed as a backdrop, much as a fireworks display might be.
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This is particularly the case in the way the film refuses any class-based interrogation of its 
material; the failure of the veterinary student turned store clerk is presented as a failure of 
individual will, not a problem of class or opportunity.  When Tyler threatens the police 
commissioner by noting that “The people you are after are the people you depend on” he 
presents their Project not as an implied unified struggle, but as a sinister threat of unknown 
origin: for Tyler the old class structures may have broken down, masked by the illusion of 
social mobility, but no truly radical alternative is proffered.  Here we see the manner in which 
the film’s generic and formal play provide a context so strongly ironic that the film is 
apparently unable to take its own rhetoric seriously, producing a strongly fantastic effect.  
The conclusion the film comes to – with its final, mocking shot of Tyler’s penis – seems to be 
that the audience itself is not just rendered complicit for its engagement with its narrative, but 
first mocked for, and then ejected from, its own complicity; liberation cannot mean the kind 
of masochistic abjection enacted by Tyler’s ‘space monkeys’, and if the audience believes it 
can, the joke is on them.  Jack has regained mastery of his self, and of Marla through the 
restoration of heteronormative ‘propriety’ which ends the film.  
 
Originally scheduled to open in July 1999, the film was delayed until October for a variety of 
reasons; while the studios indicated that post-production requirements and a crowded summer 
schedule were at fault (Klady, 1999), the primary factor was most likely the negative 
response of 20
th
 Century Fox, Fox 2000’s parent company (Waxman, 2005287; Linson, 2002).  
The film became the subject of lengthy disputes between Fincher and the studio
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 which 
reveal the liminal, fluid nature of the Smart film and the industrial dilemmas which can arise 
when attempting to market it; by producing strong calls to action for audiences on the basis of 
one set of textual cues, producers may find these militate against the film’s adoption by other 
audiences.  The case of Fight Club also illustrates the fault lines that emerged during the 
repositioning of production companies themselves; if Miramax had succeeded by applying 
studio marketing and promotion techniques to independent films, many of the difficulties 
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experienced with Fight Club seemed to be of a diametrically opposed nature.  It appears Fox 
were uncertain as to how precisely they could or should develop, produce, budget, distribute 
and market a film which had little in common with their usual output of more formally and 
thematically conservative pieces like Independence Day and Titanic: this unfamiliarity might 
be seen as revealing a sense of the ‘inflation’ that accompanied independent and quasi-
independent production at that period.
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Optioned from Chuck Palahniuk’s cult novel, the original perception on the part of chairman 
and CEO Bill Mechanic
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 was that the film could be made, and potentially profitably, at a 
budget of around $23 million.  This budget would place it well outside the capacity of Fox’s 
specialty division, Fox Searchlight, which had experienced some high-profile losses when 
venturing into higher-budget fields.
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  The goal appears to have been was to make a modest-
to-high-budget film, with all the advantages a studio could provide, but, as part of the 
corporate drive of the time to occupy and monetise the margins as well as the mainstream, to 
use the ‘poverty economics’ (or perception thereof) of the independent stratum in order to 
plead their case with potential suppliers of labour.  This strategy was revealed as flawed: 
while a star might be persuaded to take scale rate for an interesting project from a small 
independent, a project of this scale for a major studio would not be treated in the same 
manner, and the cost of Brad Pitt’s labour was a significant factor in raising its budget.292  
 
Fox’s position seems to have been a conflicted one; caught between their existing models of 
output, which for the period immediately preceding Fight Club had been highly conservative 
textually and from an industrial strategy perspective,
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 and what appears to have been the 
drive to colonise the emerging quasi-independent market, their uncertainty is revealed by a 
myriad of conflicts between studio and creative staff.  From the outset, concerns were raised 
about the unconventionality and darkness of the material, and the fact that Ziskin and 
Mechanic were able to progress the film beyond an initial reading of the source novel is 
further evidence of the industrial duality we see at work in the Smart arena.  A mainstream 
studio keen to push its repertoire, and market share, into potentially lucrative niches had to 
broaden its risk horizon by choosing to greenlight more potentially transgressive projects, but 
its institutional bias as an inherently conservative business drove it to attempt to mitigate 
these transgressions at all points.   
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Decisions and disputes over casting illustrated the contradictions at work.  Brad Pitt, cast as 
Tyler Durden, occupied the kind of semiotically resonant, paradoxical ground the casting of 
the Smart film seems to favour: in looks and physique a matinee idol, but with aspirations 
(already partially achieved in Terry Gilliam’s 1995 Twelve Monkeys) to more ‘serious’ 
dramatic acting; associated with a kind of soft, female-friendly masculinity that might be seen 
as at odds with the hard-edged viciousness of the material; a marquee name, but fresh from 
the relative box office disappointment of Meet Joe Black.
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  Examples of other such clashes 
criss-cross the history of the film; cuts to production and post-production budgets, the toning-
down of nudity, requested removal of violent scenes or shortening of fight sequences, the 
obscuring of details surrounding home bomb-making techniques, and an explicitly 
transgressive
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 sexual reference amended.   
 
The acknowledged difficulties Fox had with marketing and distribution of the film show, 
again, some of the contradictions of its position.  These difficulties were undoubtedly 
exacerbated by personal conflicts, and complicated by the occurrence of the Columbine High 
School massacre, and attendant intense focus on theoretical links between media and 
violence, which necessitated rescheduling its release from July or August to October 1999, 
thus disrupting long-range marketing plans.  But primarily the failure of Fox’s marketing 
campaign appears linked to a generalised strategic confusion about the nature of the film 
itself, as well as how the marketing department could best explicate it to its potential publics.  
In addition, the fact that its final budget would reach €67 million – half of it eventually 
supplied by producer Arnon Milchan’s New Regency Productions, which was based on Fox 
premises and in which Fox was a major shareholder (see Eller, 1997) – placed the studio in 
the position of being effectively forced to market it to a more broad audience, in an attempt to 
recoup costs swiftly.  Robert Harper and Tom Sherak, then respectively head of marketing 
and head of distribution at Fox, had fraught relationships with Fincher, and actively disliked 
the film
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 – certainly they seem to have failed to engage with the material, the former saying 
“[d]espite an aggressive marketing campaign, the general public wasn’t ready for a gritty take 
on the world of semiorganized bare knuckles [sic] street fighting” (Waxman, 2005, 264), and 
the latter that “….[Fincher] tried to tell a story that the majority of people who go to movies 
didn’t necessarily want to see.” (ibid.) Clearly, while taking a specific position on the nature 
of the box office failure that would follow, both statements emphasise the broad, mass-
market nature of the marketing campaign.  
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Fincher’s incursions into the marketing process – hiring a ‘cutting edge’ Seattle advertising 
agency, producing two trailers of his own which emphasises the film’s more ironic aspects – 
were jettisoned in favour of press, posters and billboards focusing on Brad Pitt’s semi-naked, 
bloodied body, television advertising emphasising the fight scenes, trailers that emphasised 
broad comedy, and (something Fincher in particular bridled at) a campaign on cable 
television during World Wrestling Federation programming (see Lim, 2009).  This was not 
simply a large-scale marketing campaign – with a cost of $20 million (Waxman, 2005, 267), 
it placed a significant extra cost burden on the production – but one which, in an effort to 
reach a mass market, worked to erase evidence of some of the subtleties of the film which 
could be seen to appeal to specific niche audiences: its sardonic take on masculinity, its 
ambivalence about consumer culture, its use of violence as methodology for spiritual or 
psychological transference rather than corporeal spectacle.   
 
While it is difficult to make specific claims about hypothetical situations being described 
retrospectively, there are suggestions that even at the time Fincher, and others within the Fox 
system, felt that embracing rather than rejecting the more ‘art film’ elements, might have 
produced different results.
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  The fact that this does not appear to have been proffered as a 
serious possibility indicates, I suggest, the extent to which at this point the industrial models 
for managing the trajectory of a film of this nature were solidified; the scale of the budget 
outlay was the determining factor in positioning and marketing the film, and not the generic, 
textual, or even target-market elements.  The fact that Fight Club eventually became 
massively financially successful, once outside of the confines of the first-run exhibition 
system, does suggest strongly that a platform release, building word of mouth, might have 
resulted in a different outcome.  It is also difficult to establish to what extent the largely 
hostile press coverage of the film during the period just before opening may have had.  As it 
was, its wide opening on 1,963 screens in the US resulted in a first weekend take of just $11 
million, and a scathing reception from the majority of the press.
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By the second weekend, it had become evident that it would not be another Se7en, which had 
taken an unimpressive first-weekend $13.9 million on its way to a US theatrical total of $34 
million (see Berra, 2008, 113), and that the audiences Fox had targeted were unresponsive.  
In a sense, the vital part of Fight Club’s case is the way in which it was essentially 
resurrected after its initial box failure, and not by the studio, but by audiences themselves.  
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Two weeks from release, it had failed to recoup half the cost of production, and was largely 
failing internationally too (with a meagre $7 million intake for its British and Irish stint) – but 
by the spring of 2000, the film was still running; more importantly, it was carried through 
into the DVD sales market, grossing $55 million in rentals by 2001
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 and over six million 
DVD and VHS sales before the end of the decade (Lim, 2009).   
 
However, the ascription of the label ‘cult’ can work to neuter industrial explanations, and 
leaves the matter squarely but mysteriously – innocently – in the hands of the audience; Mark 
Jancovich defines the cult movie as an essentially eclectic category, where “cult is largely a 
matter of the ways in which films are defined in consumption” (Jancovich et al, 2003, 1).  He 
also maintains that cult is defined through a “‘subcultural ideology’ [wherein] filmmakers, 
films, or audiences are seen as existing in opposition to the ‘mainstream’” (ibid.).  In this 
instance the ‘mainstream’ spoken of is not simply the socio-political world (with its demands 
on the viewer to which the film speaks; the strictures of rigid models of work, consumerism, 
and masculinity) but also the world that has created the film, that is, the mainstream studio.  I 
believe that the initial failure of Fight Club is directly related to its original positioning as 
mass-market action film, which illustrated Fox’s lack of understanding of the audience to 
which the film would appeal, and the lack of sociological nuance – the determination to court 
mass audiences at the risk of alienating those to whom its counter-cultural tenor would appeal 
– in its blunt-instrument marketing tactics.  
 
Fox’s very status as mainstream industry giant facilitated wide access to the film through 
massive international release, but contradicted and undercut the subversive intentions of the 
film; it was only when access routes to the film changed in a way that foregrounded a 
framework of audience individuality, of ‘happening upon’ the film, and privileged the notion 
of it speaking to specific niche audiences in particular ways, that financial success followed.  
It was not that Fight Club ceased to be a mainstream film.  It was that it ceased to appear as 
one in the eyes of those who could be regarded as likely to seek it out on the basis of the 
attraction implied by its (now more accessible via word-of-mouth) oppositional appeal.  This 
paradoxical appeal is in its own way symbolised by the film’s iconic phrase “The first rule of 
Fight Club is: you do not talk about Fight Club. The second rule of Fight Club is: you do not 
talk about Fight Club”, which claims this mass media event as a private pleasure, embedded 
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in discourses of prestige and exclusivity, in contrast to the highly ‘public’ – by definition 
non-exclusive – nature of any mass marketing campaign.  
 
So in what ways did the film’s audience intersect with the film’s industrial structures in a 
manner that might account for its adoption as a ‘cult’ hit?  Certainly, the film itself appears to 
have hit a certain zeitgeist nerve, particularly as regards its interrogation of masculine norms 
and consumer behaviour.  Its retrospective recalibration as ‘noble failure’ may also have had 
some impact; eviscerated by many critics on release, best-of accounts of 1999’s output saw it 
increasingly re-evaluated.  It is perhaps also the case that this new positioning, as a quality 
film that its major studio owners could not understand and therefore could not market, 
solidified its appeal, allowing the film’s very failure to be mobilised in representations of it as 
an ‘anti-studio’ film, and therefore with a higher degree of anti-establishment credibility.  
Here, then, the notion of prestige comes strongly into play, in a way that privileges being 
seen to be ‘outside the system’ at a higher level than the traditional bourgeois conception 
might suggest – and yet is still deeply grounded in the bourgeois concerns of the white 
middle class male.
300
  The film’s very attention to the discourses of contemporary masculinity 
as a fractured, tenuous state, emphasise a sense of victimhood
301
 which itself constitutes a 
strong appeal to the white middle-class cult audience. 
A significant factor is the attention that Fincher paid to the DVD extras and packaging,
302
 as 
one of the first Hollywood directors to have significant involvement with the transition of 
their film from theatres to home media (Kirsner, 2007; Lim, 2009).  Audio commentary from 
cast and crew is commonplace nowadays, but was not at this point; nor was the bonus disk 
with extra-textual material like cast and crew biographies, publicity material, behind the 
scenes footage, technical details, detailed explanatory accounts of why one angle or take was 
privileged over another, music video and so on.  Parts of this extra-textual material are 
particularly interesting in highlighting the differences between the text as industrially 
constructed for a cinema audience, and for those who viewed it at home.  Focus is strongly 
maintained on Fincher’s ‘organising’ or auteurial presence, including information on aspects 
which would have been approached differently if additional funding had been available.  The 
tendency is towards producing a dynamic which privileges the relationships of (assumed) 
auteur to text, auteur to audience, and text to audience – creating a circuit of shared secrets, a 
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shared intimacy created by exposing the technologies and practicalities of the filmmaking 
process – while obscuring or complicating the industrial origins of the film.303   
An example of this is the fake ‘warning’ which appears at the beginning of the film.  
Usurping the position of the usual anti-piracy warning, it breaches the boundary of the film 
text itself, while conveying a strongly anti-authority message, and in particular parodying the 
rule-based system which governs this conventional industry advice.
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  In other paratexts, 
information which frames the film as transgressive and, crucially, positions Fincher in direct 
conflict with notional ‘studio heads’, is foregrounded, such as an included section of deleted 
and alternate scenes, where reference is made to the ‘abortion’ line which was removed from 
the final cut.  Here, text made prominent within the display describes “The infamous line of 
dialogue changed before release” and the supposedly horrified reaction of the studio which 
“begged for it’s [sic] reinstatement when they heard what Fincher replaced it with.”  This, 
again, places the viewer in a position of privileged intimacy, of being entrusted with private 
objets previously restricted from public access, in an almost conspiratorial manner. 
This process of intimacy-building is reinforced by many of the other additional features, 
which are situated within a system of power-relations based on rule-making and rule-
breaking, and in which conventional or ‘mainstream’ social rules are seen as antithetical to 
personal growth.  Interestingly, this dynamic is also played out in the contrast between the 
materials used for the film’s theatrical use, and those either mooted by Fincher and rejected 
by Fox, or those utilised for less (at the time) mainstream channels, such as the internet.  
Included in the DVD extras, the trailers are of particular interest.  The US Theatrical Teaser 
minimises the film’s political elements, emphasising instead the visceral nature of the 
fighting, codes Marla as a femme fatale, frames ‘fantasy’ material as diegetic action, and 
utilises ‘cool’ music that echoes the David Holmes soundtrack for Soderbergh’s Out of Sight 
(1998).  Illustrating both the fluidity with which trailer construction approaches any 
cinematic text, and the polysemic nature of the film, it could easily be for an action heist 
movie.  Although it hints at the loss of self in consumerism, the US Theatrical Trailer places 
a greater focus on male bonding or shared male group experience, with violence as an 
empowering force; here the supposedly transformational aspects of combat are highlighted, 
and the trailer alludes to a ‘personal journey’ of a narratively conventional type, with a love 
triangle component, and elements of humour (the “Shatner” joke concludes the trailer).  Both 
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avoid explicit reference to any of the more potentially alienating features of the film, and 
seem constructed for mass audiences. 
By contrast, the ‘8 Rules of Fight Club’ Trailer is, it is intimated, the trailer that would have 
been used had Fincher had unrestricted control of his own project: the format of the screen 
layout prominently highlights the fact that it was never used and has in fact been completed 
“under the supervision of David Fincher” specially for the DVD.  While still somewhat 
depoliticised, this trailer greatly emphasises the film’s more transgressive and potentially 
‘antisocial’ aspects – showing us the van filled with explosives, exploding computers, Tyler 
and Jack bashing in car lights – while maintaining a more ‘mysterious’ aspect in terms of 
mood.  The audio backdrop used is of Tyler reciting the Rules of Fight Club, to underscore 
the film’s emphasis on rule-breaking: this trailer is altogether more apocalyptic in tone, and 
criminal in aspect.  The same is true of the faux Public Service Announcements which 
(according to Waxman’s account) created such consternation in the Fox marketing 
department.  Both are strongly focused on rule making and rule breaking, ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour and boundary-crossing, and ironic delivery, and breach the lines between filmic 
and pro-filmic worlds quite deliberately (it would be a misnomer here to speak of a ‘fictional 
universe’, as neither of the pieces appears to seek to create such).   
While in a sense they are incomprehensible, that is to say they do not directly refer to the film 
text itself, they contain an internal logic which gives them a certain art-cinema appeal; while 
this is speculative, I believe that even a few years later a studio would not have found them so 
baffling, nor would a specialist in the marketing of independent film, who would presumably 
have linked these with a platform release schedule and a more targeted campaign.  To me this 
lends credence to the idea that part of the reason for the failure of the film at the box office 
was Fox’s inability to manage the positioning of a film that fell even slightly outside of the 
margins of the mainstream taste culture.  Therefore, it seems possible to speculate that Fox’s 
involvement with the project constituted an attempt to conquer the industrial territory that 
smaller companies (like Miramax) seemed to be negotiating successfully.                
This is perhaps reinforced by the manner in which such (at the time) marginal intertexts as 
internet advertising slots and music video differed from the mainstream campaigns.  The 
music video is to the song released as “This Is Your Life” by The Dust Brothers,305 which is a 
combination of original electronic music and a sample-based monologue by Brad Pitt, 
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containing many of the most agitational messages from Tyler Durden.  Here, and in specific 
contrast with the film’s trailers, the focus is very strongly on the more ‘nihilistic’ or counter-
cultural, anti-establishment elements of the film, particularly its implied critique of the 
American Dream as it repeatedly intones “You have to give up”.  Similarly, the five internet 
video spots – sharing the scratched, grainy, found-footage aesthetic of the film – are 
structured as to-camera appeals made explicitly to (supposedly) disenfranchised young men; 
outwardly successful, socially concerned, but full of seething inner rage.  One has a strongly 
anti-consumerist focus, accompanied by jauntily ironic cartoon music; another contains 
sexualised appeals to links between violence and freedom, to a soundtrack of pornographic 
moaning; a third appeals on the grounds of ‘authenticity’, differentiating Fight Club from 
American football (which it presents as inauthentic, commercial or sanitised) through 
drawing a football = porn versus Fight Club = sex metaphor; a final one with a Gregorian 
chant audio track equates religion and culture, and rejects both, asking “which is worse, hell 
or nothing?” and exhorting viewers to “wipe your ass with the Mona Lisa”.  
Both the music video and internet spots eschew the softer appeals to presumed sports- and 
action-film fans that characterised the mainstream trailers; as ancillary marketing is often 
marginalised in its industrial production, it is possible to ask if these campaigns have 
‘evaded’ censure by marketing bosses, or whether the studio was well aware that potential 
niche audiences for the film existed, and could be found among alternative music fans and 
internet users.  If so, this implies that it was the industrial scale – the cost burden – of the film 
which prevented Fox from pursuing this line of publicity, and instead trapped them in a zero-
sum game of attempted mass appeal to mass audiences.  This kind of industrial schizophrenia 
does not lend itself to coherent strategising, as is seen also in the press kit visuals supplied in 
the DVD.
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Here, so, as the text has moved (industrially) from the public to the more closed-off circuit of 
the private sphere, in combination with the raised prestige (however defined) of its post-
cinematic period, discursive elements which might have had detrimental effects while the 
film was in cinematic circulation may become more open to reframing: an atmosphere of 
sensationalism and ‘moral outrage’ (in relation to the film’s violence) may also enhance 
popularity in texts viewed in the privacy of one’s home, and particularly for teenagers,307 for 
whom home access to adult-rated films is often easier than cinema viewing.  Home viewing, 
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which emphasises repetition and revisitation in a way played to by the DVD’s extras, also 
privileges intimacy and group bonding – Sirc mentions anecdotally the repeated playing of 
the DVD in men’s college dormitories (Sirc, 2001, 424) – which may be played out in 
particular ways given the film’s take on gender politics.  
 
Indeed, Susan Faludi refers to the film as “Thelma and Louise for guys” (Faludi, 1999, 89) 
with the implication of ‘male bonding’ and shared social space (or at the very least, shared 
male experience) that that provides.
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 While Giroux complains that the film reduces the 
crisis of capitalism to the crisis of masculinity (Giroux, 2001, 5), to my mind this 
conveniently – from an industrial standpoint – both encourages seeing the film as the focus of 
shared male experience, and minimises the psychological commitment to rejecting 
consumerism that the film might superficially seem to encourage, by instead displacing ‘male 
rage’ onto women.  It does seem, however, that the industrial positioning of the film both 
tacitly accepts the ‘Iron John’-style mythopoetics which underpin it, declining to explicitly 
seek a female audience for it, and at the same time underplays them; this is not difficult to do, 
when female absence can usually be taken for granted when exploring the selling of broadly 
action-based American cinema. 
 
Lynn M. Ta sees its industrial position in more progressive terms, however, noting that “[t]he 
action that indeed needs to be taken against the globalizing market ideology of consumerism 
is to seek resolution in public, communal spaces. These spaces include neither the private 
realms of the corporate world nor the underground basements of paramilitary vigilantes. They 
are, instead, spaces that take into account individual and collective needs” (Ta, 2006, 276).  
Either way, the popularity of the film seems to rest on both its textual structure (at filmic and 
paratextual levels) and industrial positioning (as corporate failure, re-colonised to the 
‘margins’ by a public with pretensions to oppositionality).  The difficult – and appropriately 
ironic – question is whether Fox’s failure to market the film to cinematic audiences in fact 
‘saved’ the text at the home viewing level, in that it saved audiences from having to ask 
themselves just how easily anti-consumerism had been marketed to them, as consumers.       
 
Here then, seemed a kind of industrial template for the studio-produced Smart film; a script 
from a critically-lauded and somewhat transgressive source (adapted or original), produced 
with a minimum of direct interference from the studio, and with a large-scale advertising 
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campaign with extensive reach, calculated to draw maximum audience numbers.  However, 
the inexperience of the studio in dealing with work of this tenor, combined with the intense 
pressure created by the high costs involved, contributed to the production of a marketing 
campaign which could not play to the fringe strengths of the film in an effort to showcase it, 
but only attempt to obscure them.  Only once the studio’s position was re-established within 
the audience-text discourse as an adversarial one (the studio which ‘could not cope’ with 
Fincher or Fight Club), and the primacy of the auteur-text-audience triad confirmed, could 
the text itself achieve a kind of plausible deniability about its real industrial positioning, as 
the big-budget output of a major studio, and take its place as a marginalised ‘cult film’.  Fight 
Club is therefore also implicated in establishing the primacy of the ‘indie subsidiary’ within 
this sector, where appropriate skill-sets and experience could be drawn from one end of the 
industrial spectrum, and capital from the other, with the personnel of  the indie subsidiary 
acting as ‘buffers’ between.  
 
The production history of Fight Club obscures the true nature of the industrial tensions at 
play, and explains to a certain extent why the broad range of what can be termed ‘Smart 
cinema’ exists both firmly within, as well as outside of, the major studio; while these David-
and-Goliath discourses pre-exist for independent films and can be plugged into as required, 
they must be manufactured in a specific manner for studio films.  Here, again, we see the 
double-coding which appears a significant feature of the Smart production, as the discourses 
which must be mobilised in order to position the film as ‘appropriate’ for the Smart audience 
are also those which reject, negate, or elide the industrial power of the studios as mass market 
powers.  In this sense, the market positioning of a film like Fight Club – textually Smart, but 
industrially not significantly different to the other big-budget action films of the period – is 
dependent on cultivating its own position within the discourse; its failure to do so on initial 
release becomes more interesting in light of its subsequent reclamation of territory.   
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Case Study: Happiness – an indie in the mainstream crossfire 
 
‘Classically’ Smart in the sense originally described by Sconce, Happiness is distinctive in its 
blackly comedic tone, and accusations of nihilism could perhaps be levelled at it, something 
most of the other films under discussion sidestep.  In tone, thematics and structure, it takes a 
classically ‘independent’ approach, the interplay of genre minimised in favour of a broad 
ensemble form.  King notes its “multi-strand narrative structure [which] defer[s] the process 
of narrative progression in each thread” (King, 2005,8 6), observing that its “lower degree of 
narrative communication” (ibid.) can be a source of confusion for viewers.  This is something 
I regard as an intentional complication of its narrative engagement, designed to heighten the 
later moral conundrum the film presents, and intensify the theme of modern America as 
lacking in genuine connectedness.  Foregrounding sexually transgressive material that seems 
unlikely to generate significant mainstream appeal, Newman describes it as in some ways 
“the quintessential American independent film” (Newman, 2009, 25) featuring as it does a 
low-budget aesthetic, disturbing subject matter treated in morally ambiguous terms, and 
problematic subject positioning, privileging irony above other interpretive frameworks.  This 
is something even the characters make sidelong reference to, as when Helen wryly bemoans 
her peers’ lack of appreciation for New Jersey, whereby “they just don’t get it. I’m living in a 
state of irony”.  Given my contention that ‘Smartness’ comes from the interplay of genre, 
structure, tone, industrial contexts and transmedia discourses, it is vital to investigate the 
ways in which these function together. 
 
Here, the way in which Smartness is configured is largely a matter of tone and transgression.  
However, that is not to say that there is no emphasis on generic play.  Occasionally neglected 
are the subdued suspense elements, where tension is generated in the creation of a gap 
between diegetic and audience knowledge: while we are aware that psychiatrist Bill has been 
drugging and raping his son’s friends, leaving tone aside temporarily, the question of whether 
this will be revealed creates suspense throughout.   Happiness, for all its ironic bleakness, is 
also primarily a comedy – indeed it combines comedic and thriller elements in the sequences 
in which Bill drugs Johnny’s food and cannot persuade him to eat it, producing a blackly 
comic tension – and one which mobilises a variety of sub-generic comedy styles.  Some of 
these styles it is faithful to and others it reproduces only to undercut them ironically: romantic 
comedy, sexual farce, social comedy of manners, black comedy, even introducing an almost 
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jarring element of gross-out humour in its last scenes, in which a dog licks semen from a 
balcony railing, then licks its oblivious owner’s face.   
 
Its introductory scenes immediately place it, with jaunty violin and accordion soundtrack, in 
the territory of light-hearted social farce; however this impression is destabilised almost 
immediately.  The ineffectual Andy, dumped after just a few dates by the ironically-named 
Joy, first presents and then retracts an inappropriate antique gift,
309
 after which he unleashes a 
torrent of abuse, finishing with “I’m champagne. And you’re shit. And till the day you die, 
you, not me, will always be shit.”  The musical accompaniment throughout maintains its 
thematic integrity, complicating both Andy’s inappropriate rage and Joy’s tearful (perhaps 
insincere) rejection, as the opening title appears, in italics which seem coded for a  romantic 
comedy of manners: Happiness.  We are thereby signalled to anticipate the ironic 
undercutting of comedic and romantic tendencies throughout.  
 
Play with generic structure is reinforced repeatedly through the film, in the variety of 
encounters which are initially set up to mirror the ‘meet cute’ of romantic comedy 
convention, and then are destabilised, turning rapidly darker.  Joy takes a call from a man she 
assumes to be the ‘Damien’ her sister has passed her number to: their conversation is 
flirtatious, but he is in fact phone sex pest Allen.  As she responds to his “What are you 
wearing?” with a cheery “You mean, when we go out? Where do you wanna go? I mean, I’m 
fairly easy to please” a shift to splitscreen310 prefigures not a comedy of mistaken identity, 
but instead shows him masturbating, asking “Is your pussy all wet?”311 before she hangs up.  
In another narrative thread, her encounter with English student Vlad, who silences her 
aggrieved class’s chants, and drives her home in his taxi after he encounters her walking in 
tears, promises romantic entanglement of a conventional nature.  However, following sex – 
after which she is cheerfully transfigured, striding down the street to romantic music which 
drowns out the chants of the union protesters outside her building – it transpires that he not 
only has a partner, whom he beats, but is a thief who steals her stereo and guitar, and extorts 
cash from her.   
 
Similarly, when Allen, who has developed a curious – built on mutual self-loathing – 
anonymous telephone connection with his neighbour Helen, Joy’s sister, on whom he has a 
crush, one specific scene is framed in a highly conventional manner which becomes ironic by 
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virtue of the audience’s knowledge of the participants.  Allen sits with phone in hand, 
mustering the courage to phone; this cuts to Helen, waiting anxiously for the phone to ring.  
The camera circling her, and the operatic strains which accompany the scene, produce an 
effect of romantic anticipation; as Allen calls, she answers and they sit in expectant, erotic 
silence.   She says “I have to see you”, and Allen hangs up: the music abruptly cuts out.  Here 
our knowledge of Allen’s predatory sexual fantasies of Helen, which he has described in 
detail,
312
 is temporarily overridden by the conventions of the genre.  As romantic comedy 
predicates itself on some kind of romantic or sympathetic connection being established, the 
conclusion of their interlude, in which Allen admits his identity, forms another instance of 
generic rupture.  They sit awkwardly, far apart on Helen’s couch, each staring away from the 
other, again with operatic counterpoint.  In an extremely slow take, he inches his hand 
towards her; what might in other circumstances be a moment of silent communion ends as 
she snaps “This isn’t working”.  The music abruptly stops, terminating the scene’s (illusory) 
romantic mood, and Allen leaves. 
 
One other way in which the film first creates and then destroys conventional romantic 
structures is in Allen’s encounter with neighbour Kristina, whose size marks her out as (in 
conventional terms, that is to say, in terms of fundamental gender inequality) as about as 
desirable as Allen, the sexual predator.  As she comes to his door, ostensibly collecting 
money for Pedro the doorman she says has been found bludgeoned to death in his apartment, 
she asks him out, and is rebuffed.  The generic-narrative implication here is that despite 
Allen’s arrogance, he will eventually appreciate that he has found a more appropriate mate 
than Helen.  Indeed, having put Allen to bed while drunk, her tender care despite his porn 
magazines and mumbles of “need pussy” implies that he has found the romantic connection 
he craves.
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  This implication is intensified when they slow-dance to romantic music; only to 
be undercut dramatically when Kristina reveals that she has in fact murdered rapist Pedro, 
and is gradually disposing of his body parts.   
 
While Allen’s “we all have our, you know, our pluses and minuses” response is measured, it 
is not the revelation that she is a murderer that ends any possibility of a relationship, but her 
admission that she hates sex.  This both breaches the romantic convention of presumed sexual 
attraction between people of equal unattractiveness or low status, and, with Kristina’s “It was 
a crime of passion. I’m a passionate woman” combined with the ‘grotesquery’ of her avid 
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consumption of ice cream while relating her story,
314
 neatly decouples sex and passion, 
desexualising the only woman with whom Allen has a genuine link.  His visions of 
hypersexualised femininity are fraudulent, and it is to Kristina, all chance of sexual fulfilment 
removed, he comes for consolation; they lie together but not touching, back to back and 
divided by bedcovers, as the song to which they danced plays again.  
 
Thematically, multiple issues come into focus, most hinging on the contingent nature of 
knowledge: outwardly-ordinary – and crucially, suburban – characters have sinister secrets 
(Allen, Bill), are focused on maintaining appearances at the expense of reality, seek to use 
information as social currency, or confront the impossibility of truly knowing another (a 
sense in which the film comes closest to accusation of nihilism).  The sisters’ parents Lenny 
and Mona are newly-estranged because of Lenny’s insistence that he “just want[s] to be 
alone”, but their rejection or avoidance of actual divorce forms a recurring joke.  Bill’s wife 
Trish’s insistence that she “has it all” not only belies the reality of Bill’s pederasty, but 
conceals that their marriage is sexless and lacking in intimacy, and he treats her “like shit”.  
The sibling rivalry between Joy, Helen and Trish is played out through a multitude of 
passive-aggressive barbs and pointed comments designed to ironically reinforce the speaker’s 
superior status, from Trish’s (later contradicted) syrupy admission that “I always thought that 
you would never amount to much, that you’d end up alone, without a career or anything.  
Really, it’s what we all thought….somehow you always seemed doomed to failure. But now I 
see that’s not true. There’s a glimmer of hope for you after all” to Helen’s cooing, insincere 
insistence that if Trish had managed to write a novel “I’m sure it would have been good.”  
Helen herself is consumed with self-loathing, outwardly highly successful but describing her 
work as “shallow and superficial”, and herself as “just another sordid exploitationist”. 
 
Contrary to the other Smart films I discuss, here the development or revelation of the real self 
is not coded as desirable or even advisable; crisis is foregrounded at all times, and strongly 
linked with sexual transgression.  In a highly ironic fashion, only Bill who, in addition to his 
secret paedophilia, dreams about massacring random bystanders, and is painfully conscious 
that he is “sick”, comes close to leading an ‘authentic’ or emotionally evolved existence.  
Where Trish brushes off son Billy’s anxieties with a casual “Ignore him, he’s just doing it for 
attention”, Bill engages with his pre-adolescent fears, talking honestly and compassionately 
with him about masturbation.  The scenes in which he does so are framed comedically, 
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particularly in the musical accompaniment which recalls that of network family television, 
transposing the (limited, and frequently suburban) emotional trials and resolutions of that 
model onto a resolutely transgressive and adult mode of sexual comedy, thus forming a 
sidelong critique of the conventional limits of media and social ‘propriety’ when it comes to 
sexual matters.  The closeness of this relationship is therefore shattered when Bill embraces 
his own destruction, admitting – during a lengthy, forcefully still sequence, in which the 
mechanics of his predation are dissected in a manner which forces both Bill and the audience 
to fully confront his actions – to Billy that he has raped his schoolfriends.    
 
We are made complicit by our narrative engagement with Bill’s moral torment, and 
compromised by the film’s privileging of his perspective – encouraged to identify more 
closely with his bumbling efforts to molest a child than we are with any other character – a 
‘humanising’ of a type of character traditionally cinematically marginalised in emotional 
terms.  While MacDowell sees the scene in which Bill first sees Johnny,
315
 with its lush 
musical accompaniment as “an (ironic) affective invitation to share in Bill’s paedophilic 
lust…[as] we are hardly being encouraged to accept this invitation sincerely – this is what 
makes it ironically ‘amoral’ rather than ‘immoral’” (MacDowell, 2013, 58), I feel this reading 
misses the way in which Bill is almost embraced within the film, as a tragic figure; while 
there is tremendous irony in the fact that the most apparently functional, likeable member of 
the ensemble is a paedophile,
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 the tragedy is in his self-awareness, in contrast to the wilful 
self-blindness of the rest of the characters – his understanding of the horror of his behaviour, 
his seeming inability to resist his dark desires.   
 
With its combination of irony, bleak pathos, tonal distancing, and complex audience 
positioning, Happiness provides a salutary example of the way in which framing within the 
media-industrial discourse operates.  Textually and industrially the film had what might be 
described as impeccable indie credentials, produced as it was by Killer Films and Good 
Machine, under a distribution agreement with October Films, then the specialty division of 
Universal, which had itself been acquired by drinks distributor Seagram in 1995; even before 
production started it had become controversial.
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  Entered out of competition at the Cannes 
Film Festival, it received – mostly, apart from some perhaps equally celebrated pannings318 – 
positive critical response and won the 1998 International Critics’ Prize for Best Film; 
however, before release in the U.S, the film ran afoul of the studio and was dropped; 
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precisely how this happened, admittedly, is unclear (see Brooks, 2001; King, 2005, 43; King, 
2009, 214-215).
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  Good Machine bought the film back from October and released it 
independently; however this arrangement too highlights some of the inherent uncertainties 
surrounding how and why Smart cinema is framed in particular positioning circumstances.  
Schamus himself describes the transfer of rights not as an adversarial ‘battle of wills’, but as 
“a remarkably amicable and collegial transaction” (Schamus, 2001, 258) – indeed, it provided 
Solondz with a paradoxically convenient opportunity to release the film without any of the 
ratings battles that would surely have ensued, given its subject matter.
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  Not only that, but 
Universal “helped, quietly and in the background, to secure the necessary bank loan.” (King, 
2005, 43) from which it would itself directly profit should the film succeed (Newman, 2009, 
27).  In this incident we see some of the compromises and complexities inherent in the 
process of the corporate colonisation of what had been previously seen as solely the territory 
of independent film; while Universal itself might not have been able to tolerate the 
reputational risk the film represented, it was clearly content to be involved to the extent of 
maintaining a financial interest.   
 
Following Cannes, the release strategy (under Bob Berney, who ran distribution for the film 
at Good Machine after its rejection by October) was to push the film heavily at festivals, 
including Telluride and the New York Film Festival (Vachon, 2006, 91). The pattern of its 
release is of some interest too.  Opening in New York, then in Los Angeles, with fifteen more 
cities thereafter, it followed what Newman describes as “a typical ‘aggressive specialized 
rollout’ for a film being marketed on the basis of controversy, critical praise, and prestige.” 
(Newman, 2009, 27)  In fact, Happiness would appear to have initially benefitted from the 
controversy; while the film eventually failed to break even on domestic sales alone, after four 
weeks on release, the film was playing in eighty-three American cities, and increasing its 
week-on-week gross.
321
    
 
For Berney, it represented something of a missed opportunity.  While the film opened at first 
in only six (art-house-oriented) cinemas, making $34,000 per theatre on average in the first 
week, it did not cross over into the mainstream suburbs and multiplexes (Vachon, 92), 
something he relates to an inability to capitalise on the press coverage in a way which could 
convert it to an attractive proposition to prospective viewers outside of established 
mainstream audiences.  This was exacerbated by difficulties in placing an unrated film in the 
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home entertainment marketplace:
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 “We didn’t have…a way to change the campaign, and 
that might have affected the release. I’ve learned since that people will pay double to see a 
movie if you tell them Hollywood or the government doesn’t want you to see it.” (ibid.)  
However, this position neglects the complexity of the compromise agreement reached, and its 
illustration of not just the dependence of even large studios on prestige and cultural 
credibility, but also their specific vulnerabilities as conglomerated operations.   
 
Seagram’s Universal, Schamus argues, could not simply dump the film or they would face 
opprobrium from the film community at a time of corporate vulnerability; to allow a 
competitor to directly take the film on could easily have resulted in an antagonistic press 
campaign emphasising the ‘saviour’ distributor’s action at Universal’s expense.  Instead, the 
compromise of effectively funding Good Machine’s self-release allowed Universal to be 
seen, within the industrial network of the film industry, as (comparatively) “morally good and 
true…at the end of the day, we had a film that benefited in the marketplace by being both 
suppressed and promoted by one and the same system. …we got to do what few filmmakers 
ever have the chance to do – control the distribution of our own film from beginning to end.” 
(Schamus, 1999, 35)  This apparent rejection, therefore, served several functions.  It allowed 
the studio to distance itself from controversy; it gave the filmmaker an unusual level of 
freedom; it acted directly as a positioning tool, in particular by generating media responses; 
and it reinforced the industrially-useful construction of wider perceptions of a binary 
opposition between indie and mainstream – again an example of a Smart film directly 
obscuring its industrial origins.   
 
As the film became a media topic in and of itself, the controversy came to stand in as a 
synecdochic token of the film’s quality, of its status as creatively and socially transgressive, 
and by extension, as independent, authentic, and autonomous.  Here the cues for a potential 
audience to self-position as available to it are not just strong, but anchored in an extra-textual 
discourse which predisposes the film as being ‘for them’, as “the audience for alternative 
culture is potentially reassured rather than threatened by subject matter tagged as morally 
inappropriate by the dominant social structure” (Newman, 2009, 25).  Happiness’s industrial 
positioning – as contrasted with its actual financial arrangements – therefore exemplified the 
ur-myth of independent cinema, in which the clear and uncompromising vision of the 
filmmaker prevails against the creatively repressed, money-obsessed philistine studios, and 
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receives widespread critical acclaim as a result, even if not financial reward (the lack of 
which could, if desired, be blamed on ‘Hollywood’).   
 
Andrew Lewis Conn makes the point, not simply in relation to Solondz, but to the entire 
discursive apparatus surrounding quasi-independent cinema, that it had been “granted critical 
immunity” (Conn, 1999, 70) through this process, in a manner that did not serve either the 
film itself, or wider cinema, well.  He argues that it “had cultivated such an aura of dark 
hipness around itself, that critics may have been afraid to puncture it.  A bleaker explanation 
is this: they were reviewing not the film they saw but the film they’d read about, the film 
they’d come prepared to see.” (ibid.)  In this reading, it is not a question of taste which 
pertains. It is that the almost ‘perfect’ industrial positioning of a film like Happiness – as a 
legitimate but controversial work of art, beleaguered by the economic tyranny and creative 
deadness of the studio system – renders it textually unassailable, protected from legitimate 
analysis by a shield of gatekeeping critics who wish to prove their own cultural 
sophistication, and to defend the idea of independent film’s ‘autonomy and authenticity’, as 
much as they wish to defend the film itself.  Here, the practice of critical analysis becomes an 
almost intolerable burden, trapping the text in an anaesthetizing web of urbane superiority, 
and halting opportunities for wider analysis, or the seeking of wider audiences. 
 
This is a potentially valid criticism but neglects the extent to which the film functions as both 
a critique of contemporary media’s tendency to shy away from serious consideration of the 
film’s position-taking – as Solondz himself points out, “a movie like Happiness can only 
come out of a society with a repressive culture, and yet there’s nothing in the movie that isn’t 
in the tabloids or talk shows.” (Levy, 1999, 292), and as a critique of the audience’s avidity 
for transgression.  It is undeniably problematic, as King points out, that sexual transgression 
is more easily commodified than alternative perspectives seen as problematically ‘political’, 
and that transgressors  
turn up disproportionately often in indie films, partly because they raise issues 
independent cinema is more capable than Hollywood of treating with any complexity 
but also because they offer the potential for a frisson that can be marketable…a kind 
of exploitation cinema for those who situate themselves as more 
culturally/educationally discerning. (King, 2005, 200)  
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It is, finally, the film’s tendency towards blankness, more than its transgressive material, 
which places the audience in the difficult – and rather ‘Smart’ – position of being rendered 
complicit with Bill and Allen through relatively conventional narrative strategies and generic 
cues, while the film retains a complexly doubled perspective of ironic distance and uneasy 
identification.  In the final scene between Bill and Billy, therefore, it is the camera’s fixity of 
gaze, its desire to make the audience confront its own viewing pleasures as much as it forces 
Bill to confront his, which turns the idea of ‘authenticity’ on its head, and constructs the 
audience itself as the problem. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The framing and positioning of each of these two films was strongly divergent.  With 
financial support but not full conceptual buy-in from its studio, and a budget which ran high 
enough to effectively force it into being positioned as a major studio action film, Fight Club 
was a box office failure.  I see this as largely due to its inability to engage its textual play, 
thematic ambiguities, and generic hybridity – as opposed to mobilising its more mainstream 
elements – in order to avail of a position farther along the perceptual continuum which would 
have seen it as more ‘independent.’  In this sense, the film found itself in an industrially 
confused position; its more flamboyant elements of textual play would not have been possible 
without the financial support of a major studio, and yet that studio’s inexperience in 
positioning work of this nature greatly hindered its ability to generate audiences.   
 
This position was reversed for home release as the film slowly ‘found its place’, not least due 
to its makers’ attention to the growing importance of paratextual materials.  The film’s 
elements which more strongly called to cult drives were thereby able to emerge; the call to 
multiple viewing; the extended space for (individual or group) consideration of socially-
problematic elements (the film’s anti-conformist politics, its consideration of gender, its 
scopophilic pleasures and its complex engagement with suture) could thereby be reframed in 
a pleasurable way for audiences.  The negative publicity the film received on release, as well 
as its temporal proximity to a tragic event which allowed discourse about media violence to 
be framed in relation to it, may have had a significant impact on its initial success.  However, 
it was the film’s positioning as a mainstream movie which enabled it to be mobilised as a 
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signifier within that discourse, which I do not believe would necessarily have happened had 
the film been either produced as, or framed as, a more ‘independent’ production.  During 
release, the film’s combination of Smartness and transgressive material (particularly its 
violence) created a dominant reading of it as a violent action film rather than enabling an 
alternative reading as a blackly comedic satire.  In its post-cinematic period, those readings 
were subsumed under the logic of oppositionality, with Fincher reframed as an adversarial 
figure as regards the studio, and the film taking on a cult appeal partly because of that same 
industrial positioning.    
 
In contrast, the form and generic play of Happiness was so strongly positioned at the 
‘independent’ end of that same continuum that the condemnation it attracted, and Universal’s 
feigned renunciation of it, functioned in an entirely different way.  While arguably more 
morally problematic, it militates towards being seen as less problematic than Fight Club 
purely because of its discursive underpinnings.  While Bob Berney notes that “[p]eople were 
almost afraid to say how much they liked it” (Vachon, 2006, 91) at the same time, the 
framing of the film as unapologetically transgressive served to place it within a discourse 
privileging transgression as a marker of prestige.  In this way it was seen to exemplify an 
auteuristic stance of creative autonomy, something which substantively distanced the film 
from the kind of mainstream concerns which, due to the scale of financial investment 
involved, Fox were obliged to consider.  However, both films are notable for the way in 
which they use their respective generic coding to positional advantage within their markets – 
for Fight Club, its action and thriller elements, and the coding of Jack/Tyler as a 
fundamentally disordered personality militated towards a ‘fantasy’ reading which mitigated 
allegations of nihilism or irresponsibility, and for Happiness, its coding as ‘art cinema’ drew 
away accusations of exploitativeness.       
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
 
This research project has not been an attempt to produce a taxonomy of textual characteristics 
– a task I regard as futile, not because it is ‘impossible’ but because to undertake it would 
work to deny one of the fundamental qualities of Smart cinema, which is that it is as much an 
industrial mode as it is a textual one.  Neither has it been a purely industrial account of the 
field, as to characterise Smart film in solely economic terms would not only fail to emphasise 
the textual complexity of the films themselves, but would conceivably result in a kind of silo-
ing of works into ‘manageable’ compartments – and this compartmentalisation would 
undermine a richer potential understanding of the way in which these films operate.  Instead, 
I have sought to link industrial and textual studies in order to attempt to clarify the nature of 
Smart cinema and the contexts in which it is both produced and received.  I have 
concentrated on the period 1990-2005, a selection which identifies sex, lies and videotape as 
the last ‘independent breakout’ prior to the first real eruptions of ‘Smartness’, and halted my 
examination in 2005 with Rian Johnson’s Brick.  Arguments about periodisation are, it 
seems, inevitable, but I feel this time-span constitutes the primary period of interest; a 
definitive moment of ‘closure’ cannot be identified, particularly in the light of continued 
crossing or intermeshing of Smart and mainstream tendencies.  However, after this period, 
Smart cinema also displayed a strong tendency towards recuperation into the mainstream, by 
way of its intermeshing with ‘blockbuster economics’, which I will discuss later in this 
chapter.   
 
My framing of Smart cinema as a ‘trans-generic mode’ works, I believe, to emphasise the 
way in which it functions both as an industrial grouping – and one which is subject to the 
same types of processual amendment that generic categories tend to be – and as a body of 
work which, while employing generic codes from a wide variety of traditions (melodrama, 
science fiction, comedy etc.) utilises a particular set of textual strategies which cross them.  I 
hesitate to use the term ‘indiewood’ throughout, as the term, while it holds great power as a 
conceptual framework and has been a tremendously useful intervention within the field, to 
my mind also fails to adequately ‘contain’ the wide range of texts I bring together here – 
while some, certainly, can easily be described as embodying all that ‘indiewood’ implies, 
others fall either at the strongly independent end of the continuum, or are deeply embedded 
within the traditional studio system.   For me, the term ‘trans-generic mode’ emphasises the 
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discursive nature of the contexts within which the texts operate and their fluidity over time, as 
well as the texts themselves, and while an industrial grounding is vital to an understanding of 
these contexts, too rigid an interpretation of the terms ‘independent’, ‘indie’, or ‘indiewood’ 
can result in a kind of hard-coding of definitions which obscures rather than clarifies. 
 
Industrially speaking, my conclusion is that Smart film constitutes above all things a 
symptomatic historical ‘moment’, a manifestation of textual tendencies wherein the processes 
of industrial consolidation, and the mechanisms by which assimilatory practices draw 
filmmakers from the fringes to the centre of industrial production, are revealed.  Smart 
encompasses both independent and studio production, but is probably best thought of as a 
largely mainstream-industrial phenomenon rather than an independent one, given that its 
products are largely distributed and exhibited via the mainstream industry even where they 
have originated outside it in a strict sense.  Therefore it is not possible to directly regard 
Smart as independent cinema, although media-discursive representations frequently highlight 
textual and extratextual elements which privilege this framing.   
 
A combination of industrial circumstances which themselves were largely a consequence of, 
or related to, the deregulation of the American media industries during the 1980s 
(international conglomeration, the unifying of production and delivery, increasing 
globalisation, raised production and associated marketing costs).  This produced in the 1990s  
an impetus to reprioritise within the studios, and in several cases to utilise that reprioritization 
as means of revitalising or refocusing their brand, and brought forth larger (and more 
internationalised) markets which could be exploited through a strategy of product 
diversification.  One result of this diversification was the drive – expressed in the industrially 
hybrid form of Smart – to appeal to not only mass international markets, but also diverse 
niche markets comprised of potential audiences who were more responsive to impressions of, 
respectively, prestige, independence, auteurial creativity, and stylistic innovation.   
 
This constituted a form of industrial ‘colonisation’ of territory which had previously been 
considered the preserve of independent filmmakers, and is seen most clearly in the studio 
acquisitions of small producers and/or distributors, and the widespread establishment of 
quasi-autonomous production units within studios themselves.  This was reinforced 
discursively by tendencies within the popular and industrial media to narrativise a process of 
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market segmentation into the idealised frame of a ‘New New Hollywood’, wherein auteurial 
mythologies obscured industrial practices.  The financial risks undertaken were generally 
relatively modest, however the desired return on investment was not simply that of box office 
success: competition for symbolic dominance within these niche markets also contributed to 
status for the industry itself.  While the more textually marginal an individual film is – the 
fewer generic or, sometimes, auteurial attractions it possesses – the likelier it is to have been 
produced independently and subsequently purchased for distribution, individually, the 
positioning of texts was accomplished through a variety of strategies.   
 
In order to position themselves, some texts emphasised mainstream generic values, with 
varying degrees of success (The Matrix, Fight Club); others claimed a place within bourgeois 
prestige discourses (American Beauty, Sideways), or were associated with perceptions of 
contemporary ‘hipness’ (Wes Anderson’s films, Lost In Translation); some made appeals on 
the basis of strongly art-house, occasionally transgressive values (Happiness, Safe, Welcome 
to the Dollhouse).  Others adopted more textually hybrid approaches, such as Paul Thomas 
Anderson, whose work has been positioned within generic, transgressive, prestige and 
auteurial framings; at one level an art-house film with a prominent low-budget aesthetic, Pi 
also carries strong associations of contemporary ‘coolness’, for example in its soundtrack; 
Eternal Sunshine contains a high degree of experimental complexity within the strongly 
mainstream generic environment of the star-led romantic comedy, and which is also inhabited 
by the auteurial ‘presence’ of Charlie Kaufman.   
   
Therefore, while these strategies include tactical releasing and strategic publicity generation 
(indeed, elements of controversy tended to be parlayed into free publicity) as well as 
traditional advertising campaigns, the positioning of an individual film is also a function of 
the interplay between its textual and generic characteristics, and various (occasionally 
competing) discourses of prestige.  Here, prestige constitutes the search for acclaim for the 
film text itself, usually for the (within this discursive context, often regarded as an ‘auteur’) 
director, and occasionally for the writer, but also for the production team and/or studio 
itself.
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  When unpacked, the discourses of prestige and auteurism illustrate both the 
temporal trajectory of these films – the ‘progress’ of Smart cinema into the mainstream – and 
simultaneously show how framings of an art-house or ‘indie culture’ nature work to obscure 
its industrial underpinnings.  This is something which emerges from my research into the 
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evaluative mechanisms which have worked to reinforce Smart within the industry.  These 
include awards bestowed by festivals (which serve multiple functions, as sources of intra-
industrial prestige, promotional tools, and physical marketplaces) and stand-alone awards 
systems (which function as sources of intra-industrial prestige, promotional tools, and as 
media events engaging public involvement, either in voting or as spectators), and which 
because of their multiple functions form a useful test-bed for analysis.   
 
My conclusion is that when broken down in this way, Smart cinema encompasses a variety of 
different categories in terms of films’ reception, and these categories are perceived in 
different ways by the prestige industry – a finding that I believe warrants further research.  
Some (those I describe as ‘art-house/independent’) are primarily valorised for non-classical 
attributes (in tone, theme, formal play and so on), auteuristic associations, and for industrial 
or material distance from the conglomerated studio system: that this grouping contains the 
majority of the films from the early part of the period under discussion suggests that 
discursively and economically, Smart film moved gradually towards larger budgets and more 
mainstream acceptance.  Others (the ‘hybrid indie/mainstream’ films) show the transitional 
nature of the Smart mode, moving industrially into the mainstream during the early 2000s, 
and are dominated by comedic (including ‘quirky’) generic drivers; they are awarded prestige 
by youth audiences in particular.   
 
The category of ‘bourgeois/mainstream’ films to me illustrates the assimilatory nature of the 
mainstream; these minimise cult and art-house elements, are strongly classical in their style, 
and are intensely focused on the male white middle-class.  While Pardoe and Simonton 
conclude (2007, 380) that genre is not a factor in predicting Academy Awards winners, it 
may be in nomination selections; without further research I acknowledge that the point is 
speculative, but it does seem interesting to me that each of these films generically tends 
strongly towards the family drama (or indeed melodrama).  In any case, the films which tend 
least towards the formally or narratively transgressive,
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 are here the most likely to be 
rewarded with institutional approval.  For me, the prestige bestowed by their inclusion at 
what we might call the ‘top’ of a notional hierarchy of prestige (signified by the dominance 
of the Academy Awards and Golden Globes) also represents an intra-industry symbolic 
reinforcement of the perceived institutional benefits of studios’ colonisation of the quasi-
independent field.   
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The two films which availed primarily of ‘cult/technical/genre’ prestige and audience-
awarded prizes illustrate the extent to which, I assert, their strongly generic nature – and the 
possible cultural devaluing of science fiction as a genre among others – dominated other 
considerations and obscured a prestige-industries reading of them through a quality 
framework, effectively erasing the discursive sense of them as ‘Smart’.  The ‘strongly 
hybridised’ group of films contains, in contradiction, the most directly ‘indiewood’ of films – 
those which employ classical generic drivers and star presence, and a high degree of formal 
experimentation.  These are the films which I would regard as constituting the clearest 
illustration of the ground which Smart cinema sought to occupy: the fact that they are also 
awarded the widest variation in types of prestige to me demonstrates not just that they have 
become popular, but that they have indeed fulfilled the industrial desire to appeal to multiple 
‘small but significant’ audiences.  
 
An additional element in the fulfilment of this desire is the manner in which auteurist 
discourse works to symbolically unify the contradictions implied by Smart’s theoretical 
position as simultaneously ‘indie’ and mainstream.  Auteurist discourse functions to contain 
Smart in an overarching narrative of creative innovation which does not just create a 
discursive framework of critical legitimation for its texts, or elide questions of independence 
and industrial origin, but also tends to downplay the generic elements which are a vital part of 
embedding them in a matrix of mainstream accessibility.  Similarly, mobilising ideas of ‘cult’ 
not only creates a sense of distinction from the mainstream for Smart texts (albeit in a variety 
of different ways, given the disparity of texts under discussion here) and downplays industrial 
contexts, but positions them as works through which audiences produce cultural capital.  
However this is not the intensely codified cultural capital of the hardcore cultist, but an 
attenuated version of it, in which the idea of discovery or early adoption is foregrounded, 
rather than textual mastery as a process or goal in itself: Smart cinema’s fundamental 
embedding within the mainstream industry, and its propensity towards comprehensive 
generic accessibility, undercuts real tendencies towards cult status.   
 
The question of how important independence is to the positioning of these films is a larger 
one.  In Chapter Five I draw on the idea of ‘independentness’, which I describe as the 
tendency to emphasise perceptions of creative independence – expressed through textual 
strategies (such as Wes Anderson’s ‘quirky’ distancing, Brick’s opaque dialogue, Fight 
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Club’s surface politicisation, American Beauty’s faux-transgressive sexual politics, or the 
aestheticised technology of The Matrix), as well as a reliance on the mythmaking power of 
contemporary auteurism (as when films written by Charlie Kaufman are framed as the 
singular product of an extraordinary mind, rather than the output of a collaborative industrial 
and creative process
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) – while seeking to appear free of industrial contexts which might be 
seen to directly compromise such perceptions.  However, this position is not without its 
contradictions.   
 
While discursive attention drawn to these texts privileges notions of creativity and exception, 
the sociological context within which they are received and consumed can be said to have 
produced a more nuanced (or perhaps compromised) status for them.  In this, the intervention 
of major studios into the independent or quasi-independent marketplace is not necessarily 
condemned as a ideologically ‘fraudulent’, or as representing a minimising of options for the 
non-mainstream audience, but (as per Newman’s 2009 exploration of indie culture and the 
idea of ‘selling out’) as part of the late-capitalist rhetoric of consumer choice in which a 
mainstream audience is provided with a wider range of options from which to choose.  In this 
context, the generic ‘anchoring’ of each Smart film as a mainstream-accessible text, within 
the context of an ongoing practice of corporate colonisation, forms part of an industrial drive 
to induce audiences to self-position in relation to structural aesthetics and generic drivers 
rather than industrial contexts.  Primarily, the idea of the ‘self-positioning’ of audiences 
implies that viewers are responding to discursive cues about the status, cultural relevance, 
and ‘coolness’ of the auteur with whose creative work – and brand image – they have 
cultivated some sort of relationship.   
 
Newman’s assertion that ‘indie culture’ generally, as well as independent film specifically, 
generates its identity from a set of practices focused on making distinctions between ‘indie’ 
and ‘mainstream’ that are fundamentally economically- or industrially-based, highlights the 
contradictory nature of the cultural processes, or overall cultural system, via which Smart 
operates, and through which it embedded itself within Hollywood industrial output (and 
became accessible to non-fringe audiences).  If ‘indie’ connotes “small-scale, personal, 
artistic, and creative” (Newman, 2009, 16) and was once conceived of as existing in specific 
challenge to the mainstream, with its assumed binary opposition the large-scale production 
less concerned with artistic quality and more concerned with financial return, then certainly 
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as regards Smart cinema the term ‘indie’ has become a social signifier rather than a marker of 
industrial origin:  
a term whose meanings – alternative, hip, edgy, uncompromising – far exceed the 
literal designation of media products that are made independent of major firms…It 
includes social groups that cluster around these forms and the practices of 
entrepreneurship that produce and disseminate them. (ibid.)    
The logical extension of Newman’s framing of this condition – that the idea of 
‘independence’ has effectively been evacuated of meaning at a consumption level – should 
not be made too literally, however, as I believe it breaks down when we look at the extent to 
which industrial-discursive considerations still focus on emphasising the creative, auteuristic, 
and transgressive credentials of films.     
 
My conclusion is that for Smart film, the drive to construct appeals to multiple audiences 
means that emphasising the idea of creative independence in positioning films continues to be 
tremendously important for some niches, and so the tendency to minimise industrial 
underpinnings continues, but that as the industrial movement towards semi-autonomous 
studio units developed, this movement was itself positioned not as colonisation or market 
saturation, but as a ‘new’ creative and innovative production tendency.  As an example, by 
2004 the semi-autonomous studio production units had become so embedded within a set of 
public or discursive assumptions about quality and creativity that a regional US newspaper 
critic discussing them could confidently declare that “the individual…quality from this new 
breed of ‘It’ names is enough to make me check a coming title’s distribution and/or 
production credits as one would any respected actor or filmmaker” (Schurr, 2004, 20).  These 
apparently multiply-contradictory strands were in fact strongly reinforcing each other, and 
facilitating Smart’s movement into the mainstream.   
 
At the same time, we can separate the notion of Smart cinema from ideas of ‘independent’ or 
even ‘indiewood’ filmmaking by acknowledging that it is a mode of cinema which produces 
different textual and discursive appeals to multiple constituencies.  Therefore, despite its 
tendency to mobilise strong concerns about authenticity and identity directly within its textual 
formations as much as in its industrial contexts and discourses, I believe it would be a 
mistake to automatically attempt to define a notional Smart audience as being precisely the 
same as the notional ‘indie audience’ assumed to be highly motivated in their consumption 
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choices by those self-same concerns.  A great deal more research needs to be done into the 
ways in which real audience constituencies approach and experience Smart film, but certainly 
I conceive it likely that not all audiences for it are similarly invested, or necessarily invested 
at all, in the kinds of rhetorical game regarding ‘real’ independence often assumed to be the 
territory of the ‘indie fan’.      
 
Smart cinema’s integrational movement towards the mainstream over the period was 
heightened by the fact that it also constituted a training ground for filmmakers who were then 
assimilated into the mainstream (a tendency which has characterised the industry since its 
earliest days).  Our notional ‘Hollywood’ functions as a social and professional as well as 
industrial network, and one in which the reputational capital provided by work produced 
under the Smart heading would later be parlayed as what Staiger describes as “authorial 
calling cards” (Staiger, 2013, 25) into bigger-budget forays into the mainstream industry.  
This was made possible partly by the transactional structure of the industry, in which  
production communities themselves are cultural expressions and entities involving all 
of the symbolic processes and collective practices that other cultures use: to gain and 
reinforce identity, to forge consensus and order, to perpetuate themselves and their 
interests, and to interpret the media as audience members. (Thornton Caldwell, 2008, 
2) 
Smart in this sense functions as a training ground in practical or technical terms, and also in 
the sense through which it constitutes not just a strand of product diversification aimed at 
market dominance, but part of the self-reinforcing collective mythology of Hollywood.  Here, 
establishing reputational capital through creative legacy is a cultural ‘demand’, although one 
which is frequently subordinated to profit motives.   
 
The accumulated perceptions of creativity, innovation, transgression and quality which attend 
Smart are therefore harnessed in service both of market colonisation and reputational capital, 
the first being served by a given film’s financial returns, and the second by the sense in which 
Smart cinema availed of different kinds of prestige.  Linked through a historical narrative 
with earlier New Hollywood filmmakers now ‘canonised’ by the passage of time, Smart 
thereby comes to be seen as a generational inevitability, in ways which serve to symbolically 
present the textually disparate work of different filmmakers as linked through the overlaying 
of a presumed shared creative perspective, or even ‘cultural movement’.  This has significant 
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consequences (which I discuss below) for both the type of creative project later made 
available to Smart filmmakers, industrially speaking, and the way in which that later work is 
framed.   
 
While, economically, the studios’ increasing involvement in indie-style filmmaking counts as 
part of a strategy of product differentiation, it is possible that another element was the manner 
in which the rise of the ‘high concept’ film326 in the 1980s, and the targeting of ever-younger 
(and less culturally-powerful, if more financially liquid) audiences gave rise to accusations of 
dumbing-down and the death of the art of cinema, whatever about separate debates relating 
to its profitability.  Even leaving aside the great question that is ‘what role does and should 
film play in modern culture?’ cinema in the 1980s became – as have, at various points, rock 
and rap music, television and computer games – a sociological site of contention in the light 
of the rise of the American right.  A change in focus towards more potentially adult-oriented 
films was not, I would argue, strictly a response to representation of the film industry as one 
of the central locations of the ‘moral panics’ of the period, but a consequence of a more 
internalised loss of confidence – within the system – in the idea of Hollywood as part of the 
culture industries, with the emphasis on culture.  
 
One element I view as particularly important in this study is the extent to which viewing 
Smart cinema as a trans-generic mode has highlighted the (previously, I believe, 
underexplored) way in which investigating generic concerns is vital in gaining an 
understanding how Smart cinema functions within the industry.  I believe a consideration of 
genre here works to explain how Smart cinema gradually moved towards the mainstream, in 
that for each of the films involved, embedding more challenging art-house or cult tendencies 
in ‘reassuring’ or classical generic contexts has worked to make them more accessible to the  
mainstream.  Through my exploration of the idea of ‘double coding’, I have explained how 
each film expresses its thematic and tonal considerations, and its textual strategies (which run 
the gamut from classical narrative structures to those which are designed to achieve a much 
more art-house effect) in a different way, but each does so by locating these in a framework 
of variable generic familiarity or accessibility.  Interpreting these films also tends to require a 
strong element of intellectual or cultural viewer investment, which constitutes a gatekeeping 
mechanism in itself; viewers who are not motivated to invest accordingly may, perhaps, 
experience a degree of alienation from the texts.  
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Some of the films I have examined produce experimental narrative, temporal or visual 
effects, or a combination of them (Pulp Fiction, Pi, Dark City, Malkovich, Fight Club, The 
Matrix, Adaptation, Memento, Magnolia, Primer, Huckabees, Eternal Sunshine, Brick).  
These intersect with those which deploy non-mainstream or highly contingent identificatory 
contexts for their characters – sometimes through the unreliability of a narrator,  through 
psychosis, or external forces which threaten psychosis (Donnie Darko, Memento, Pi, Dark 
City, The Matrix, Fight Club); at other times via the adoption of multiple – sometimes 
contradictory, and often ironicised – tonal perspectives towards them (the work of Wes 
Anderson, Election, Ghost World); or through authorial – again, often signalled as ironic – 
distancing from moral position-taking, (Happiness, Safe, Dollhouse).  In these cases the films 
can also be seen to produce appeals to mainstream audiences by virtue of their generic 
underpinnings.   
 
In contrast, the films where classical generic concerns dominate over narrative or visual play 
– in effect, the films positioned more squarely as mainstream works (particularly here 
American Beauty, Sideways, Boogie Nights, and Lost in Translation) – produce a sense of 
Smartness predominantly through their sociological or ideological preoccupations rather than 
stylistic ones, in that theme rather than form dominates.  The extent to which common themes 
present themselves indeed varies; however a preoccupation emerges with questions of 
personal identity, particularly identity lost or in crisis (Pi, Dark City, Malkovich, Fight Club, 
The Matrix, Adaptation, Memento, Magnolia, Donnie Darko Eternal Sunshine), and the 
negotiation of definitions of authenticity through personalised philosophy or creativity 
(Huckabees, Adaptation, the work of Wes Anderson).  For many of the films (American 
Beauty, Sideways, Magnolia, Happiness, Election, Safe, Huckabees, the work of Wes 
Anderson, Primer, Lost in Translation), this preoccupation with identity is strongly linked 
with a focus on white middle-class experience, something which places them within a context 
of high availability to bourgeois prestige mechanisms, something I conceive of as having a 
distinct effect on the way in which Smart moved towards occupying a more mainstream 
position.  
 
Many of these films use play with generic and diegetic conventions in order to deliberately 
complicate classical conceptions of genre, disrupt the sense of classical narrative equilibrium, 
and work against classical expectations of narrative resolution.  This can work to 
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‘defamiliarise’ a film’s structure, however the location of these textual strategies within a 
more accessible generic framework grounds most of the films in more mainstream contexts 
than certain of the textual strategies might suggest.  Again, the wide range of positions taken 
by individual films indicates that we are dealing not with a fixed set of formal, thematic and 
tonal characteristics, but with a set of (industrial and creative) position-taking decisions 
which exist along a continuum, from the more marginal art-house-inflected pieces to the 
much more mainstream-oriented works.  
     
Individually, therefore, each film takes a singular place along the continuum from 
‘alternative’ to ‘mainstream’, and mobilises quality- or prestige-based audience expectations 
via textual strategies (see Chapter Five) as well as paratextual or extra-textual references, 
most frequently to art-house or independent cinema, or in a generational sense through 
musical soundtrack.  Collectively my conclusion is that Smart films are characterised by the 
productive tension caused by this double coding across and between classical generic 
structures, art-house-leaning and independent-influenced textual strategies such as narrative 
and diegetic play, and a tonal register ranging from the observationally distanced to the 
dynamically ironic.  In the sense in which Smart cinema can be regarded as an industrial 
intervention through the process of product differentiation, therefore double-coding forms 
part of an embedded position-taking process which occurs at the level of writing and 
production, whereby these films are constructed to appeal to multiple audiences on the basis 
of both mainstream and marginal tendencies, as part of an industrial drive to cultivate and 
develop new products and new audiences.   
 
This process of colonisation was, however, not to continue, with the entertainment industry 
having to some extent retrenched following the global financial crash of 2008.  The decade 
saw a progressive closure of the studio semi-autonomous units, a development that gained 
speed towards its end, when during the period 2008-2011 the industry “witnessed the closure 
(or sale) of more than half of the studio specialty film divisions” (King, Molloy and 
Tzioumakis, 2013, 4; see Tzioumakis, 2013, 28-30, King, 2013, 42-44 or Schatz, 2013, 137-
138).  This was not necessarily due to the crisis itself; as King (2013, 41-52) argues, it is hard 
to assess whether the “particular signs of ‘crisis’ are related to specific factors – such as a 
particular economic downturn – or the broader pressures often felt by those operating in the 
more marginal parts of the industry” (King, 2013, 42).  Motivations for the closures 
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themselves are also subject to differing interpretations.  Schatz argues that as the decade wore 
on “the risk-averse conglomerates found it increasingly difficult to rationalize their indie 
operations” (Schatz, 2013, 137), implying that proportional returns might be the key to this 
retrenchment.   
 
On the other hand, Tzioumakis makes the point that the increasing convergence of operations 
(or what I might describe as the success of the industrial assimilatory process) is also a factor; 
citing MPAA figures indicating that by 2007 the average cost of producing/releasing through 
a specialty division had reached $74.9 million, just $30 million less than the same costs for 
the average studio film that year, he concludes that  
it comes as no surprise that the parent companies of the specialty film divisions 
started questioning the seeming evolution of their subsidiaries into studio-like 
organisations….In this respect it made little sense for the major entertainment 
conglomerates to maintain these divisions, as their main studio distributors could now 
handle the distribution process (Tzioumakis, 2013, 37-38)  
Regardless, few large autonomous units have been left standing.  Notably, Sony Pictures 
Classics remains, the one unit which most strongly resisted the drive to move from 
distribution into production.
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  James Schamus’s October 2013 exit from Focus Features and 
the relocation of the operation’s headquarters from New York to Los Angeles perhaps a 
symbolic ending to that particular era (see Stewart, 2013).  His description of “the successful 
integration of the independent film movement into the structures of global media and 
finance” (Schamus, 2001, 254) may indeed, it appears, have reached its logical conclusion.   
 
At the same time, it would be too simplistic to regard this as a simple narrative of economic 
failure and withdrawal; while King acknowledges that if there is a crisis, it is within the 
quasi-autonomous units, he points out that the relationships between those and their studio 
parents had never been “entirely stable or comfortable in some cases” (King, 2013, 44).  
Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that the narrativising of crisis tends itself to form part of the 
discursive framing of ‘independence’ in this part of the market, and as such the withdrawal of 
the studios from the sector has been represented as a highly favourable development in some 
quarters, in that it can be construed as a corporate withdrawal which presents ‘space’ from 
which (romanticised) ‘truly authentic’ work can emerge.  When ‘indie’ is framed as an 
oppositional concept in which emotional investments are made, then “within the prevailing 
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discourse, the indie sector almost needs to be seen as existing in a permanent state of crisis; 
that this is, in a sense, part of its definition. To be truly indie, in this view, is not to be too 
stable and secure” (ibid., 45).  
  
Of the independent studios, as Alisa Perren points out, “Lions Gate was the only major 
independent film company to survive the entire decade” (Perren, 2013, 108).  This 
achievement she ascribes as much to its ‘mini-major’-style diversification into television and 
digital media – and, crucially from my perspective, its move away from the Smart model, by 
producing niche or genre work “in marked contrast to…the remaining studio-based indie 
divisions, which tended to trade on discourses of distinction as a means of product 
differentiation” (ibid., 117) – as to healthy capitalisation.  Independent cinema itself arguably 
has the potential to become ‘ghettoised’ as a result of these developments: however, that is 
not to say that opportunities have simply been withdrawn as a result of the industrial 
retrenchment which has to a certain extent presented itself.  While the availability of 
production capital through quasi-autonomous units and independent studios may have 
become more limited, several writers (King, 2013; Tzioumakis, 2013) have emphasised the 
potential of crowdsourcing, digital production and distribution media, the continuing 
importance of the festival circuit, and above all the “partial self-distribution model” 
(Tzioumakis, 2013, 38).  Technological innovations aside, this would theoretically represent 
an overall independent production context much more akin to that from which Smart cinema 
emerged; that is, the production context of the late 1980s.  
 
However, we are not simply speaking here of the ‘closing off’ of options, but also of the 
consequences of the Smart mode’s rise to prominence.  The reduction of studio involvement 
is perhaps an indication that studio ambitions, which had decreased substantially by 2008, 
were always limited; to attracting and developing talent, and to infusing larger studio pictures 
with certain of the more widely accessible elements of Smart; the impression of quality, 
prestige, independence, and edginess created by the adoption of those textual strategies that 
had proven profitable in the grand laboratory of the Smart experiment of the 1990s.  While 
production and distribution contexts may have changed, if anything the textual (and in some 
cases generic) amendments prioritised within Smart texts have not disappeared but have 
passed into the mainstream, both through the assimilation of its progenitors into the industry, 
and through the adoption of aspects of Smart’s ‘means of address’ to audiences.  This is the 
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case both for studio films and for independent productions, and a few broad trends appear to 
be displayed over the ten-year period since the influence of Smart cinema began to spread.  
 
The first is for what might seem, industrially, the greatest departure: for action films 
(including action-adventure, superhero or graphic novel adaptations, action thrillers and 
science fiction, whether produced inside or outside the studio system) to display more self-
conscious temporal and narrative play, sometimes involving the unreliable, duplicitous or 
unpredictable narrator (often with a markedly problematised identity), and evincing a 
tendency towards a distinctly darker, more ‘philosophised’ or occasionally even politicised 
tone.  These films include but are not limited to Sin City (2005), V For Vendetta (2006) 
Children of Men (2006), Cloverfield (2008), Jumper (2008), Vantage Point (2008), The Dark 
Knight (2008), Gamer (2009), Shutter Island (2010) Kick-Ass (2010), Inception (2010), Scott 
Pilgrim vs. the World (2010), Limitless (2011), Source Code (2011), Hanna (2011), In Time 
(2011), and Drive (2011).  Here we also see a leaning towards more ambiguous or open-
ended resolution, even allowing for the industrial drive to sequelisation which tends to 
pervade the genre.  Indeed, Christopher Nolan’s Batman trilogy forms a particularly 
interesting example within this context, as discussed in Chapter Four: not only did Nolan 
oversee a financially successful franchise, but I believe his reputation as a Smart filmmaker 
allowed a certain recuperation of credibility for the superhero genre which had to a certain 
extent been lost.   
 
One of the most significant features of this set of solidly mainstream – aimed at mass and/or 
youth audiences – films is a tendency towards the visual spectacularisation of narrative 
complexity: that is, within industrial contexts which would historically have tended to eschew 
intricate narratives as limiting to mass-audience comprehension, complex and difficult 
narrative elements are being foregrounded as ‘evidence’ of stylistic innovation, and sold as 
markers of generic distinction.  Most prominent, and most financially successful, in this 
group is Inception, where narrative play, and most specifically temporal play, is set within a 
convoluted action diegesis. One could also note films outside of an action context, where we 
see similarities: Stranger Than Fiction (2006), The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (2008), 
500 Days of Summer (2009), The Time Traveller’s Wife (2009); again, this is a tendency that 
appears across a variety of genres.        
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The second trend is for a mobilisation of ‘Smart’ elements of blank style and, in a narrative 
sense, distanced perspective (particularly related to moral ambiguity) moving towards the 
mainstream, across a variety of genres, and with varying degrees of success.  The 
observational comedy style of crossover Little Miss Sunshine (2006) seems a world away 
from The Happening’s (2008) emotionally-flattened sci-fi, or the intense domestic drama of 
Blue Valentine (2010), but they are linked by this distancing technique, which privileges 
tonal considerations over narrative dynamics.  Others within this grouping (and again one 
should note their generic disparity, in addition to their origins outside as well as inside the 
studio system) include Brokeback Mountain (2005), No Country For Old Men (2007), There 
Will Be Blood (2007), Juno (2007), The Wrestler (2008), The Killer Inside Me (2010), 
Winter’s Bone (2010), Another Earth (2011), Take Shelter (2011), and Martha Marcy May 
Marlene (2011).   
 
Both of these trends are replicated to a certain extent in American television of the period, 
which has thus both normalised and domesticated some of the original ‘aesthetics of 
strangeness’ which Smart employed, absorbing them into the material fabric of daily media 
consumption.  This can be seen in the innocuous quirkiness of series such as Pushing Daisies 
(2007-2009), Scrubs (2001-2010), Joan of Arcadia (2003-2005), and others.  In a sense, 
however, the evolution of Smart has been a parallel process; Twin Peaks (ABC, 1990) was 
arguably as influential an ‘origin text’ for Smart cinema as any of David Lynch’s film work: 
the links between Smart cinema and television still remain underexplored, and I identify this 
as a further research opportunity of major significance.  
 
There are a host of different perspectives that can be taken on the industrial nature of a set of 
films as textually – and commercially – wide-ranging as those I am engaged with here.  To 
summarise, however, I believe the following points apply.  In terms of production, while 
investigating Smart cinema as a whole in terms of its industrial origins has been a worthwhile 
and productive task, to attempt to classify individual Smart films by distinguishing between 
them as more or less ‘authentic’, at some qualitative level, by virtue of their respective 
origins in independent production company, quasi-autonomous subsidiary, or major studio, is 
futile.  To do so fails to take into account the fact that even aside from production origins, 
engaging with the mainstream exhibition system – at the cinema or through home viewing – 
controlled by the major entertainment networks was the only real way, during the period in 
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question, to encounter Smart cinema.
328
  Indeed, to define a film in terms of its supposed 
‘moral distance’ from the mainstream exhibition process is the kind of binary thinking that 
reinforces textual and structural divisions between the mainstream and the fringes, which is 
not necessarily helpful in understanding how the texts themselves operate.   
 
A significant gap remains, when we discuss how these texts operate, in relation to the manner 
in which audiences approach and consume them.  My tentative conclusion is that audiences 
call upon a variety of self-positioning strategies not simply related to the appeals each film 
generates, but additionally depending on their own perspective.  While it is possible that 
audiences for Smart range from art-house fans and cultist novelty-seekers, to those who value 
discursively-sanctioned measurements of prestige, to the ‘hipsters’ often associated with this 
form, for whom distinction-maintenance through cultural consumption is a constitutive 
element of their identity, to almost ‘accidental’ encounters between texts and audiences for 
whom mainstream films constitute the bulk of their cinematic consumption, without 
significant further research it is simply too large a question with which to directly engage.   
 
As mentioned previously, I also believe the nature of prestige mechanisms and how they are 
constituted – and how prestige is mobilised by audiences – also warrants further research.  So 
too, does the role of studios as distributors rather than producers, in terms of their function as 
gatekeepers for particular styles and forms.  In addition, I believe there is an argument for 
considering the possibility that Smart cinema has introduced variations to pre-existing 
‘classical’ genres, producing formal and thematic amendments within several groups (in 
particular the teen film, neo-noir, and science fiction).  In this respect I believe that a 
thorough exploration of how these amendments have functioned might be of some 
significance to genre theory itself.  Finally, as throughout I emphasise that the notion of 
Smart cinema is at all points ringfenced by quasi-industrial discourse which privileges the 
exceptionalist mythology of auteurism (the discursive power of the myth of American 
independent cinema cannot, it seems, be disrupted by inconvenient industrial factors), and 
which is fed into by the studios, which utilise it to position their texts, I believe a great deal of 
research is needed into exploring how this process operates.   
 
In summary, my conclusion is that the major studios, as a result of their agglomerated drive 
to vertical and horizontal expansion, and whether through their production, distribution or 
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exhibition arms singly or in a more unified manner, attempted through Smart cinema to 
colonise newly-significant audiences identified as lying somewhere between cult and art-
house.  One significant way in which they did so was by figuring in a process of ‘double-
coding’ – at both production and positioning stages – which appealed on the basis of both 
mainstream and marginal tendencies, and whereby ‘classical’ generic framings were 
mystified and complicated.  All of this was made possible by the introduction of new (at 
home and in-cinema) technologies and industrial practices which facilitated targeting small 
but specific – previously disparate and difficult to locate – market segments.329  Double 
coding, here, works to do several things.  The first is to cultivate potentially mainstream-
resistant audiences, by positioning the texts as distanced from the industrial circumstances 
which produced them.  The second is to ground these in a fundamental framework of generic 
commonality which may more easily render them accessible to audiences not familiar with 
alternative film forms, and from which they can generate a sense of intellectual investment 
through experiencing them as novelty.  The third is to accrue cultural capital for the studios 
who produce the films by emphasising traits perceived as non-mainstream; that is, to produce 
cultural capital, as distinct from financial reward, which clearly they also seek.  
 
While certain textual similarities do emerge, the tendency of Smart to shy away from the 
extremes (textually and in audience terms) adopted by cult film tend towards framing Smart 
more as a parallel form: one which calls upon audiences to view themselves as consumers of 
a less-than-mainstream form, but which by remaining generically fundamentally accessible, 
does not call attention to textual or industrial characteristics which contradict this mode of 
viewing.  Where individual texts contain thematic, stylistic or structural elements which can 
be positioned at, and interpreted along, a variety of loci on the continuum from mainstream to 
independent, the discourses of auteurism and prestige form a framing mechanism which 
obscures their sometimes contradictory industrial underpinnings.  This allows the texts to be 
positioned according to territory, marketing channel, prevailing discursive trends and related 
industrial demands.  All of this was made possible by the introduction of new (at home and 
in-cinema) technologies and industrial practices which facilitated targeting small but specific 
– previously disparate and difficult to locate – market segments. 
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Chapter One 
 
1
 The term did not gain popular traction during the 1990s, and where it continues to be used in more popular 
contemporary contexts, such as press accounts, the term’s looseness is apparent.  At the same time, a nearly two 
decades on it still  appears in ways which reflect or parallel the academic usage: as a marker of critical 
approbation for specific types of film, particularly those which engage in cross-generic play (Edwards, 2011; 
Solomons, 2011; Puig, 2012), hinge on crises of personal identity (Solomons, 2008), or are seen as controversial 
or transgressive in some way (O’Hagan, 2010); as a descriptive term which serves to position the work of 
specific filmmakers within a context of prestige (Malcolm, 2009; Puig, 2009; Kermode, 2012); and as an 
antithetical framing device, an idealised benchmark against which ‘Hollywood’ film is measured and, it is 
implied, found wanting (Dargis, 2012; Muir, 2012). 
 
2
 Not all accounts neglect genre: King explores it in his 2009 analysis of the treatment of Steven Soderbergh’s 
Solaris and Traffic (King, 2009, 141-189), following from his earlier statement that while “familiar genre 
location is sometimes abandoned, complicated or undermined in the independent sector, it also forms an 
important point of orientation in many cases.” (King, 2005, 166) 
 
3
 As an example, see the enthusiastically millennial zeal which attends this Entertainment Weekly cover story, 
published just before 1999’s end: “Someday, 1999 will be etched on a microchip as the first real year of 21st-
century filmmaking. The year when all the old, boring rules about cinema started to crumble.” (Gordinier, 1999)  
 
4
 Schatz’s listing of the top-performing box office hits to the end of 2006 conveys something of this sense of 
inter-relationship of genre and industrial ‘type’, as well as the globalised nature of the industry: “[a]s of October 
2006, 47 of the top 50 all-time worldwide box-office hits had been released after 1990 (all but E.T. and the first 
two Star Wars films), and 90 of the top 100. The majority of these were franchise films, with the Star Wars, 
Lord of the Rings, and Harry Potter series accounting for 10 of the top 20 all-time global hits. Moreover, the 
vast majority of these top hits, including 33 of the top 35, earned far more overseas than in the US.” (Schatz, 
2008, 29)  
 
5
 Or at least that which can reliably be contested as such – one can discuss whether the Paramount decrees 
constitute the end of the ancien regime, or WWII, but I am locating the birth of the New Hollywood at the end 
of the 1960s and the coming of the ‘Movie Brats’.  
 
6
 A few examples include James Schamus, David Linde, Ted Hope and Anne Carey, all Good Machine 
executives who went on to make significant contributions to the general independent and quasi-indie field.  
Others include: Stephanie Azpiazu and Anthony Bregman (formerly also of This is That) who co-founded 
Likely Story films, the producers of Synecdoche New York, Charlie Kaufman’s 2008 directorial debut; Glen 
Basner (formerly also head of sales for The Weinstein Company and Focus Features) founder of FilmNation, 
working with filmmakers including Sofia Coppola and Steven Soderbergh; Ross Katz, who produced Lost in 
Translation (2003) and Marie Antoinette (2006) for Sofia Coppola; and Mary Jane Skalski, producer of The 
Station Agent (2003) and The Visitor (2007). 
 
7
 This rolling text, which has something of the character of a public service announcement noticeably 
foregrounds Miramax as a brand in itself. 
 
8
 As Susan Hayward defines art cinema, “narrative codes and conventions are disturbed, the narrative line is 
fragmented so that there is no seamless cause-and-effect storyline.  Similarly, characters’ behaviour appears 
contingent, hesitant rather than assured and ‘in-the-know’ or motivated towards certain ambitions, desires or 
goals. Although these films are character-rather than plot-led, there are no heroes – in fact this absence of heroes 
is an important feature of art cinema. Psychological realism takes the form of a character’s subjective view of 
events; social realism is represented by the character in relation to those events. The point of view can take the 
form of an interior monologue, or even several internal monologues...Subjectivity is often made uncertain...and 
so too the safe construction of time and space. This cinema, in its rupture with classic narrative cinema, 
intentionally distances spectators to create a reflective space for them to assume their own critical space or 
subjectivity in relation to the screen or film.” (Hayward, 2006, 28) While clearly Smart cinema shares certain 
elements with art cinema, it cannot be defined as art cinema due to its industrial underpinnings which remain 
focused on more mainstream objectives than would usually be the case.  
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Chapter Two 
 
9
 Stam also sees a danger in of rooting them too strongly in Hollywood traditions (for example, omitting 
Bollywood in considerations of ‘the musical’). 
 
10
 I also note Brown’s contention in discussing the ‘family film’ that a disconnection exists “between scholarly 
and popular discourses on film genre, in which numerous generic forms widely recognised by producers, 
exhibitors, trade writers and fans remained wholly unrecognised by formalist genre theorists.” (Brown, 2013, 
22) a position that illustrates, perhaps, a gap between audiences’ experience of genre and critics’ theoretical 
framing of it. 
 
11
 Sconce categorises the films (loosely) as follows: “arch emotional nihilism” [Storytelling (Todd Solondz, 
2001), Happiness (Solondz, 1998)and Welcome to the Dollhouse (Solondz, 1995), Your Friends and Neighbors 
and In the Company of Men (Neil LaBute, 1997)]; “‘blank’ political satires” [Election (Alexander Payne, 1999) 
and Citizen Ruth(Payne, 1996)]; “postmodern screwball comedies” [Hal Hartley's The Unbelievable Truth 
(1990), Trust (1991) and Henry Fool (1998); “post-Pulp Fiction black comedies of violence” [Very Bad Things 
(Peter Berg, 1998), Go (Doug Liman, 1999) and 2 Days in the Valley (John Herzfeld, 1996)]; “bittersweet” 
[Wes Anderson’s Bottle Rocket (1994), Rushmore (1998) and The Royal Tenenbaums (2001)], “operatic odes to 
the San Fernando valley” [PT Anderson's Magnolia (1998) and Boogie Nights (1997); “‘cold’ melodramas” 
[The Ice Storm (Ang Lee, 1997), The Sweet Hereafter (Atom Egoyan, Canada, 1997) and Safe (Todd Haynes, 
1995)]; “‘matter-of-fact’ surrealism [Being John Malkovich (Spike Jonze, 1999) and Donnie Darko (Richard 
Kelly, 2001).]  
 
12
 Sconce does not engage in specific considerations of postmodernism, but explorations of postmodern theory 
may indeed have value in unpacking Smart cinema, whether looking at the circumstances in which a pop 
culture-immersed audience interprets these ‘game-playing’ texts, deconstructing the significance of specific 
recurring themes, or examining the visually and structurally rich worlds these films create. Rather than 
describing postmodern texts as inclined to be self-referential, to “have a methodological self-consciousness…[a] 
tendency to scrutinize its own instruments.” (Stam, 2000, 151), Sconce relates these tendencies to the influence 
of art film, particularly in regards to narrative causality and the increasing use of multiple protagonists and 
episodic structure, noting that “unrealistic coincidences have morphed into the new realism of synchronicity, an 
overarching belief in the fundamentally random and yet strangely meaningful structure of reality (even if that 
‘meaning’ is total absurdity).” (Sconce, 2002, 363) 
 
13
 For Sconce, Smart’s shift in emphasis from a single protagonist to a loosely-connected ensemble cast, with 
exposition withheld to a level at which we see only a limited picture of each, triggers the presence of 
synchronicity as a causal agent: he suggests that the contemporary smart cinema protagonist has become “even 
more listless than his or her European forebears.  More acted upon than acting, these contemporary protagonists 
are often prisoners of emotional abuse, sterile environments, or just fate itself” (363-364). It is possible that the 
strong presence of ideas of synchronicity and fate in Smart film relates to a (perhaps postmodern?) morphing of 
religious/spiritual discourse, with concerns related to an ill-defined ‘fate’ replacing traditional fears structured 
around heaven and hell, and synchronicity replacing the ‘God’ figure of classical narrative (perhaps with the 
exception of Fight Club, a film with more explicitly theological references).  The search for a clearly-formed 
personal identity in an apparently ideologically-unanchored world dominated by what Sconce describes as “the 
logic of the random” (ibid., 364) here forms the material for a spiritual quest. 
 
14
 Casually stereotyped, for Sconce, as a postmodern, relativist generation of ‘slackers’, habituated to ironic 
position-taking rather than possessed of their own ideals, focused on the camp appropriation of existing pop 
icons in place of creating an innovative culture of their own, and politically inclined to mocking cynicism 
towards authority rather than direct action. 
 
15
 Sconce’s quote neatly summarises the political ‘problem’ such cinema poses: “From the perspective of 
traditional leftist politics, smart cinema seems to advocate irresponsible resignation to the horrors of life under 
advanced capitalism and an attendant disregard for the traditional villains of racism, sexism and class division. 
For the Right, these films seem to advance an irresponsible world view where truth and morality are no longer 
of concern.” Sconce, 2002, 368).  Not simply apolitical, the Smart generation supposedly conducts its political 
protests in the terrain of consumer behaviour rather than via traditional party politics.  In this sense, they appear 
to function as ‘experts in semiotic distinction’, who feel more free to exercise their identity via the free market 
255 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
than they do as constrained ‘citizens’. This is why Sconce can make the assertion that “irony…is not a passive 
retreat from politics but a semiotic intervention within politics. ......Irony [is not] a disengagement from belief, 
politics and commitment, rather, it is a strategic disengagement from a certain terrain of belief, politics and 
commitment.” (ibid., 369)  
 
16
 For Sconce these films are a kind of social litmus paper, subtly revealing important preoccupations of 
American culture of the period; as he argues, “[e]ngaging this smart sensibility in recent American cinema thus 
requires attention to both the sociocultural formation informing the circulation of these films (a ‘smart’ set) and 
a shared set of stylistic and thematic practices (a ‘smart’ aesthetic)” (ibid., 352).   
 
17
 Tzioumakis (2011b, 327) notes that “some of the terminology she uses is open to criticism (calling, for 
instance, New Line Cinema both a ‘mini-major’ and a ‘major independent’ [Holmlund 2005b, 6])”; given the 
fluidity of debate on the topic at this point, a certain degree of ambiguity or confusion is understandable. 
 
18
 For example, he erroneously states that independent cinema has only been discussed tangentially “as an aside 
or a footnote to a bigger picture” (Berra, 2008, 11) and his assertion that “the term has only gained cultural 
significance in the 1990s” (ibid.) is quite tendentious, although his qualification that “now the term carries with 
it a cultural, as well as economic significance.” (ibid. 11-12) may have some merit, in terms of the form’s reach 
into popular culture.  Similarly, he conducts some useful audience research including case studies of 
independent filmgoers, but does not provide detailed information on sample size or other empirical data.  
 
19
 For Berra, certain filmmakers (John Sayles, Abel Ferrara, Jim Jarmusch, Spike Lee) he sees as adhering to the 
independent “rhetoric” (ibid., 94), while others (Soderbergh, Bryan Singer, Doug Liman, David O. Russell) he 
conceives of as “independent graduates” (ibid., 109) of the “finishing school” (ibid.) of independent film. 
 
20
 Berra produces a theoretical definition of the ‘cinephile audience’ but problematically this is not backed up 
with detailed references, although he states that he conducted primary research at art-house cinemas over a 
period of eighteen months. He distinguishes a set of cinephile groups as follows: students and graduates; single 
young professionals; professionals without children and with disposable income; “serious-minded filmgoers” 
(ibid., 181) who consciously seek socially or intellectually provocative material; filmgoers with an appetite for 
new films and filmmakers; and filmgoers who routinely see multiple films each month (ibid.).  He characterises 
younger cinephiles as demanding audiences searching for novelty, “with a need to be surprised, challenged, 
stimulated, and even shocked, as well as entertained.” (ibid, 183) and older ones as “jaded with the conventions 
of the Hollywood mainstream…The cinephile audience is not obsessed with the avant-garde, but it is seeking 
the ‘independent spirit’” (ibid.) Additionally he sketches a sort of ‘ideal’ viewer, possessing or seeking “(1) 
Cultural hopefulness. (2) Narrative enthusiasm. (3) Individual assertiveness. (4) Urban life expectation.” (ibid., 
195), however these assertions are not rooted in verifiable empirical detail. 
 
21
 As he argues, ‘indie’ work might be regarded as being situated “somewhere between the poles of Indiewood 
and the more radical end of the art-cinema spectrum.” (King, 2009, 273); he acknowledges Indiewood has 
drawn criticism for theoretically drawing financing and audiences away from more strictly independent 
production, he argues that “[i]t is questionable how far the development of Indiewood has reduced the number 
of genuinely radical or disturbing independent productions that achieve distribution, given how limited their 
numbers have always been in any kind of significant commercial release.” (ibid.) 
 
22
 King notes the importance of conceptions of auteurism, not just in relation to Kaufman, whose increased 
public profile over the period marked “the consolidation of a reputation for the creation of a particular kind of 
fictional universe offering distinctive pleasures.” (ibid., 84) but also Soderbergh. Here King argues that 
investment in the idea of the director as auteur is mobilized across the mainstream/Indiewood/indie spectrum in 
different ways, and that auteurism forms part of “the frame through which Indiewood features of this variety are 
mediated to the potential viewers (ibid., 179).  However, while he acknowledges that that the figure of the 
auteur plays an important role in many Indiewood examples, both in developing and selling projects, it does not 
always arise, and often presents “in combination with other major points of orientation.” (ibid., 248) 
 
23
 At the other end of that scale, a film like Shakespeare in Love fits into particular ‘quality’ parameters, 
including a mix of appeals including broad comedy and light satire, yet contains a certain requirement for 
‘cultural competence’ through which to interpret it, offering viewers “numerous ways to mark their cultural 
competence, beyond what is signified by their initial choice of such a film against others” (ibid., 98). 
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24
 Interestingly, King argues that the acclaim given to American Beauty by audiences and critics alike may have 
related to a sense in which they “shared something of the central value-structure embodied in the film; and that 
it could act as a vehicle for their own assertions of opposition to its vision of shallow suburban materialism and 
their openness to the more positive values the film propounds.” (ibid., 208), something he argues links to the 
commodification of  countercultural values. This leaves American Beauty in a somewhat compromised 
ideological position, where “[f]ilms of this variety are designed, if only implicitly, to flatter more than to 
challenge the existing assumptions of their target (and, potentially, wider) audiences, a process that functions 
through a combination of thematic emphasis and aesthetic qualities” (ibid., 209). 
 
25
 This degree of recognition is linked in a complex way with Kaufman’s tendency to distance himself from the 
industry, whereby his “disavowal…of the notion of ‘product’ to be packaged and sold is itself, however 
genuinely meant, functional to the selling of particular varieties of product” (ibid. 57) and therefore 
demonstrates “the kind of tension and explicit negotiation that exists between the ‘creative’ and ‘commercial’ 
processes involved in production in the Indiewood sector.” (ibid., 73) 
 
26
 King’s speculation that this constitutes a defensive reaction against the potential pigeon-holing of critics, in 
light of the early-career significance of Soderbergh’s sex, lies and videotape, is of particular interest: this 
strategy would provide him “licence to range more freely across the indie/Hollywood divide, even if certain 
stylistic traits can be identified in works located at very different points in the cinematic spectrum.” (ibid., 178) 
 
27
 In his case study of thirty-four films released in the first four years (2002-2005) of Focus Features’ somewhat 
‘middle-market’ operation, King asserts that part of the dynamic was “the articulation of what sets out to be a 
distinctive brand image for the division” (ibid., 235).  Taking from key staff statements and promotional 
materials, he notes that “an attempt is made to identify a position somewhere between Hollywood and the 
farther reaches of independence: something ‘specific’ that involves ‘original, compelling cinema’ (read: not 
generally the same as Hollywood), but that can also reach ‘mainstream’ or ‘pretty substantial’ audiences (in 
other words, not too far away).” (ibid., 241) Therefore, Focus articulates its desire to be framed as producing 
work of distinctive and artistic quality, in which auteurs are accorded “privileged space” (ibid., 255).  At the 
same time, he notes that indie subsidiaries are  
very clearly part of a broader capitalist media and wider commercial enterprise……[designed] to 
maximize the extent to which a larger film industry unit is able to exploit a particular range of 
relatively or potentially substantial niche markets…those which carry the potential to break through to 
relatively larger audiences (ibid., 263). 
 
28
 Perren’s analysis of the marketing for the film (Perren, 2012, 33-36) illustrates how it targeted traditional art 
house audiences (exploiting the film’s status as a festival award winner), and wider Gen X/boomer audiences, 
through positive press quotes from high-profile publications, reinforcing both quality and genre; therefore as 
well as emphasising the film’s sexual content, it “was differentiated as being more serious than its summer 
blockbuster counterparts even as it was drawn closer to studio product by its association with comedy.” (ibid., 
34). 
 
29
 For Perren, the success of The Crying Game (Neil Jordan, 1992) – a film she regards as under-explored purely 
because it complicates the narrative of Miramax and American cinema – made Miramax an obvious target for 
Disney, “providing the conglomerate with heightened prestige and adult-oriented material at a relatively low 
cost. For the most part, Miramax product complemented, rather than competed with, the films generated by 
Disney’s other divisions.” (ibid., 71). Additionally, she regards it as important “not only for the impact the deal 
had on its primary participants, but also because of the extent to which it motivated a high degree of 
introspection on the part of the industry and its observers.” (ibid., 73) 
30
 In this sense, for her the 1999 Academy Awards (dominated by Miramax films Shakespeare in Love and Life 
is Beautiful) functioned as a simultaneous high and low point for the company. As she puts it, Miramax had 
become dominant as a niche operator in an industry increasingly populated by well-capitalized indie divisions, 
where it had “cultivated a clear brand identity that remained distinct from its parent company. It had altered the 
way that low-budget films were acquired, produced, distributed and marketed.” (ibid., 178): however, its awards 
also “had the unintended effect of drawing initial scrutiny to the company and its marketing practices…it was 
being depicted with growing frequency as a belligerent brute that used money, relationships, and fear tactics to 
dominate the marketplace.” (ibid.) 
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31
 She cites a November 1996 Variety study, commissioned by the studios, which confirmed that “the least and 
most expensive films to make were the ones that typically earned the most.” (ibid., 157) meaning that mid-range 
films “were increasingly viewed as ‘pariahs’.”(ibid.) 
32
 This strategic adoption of an ‘outsider’ position is of course not confined to film or indeed cultural 
production, as can be seen, for example in the explicit positioning of Apple Computers as producing computers 
for ‘free-thinking’ individualists during the 1980s, something Heath and Potter describe as an almost perfect 
instance of “the rebel sell” (Heath and Potter, 2004, 230). 
33
 As she states convincingly, given the depth of her research, “What is particularly notable is the extent to 
which the increasing incorporation of specialty distributors under studio supervision heightened – rather than 
diminished – the attention given to the rise of independents. In fact, not until the major studios entered into the 
low-budget film business did many articles about the rise of independents appear in the mainstream press.” 
(ibid., 75) 
 
34
 Perren argues that this strongly masculinist and genre-based ‘cinema of cool’ marginalised filmmakers like 
Jane Campion, Nicole Holofcener, and Allison Anders, and limited their access to funding and related publicity, 
contributing to “the increased marginalization of films that proved more challenging for specialty divisions to 
market.” (ibid., 80) 
 
35
 As she notes, Miramax didn’t necessarily handle controversial material, and indeed its international imports 
were becoming increasingly safe and reassuring, but it had “built up its profile by exploiting controversial 
content and by creating artificial controversies through its marketing practices…….The number of times the 
company engaged in battles over content was far eclipsed by the number of times that films were sold as being 
controversial.” (ibid., 124-125) 
 
36
 Similarly, and in a way that relates to some of my own contentions about the place of genre within Smart film, 
she argues that Miramax’s move into genre pictures with Dimension films, and the press’s reaction to them, 
“exposed a great deal about cultural hierarchies, critical distinctions, and assumptions operating about the media 
sphere during this time.” (ibid., 115). To maintain distinctive brand identities for both labels, Harvey Weinstein 
repeatedly evoked a ‘Robin Hood myth, in which Dimension’s ‘disreputable’ genre profits were seen as funding 
Miramax’s more ‘alternative’ activities; however in reality, “Miramax had never been heavily invested in 
producing and distributing ‘art cinema’…Miramax was rewriting its own history, erasing the presence of Disney 
money and downplaying the substantial sums generated by [its hits].” (ibid., 136)  Crucially, Perren relates this 
to a wider cultural and media uncertainty about genre, suggesting that the divergent nature of discourses around 
Miramax and Dimension indicate that “critics and scholars have remained unsure of how to categorize genre 
films, and thus (if discussing them at all) have placed them in a separate box – one that is almost always 
perceived to contain inferior product to that found in the Miramax/specialty film box.” (ibid., 142) 
 
37
 She particularly asserts this in relation to underperforming studio films like Go, Election, and Rushmore, 
stating that they would have been better-served by more specialist subsidiary positioning. (ibid., 220)  
 
38
 Indeed she argues that the extent to which “‘Independent’ became a blanket term for many writers.” (ibid., 
153) in a discursive sense, effectively obscured these shifts.  
 
39
 For Perren a certain degree of fluidity did indeed exist, and it was “largely due to the existence of this grey 
area that the use of the term ‘independence’ continued to be so imprecise and contradictory at this time.” (ibid., 
160)  This she also relates to the increasing fragmentation of international film financing, in which the 
increasing divergence of sources of funding meant that “the web of institutional allegiances of any given movie 
became even more complex.” (ibid.) 
40
 “In total, well over fifty such films were released from May to August.” (ibid., 219) 
 
41
 She argues that the Sundance festival also became a key factor in solidifying the quasi-independent model; 
those “lacking name talent, edgy content, an identifiable marketing angle, or explicit links to Hollywood 
narrative and generic conventions experienced the same fate that met most independently distributed features 
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throughout history: marginalization.” (ibid., 150) as studios trying to create brand identities in a crowded market 
increasingly pursued a single demographic, that of the urban professional. 
42
 In what she describes as a post-2008 decline, she cites global economic crisis, the decline in DVD sell-
through and failure to monetise online replacements, a greater focus in cable TV on original production, and the 
availability of more non-film media consumption opportunities, but fundamentally argues that “the business 
model for specialty divisions grew increasingly untenable.  Too many companies spent too much money 
acquiring and producing too many films for which there was not a large enough market.” (ibid. 231)  
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
43
 “Where at one stage conglomeration resulted in the studios becoming part of corporations with wide and 
diverse portfolios of operations, from the 1980s onwards the Hollywood studios came under the ownership of 
parent companies more squarely focused on media and communications.” (McDonald and Wasko, 2008, 4) 
 
44
 This can be seen, for example, in the article “Box office heading toward record despite economy” (Richwine, 
2011) wherein the contradictory nature of Hollywood’s 2011 position is visible: a revealing segment reads  
[s]ummer ticket sales in the domestic (U.S. and Canadian) market through last weekend stood at an 
estimated $3.8 billion. Attendance was up 2.8 percent, though that was compared with last year's 13-
year low, according to figures from tracking firm Hollywood.com. Premium charges for 3D films and 
slightly higher average ticket prices helped raise revenue. ‘If we keep at this pace, we should wind up 
with $4.5 billion,’ the highest summer total ever, said Paul Dergarabedian, box office analyst with 
Hollywood.com.”  
 
45
 See for example industry commentary from March 2013 describing the “slumping 2013 box office…2013 is 
going to take a beating in the year-over-year comparison and it is already $100 million behind last year’s pace.” 
(Strowbridge, 2013) 
 
46
 In the 1930s, “[n]o one studio had the capacity to produce a year’s supply of pictures……Because these 
theatres required as many as three hundred pictures a year, the majors needed supplemental products, 
particularly inexpensive class-B pictures to fill the bottom half of the double bill.” (Balio, 1995, 7-8) – a 
situation analogous to the manner in which the contemporary studio system seeks out additional resources from 
beyond its own direct reaches to add variety to its schedules. 
 
47
 Drake (2008, 67) is particularly interesting on how film marketing changed as the market became more 
youthful: faced with competing leisure activities including television, studios had to market more intensively 
(including on television), thus raising costs even as more ‘reach’ was gained.  This locates the upswing in 
production and marketing costs earlier than some other writers place it. 
 
48
 As regards some of the more influential or pertinent films of the period, the studios’ respective slates unfolded 
as follows – Paramount: Rosemary’s Baby, Love Story, The Godfather; Columbia: Easy Rider, Five Easy Pieces, 
The Last Picture Show; Warner Brothers: Bonnie and Clyde, Bullitt, The Wild Bunch, Woodstock, A Clockwork 
Orange, Dirty Harry, McCabe and Mrs. Miller, Klute, Deliverance, Mean Streets, Badlands, The Exorcist 
(Schatz, 2008, 18). 
 
49
 He identifies among these Dances With Wolves, Schindler’s List, Braveheart, The English Patient, Titanic, 
Saving Private Ryan, The Thin Red Line, and Gladiator – which I would regard as a somewhat conservative list 
– it is important to remember that Hall’s focus is more on the ‘blockbuster’ than on the ‘prestige’ aspect of the 
industry. 
 
50
 He notes that for many of the new conglomerates (e.g. AOL Time Warner, Viacom, NewsCorp, Disney) by 
the end of 1999 “filmed entertainment became one of many profit centres and today contributes around a third 
of the total proceeds of its respective parent companies.” (Balio, 2002, 165). One might also point to MCA head 
Lew Wasserman’s disastrous sale of Universal to Japanese electronics manufacturer Matsushita, who 
subsequently themselves sold an 80% stake to Edgar Bronfman Jr., head of distilling giant Seagram (his family 
business); on Seagram being sold to French water utility and media company Vivendi, Vivendi Universal was 
created – it was then sold then to General Electric, also owner of NBC. The current incarnation, NBC Universal, 
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is part-owned by General Electric and part-owned by telecoms giant Comcast, and can only be described as a 
‘super-conglomerate’. It owns Focus Features, formed from the 2002 merger of USA Films (itself a 1999 union 
of October Films, Rogue, and Gramercy Pictures), Universal Focus, and Good Machine; the tiny comparative 
scale of a division like Focus Features must be taken into account.  
 
51
  “The majors released close to thirty features a year at the start of the 1990s and about half that on average at 
the end. (Subsidiaries such as Miramax and New Line released a comparable number of low-budget films each 
year.) (Balio, 1998, 165) 
 
52
 Douglas Gomery argues convincingly that insufficient attention is paid to the analysis of ownership, control, 
and operation of studios, compared to that which is lavished on film directors; in an interesting example from 
this period, he asserts that what some call the “collapse” of the Hollywood studio system, he regards as its 
reinvention. (Gomery, 2005) 
 
53
 Or as Eileen Meehan’s work in relation to television, relevant nonetheless, puts it, the Reagan 
administration’s work was simply the start of a process (continuing to today) whereby 
neoconservative deregulation has facilitated a radical reorganization of media industries and 
operations…Undergirding that reorganization has been the FCC’s dismantling of regulations designed 
to keep television a separate industry and the Department of Justice’s gutting of antitrust legislation, 
including the Paramount decree…Deregulation has also fostered vertical and horizontal integration 
within each industrially based operation such that media conglomerates may own multiple studios or 
networks. (Meehan, 2008, 108)  
 
54
 Drake cites a Merrill Lynch report indicating that “Box-office takings currently account for less than a quarter 
of total revenues and have become increasingly ‘front-loaded’, earning the majority of receipts in the opening 
two weeks of exhibition…by the early 2000s as much as 50 percent of theatrical box office was generated in the 
first week of release, compared to only around 20 percent in 1990” (Drake, 2008, 64). 
 
55
 “Two factors boosted the foreign box office: better cinemas and more effective marketing. Outside the US, 
nearly every market was under-screened. Western Europe, for example, had about one-third the number of 
screens per capita as the United States, despite having the same population.” (Balio, 1998, 60) 
 
56
 As Drake points out, this is a process that has been in train since the changes wrought during the 1970s: 
“These factors also brought changes in film distribution, with a national saturation release replacing the road-
shows that once toured films across the US slowly building audiences. ‘Platform releasing’, running a film in a 
few key cities before gradually widening the release to provincial areas, is still used for films which primarily 
recruit audiences through word of mouth, or art-house films with a limited P&A spend” (Drake, 2008, 67). 
 
57
 Miramax has been discussed elsewhere, but New Line has often not been afforded the same level of attention, 
perhaps due to its lack of attractively controversial Weinsteins: “In 1990 New Line branched out from its 
traditional slate of inexpensive niche films and created a division called Fine Line Features to produce and 
distribute art films and offbeat fare. Within two years, Fine Line rose to the top independent ranks by backing 
such American ventures as Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho (1991), James Foley’s Glengarry Glen Ross 
(1992) and (66) Robert Altman’s The Player (1992) and by releasing such English-language imports as Derek 
Jarman’s Edward II (1991) and Mike Leigh’s Naked (1993).  Acquiring New Line Cinema and Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Turner Broadcasting manoeuvred itself into the front ranks of Hollywood and positioned itself 
for global expansion.” (ibid., 66-67) 
 
58
 As Holt sees it, “in 1987 there were accusations that independent producers stood less than a 50 percent 
chance of having their films distributed to neighbourhood theatres, and 11 of Hollywood’s largest distributors 
were taking in 96 percent of the domestic box-office revenues.  This produced what Variety called ‘a 
stranglehold on the market’ when compared to the 20-25 percent market share that the independents had held 
just 15 years earlier.” (Holt, 2001, 28) 
 
59
 Holt speculates that “[t]he growing reliance on blockbuster filmmaking initially made the business 
significantly more unstable...The well-documented Heaven’s Gate fiasco that nearly destroyed United Artists in 
1981 was an ominous example of the enormous risks associated with this mode of production and the increasing 
volatility of Hollywood’s infrastructure during this period.” (Holt, 2001, 23) 
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60
 King (2005) points to the American stock market crash of 1987, which I believe may have some relevance, as 
it “brought an abrupt end to the easy availability of capital, making money harder to raise and usually on stricter 
terms.” (King, 2005, 24) 
 
61
 “Considering all films receiving MPAA ratings, independent films increased from 193 in 1986 to 277 in 1987 
and to 393 in 1988. The figures for 1989 through 1991 also remained close to the 400 mark.” (Wyatt, 1998, 74) 
 
62
 Wyatt cites Vestron, which doubled production after Dirty Dancing grossed $63m domestically in 1987, 
Cinecom, which acted similarly after A Room With A View (1986), and Skouras, after My Life As a Dog (1987). 
63
 Unless stated otherwise, figures throughout are triangulated from a number of sources, including www.the-
numbers.com, www.boxofficemojo.com, and trade publications such as Variety and Screen Daily.  
 
64
 Wyatt argues that New Line “has continually favoured gradual expansion and diversification only following 
breakthrough successes [whereas] Miramax’s presence is based much more on marketing and targeting 
audiences beyond a narrow art house niche.” (Wyatt, 1998, 76)  Perren (2012) provides a thorough 
contextualisation of Miramax’s activities; Betz’s 2003 account of the marketing in America of European art 
cinema in the 1950s and 1960s, interestingly, is strongly reminiscent of the tactics of the Weinsteins.  
 
65
 See Wyatt, 1999, for a more thorough consideration.  
 
66
 In particular his complaint is that “America’s youth transferred its allegiance to the ‘personal’ cinema of the 
seventies’ auteurs without realizing how corporatist and impersonal it had become.” (Cook, 1999, 35) 
 
67
 Although Quentin Tarantino, with his (heavily-embroidered) slacker history effectively counts as the poster-
child for this cultural tendency, it can also be seen early on in the promotion of the likes of Robert Rodriguez.  
While not a Smart film, his El Mariachi (1992) is relevant in illustrating the positioning strategies employed by 
the studios; promoted internationally as an ‘American Dream’ tale of the infiltration of the corporatized studio 
system by a $7,000 wildcard, Columbia Pictures’ investment in the film was perhaps hundreds of times greater. 
Rodriguez’ deal to complete and cover distribution and exhibition “amounted to hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, taking it closer to the conventional definition of a ‘microbudget’ film, meaning anything under $2 
million.” (Grainge, Jancovich and Monteith, 2007,  509) Of course, studios have often constructed or 
emphasised ‘origin myths’ in the promotion and positioning of their work; a clue to the extent to which the 
treatment of El Mariachi reveals a wider cultural preoccupation at the time can be seen, for example, in Chuck 
Kleinhans’ description of the prominence given in bookshops to Rodriguez’s book “Rebel Without a Crew: 
How a Twenty-three-year-old Filmmaker with $7,000 Became a Hollywood Player” (Rodriguez, 1996) 
(Kleinhans, 1999, 308). 
 
68
 For example, David Cronenberg had long been associated with the genre which tends to most distinctly evade 
considerations of prestige, that is, horror; however, 1999’s eXistenZ and Spider (2002) must be considered 
potential candidates for ‘Smartness.’  Both have to be considered in light of Cronenberg’s unexpected 
anointment as establishment figure via A History of Violence (2005).  One could argue that the unexpected and 
temporary elevation of character actor Viggo Mortensen to screen idol status via the Lord Of The Rings trilogy 
(Peter Jackson, 2001-2003) may also have been a factor in Cronenberg’s revival. Similarly, the Coen brothers, 
whose idiosyncratically ironic folk storytelling had been critically well regarded, but reaped at best modest 
rewards at the box office, found themselves ideally positioned in 1997 with Fargo to capitalise on the 
apparently increasing palatability of ‘eccentric’ work to both mainstream audiences and the academy, and 
positioned the filmmakers squarely within the Hollywood mainstream in a manner that must have seemed quite 
unlikely even a few years previously. The mischievous The Big Lebowski (1998) became a cult favourite, and 
while several of the Coens’ subsequent films can be regarded as failed experiments (in particular a 2004 remake 
of Alec Guinness classic The Ladykillers), the critical and commercial acclaim they received for the 
comparatively bleak and sombre No Country For Old Men (2007) – a bona fide blockbuster taking over $170 
million worldwide – clearly solidifies their place as insiders, not filmmakers of the margins. 
 
69
 Jin’s breakdown of the risk-based nature of film production is worth noting: “production involves high levels 
of investment in a heterogeneous, highly perishable product, for which demand is uncertain, while exhibition 
involves the projection of that product to relatively small numbers of people in geographically scattered locales 
261 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
paying individually small sums that bear no necessary relationship to either the cost or the quality of the film.” 
(Jin, 2012, 416) 
 
70
 Economies of scope include the production of synergy effects across the conglomerate, accumulated 
organisational knowledge and experience (e.g. at identifying suitable target markets and budget specification, or 
‘internal’ tie-in partners) of the kind actual independents might not be able to access. 
 
71
 See as a related example, Caves’ chapter on the ‘apprenticeship’ of visual artists, where he cites the 
difficulties of breaking into the marketplace when galleries (the gatekeepers of this particular industry) heavily 
on the work of already-established artists, resulting in disproportional difficulties in entry to market for newer 
artists (Caves, 2000, 21-36). 
 
72
 It is worth noting that while for an audience familiar with Smart cinema, the temporal games of a piece like 
Inception (2010) will not hold innovatory thrills, it could easily be experienced as a profoundly shocking 
departure for a notional audience accustomed only to action films founded on a classically-driven three act 
structure with the only frills coming in the form of spectacular set pieces. Similarly with Stranger Than Fiction 
(2006) which privileges its ‘straight’ romantic comedy leanings and minimises its potential for a Smart reading, 
to the extent that it must be regarded as a “Smart-influenced rom-com” as opposed to a “smart film which also 
happens to function as a rom-com” which would be the case with Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. This 
illustrates, I think, the way in which the presence of Smart features work to rupture traditional notions of genre 
which rely exclusively on iconography and thematics rather than tone and sensibility. 
 
73
 With the necessary caveat that the funding for this primarily came from (aside from alliances with other 
production companies, e.g. Working Title in the UK), profits from the Nightmare on Elm Street series and one 
of the most successful independents of all time: the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles series, whose franchising 
success gave New Line a great deal of financial independence.  This allowed them to divide themselves; The 
Player, Shine, Hoop Dreams and Short Cuts on one side, with The Mask and Dumb and Dumber on the other, 
until the behemoth that was The Lord of The Rings emerged. But as Wyatt points out, “By separating product 
between the two arms, [Bob] Shaye has been able to create a market identity for each company and to allocate 
advertising/distribution expenditures consistent with each film’s potential pay-off.” (Wyatt, 1998, 78) 
 
74
 King identifies a few salient examples: “indie/specialty-oriented distributors and/or producers owned by the 
major studio companies: either studio-created subsidiaries (such as Sony Pictures Classics, Fox Searchlight and 
Paramount Classics) or formerly independent operations taken over by the studios (Miramax under the 
ownership of Disney from 1993, or Good Machine, taken over by Universal Pictures in 2002 as part of the basis 
of its subsidiary, Focus Features).” (King, 2009, 4). 
 
75
 The likes of Waxman and Biskind have given thorough, albeit gossipy, accounts of the period (utilising the 
first-person accounts of industry figures), and King also identifies particular individuals within the studio 
system as having had a specific impact on the direction production was taking (King, 2009, 200-201).    
 
76
 Bill Mechanic’s staunch defence of Fight Club in the face of studio befuddlement at its apparent 
‘unmarketability’ led to a serious deterioration of relations between him and Rupert Murdoch. See for example 
Lyman, 200b.  
 
77
 Gondry’s move to the superhero form was regarded as unsuccessful, but still earned almost $228m 
worldwide; the critical and public resistance shown to his transition is rather interesting in itself, as indicated by 
this quote from a contributor article on Yahoo!, one of many seen around the time of The Green Hornet’s 
release: “When you think of French director Michel Gondry, you think of lower budget quirky films like, ‘The 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind,’ [sic] or ‘Be Kind, Rewind,’ you don't think of big budget superhero 
movies. While Gondry is a good director in his own right, his interest in this genre seems either an act of 
desperation by a studio that needed to replace the original director Stephen Chow, or an experiment to veer 
away from the time tested method in which superhero movies are made.” From the blog “Five Reasons Why 
‘The Green Hornet’ will Flop at the Box Office (The First Box Office Flop of 2011)” November 23rd 2010 
(http://voices.yahoo.com/five-reasons-why-green-hornet-will-flop-the-7250166.html accessed 15/05/2012) 
 
78
 See Jin, 2012 for an account of horizontal integration in the context of neoliberal globalisation. 
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79
 See Ellexis Boyle (2010) for a fascinating account of the transition of one action star’s image from ‘foreigner 
and alien’ to deliberately Americanized masculinity in Hollywood action films of the 1980s. Interestingly, his 
image’s further alteration to what she describes as “‘New Age Guy’ and family man” (Boyle, 2010, 42) rests on 
a movement away from action and into comedy and family films in the 1990s and 2000s via strongly-visualised 
parodies of his previously implacably hyper-masculine image, which is rather in keeping with structural 
tendencies towards parody and intertextuality displayed throughout the period, as well as with amendments to 
interpretations of masculinity.  
 
80
 While Susan Jeffords (1994) and Fred Pfeil (1995) argue that masculine representations shift cyclically or 
periodically, with a more domineering masculinity evident in the ‘hard body’ aesthetic of the 1980s and a softer, 
more sensitive representation available in the 1990s ‘New Man’, Peberdy contends that “[s]eeing divergent 
examples of masculinity dominating at different historical moments…ignores the part each male trope plays in 
the identity formation of the other…[these framings] do not address the possibility that male identity exhibits 
both hard and soft masculinity at the same time.” (Peberdy, 2010, 237)  Instead she posits a mode wherein “hard 
and soft masculinities depend on the existence of the other for definition. Representations of masculinity are 
inherently bipolar, moving between hard and soft modes……Hard and soft masculinity should instead be seen 
as a sliding scale; a hierarchy of masculine tropes demonstrated both across roles and within them.” (ibid., 237-
238) While from the perspective of identity formation itself, I agree with her, I am inclined to think that 
representations of masculinity experience flux across time as well as within a specific block of time. 
 
81
 For a consideration of the changing face of race in action cinema and in relation to multicultural audiences, 
see Beltrán (2005). 
 
82
 This would not be the first or last time Cruise worked outside of his original persona – his character in Born 
On The Fourth of July (Oliver Stone, 1989) an interesting exception to the self-assured and over-confident 
characters he had played during the 1980s.  However his role in Magnolia was significant in its sense of parodic 
masculinity or self-referential display; in a fascinating article Donna Peberdy (2010) notes that Cruise’s later 
work utilises metaphorical – and sometimes literal – masks to an extraordinary extent, which she sees as 
relevant to his celebrity status, and to his conflicted, paradoxical, or ‘bipolar’ representations of masculinity. 
 
83
 As Barry King discusses in his consideration of celebrity culture and the commodification of stardom, the 
position of actors/stars has changed within the industry as well as in the surrounding culture: “[i]n contemporary 
Hollywood stars have become producers and entrepreneurs pitching projects to the major studio distributors. 
They are no longer habitually associated with particular genres that invest them with particular personalities but 
rather with the concept of efficient performance in any genre, which is the creative analogue of financial 
performance. ……Although ostensibly more than ever is known about the intimate existence of the celebrity or 
star, this is not concrete knowledge of the person but knowledge of the persona as a market-tested exchange 
value and object of abstract desire.” (King, B., 2010, 15) 
 
84
 Celeste, 2005, argues that understanding the emergence of the modern celebrity is crucial to understanding the 
structure of popular culture, and that the modern celebrity is a creature of the camera and mass communication 
technologies, who draws on figurations of tragedy, heroism and loss. (Celeste, 2005).  See also Gorin and 
Dubied (2011), particularly on the idea of the ‘celebrity meltdown’, and Barry King (2010) on the 
commodification of the celebrity. 
 
85
 Popular culture website www.vulture.com runs a regular feature, Star Market, which provides fascinating 
theoretical analysis based on a star’s persona-based aggregation, combining industry discourse and past 
financial performance of projects in order to provide a theoretical ‘market value’ for them. 
http://www.vulture.com/news/the-star-market/  
 
86
 For Florida, the ‘creative class’ constitutes the potential source of change and growth for modern economies, 
arguing that what the working class was to the early 20
th
 century, and the service class to the late 20
th
 century – 
the main engine for social and economic development – the creative classes will be for the 21st.  Educated, 
mobile and information-driven, but individualised and without collective bargaining power, the creative classes 
may form a theoretical category for both producers and audiences of Smart cinema; it is important to note that 
the idea of the ‘creative class’ is a site of the exploitation of cultural capital in itself. As John Hartley points out, 
the creative class is simultaneously producer, consumer, and mediator of creative work, and “[t]he creative 
industries are enterprises that monetize (creative) ideas in a consumer economy….beneficiaries of the drift from 
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production to consumption, public to private, author to audience. They exploit the commercialisation of identity 
and citizenship. They broker the convergence and integration of entertainment and politics” (Hartley, 2005, 114) 
 
87
 I note that Schatz is not convinced as to whether one can consider ‘millennial Hollywood’ a distinct period, 
arguing that it remains to be seen. 
 
88
 Scott prefigures Schatz’s position by acknowledging that a more diffuse process may be at issue than simple 
bifurcation, saying “the two [major studio and independent producers] tiers…are actually complemented by a 
more indistinct circle of companies as represented by independents strongly allied to the majors together with 
the majors’ own subsidiaries.  This middle tier provides a shifting but evidently widening bridge between the 
two more clearly definable segments as represented by the majors proper and the pure independents.” (Scott, 
2002, 964) It is that middle tier which would come to provide what King understands as ‘Indiewood’. 
 
89
 Scott avers that “the growing complexity of these conglomerates can be ascribed in large degree to attempts to 
internalize the synergies that are frequently found at intersections between different segments of the media and 
entertainment (and hardware) industries.” (Scott, 2002, 961) This includes technological synergies, and it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that no major conglomerate has yet found a way to protect itself from loss via 
innovation, as much as benefit from it.  In that light, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the ways in 
which conglomerates utilise their differing media divisions as wardens, ring-fencing commercial prospects for 
valuable film texts by contributing to continuous media discourse about them, and ways in which they act as 
‘simple’ gatekeeper to a channel. 
 
90
  I would argue that only the first exhibits ‘true’ Smart characteristics textually, however the industrial 
attributes and production conditions of the other two are very similar.   
 
91
 See for example, as per Steve Neale, the argument that “New Hollywood can be distinguished from the old by 
the hybridity of its genres and films.  Most argue in addition that this hybridity is governed by the multi-media 
synergies characteristic of the New Hollywood, by the mixing and recycling of new and old and low art and 
high art media products in the modern (or post-modern) world, and by the propensity for allusion and pastiche 
that is said to characterize contemporary artistic production.” (Neale, 2001, 248) 
 
92
 See also Grainge, Jancovich and Monteith (2007) on Austin’s work; as they note, his work focuses on “the 
means by which film creates appeal not through any singular or unified style, as might be implied with the 
marketing theories of high concept, but through ‘promotional and conversational processes of fragmentation, 
elaboration and diffusion’……the idea that there is nothing innate about the identity of film, that its status relies 
on particular ‘discursive formulations’, also has a bearing on the definitional fluidities of ‘cult’, ‘independent’, 
and ‘mainstream’ cinema.” (Grainge, Jancovich & Monteith, 2007, 513) 
 
93
 Manjunath Pendakur (2008), for example, argues beyond that – that the MPA/MPAA functions as a cartel 
internationally, adhering to the classical definition of a cartel’s goals, that is “to contain inter-capitalist rivalry 
and the antagonisms that develop out of the contradictions within capital. Cartels engage in anti-competitive 
trade practices such as fixing prices of the commodities its members buy and sell, and gaining exclusive access 
to markets (and thereby monopoly profits) for its members.” (Pendakur, 2008, 183)  
 
94
 That is, as per Staiger’s contention: “I see Hollywood’s industrial structure, modes of production, signifying 
practices, and modes of reception as an intensification of monopoly capitalism.” (Staiger, 2000, 74) 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
95
 Rosenbaum makes a few acidic points on the way in which audience opinion and value judgements are 
cultivated and calibrated, noting that grosses for films are a ubiquitous feature of non-industry coverage of 
cinema, including weekly box office tables, where these details would not necessarily have been singled out 
historically (Rosenbaum, 2002, 14-15), indicating that the discourse of cinematic ‘success’ has changed at a 
public level.  This co-exists with what Edward Buscombe described in 1970 as “auteur-hunting” (Buscome, 
1970, 10) – in a modern context, the (often fan-originated) search to produce textual justifications for ascriptions 
of quality and distinction to a particular film or its maker. 
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96
 Comparisons between the two periods may be even more relevant, in that the 1960s-1970s directors also 
emerged following a protracted period of industrial uncertainty, followed by a series of far-reaching mergers 
and takeovers (see Langford, 2010, 107-129).  This should not encourage us to adopt too simplistic a view – 
while casual 1960s /1990s analogies were encouraged by the film industry, music industry, fashion industry and 
others, the economic, political and sociological realities were a great deal more complex.    
 
97
 As Gallagher puts it, “[i]nvocation of the practices, output and abstracted spirit of this age repeatedly serves to 
legitimate contemporary films and filmmakers working firmly in the Hollywood mainstream as well as at the 
furthest margins of independent American cinema.” (Gallagher, 2013, 84) 
 
98
 Or as Perkins, who draws heavily on Elsaesser’s work in her analysis of Whit Stillman, points out of 
Bergman, Antonioni, Rossellini, and Truffaut: “All of these directors have been understood as auteurs in a way 
that is at least partially determined by the fact that they have all been understood, at various times, as 
representative national voices.” (Perkins, 2008, 19) 
 
99
 Clearly this does not account for all textual models; for example a strongly distinctive subset of films has long 
existed concerning the adventures (often comedic or horrific) of Americans abroad, and the ongoing use of 
locations in Canada, Australia and elsewhere to double for US locations confirm that ‘America’ is as much a 
fictional – or psychological – construct on film as it is a geographic location. 
 
100
 Perkins’ reading of Elsaesser emphasises again, however, the transnational nature not of production or 
reception, but of  recognition, saying that “[t]he figures understood as contemporary European and American 
auteurs are no longer national auteurs: their work constitutes an international art cinema that expresses similar 
concerns and styles across a wide spectrum of settings. The group of directors who, for Elsaesser, seem to have 
more in common with each other than with directors of their respective national cinemas includes Lars von 
Trier, Wong Kar-Wai, Tsai Ming-Liang, Tom Tykwer, Abbas Kiarostami, Hal Hartley, Richard Linklater, and 
Paul Thomas Anderson, among others.” (Perkins, 2008, 20) 
 
101
 The extent to which auteurist perspectives have been adopted, or incorporated into viewing strategies, by an 
increasingly networked fan culture may be an additional factor here.  Christopher Nolan, for example, 
constitutes a particular instance of this process, whereby ‘auteurism’ can be seen as a mechanism of legitimation 
linking film texts and fan cultures.  If questions of auteurism, and the responsibility for ‘crowning’ any 
particular filmmaker as an auteur, can be evacuated onto fan cultures, the term itself becomes industrially 
‘innocent’; the industrial mobilisation of auteurism as a marketing or positioning strategy can thereby be 
minimised by industry and audiences alike. The casual adoption of auteurism as a popular framing device also 
places filmmakers in an unusual situation; several of them seem to feel the need to address it in their work, most 
particularly as we have seen with Wes Anderson. In this sense, as Perkins outlines, directors become “highly 
conscious of the way they are positioned as auteurs by those processes that force them to reveal the[ir] 
signatures…In these contemporary works, the repetition of characters, actors, themes, and settings is less about 
the establishment of a signature and more about the narration of that signature. In an approach that often seems 
more playful than deterministic, authorial remaking becomes a subject as well as a function.” (Perkins, 2008, 
20)  
 
102
 I believe this links with Andrews’ assertion that “auteurism in mainstream criticism often seems authorized 
by academic authority despite the fact that mainstream critics regularly cast aspersions on academic sectors of 
film studies, which may seem inaccessible or just flaky.” (Andrews, 2012, 48) in that traditional media, fast 
losing its grasp on the material of public intellectual discourse, may see a benefit in adopting historically 
‘authorised’ framings in order to bolster its own authority.  
 
103
 Nolan’s involvement with the Batman franchise possibly counts as something of an irony here, given the 
historical position of Tim Burton’s 1989 Batman, an early example of the direction the film industry would take 
in the 1990s.  Nolan is now also involved with Superman, as writer and producer of Man of Steel (2013). 
 
104
 It must be noted that, Bond aside, budgets for his films have grown steadily smaller and proportional returns 
have fluctuated wildly, with the $70 million Jarhead (2005) grossing $60 million, and $35 million 
Revolutionary Road (2008) taking $75 million. 
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105
 The still-evolving career path of Rian Johnson suggests a similar and familiar track to be followed; from 
critically lauded low budget (under half a million dollars) independent Brick, through to The Brothers Bloom 
(2008) a mid-level ($20 million budget) co-production venture with an indie major (in this case The Weinstein 
Company) with a cast associated with ‘quality’ productions (Rachel Weisz, Adrien Brody) rather than box-
office attraction, before moving on to Looper (2012).  This cannily unites a somewhat larger (although still 
relatively modest, at $37.5 million) budget with a big-name star in the form of Bruce Willis, and a known 
‘Smart’ name (Joseph Gordon-Levitt, whose indie credentials are well-established) in order to construct an 
action/sci-fi film which can appeal to multiple constituencies.  The industrial positioning used to make these 
appeals is illustrated in the catchline quote used to topline one film poster: “This decade’s The Matrix” 
(available at: http://broadcast.rcs.ac.uk/2012/10/screen-looper-and-the-art-of-thinking-for-yourself/looper-
poster-11/  accessed 03 March 2013), promising diegetic unpredictability and narrative play in an action-based, 
kinetically stylised package, but requiring a degree of intellectual investment.  Other Smart filmmakers seem to 
plough a steadier industrial furrow.  With the exception of the ill-fated $50 million The Life Aquatic With Steve 
Zissou (2004) and costly animation Fantastic Mr. Fox (2009), Wes Anderson’s commitment to a particular form 
of quirky observational comedy has kept budgets squarely within the $15-20 million category. David Fincher 
has continued to work squarely within the mainstream, with budgets for his work rarely dipping below the $50 
million mark, and most recently taking on global publishing phenomenon The Girl With The Dragon Tattoo 
(2011), after 2010’s $90m The Social Network.  Others again have moved away from the mainstream; since 
Adaptation, Spike Jonze has worked mainly in music video, short film, and documentary, apart from the highly 
stylised Where The Wild Things Are (2009) which cost $100m, and barely broke even internationally.  Not all 
enter the mainstream; Todd Solondz’ Life During Wartime (2009) and Dark Horse (2011) were distributed 
strictly on the art-house and international festival circuit, as was the case with Shane Carruth’s Primer follow-
up, Upstream Colour. 
 
106
 This can be seen in the manner in which popular/industry/academic discourses repeatedly privilege the 
notion of Nolan’s Batman as ‘darker’ or more ‘serious’ than previous iterations. A random selection of 
examples of review articles includes such phrases as: “A Batman that plumbs the violence of the mind is a risk. 
But true fans should revel in the fact that the Dark Knight just got darker.” (Travers, 2005, 87); “very 
serious…too dark and talky to appeal to kids” (McCarthy, 2005, 19); “a resolutely grim outlook which takes the 
Dark Knight to darker places.” (Newman, 2008, 59); “a brooding and pessimistic vision of Gotham City. Nolan 
and his team depict a city riddled with corruption.” (Macnab, 2008, 10); “the unrelenting nightmare 
atmosphere” (Tyree, 2009, 31). See also Robert P. Arnett’s 2009 “Casino Royale and Franchise Remix: James 
Bond as Superhero” which discusses the contemporary franchise ‘reboot’. 
 
107
 Such as when we are told “on the phone Kaufman, unlike his screen alter-ego, comes across as confident and 
assured……He is reclusive to the point of obsessive, perhaps sensing that if you create a mystery about 
yourself, you also create a mythology around yourself. To this end, he often refuses to be photographed, is 
reticent about divulging too much autobiographical information, and, in a recent Esquire profile, refused even to 
divulge the type of car he drives” (O’Hagan, 2003, 10) or “I interviewed him on stage at the London Film 
Festival last year and it was one of the toughest interviews I've ever done. He is nervous and awkward, but don't 
let that fool you into thinking he's vulnerable…shyness is a form of aggression, and Charlie Kaufman uses his 
social ineptitude like a very precise form of karate……as soon as I could, I invited members of the audience to 
ask questions. His response to them was so different it was as if someone had thrown a switch. He was all 
sweetness and light. If I then tried to follow up, Mr Happy would vanish and it would be back to Mr Grumpy. 
The difference in his responses was so profound, it was almost comic.” (Young, 2009, 5) In each case, the 
undeniable intrusion of any confident, sociable, or warm behaviour, attitude, or perspective, must be recuperated 
back into the myth of ‘Kaufman’. 
 
108
 As King says, these are films for a particular niche market, but they are still also creative products; the salient 
point is that the niche itself is defined by perceptions of creativity which frequently obscure or deny ‘the 
commercial’: “[t]he whole point of this niche is, in some cases, the selling of a particular notion of ‘the 
creative/artistic’ as a source of product and, consequently, viewer distinction. In this case, the disavowal by the 
filmmaker of the notion of ‘product’ to be packaged and sold is itself, however genuinely meant, functional to 
the selling of particular varieties of product.” (King, 2009, 57) 
 
109
 Similarly, yet with some contrasts, Steven Soderbergh plays a game of auteurial margins; his work is 
positioned as ‘auteurial’, i.e. presented for marginal-audience self-selection, when such cachet is deemed 
important for strategic or marketing purposes (The Limey, Traffic, The Good German) – a clear use of the 
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auteurial position – but these considerations are elided when questions of prestige or distinction are deemed 
moot (The Ocean’s series, Contagion, Haywire). It seems, therefore, as if these somewhat diffuse notions are 
themselves hard-coded into the notion of ‘niche’ filmmaking. A more complex figure here is Christopher Nolan, 
whose work reminds us that filmmakers themselves continually complicate this nexus of power and prestige; for 
reasons not yet clear to me, his auteurial preoccupations are continually foregrounded in public discourse, 
especially when producing such otherwise mass-market work as the Batman films or Inception. Perhaps this is a 
case of the industry eating its own, but it may be a strategic attempt on behalf of the industry at recuperating its 
tangential outcroppings back into the ‘monolith’. There are contradictions everywhere here; the ‘strain’ between 
auteurial image and mass-marketing that seemed to emerge with Jonze’s The Green Hornet was in clear contrast 
to the lack of similar strain regarding Nolan’s work.   
 
110
 Noting the variation between paratextual materials, which at various points include or exclude the “with 
Steve Zissou” part of the film’s name, Orgeron (2007, 57-58) makes an interesting link between Anderson’s 
auteuristic image, the fictional auteur of Steve Zissou, and Corrigan’s assertion that since the 1970s, the 
embedding of an auteur’s ‘signature’ within the frame of the title – for example Bernardo Bertolucci’s 1900 
(1976), David Lean’s Ryan’s Daughter (1970), or Michael Cimino’s Heaven’s Gate (1980) – has been a vital 
part of “guarantee[ing] a relationship between audience and movie whereby an intentional and authorial agency 
governs, as a kind of brand-name vision whose contextual meanings are already determined, the way a movie is 
seen and received.” (Corrigan, 2003, 97) 
 
111
 For Zoller-Seitz, this recalls Scorsese, again linking the 1970s New Hollywood auteurs with their assumed 
‘successors’. 
 
112
 Olsen argues that Anderson is tonally out of step with his contemporaries, saying that “Unlike many writer-
directors of his generation, Wes Anderson does not view his characters from some distant Olympus of irony. He 
stands beside them – or rather, just behind them – cheering them on as they chase their miniaturist renditions of 
the American Dream…In a climate where coolness reigns and nothing matters, the toughest stance to take is one 
of engagement and empathy. Anderson seems to have accepted the challenge……Maybe it would be going too 
far to see him as the vanguard of the New Sincerity, but he is clearly out of step with many of his 
contemporaries.” (Olsen, 1999, 12) The confidence of this perspective, coming as it does essentially mid-period 
chronologically, is particularly interesting, given the later tendency to view Smart auteur figures as broadly 
similar in approach. My conclusion is that this view became less prevalent as the Smart era wore on and greater 
discursive priority was accorded to interpretations which emphasised the diverse group of films and filmmakers 
as a coherent ‘movement’. 
 
113
 She convincingly claims that “Anderson often seems to include a variety of racial and ethnic characters, but 
the ways in which he does so ultimately underline and emphasize the unmarked whiteness and white privilege of 
the primary characters in all five films…….[it] upholds and maintains the supposed “normative values” of 
whiteness, by contrasting it against the seemingly diverse casts that surround his protagonists.  However, the 
power and privilege always rests in the hands of the white characters, in ways that are never complicated or 
dealt with by the films themselves. The films create a seemingly unproblematized view of American culture in 
both their presentation and reception by critics and audiences, and merely perpetuate the myth of the normalcy 
and unmarkedness of the category white.” (Dean-Ruzicka, 2013, 25-37) 
 
114
 Dean-Ruzicka notes, almost in passing, a single but distinctive example of the way in which Anderson’s 
auteur image is repeatedly reinscribed into considerations of his work, regardless of the context:  
those who work with Anderson on projects…note his skill and specificity as a director, notably Bill 
Murray in a 1999 appearance on Charlie Rose.  Murray explains his choice to sign on with the then 
virtually unknown Anderson because ‘the script was so precisely written you could tell this guy knew 
exactly what he was doing. He knew exactly what he wanted to make. Exactly how each scene would 
go. I’ve never really seen one that was that precise.’ Murray then comments on Anderson’s very 
precise understanding of Rushmore’s scope and details. From this interview, the perspective on 
Anderson is clearly painted as being aware and in complete control of his projects, and Murray’s words 
offer the opportunity to critique Anderson as the one responsible for the ideologies of his texts, as he 
does have this incredible specificity and focus on detail. (Dean-Ruzicka, 2013, 27) 
 
115
 While outside of the time period at issue here, Dorey’s account of the “For Your Consideration” campaign ad 
designed for Anderson’s Fantastic Mr. Fox (2009) following the announcement of the 2010 Academy Award 
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nominations, is still of interest, in illustrating how Anderson’s auteurial image is discursively reinscribed.  
Emphasising ‘ingenuity’ and ‘skill’ in its textual elements, the poster image shows Anderson himself, physically 
manipulating one of the tiny human puppet characters 
as he stares intently at the line of human figure puppets while adjusting the arm of one of them who 
looks conspicuously like the director.  This image reflects a major component of Anderson’s auteur 
persona combining both his signature at the formal level of his films and their narrative focus on 
attempted-auteur characters. …The emphasis on the omniscient, controlling figure presiding over what 
is seen within the frame is a function of the formal elements of Anderson’s style and his signature as an 
auteur…In situations such as these, the director, for the initiated viewer, becomes an implied author in 
narratological terms, a matter of belief where viewers construct it (Lanser 2001, 154).” (cited in Dorey, 
2012, 177)  
The implication is, clearly, that the image of Anderson as auteur is entwined with how the auteur image 
performs within a given audience context; here, the context being, the film industry itself.   
 
116
 See www.rushmoreacademy.com as an example, a long-running fansite which declares its purpose as 
follows: “With the release of The Royal Tenenbaums in 2001, we began the tradition of enshrining each Wes 
Anderson in our hallowed halls.” The phrasing is telling, both the use of the word ‘enshrining’, implying the 
virtual canonisation of the filmmaker, and the exclusion of the word ‘film’ from the sentence.  Here, the term 
“each Wes Anderson” clearly identifies the text as synonymous with its director. 
 
117
 Of the filmmakers within this Smart ‘sample’, Soderbergh, Fincher, Zwigoff, Jonze and Solondz also have 
work featured in the Criterion Collection. 
 
118
 Orgeron’s contention that Anderson is (or at points has been) greatly concerned about his credibility to me 
rings true, as “[a]t the conclusion of the audio commentary for The Life Aquatic, in fact, Anderson and 
Baumbach articulate their hope that they do not sound “phony or pretentious,” admitting that they spend a good 
portion of their time talking about themselves; indeed, this is the very nature of DVD commentary…Anderson, 
in what appears to be a whimsical and comedic gesture, an extension of the childlike aesthetic that governs his 
cinematic heroes, does not pull a gun but controls the situation in a manner more familiar to him and his 
collaborators (audience included) with a pen, a camera, and a crew. Anderson’s interviews, in other words, are 
equally signed and authored.” (Orgeron, 2007, 60) This is in contrast with the auteurial impression created for 
and by Charlie Kaufman; where Anderson inscribes himself within texts via fictionally distanced proxies, but 
materially controls the ‘reality’ of his auteur image by creating paratexts in ways which fictionalise his 
personality, Kaufman’s absenting of his own personality (as distinct from his presence – see 
http://moviecitynews.com/2009/01/dp30-charlie-kaufman/ accessed 10/04/2012 for Kaufman’s own complaint 
that journalists erroneously believe he ‘doesn’t do’ press) from paratexts creates a gap for the fictionalisation of 
his personality by third parties, such as journalists, while he simultaneously invests his fictional creations with a 
literally indexical ‘personality’ of his own, such as in Adaptation.  
 
119
 This particular advert is one of a series for American Express: “Starring a range of well-known American 
personalities, three of the spots feature filmmakers sending themselves and their own products up while pitching 
another: Martin Scorsese, the perfectionist, picks up and critiques processed photos from a drugstore; M. Night 
Shyamalan, the dreamer, attempts to dine at a restaurant where strange things happen.” (Orgeron, 2007, 61) 
However, Anderson has moved repeatedly between the worlds of advertising and cinema in the past two 
decades, making ads for corporations including Hyundai, Stella Artois, IKEA, AT&T, Sony, and Prada. See ad 
on Youtube at parkerbros channel, accessed 22/05/2013 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spCknVcaSHg 
 
120
 Orgeron, interestingly, and in an at first apparently contradictory manner, argues that Anderson’s impression 
of auteurism is created not by the ‘singular figure’ effect which the likes of Sarris might have emphasised, but 
by Anderson’s tendency to emphasise the collective nature of filmmaking, which Orgeron contends is made 
transparent by paratextual materials. In this interpretation, “the reborn auteur as exemplified by Anderson 
appears more prominent than ever; but his centrality – one might say his celebrity, his authority – remains in 
spite of attempts to document the many collaborative layers of the filmmaking enterprise….With images of 
overpopulated sets filled with cast and crew, interviews with and commentary by cinematographers, costumers, 
set designers, and the like, Anderson’s strategy to foreground the collective has, interestingly, buoyed his 
reputation as auteur. (Orgeron, 2007, 59)  This dovetails with Elsaesser’s exploration of European cinema, in 
which he argues that “the European ‘auteur’ – as if to compensate for the absence of pre-defined genres and 
stars – requires often a ‘trilogy’ or a steady cast of players in order to have his universe recognized as not just 
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personal but belonging to cinema history.” (Elsaesser, 2005, 136) and illustrates both the resemblances between 
Anderson and the ‘classic’ auteur figure, and the contradictions inherent in the positions he takes.   
 
121
 See Jancovich: “The cult movie is often seen as a particular and even subaltern scene but it is precisely its 
sense of itself as a kind of oppositional and underground culture that it shares with the European art cinema. Not 
only do both the art cinema and cult movie fandom emerge out of similar developments in both exhibition and 
the academy…but they have therefore frequently interacted and even overlapped with one another.” (Jancovich, 
2003, 11) 
 
122
 Along the lines of Frank’s idea of ‘hip consumerism’, where “[n]ot only does hip consumerism recognize the 
alienation, boredom, and disgust engendered by the demands of modern consumer society, but it makes of those 
sentiments powerful imperatives of brand loyalty and accelerated consumption.” (Frank, 1997, 231) 
 
123
 The list of films following Reservoir Dogs and Pulp Fiction which can be easily described as 
‘Tarantinoesque’ is lengthy; many of them are derivative, or at least could be and were described as such, given 
their temporal place; Things To Do In Denver When You’re Dead (Gary Fleder, 1995); 8 Heads In A Duffel Bag 
(Tom Schulman, 1997); The 51
st
 State (Ronny Yu, 2001); Go (Doug Liman, 1999); Snatch (Guy Ritchie, 2000) 
and the slew of British and Irish gangster films which followed including the work of the respective McDonagh 
brothers); Sin City (2005, unsurprisingly, given Tarantino’s direction of one segment – Frank Miller and Robert 
Rodriguez responsible for the other two); and Smokin’ Aces (Joe Carnahan, 2006). Newman notes that Wes 
Anderson is regarded not only as (for good or ill) “the quintessential hipster auteur, but also for having inspired 
a wave of indie cinema that bears his influence.” (Newman, 2013, 73) 
 
124
 This is not to minimise the very real tendency for studios to push the term ‘cult’, as a market-positioning 
signifier, at even the most broadly mainstream films, in an attempt to garner extra-textual credibility (see Joe 
Bob Briggs, 2008, on Attack of the Killer Tomatoes! (John DeBello, 1978), which he describes as the first “self-
conscious attempt to create a cult through titling and marketing” (Briggs et al, 2008, 44)). 
 
125
 Jancovich discusses the ‘subcultural ideology’ which underpins the practices and perspectives of cult 
audiences, but the Smart audience may more closely resemble what Hawkins (2003) calls “the downtown avant-
garde” – a description which recognises the ways in which cult film and art-house cinema, and the cultural 
communities around them, support, reinforce and cross-pollinate each other.  She describes both an audience 
sector and a set of filmmakers (Todd Haynes and David Lynch as well as more marginal directors), which 
despite differences in political perspective, have “a common urban lifestyle, a shared commitment to formal and 
narrative experimentation, a view of the human body as a site of social and political struggle, an interest in 
radical identity politics and a mistrust of institutionalised mechanisms of wealth and power.” (Hawkins, 2003, 
223)  This constitutes a reasonable attempt at identifying a shared set of values and behaviours around and from 
which Smart cinema evolved, although without further audience-specific research in the area, all is speculation.  
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
126
 This is an intensively researched piece in which they cite almost two dozen separate studies.   
 
127
 Conversely, Holbrook and Addis argue that “an attempt to encourage positive evaluations would be hurt by 
excessive spending on aspects of marketing clout that can work against the impression of excellence. Indeed, 
opening a low-budget film on a small number of screens appears actually to enhance the favourability of its 
evaluations.” (Holbrooke and Addis, 2007, 102) They fail to expand on this provocative statement beyond 
intimating that public perception of a film’s industrial origin may have a relationship with that public’s 
assessment of its quality, in that films “of the type found in the scattered specialty houses that show art films are 
perceived as better in artistic quality” (ibid.). However, while this may prove a jumping-off point for future 
research, there is insufficient data here to make full determinations on the basis of audience opinions.   
 
128
 See for example Gemser, Leenders & Wijnberg, who conclude that while statistically buying decisions for 
independent films are more influenced by ‘expert’ opinion in the form of critical reviews and awards, and 
suggest that “consumers give different degrees of credibility to different types of awards” (Gemser, Leenders & 
Wijnberg, 2008, 27), that “the influence of signals of quality on consumer choice is dependent on the type of 
movie involved” (ibid., 28), and that “expert-selected awards are the most effective for the independent film 
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segment (in terms of increasing box office revenues and screen allocations” (ibid., 44) but note that empirical 
research comparing different types of ‘quality signal’ is scarce.  Hennig-Thurau, Houston and Walsh (2006, 
2007) concluded that “[a]wards have the strongest direct and total impact on proﬁtability” (Hennig-Thurau, 
Houston, and Walsh, 2007, 85).   
 
129
 To clarify the nature of ‘roadshowing’,  Balio expands: “[a]t the exhibition level, prestige pictures were given 
splashy premieres and the roadshow treatment…Prestige pictures, with their longer running times, were 
particularly suited to roadshowing, which entailed twice-a-day performance, intermissions, and reserved seats. 
Because the practice also meant higher ticket prices, higher film rentals, and extended runs, this pattern of 
release had the potential of recouping production costs much faster than normal…[but its high cost] increased a 
company’s exposure when a picture met resistance at the box office.” (Balio, 1995, 180) 
 
130
 Without wishing to damn with faint praise, the work of Steven Spielberg in the 1990s and 2000s would be a 
good example of this kind of solid, nominally prestigious, thoroughly classical filmmaking.   
131
 “In 2003, FIAPF, the International Federation of Film Producers Associations, has estimated the overall 
number of international film festivals at 700–800 (www.fiapf.org), and their number has probably further 
increased over the last decade—industry experts estimate that nowadays up to 3500 film festivals are held in the 
world each year.” (Rüling & Pedersen, 2010, 318)  
 
132
 For clarity I have excluded purely regional or specifically technical awards (for example, those presented by 
the Costume Designers Guild) unless there seems a compelling structural reason to include them, for example 
the New York-based Gotham Awards which take a national view on submissions and have a strong focus on 
independent film. 
 
133
 Contrasting perspectives on the importance of ‘quality’ as measured in awards to box office returns are 
common; Terry, Butler & DeArmond (2005) found that Academy Award nominations were worth over $6 
million in film revenue per nomination, and Simonoff & Sparrow (2000) found that for a film opening on fewer 
than ten screens, an Academy Award nomination increased its expected gross by close to 250% (for films 
opening on more than ten screens, it increased gross by nearly 30%) However, following from a study by Austin 
(1984) which concluded that there was no significant relationship between awards and overall box office 
success, Smith and Smith (1986) for example found that the relationship between awards and performance was 
time-dependent, only influencing box office results in certain years, which seems probable.  A problem is 
presented, however, by the intense concentration of the empirical research in this field on the Academy Awards, 
as opposed to other evaluative systems. 
 
134
 It is worth noting too that award acknowledgments in this category broadly appear to follow in agreement 
with critical attention and box office; The Life Aquatic With Steve Zissou and I ♥ Huckabees are the least 
awarded films here, and through awards systems more ‘indie’ than mainstream.  
 
135
 This illustrates why, for example Negus can argue as late as 2006 that an emphasis on the cultural or creative 
industries as industries is important, insofar as it is part of “a concerted attempt to move away from a short-term 
over-emphasis on audiences and the polysemantic interpretation of texts during the 1980s and early 1990s.” 
(Negus, 2006, 200-201)   
 
136
 With the proviso that DreamWorks were not an established major at that point.   
 
137
 Kim Newman’s retrospective review points out that: “When it opened in America to somewhat disappointing 
business, there was a widespread misjudgement that Fight Club was an action movie about underground bare-
knuckle boxing contests — perhaps an inflated, star-powered version of Jean-Claude Van Damme vehicles like 
Bloodsport or Kickboxer.” (Newman, n.d.)   
 
138
 Not all would take this position: Jonathan Rosenbaum, for instance, notes that in the periodic arguments 
which erupt for the supposed ‘decline’ of cinema, much of the blame is levelled at the audience, whose overall 
‘coarsening’ is supposedly a function of their decreased literacy, their youth, or a prevailing sense of anti-
intellectualism. (Rosenbaum, 2002, 1-2).  He argues instead that while there may be a grain of truth in some of 
these ideas, and that the loss of theatrical experience inherent in home entertainment has reduced expectations of 
what a film ‘is’, the films to which audiences are exposed are responsible for them lowering their expectations.  
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From Rosenbaum’s position, studios are at fault for replacing ‘individual’ studio heads with conglomerate 
accountants driven by spurious ‘market research’ which produces self-fulfilling test results, and who adhere to 
(in his view) wrong-headed assumptions (teenagers hate black and white films, Americans hate subtitles) 
without challenging them. 
 
139
 For example, the popular evaluative matrix for the blockbuster sometimes appears more dominated by 
financial considerations (in the form of the ubiquitous box-office figure tables of newspapers, entertainment 
magazines, and websites) than by critical perspectives or audience commentary. 
 
140
 The phrase “Must See TV” was originally a commercial slogan for NBC but has been widely co-opted to 
describe “shows that are not simply part of a habitual flow of television programming but, either through design 
or audience response, have become ‘essential viewing’…distinguished by the compulsive viewing practices of 
dedicated audiences who organise their schedules around these shows.” (Jancovich and Lyons, 2003, 2) 
 
141
 The extent to which critics and commentators (and perhaps publics) seek to apportion ‘blame’ for a supposed 
decline in quality of films and audiences forms a fascinating type of position-taking in itself, and deserves 
further exploration.  See, for example Rosenbaum’s gloomy conclusion to his interesting but frequently self-
contradictory work, that “people went to the movies out of habit and as a matter of course, so the main aim of 
the industry was to service that taste and furnish theatres with a lot of product. Today they’ll only go to a movie 
if something or someone guides them there – advertising, ‘coverage’, a review, a general buzz, anything that 
makes the appearance of that movie an event.” (Rosenbaum, 2002, 202-203) 
 
142
 Following Todd Gitlin, Nancy San Martin argues that, for example, the sitcom has moved into urban (from 
suburban) space, and “absents poorer, isolated, or rural regions, a rejection informed perhaps by the network’s 
desire to disassociate itself from the provinciality, backwardness, or cultural homogeneity it associates with then 
displaces onto those regions…[its] preponderance of affluent, white, well-appointed white bodies produces just 
such an erasure of difference…This sensibility makes it safe for ‘America’ to ‘come together’ in viewership 
through an appeal to white audiences that whitewashes urban and sexual subcultures.” (San Martin, 2003, 33).  
One can argue that this is in contrast to the privileging of the ‘traumatic suburb’ of Smart cinema, but the 
similarities of representational approach are still quite striking; the key difference here is that Smart at least 
superficially attempts to interrogate these presentations of a safe, (internal or outer) conflict-free America, 
whereas the television sitcom structurally works to erase conflict, to present a reassuring vision of continual 
resolution.  
 
143
 As Jennifer Holt says on the much-vaunted notion of ‘synergy’ in media,  
[t]he companies that control the airwaves today are…a high-powered cabal of entertainment empires, 
dominating film, television, publishing, cable systems, home video, music, merchandising and theme 
parks – all at the same time…the CEOs of these conglomerates are constantly redefining the art of 
vertical integration in a new and paradoxical market – one that is simultaneously driven by 
segmentation and unified vision, broad range and specific demographics, localism and global scope, 
expansion and consolidation. (Holt, 2003, 11).   
She also argues, as I have outlined in relation to cinema, that the changes in television rest on similar political 
and regulatory foundations, whereby “the concept of ‘must see’ can also be interpreted as a mandate of 
industrial economy and government regulation as opposed to solely a marketing design or textual paradigm.” 
(ibid., 12)  
 
144
 In the sense in which American television series such as The Sopranos, The Wire, Breaking Bad and Mad 
Men are both widely watched, and discursively valorised as high-status cultural artefacts – in this sense, a 
somewhat niche channel like HBO can be regarded as possessing a similar social valence to that of the Smart 
environment.  Jaramillo (2002) explores some of these elements.  
 
145
These patterns are easier to see when viewed ‘vertically’, through the continuing evolution of a single channel 
(HBO), than when seen through the more ‘horizontal’ prism of Smart film, which, as a body, diverse work from 
a multiplicity of origins, consumed through a variety of exhibition platforms.  Looked at logically, audiences 
tend to have a greater level of practical engagement with television network ‘branding’ than they do with that of 
specific film studios, as choosing to view a specific network channel entails precisely that – engaging with a 
channel’s branding in order to activate a channel of content supplied by a single distributor, with a known and 
set location (a predictable setting on the remote control).  By contrast, choosing to view a film involves 
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engaging with distribution via a single exhibitor (the cinema location of choice), and the production origins of 
any film may not make themselves known until the film begins and the credits roll.   
 
146
 See, for example Jaramillo’s note that “pay cable chauvinism not only holds broadcast TV to a different 
standard but also implies that pay cable consumers can handle graphic language, sex, and violence in a more 
thoughtful and productive way than broadcast viewers.” (Jaramillo, 2002, 66) 
 
147
 The emphasis on differentiating Smart or quality television texts from the mainstream is also crucial 
industrially.  Not only, in both cases, does an emphasis on deviation from classical norms form a tool for the 
positioning and marketing of each text, but it also serves to elide genuine questions of industrial difference.  As 
we have seen, most Smart films come from squarely within the conventional Hollywood industrial structure, and 
as such find themselves ‘competing against’ sister films from their own studios, which is to say, they are texts 
used by studios for targeting niche audiences whilst simultaneously laying claim to the rhetoric of 
independence.  This is similarly the case with HBO, which, as part of the Time Warner conglomerate, finds 
itself closing the political economy loop where it competes against sister channels – and most specifically, 
against Time Warner’s The CW Television Network, itself the result of a merger between The WB Television 
Network, and UPN (a CBS Corporation holding).   
 
148
 The term describes a cultural state which has historical precedents in the co-opting of 1920s bohemian 
culture and the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s but is latterly more culturally embedded within the 
mainstream. 
 
149
 Bearing in mind that what constitutes ‘indie’ alters over time; Newman refers to Tzioumakis (2006) when he 
notes that use of the term has remained fairly stable during the period from the 1980s to date, while noting 
“There is no transcendent ‘American independent cinema’ that spans the history of film; rather, in each era, a 
new discourse of independence arises in response to industrial, technological, and cultural configurations.” 
(Newman, 2009, 18) 
 
150
 Although Newman is careful to point out that this is not a binary opposition, there are indie and mainstream 
texts, and indie and mainstream audiences; although he does not elaborate on this it seems clear to me that these 
may encounter each other in a variety of different ways. 
 
151
 As per Aronofsky himself, “It was always a creative choice, not really a budgetary constraint. Actually some 
people think black and white is cheaper. So few films are done in black and white these days that it’s actually 
more expensive. So it actually cost us more money to do it. It cost us even more than most black and white 
movies because we decided to shoot a film stock called ‘black and white reversal’ which no one has ever shot 
for a narrative feature film before. And it’s this very sort of hard to get film stock that actually comes up very, 
very, contrasty.” See interview at http://aronofksy.tripod.com/interview14.html   
 
152
 See Sarah Thornton’s Club Cultures (1996) for a music industry parallel. 
 
153
 He cites the mainstreaming of previously fringe dance acts such as Moby and Fatboy Slim, who permitted 
widespread licensing of their music for film and commercials.  What would once have been regarded as an 
unseemly capitulation to ‘the man,’ was instead “seen as a way of finding exposure for interesting music that 
would be unlikely to break into the increasingly safe and homogeneous radio and MTV playlists controlled by 
the major labels.” (Newman, 2009, 21).  He also cites the complex signifier of Kurt Cobain wearing a handmade 
t-shirt reading “Corporate Magazine Still Sucks” on the front of Rolling Stone. 
 
154
 See Gallagher, 2013 for a discussion of the highly-mobile Steven Soderbergh. 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
155
 This is broadly in line with Thomas Schatz’s interpretation of the film sector’s history, as he attempts to 
coherently place this ‘industrial world’ within a wider economic context.  Schatz does acknowledge that 
personalities play a part, insofar as individual executives’ and filmmakers industrial positions dictate which film 
gets made, and in what manner; indeed he places a great deal of faith in the ability of top executives to “protect 
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the interests and autonomy of their production operations and ensure the creative freedom of top filmmaking 
talent.” (Schatz, 2009, 28).   
 
156
 Sources conflict significantly on the final cost of Rushmore, to an extent not seen with any other film within 
my selected group.  Originally budgeted at $9 million (see Petrikin, 1997)  www.boxofficemojo.com cites its 
final cost at $20 million, www.the-numbers.com at $10 million, www.imdb.com at $11 million, and Emanuel 
Levy at $15 million (Levy, 1999, 4).  In any case, the final cost was still over the $10 million border I have here 
employed to indicate a ‘larger’ budget.   
 
157
 As Langford points out, “the blockbuster ‘tentpole’ films around which a year’s schedule is organised, and 
which can make or break a balance sheet…are dominated by effects-laden SF spectaculars……SF has risen to 
industrial pre-eminence both as a function of and a driving force in the rise of the ‘New Hollywood’…in ways 
that could not easily have been anticipated prior to the 1970s.” (Langford, 2005, 182-183)   
 
158
 Dark City may have suffered for its temporal position, slightly ahead of the Smart curve; it may have been 
just as hampered by finding itself in direct competition with the behemoth that was Titanic (1997); the latter, 
released in America 19/12/1997, was still topping box-office lists weeks later when Dark City came out, on 
27/02/1998 – the film continued to take top spot until the beginning of April.     
 
159
 In ranking the major awards for which each film was nominated and which each film won (94 wins and 74 
separate nominations for American Beauty, 108 wins and 39 separate nominations for Sideways), out of the set 
of films selected, these ranked respectively first and second. 
 
160
 To give just a few examples: “Gondry earns plaudits…for eschewing expensive special effects in favour of 
the inventively mechanical visual solutions which characterised his pop videos….A devotee of the tricks of 
early cinema (many of which have been forgotten in today’s digital age), the French-born Gondry is living proof 
that music video directors can bring much more to the movies than flashy visuals and rapid-fire ‘MTV 
editing’…… Crucially both Spike Jonze and Michel Gondry learned their trade in advertising and music videos, 
learning their craft and breaking new ground in both fields before venturing on to the big screen.” (Kermode, 
2004, 5); “While big-studio films employ banks of supercomputers and armies of programmers, he does most of 
his magic tricks with egg cartons, cellophane, toilet paper rolls and imagination……‘I would rather do the 
effects by finding tricks to do it physically with construction and mechanics,’ he said. ‘I get more excited to do 
it physically because it’s more like a playground to me. I can play with texture and physics and mechanics. 
When it’s digital, it’s elements that are not connected together.”(Covert, 2007, 24); “With this adamantly lo-fi 
visionary [Gondry], Kaufman has found a shrewd marriage of conceptual sophistication and fanciful, childlike 
imagery. Together, they skew clunky instead of sleek, low-tech instead of high-, analog instead of 
digital……Gondry instead opts for low-tech, painstakingly wrought effects – labours of love rather than 
Industrial Light and Magic.” (Norris, 2004, 21); “High on ambition, and vigorously low-budget” (Christopher, 
2004, 4). 
161
 Feeny’s account of the digital production work on the film illustrates the general perception of Gondry’s 
perspective as being somewhat anti-digital techniques, but, as the article is for the Videography journal, 
different editorial considerations are allowed to weigh more heavily in the balance, with digital effects work 
foregrounded in a way not found anywhere else:  
Gondry went into production without a digital effects team on set…The film’s effects work was split 
between Buzz and Custom Film Effects, based in Burbank. Morin runs SOFTIMAGE|XSI on PCs and 
uses Discreet Inferno for compositing. The team renders with Mental Ray...about 15 of the 25, 
including CG artists, compositors and matte painters, were working full time on Eternal Sunshine 
……Initially, Gondry wanted to give the deterioration a stylized, stop-motion feel. ‘We worked for a 
month on it and even then I wasn’t 100 percent sure that it was working,’ says Morin. ‘Michel looked 
at it and asked us to try another route.’……Buzz Effects had received a beta version of 
SOFTIMAGE|XSI version 4, and Morin experimented with the software’s hard body dynamics 
capabilities. He and his team used XSI to make the chimney of the house collapse in CG. ‘When 
Michel saw this, he liked it so much that he wanted more collapsing,’ says Morin. The team re-built the 
house in 3D and based their animation of its collapse on earthquake footage. ‘Looking at the shot now, 
I think we made the right decision,’ says Morin. ‘I am proud of it, because Michel is not usually fond 
of CGI.’  In fact, Buzz Effects had to dirty up their shots to match the grainy 500 ASA stock that 
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Director of Photography Ellen Kuras had used in that scene. ‘We realized that we were trying to make 
it too clean,’ says Morin. Smiling, he adds, ‘I guess that’s our professional flaw’. (Feeny, 2004, 54)  
162
 This was soon after Village Roadshow, which had been in the Australian film business at production, 
distribution and exhibition points since the 1950s, formalised its partnership with Warner; The Matrix signalled 
Village Roadshow’s transition from producer of an endless series of instalments of family dolphin drama 
Flipper to an international production institution.  Bruce Berman, President of Worldwide Theatrical Production 
at Warners from 1991-1996 became Chairman and CEO of Village Roadshow Pictures, a measure of the 
strategic importance in which the marque appears to be held.  
 
163
 These include: “all-star comedy about an environmental campaigner who hires a couple of ‘existential 
detectives’ to solve the riddle of his existence. It’s got a touch of the Andersons (Wes and Paul Thomas) and 
sometimes looks like a zany-brainy episode of I Dream of Jeannie or Bewitched. But the main resemblance is 
obvious. Russell has been hugely influenced by screenwriter Charlie Kaufman’s trademark flights of surreal 
fancy……The movie’s batsqueak of complacency is effaced by these funny and intelligent performances.” 
(Bradshaw, 2004, 30); “may tap pockets of ardent critical support to buoy its status among upscale fall 
releases…The group of young filmmakers that included Wes Anderson, Alexander Payne, Paul Thomas 
Anderson, Spike Jonze and Russell, as well as screenwriter Charlie Kaufman, were collectively hailed a few 
years back as the new saviors of creatively moribund Hollywood. Since then it has become apparent just how 
much the group has in common.” (Rooney, 2004b, 56); “a romance of ideas for our troubled times…… sweet 
and buoyant…despite its seemingly excessive stylization. [Russell shows] even more audacious whimsy than 
before, and with a less conventional narrative structure…way more ‘out there’ than any other American movie 
you are likely to see this year.” (Sarris, 2004, 23); “extraordinary and truly delightful new comic panorama, the 
improbably titled and unfashionably heartfelt I love [sic] Huckabees. ……an attempt to envisage a cinema of 
ideas in a multiplex context… a dialectical film….unavoidably part of the millennial reality-upending zeitgeist 
that has given us The Matrix and the collected works of Charlie Kaufman. Moreover, you could read [it] as a 
Zen-influenced response to the ironic nihilism of Fight Club, another reality-warping meditation on materialist 
discontent and psychic anomie.” (Smith, 2004, 28); “As with Russell’s other films, Huckabees moves its 
audience from initial bafflement to a broader apprehension of a situation rife with complexity.” (Walters, 2004, 
34-35) “If you left David O. Russell’s intellectual farce scratching your head, this two-disc, bonus-packed set is 
your way to enlightenment. Sort of.” (Travers, 2004, 77) 
 
164
 Negative reviews of the film often refer to its industrial positioning, interestingly: “This anti-corporate 
comedy is almost beyond a stinker. If it weren’t directed by David O. Russell, one would be tempted to call it 
unreleasable – actually, I still am tempted. ……a philosophical mishmash that needs rewriting, not to mention 
some laughs. Its whimsy might win it a cult following, but it couldn't qualify as fun.” (Quinn, 2004, 7); “Clever 
but distancing…largely an intellectual pleasure with a hollow core. A definite specialty item despite its more 
mainstream accoutrements…… basically a hipster head trip about life’s big questions, and, as a result, is a more 
rarefied entertainment.” (Rooney, 2004b, 56); “a big dustbin of a movie, filled with throwaway details, 
whimsical ‘plants’ designed to bemuse and bedazzle us. Hardcore Huckabees fans will doubtless whip up an 
internet debate about the significance of the cardboard cut- outs of Shania Twain, the Magritte bowler hat, the 
cantaloupe melon and the swimsuit photos of a young Jessica Lange…….one of those films that you either take 
to or you very much don’t; that you see either as a teasing cornucopia of philosophical profundities, or as a 
farrago of half-baked freshman posturing….a film that plays at ideas, rather than with them. The philosophical 
content is grindingly banal.” (Romney, 2004, 14) 
 
165
 See in particular Tzioumakis 2011(a and b), who conducts a close review of scholarly work on the field, 
revealing the assumptions made about independence and its constructions. He points out in particular that 
“American independent film’s own trajectory, which moved progressively closer to Hollywood cinema 
(especially from the late 1980s onwards), in tandem with the expansion of Hollywood cinema courses in 
university curricula, inevitably made the discourse that saw American independent film as related to Hollywood 
more visible and therefore dominant.  In this respect, academic film criticism after the 1990s (‘Takes Four and 
Five’) increasingly looked at the nature of the (symbiotic) relationship between American independent film and 
Hollywood, the latter’s co-optive practices and impact on the former and the potential for critiquing the system 
from within…….No wonder then why the flurry of activity in the 2000s insisted on approaching and defining 
American independent cinema and film in ‘relation’ to Hollywood.” (Tzioumakis, 2011b, 335-336) 
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166
 The prevailing tendency is to link Boogie Nights with the work of Martin Scorsese, and Magnolia with 
Robert Altman’s, in particular the sprawling ensemble piece Nashville:  “vaguely Altman-esque (Short Cuts, 
Nashville) in the size and number of its cast and plotlines” (Udovitch, 2000, 46); “If Boogie Nights was 
unmistakably influenced by Scorsese’s style, Magnolia…invites comparison to Altman’s Short Cuts and to John 
Sayles’ political drama City of Hope, two mosaics of American life woven through a series of darkly comic 
vignettes” (Levy, 1999,105); “Once again, Anderson's master is Robert Altman……as with Altman, the flaws 
are inseparable from the flourishes.” (Quinn, 2000,10); “Altman-by-way-of-Scorsese-and-Tarantino pop 
melodrama” (Doherty, 1998, 40); “slicker, quicker and less complex than something by, say, Robert Altman, but 
it does show tendencies in that direction….he does not hesitate to steal from his elders, such as Scorsese.” 
(Klawans, 1997, 36); “Nashville meets GoodFellas meets Pulp Friction.” [sic] (Corliss, 1997, 88); “the one 
Magnolia most resembles is Robert Altman’s Short Cuts” (French, 2000, 7); “The film’s unofficial family group 
is immersed in exploitation movies, which becomes the same collective eccentricity that country music was for 
Nashville.  Mr. Anderson, who begins his film spectacularly with a version of the great Copacabana shot from 
Goodfellas, has no qualms about borrowing from the best” (Maslin, 1997, 1); “Anderson freely appropriates 
from his personal pantheon of post-studio-system maverick film-makers (chiefly Altman, Demme and Scorsese) 
while at the same time striving to bring his own original vision to the screen.” (Olson, 2000, 26) 
 
167
 This is not to say that Anderson fails to live up to early claims of auteurship, merely to suggest that it would 
have been a premature conjecture to make after Magnolia, which in 1999 became just his third feature film.  On 
the contrary, I believe that There Will Be Blood (2007) and The Master (2012) confirmed these suspicions, and 
position him as producing a distinctively-styled type of modern American psychological epic.     
 
168
 This was not simply a theoretical movement towards the mainstream: as Schatz points out, in 1992, Miramax 
and New Line combined shared 3.2% of the US market; in 1994, their first full post-acquisition year, New Line 
alone took 6.2%, and in 1996 their David Fincher film Se7en took $300 million worldwide “roughly on a par 
with Batman Forever, the designated summer blockbuster from New Line’s sister studio, Warner Bros.” 
(Schatz, 2013, 136) thus moving themselves into the ‘mini-major’ – or major independent, if one concurs with 
Justin Wyatt (1998) – category.  New Line and Miramax would together dominate the field for much of the 
decade.  
 
169
 Music is strongly emphasised throughout, and the film produced not just one but two soundtrack albums on 
the Capitol record label, the first in 1997 and the second in 1998.  
 
170
 This echoes Newman’s contention that “[h]ipsters are defined by their striving to be hip, but among the 
crucial components of hipsterism are frequent failures at hipness, and the rejection of hipsterism as inauthentic.  
Hipsters thus comprise a culture in pursuit of hip rather than a hip culture……so much of the discourse of indie 
hipsterism is negative that denial and de-authentication must be a key structuring principle of histerism.” 
(Newman, 2013 72-73)  In this sense, if the fact that Anderson’s films are made by Disney constitutes an 
audience concern at all, it can be seen as either a fact which has been ‘successfully denied’, or can be 
appreciated through a consumption framework which renders it ironic.   
 
171
 This is certainly the conclusion industry writers at the time had come to, such as Bing, 2002: “major studios 
continue to invest in the specialty arena and not just for the prestige factor…they’re nixing midrange pics in 
favour of event films that cost more than $80 million and niche films that cost less than $10 million, many of 
which come with foreign financing and minimal risk.” (Bing, 2002, 1)  
 
172
 Sources differ on the budget; as the final total is either way sufficient to classify it within this grouping, I do 
not believe this uncertainty is problematic.  
 
173
 As per an account of the time “insiders say MTV faced resistance from some quarters when it began 
shepherding its subtly subversive satire Election through the Par machine. While studio chairman Sherry 
Lansing and production VP Dede Gardner are said to have been big supporters of director Alexander Payne's 
dark comedy, others at the studio were less enthusiastic about Election, which continually scored poorly in test 
screenings.” (Hindes, 1999, 7) 
 
174
 See Tzioumakis, 2006 222-245 for a history of Orion Classics as a mini-major. 
 
275 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
175
 Schatz emphasises the importance of the global wave of mergers and acquisitions at the time, arguing that it 
was Sony’s purchase of Columbia Pictures “which in turn induced Sony’s arch-rival Matsushita to acquire 
MCA/Universal in 1990” (Schatz, 2013, 131); while Sony Pictures Classics therefore constitutes a small cog in 
a very big financial machine, as can be seen from the rapid expansion of Universal’s Focus Features division, 
each conglomerate was anxious to colonise this particular industrial space.  
 
176
 See, for example, Schatz’s optimistic outlook on its fortunes: “As the indie market surged, however, the 
subsidiaries moved increasingly into financing (or co-financing) their films, and moved steadily away from an 
‘art film’ orientation as the commercial stakes went up. The sole exception was Sony Pictures Classics, which 
continued to operate primarily as a distributor and to sustain its commitment to art films and imports – and 
which may well stand not only as the first of the conglomerate-owned indies but possibly the last of them as 
well.” (Schatz, 2013, 137) 
 
177
 While Live Entertainment would be better known as Artisan Entertainment in the future, both titles appear to 
be in common use at this time. 
 
178
 Live/Artisan would in 2003 be absorbed into Lions Gate, which earns special note here, distinguishing itself 
from the rest of the ‘third wave’ of indie production and distribution companies, in that it was “much better 
capitalised than the smaller boutique companies that had entered the market in the early 1990s” (Tzioumakis, 
2013, 36), a fact which he too relates to increasing costs of production and distribution).  Alisa Perren’s case 
study (2013, 108-120) provides a full consideration of the place of Lions Gate as a mini-major in the 
contemporary marketplace; as of now “the largest autonomous film production and distribution operation in 
Hollywood.” (ibid., 108). While it falls outside of the time period under discussion, her argument that it has 
much in common with pre-Disney Miramax, in its eschewing of prestige-led discourse – and associated popular 
profile – in producing “commercial genre fare targeted to clearly defined and often underserved demographic 
groups such as young adults, African Americans, Latinos and ageing boomers.” (ibid., 109), and emphasising 
home media, on the basis that the Smart (aka white, middle-class, predominantly male, quasi-art-house) 
audience was oversaturated, is relevant.  In that Lions Gate also capitalised on work too controversial for the 
increasingly-corporatised quasi-independents (taking Fahrenheit 9/11 from Miramax-Disney in 2004), I would 
regard this as an indication of that sector’s growing rigidity during the period. 
 
179
 See King, 2009, 235-277 for a fuller consideration of Focus’s output and its place within Indiewood; his 
conclusion, with which I broadly agree, is that it demonstrates “a clear leaning towards the territory of 
Indiewood, as a particular kind of hybrid form, as opposed to the wider independent/specialty landscape.” (ibid., 
258).   
 
180
 Th!nkFilm released an unusually broad slate of off-beat feel-good films (Mongolian fable The Story of the 
Weeping Camel and spelling bee documentary Spellbound), work by filmmakers with art-house pedigree or 
existing name recognition (Gus Van Sant’s Gerry, Bright Young Things, comedian and writer Stephen Fry’s 
directorial debut), and controversial or difficult material which seemed likely to generate comment 
(documentary Born Into Brothels, scatological comedy history The Aristocats, and explicit sexual comedy 
Shortbus).  Its most prominent moment was 2006’s Half-Nelson, for which rising star Ryan Gosling was 
nominated for an Academy Award; however, it filed for bankruptcy in 2009, along with several other of founder 
David Bergstein’s companies including Capitol Films. 
 
181
 This brief survey – which neglects through lack of time and space any significant internet research, given that 
a search for “Darren Aronofsky Pi” generates 480,000 hits – was conducted through a Lexis-Nexis search 
focused on English-language newspaper accounts from 01/01/1997-31/12/1999. The resulting 280 records were 
cross-checked for duplicates (e.g. for the same piece running in different regional newspapers owned by a single 
publisher) and ‘Listings’ pieces were excluded unless they included significant commentary on the film 
(although it should be noted that almost all of them contained references to the film as a Sundance award-
winner).  I have included only a few industry accounts (e.g. those running in Variety) and those only to establish 
the film’s pre-release ‘credentials’ and positioning.  This left seventy-six different press pieces, coming from the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia and comprising national and regional press, 
from which I have drawn my conclusions.  
 
182
 Pi’s artwork reinforces this positioning as an art film/thriller; the background directly replicating the film’s 
grainy black-and-white stock, it features a single eye framed and shadowed in a manner which recalls both Un 
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Chien Andalou and The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari as well as calling upon associations with surveillance and 
paranoia, interrupted by a large red pi symbol in which digits are inscribed, with the ambiguous tag line “faith in 
chaos”.  Aronofsky’s name is more prominent than might be expected for a first-time director, and his status as a 
Sundance winner takes centre position within the frame; a quote from critic Janet Maslin emphasising its 
generic traits – “a bizarre and ingeniously paranoid thriller” – takes a strong position at the top of the frame.     
 
183
 Tzioumakis indicates that ‘autonomy’ is a relative concept during the period, Fox Searchlight having a 
production budget threshold of $15 million over which production decisions must be approved from the parent 
arm; Focus Features’ budget ceiling was twice that at $30 million, but with approval required for individual 
pictures (Tzioumakis, 2006, 264).  King argues that they still have a “significant degree of autonomy from their 
studio/corporate parent.” (King, 2009, 6), noting that “the heads of the division were quoted in 2004 as saying 
the studio had in no case blocked a project Focus wanted to pursue.” (ibid., 240) 
 
184
 King also explores generic contexts in a more elaborated sense in his earlier work American Independent 
Cinema (2005).  
 
 
Chapter Seven 
 
185
 The industrial position generated for these films was partially dependent on their textual qualities, but was 
sometimes linked to, as we have seen, discourses of auterism and prestige, and sometimes on public 
controversy, often generated by conventionally ‘inappropriate’ position-taking around issues of sex or violence 
(see Chapter Eight). For a fascinating related discussion, see Sally Bachner’s The Prestige of Violence (2011), 
which argues that in American fiction from the 1960s to date, violence carries “a peculiar prestige…These 
novels do not merely insist that violence lies at the centre of American life and of the project of fiction.  They 
locate in violence the ultimate source and site of authentically unmediated reality” (Bachner, 2011,2) 
 
186
 Jackrabbit Slim’s combines Scalextrix, a Richard Nixon lookalike as maitre d’, booths made from vintage 
cars, 1950s music performed by ‘Ricky Nelson’, themed food, and servers who resemble old Hollywood stars, 
like James Dean, Jerry Lewis, Marilyn Monroe, and Buddy Holly. 
 
187
 In one sequence, boxer Butch returns to his apartment to retrieve his treasured gold watch.  From the 
beginning of this scene to its conclusion with the unexpected death of (we have supposed) central character 
Vincent, is a period of almost six minutes without dialogue, added sound, or incidental music, although diegetic 
sound – most notably a toilet flushing and toaster ‘popping’, triggering Butch’s shooting of Vincent – is used to 
tremendous effect. 
 
188
 The timing of Christopher Walken’s delivery of lines such as: “Five long years he wore this watch, up his 
ass. Then he died of dysentery, he gimme [sic] the watch, I hid this uncomfortable hunk of metal up my ass two 
years…Now, little man, I give the watch to you” foregrounds comedic elements, thereby deflecting attention 
from the more problematic aspects.   
 
189
 Here, the insults ‘faggot’ and ‘lesbian’ are not insults related to sexual preference so much as tools 
reinforcing high school caste structures; sex is about power and rank, not pleasure or identity.           
 
190
 Newman notes that Solondz mentions TV sitcom The Wonder Years in relation to Dollhouse, as a work he 
could not ‘recognise’ or relate to, linking that to the ending, where the “bitter note amidst an ostensibly positive 
scene...is offered as the antidote to the idealization and distortion of reality in one mainstream other, the sitcom, 
with its routine of problems solved, of weekly happy endings.” (Newman, 2011, 123) 
 
191
 Music is used to strong effect in the film, in particular the provocative combination of highly sexualised and 
childish imagery in the music of the boys’ garage band. This reflects the way in which popular music links male 
sexual power with the infantilisation of women.  Dawn’s sexual awakening arrives as she listens to Steve 
singing about love being like “taking candy from a baby”, strongly paralleling the dominance/submission 
dynamic of her relationship with Brandon. The film’s title comes from a later song containing the lyrics “Love’s 
a confusing thing, in my suburban home, I feel so alone…little girl…Welcome to the dollhouse, I’ve got it all 
set up for you”.  Sung in a sexually suggestive manner, the darker side of the way in which sex and youth are 
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linked in popular culture is highlighted; later, the ‘real’ paedophile who abducts Missy is positioned as less 
emotionally destructive and sinister than the psychosexual drama in which Dawn is engaged.   
 
192
 Such as when Mark insinuates that Dawn is not attractive enough to be abducted, or the pretty and popular 
Mary Ellen Moriarty recounts her abduction story at a school assembly. 
 
193
 The film falters in its exploration of the weight of gendered sexuality is in its brief depiction of Ginger 
Friedman, a counterpart of Dawn’s.  Solondz appears to make the mistake of equating biological maturity with 
sexual maturity in what we see of Ginger: lying on a car kissing a much older man, with others drinking, and 
apparently in total control of her own sexuality despite her youth. Here, while the visual shorthand is perhaps 
understandable for such a short scene, its straightforward perpetuation of the ‘jailbait’ myth jars when the film 
challenges so many other positions on youth, sexuality, and the nature of coercion.  
 
194
 Her piano ‘serenade’ of Steve does indeed flip conventional gendered cinematic expectations; however, due 
to this reversal as much as because of Steve’s lack of interest Dawn, it fails to have the kind of effect it might 
have in a more mainstream teen film like Say Anything (Cameron Crowe, 1989).  
 
195
 There is no triumphal arc for Dawn, who achieves merely a wary solidarity with Mark, and an acceptance 
that she will never be truly ‘seen’ by her family. 
 
196
 While not strictly a generic element, it is worth mentioning the film’s soundtrack.  Taking a strongly techno 
or electro form, with work from electronic music pioneers such as Orbital and Autechre, links can be seen 
between this explicitly mathematically-based music (one might describe it as the contemporary musical 
expression or experience of maths for many listeners), and the fixation with the digital which it here underpins. 
This can be seen in the opening sequence, where electro music backs a display of numbers and neurons in a 
style resembling an underground club lightshow, or in the way in which it counterpoints abrupt jump cuts.  The 
soundtrack is the sole periodising agent of a narrative which occurs in a curiously timeless space. Here, it 
functions as a positioning tool, signified as relating to a particular generational or taste grouping. In this sense it 
forms both a route of access to the film and a restriction on its wider accessibility.  
 
197
 This is in stark contrast to much other sci-fi; the form often privileges a clean and modernist, or at least a 
‘digital’ aesthetic, and this more self-consciously retro mechanical style prefigures that of The Matrix, where the 
‘real’ world has strong resemblances to that of Dark City.  This is a matter of industrial as well as stylistic 
interest – both were partially shot at News Corporation’s Fox Studios Australia.      
 
198
 Higley, 2001, notes their strong resemblance to the eponymous Nosferatu (F.W. Murnau, 1922). 
 
199
 Conventional in many ways, it is worth noting that these are not uncomplicated representations for a sci-
fi/action film, drawing as they do on the history of the female noir character.  ‘Bad girl’ prostitute May is a 
devoted mother figure and indeed performs a mothering function for Murdoch, for which she is punished with 
death; ‘good girl’ Emma/Anna is a nightclub singer, a sexually-charged and historically-weighted role in the 
history of noir cinema, albeit an oddly asexual one in this case – Emma’s child-like singing voice is atypically 
‘innocent’.      
 
200
 It is worth here mentioning the design’s conscious attempt to compress architectural history and geography 
into one unpredictable locus, calling to mind the phrase “all that is solid melts into air”. Mike Wayne describes 
the strangers as “postmodernist bricoleurs” (Wayne, 2003, 216), and as production designer Patrick Tatopoulos 
describes the city’s layout, “the movie takes place everywhere, and it takes place nowhere. It’s a city built of 
pieces of cities. A corner from one place, another from some place else. So, you don’t really know where you 
are. A piece will look like a street in London, but a portion of the architecture looks like New York, but the 
bottom of the architecture looks again like a European city. You’re there, but you don’t know where you are. 
It’s like every time you travel, you’ll be lost.” (Wagner, 1997, 64)  More tellingly, as the rebellious Mr. Hand, 
whose hive-mind is strongly affected by the implantation of Murdoch’s human ‘memories’ says: “The city’s 
ours, we made it…We fashioned this city on stolen memories. Different eras, different pasts, all rolled into one. 
Each night we revise it, refine it, in order to learn…what makes you human…We need to be like you.”  Here, 
history is rendered unstable, and geography mutable; ideas of the transcendent human ‘soul’, supposedly eternal 
and precious, form the crux of the film’s moral code.   
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201
 The film gained cult status not simply in its own right but also in relation to the on-set death of young actor 
Brandon Lee.  
 
202
 Class featured prominently in teen pictures during the 1980s and particularly within the work of John 
Hughes.  However, as Shary points out, by the end of the 1980s “teen movies in general had lost much of their 
social and financial momentum…… class became just another issue in the comprehensive conflicts that 
inevitably influence young romantic struggles.” (Shary, 2011, 577)  Rushmore’s – albeit very low-key – 
inclusion of class as an element is significant.  However, Anderson’s disinclination to engage directly with 
Max’s class status, using it instead as colourful background material, lays the Smart film open to accusations of 
middle-class smugness.    
 
203
 Max and his companions stride slowly, in a manner reminiscent of the nouvelle vague or Tarantino’s 
homages to it, across campus as his extra-curricular activities are outlined. Many of them are very marginal 
activities, or Max’s performance in them clearly mediocre, not that he appears to care: editor of the Yankee 
Review, French Club president, Russia in model UN, stamp and coin club vice president, debate team captain, 
lacrosse team manager, calligraphy club president, astronomy society founder, fencing team captain, track and 
field junior varsity decathlon, 2
nd
 chorale choirmaster, bombardment society founder, Kung Fu club yellow belt, 
trap and skeet club founder, Rushmore beekeepers president, Yankee Racers founder, Max Fischer Players 
Director, Piper Cub flyer 4.5 hours logged. This intense desire for activity marks him out clearly as a kind of 
‘anti-Slacker’, although of course one could argue that psychologically Max’s tendency to busy himself beyond 
all reasonable expectations signifies an avoidance tactic of its own, a search for continual distraction as much as 
for community. 
 
204
 He is in some ways, for example, reminiscent of Ferris Bueller in his position as a trickster figure who sees 
himself as above and/or outside of the adult social world. 
 
205
 Speaking at a school assembly, factory owner Blume emphasises that although from a blue collar 
background, he is sending kids there because it’s one of the “best schools in the country”. He then goes on to 
say “Now, for some of you, it doesn’t matter. You were born rich, and you’re going to stay rich.  But here’s my 
advice to the rest of you: take dead aim on the rich boys.  Get them in the crosshairs. And take them down. Just 
remember: they can buy anything. But they can’t buy backbone.” 
 
206
 Kaveney (2006, 19, 41-42) regards this trope as important: in The Breakfast Club and Ferris Bueller’s Day 
Off, as well as Rushmore and Election, authority figures become embroiled in petty rivalries with teenagers, 
showing a mean-spiritedness, and/or lack of appropriate ‘adult’ perspective, necessary for narrative conflict.   
 
207
 The Blume brothers leave Rushmore for military school; in most teen films this would be coded as 
punishment or abandonment, however for the thuggish insensitive twins, Max’s diametric opposites, this counts 
as a happy ending. Clearly this ending avoids any potential slur to Blume’s ‘good (symbolic) father’ status, 
however it is also similar to the conclusion of another quasi-Smart teen picture, Election.  In this, lesbian 
Tammy is ‘punished’ for being a “troublemaker” by being sent to a Catholic all-girls school, where she falls in 
love.  Here, the traditional punishment of being sent to a convent in fact functions as a triumph or reversal, 
emphasising the classical teen film gap between adolescent and parental values and expectations.    
 
208
 As in many teen pictures, the idea of life as a masculine competition for sexual resources, and the lack of 
female entitlement to agency (passed from one male competitor to the other), are reinforced.  We see a high 
degree of intentional absurdity, as the object of Max’s affections is both a teacher and a grieving widow with 
fragmented personal boundaries.  Max is surrounded by a culture of sexualised bragging, where sexual activity 
is seen as an obligatory rite of passage, and his pursuit of Rosemary Cross is marked by his adoption of models 
of masculine behaviour which reveal themselves as both misogynistic and ineffectual.  Courting her with self-
consciously cool references to opera and wearing a red beret, Max utilises his comparative – although clearly 
inscribed as misguided and humorous – verbal sophistication and desire to behave in a socially-prescribed 
‘adult’ manner to wrong-foot and manipulate his target.  His behaviour would be described as aggressive, 
sinister and controlling in an adult or non-comedic context, but here is marked out as the product of a counterfeit 
adopted persona, exonerating Max.  It is also linked with Max’s conflicting desires to avail of the autonomy of 
adulthood, and to remain sequestered at Rushmore, producing an effect of distanced or complicated empathy for 
the obsessive and confused teenager. It is only when Cross punctures Max’s sense of himself as an adult, 
sexually powerful male that she manages to defuse his sense of entitlement to her, and Max’s fantasy of 
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ownership and ‘perfect’ intellectual harmony collapses in the face of her adult sexuality.  At the end Max courts 
Margaret, providing a rather pedagogical note on the importance (crucial within the teen picture genre) of 
aspiring to ‘appropriate’ sexual partners. It is useful to note, too, that the romantic climax takes place at a prom-
style dance, the traditional teen picture location for elaboration or recuperation of romantic ‘destinies’. 
 
209
 Maxine, in fact, is visually a rather contemporary noir figure, with her stark black-and-white clothing, dark 
lips, sharp haircut and omnipresent cigarette, in some ways she resembles a more hard-edged New York Mia 
Wallace.  
 
210
 In its linking of comedy with gender confusion and gendered roleplay, the film is part of a lengthy American 
heritage, along with films as diverse as Some Like It Hot (Billy Wilder, 1959), Tootsie (Sydney Pollack, 1982), 
The Birdcage (Mike Nichols, 1996), and Big Momma’s House (Raja Gosnell, 2002). 
 
211
 The academy is represented here by Malkovich’s ‘biographer’, and fictional Los Angeles Times National 
Arts Editor Christopher Bing (played by David Fincher), who describes him as “a technical genius”. It is also 
represented by the – seen as self-referential and seeking its own cultural capital above other considerations of 
authenticity – ‘artsy’ wing of Hollywood; this is seen in a parodic interview with Sean Penn, worried that if he 
moves into puppeteering too quickly “I’ll be deemed an imitator” but “once we all get the courage to just follow 
through on our instincts like Malkovich has, a lot of us will move into puppetry.”  The framing of Penn in front 
of a French poster for “The Crossing Guard, un film de Sean Penn” has clear semiotic underpinnings here – 
Penn’s public persona tends to be associated with both a kind of pretentious over-seriousness, and the crossing 
over from low to high(er) culture (as a former ‘Brat Pack’ member-turned-director).  The sly implication here is 
that Hollywood aspirations to art are related more to a desire to be seen as ahead of new trends than genuine 
creative conviction. 
 
212
 The phrase does not appear in any of Shakespeare’s known works, and the earliest reference to it I have 
found is in the title of the 1932 Arlen/Koehler song later made famous by Frank Sinatra. 
 
213
 The title American Beauty references several underpinnings of U.S. culture; as well as having a certain 
indexical likeness to the phrase ‘American Dream’, the rose for which it is named, and which recurs throughout 
in a series of highly sexualised fantasy sequences, is also known as ‘Miss All-American Beauty’.  The official 
flower of Washington D.C., it has a certain minor iconicity to its credit, and has featured in china patterns, 
lipstick names, and Frank Sinatra songs.  Potently, it is also the subject of a J.D. Rockefeller quote which 
equates, in a quasi-Darwinist fashion, the rose’s growth to the development of capitalism, in a manner which 
clearly means to align capitalism with supposed ‘natural law’: “The American Beauty rose can be produced in 
the splendour and fragrance which bring cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds which grow up 
around it. This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working-out of a law of nature and a law of 
God.” (cited in Arthur, 2004, 131) 
 
214
 Asked to produce a job description with the understanding that an unsatisfactory evaluation of his own 
attributes and contributions may result in dismissal, Lester’s response is to produce the following: “My job 
consists of basically masking my contempt for the assholes in charge and at least once a day retiring to the 
men’s room so I can jack off while I fantasize about a life that doesn’t so closely resemble hell.” As in 
Adaptation, masturbation presents here as a particularly masculinised symbol of the loss or waste of individual 
autonomy, personal creativity, or independence. 
 
215
 Kevin Spacey’s Oscar acceptance speech summarises the film’s preferred reading: “We got to see all of his 
worst qualities and we still got to love him.” See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCjt7PME5_E (Oscars 
channel).    
 
216
 While recognising that the film provides more space for Carolyn’s character development than might be the 
case in a more obviously mainstream film, a fuller reading of American Beauty from a feminist perspective 
could conclude that the only real ‘challenge’ to Lester’s personal autonomy is his wife’s success, and her 
determination to be seen to succeed.  It would also cast Lester as a sexual predator whose apparent change of 
heart regarding his fantasies of Angela is fuelled only by her virginity; that is, seeing her as another man’s future 
sexual property deters him, not her obvious vulnerability.  The framing of Jane and Ricky’s characters also 
provides for a reading of it as misogynistic.  For distant father Lester, the primary threat Jane presents is her 
potential lack of compliance.  Taunts of “You’d better watch yourself, Jane, or you’re going to turn into a real 
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bitch, just like your mother” reveal Lester’s true agenda: his assertion of victimhood, which must be transcended 
by the achievement of dominance over the women in his life.  Similarly, Ricky feigns compliance in order to 
survive his abusive family, and is rewarded for doing so (with Jane’s affection, and with an improbable $40,000 
stash earned through drug-dealing), and symbolically colludes with Lester in minimising Jane’s pain.  In a 
sequence which exists primarily (cynically?) to provide misdirection as to Lester’s killer, this is made clear 
through Ricky’s statement that his father is not ‘bad’, merely weak and afraid.  While he attempts to explain 
Jane’s repugnance towards Lester in Oedipal terms, Jane replies “I know you think my dad’s harmless, but 
you’re wrong. He’s doing massive psychological damage to me.”  We are however not encouraged to read 
Jane’s pain as centrally meaningful, because of the narrative demand that Lester remain dominant, and the 
inevitable comparison which must be made between Lester and Ricky’s father, the violent, closeted Fitz.  The 
implication is clear: if Ricky can forgive his bigoted authoritarian father, then Jane should adore hers, and 
resume her subservient position within the family hierarchy.   
 
217
 I would argue that the deep unpleasantness of Lester’s desire for Angela is partially suppressed by the casting 
of Kevin Spacey, whose fey, unthreatening persona and lack of excessively ‘masculine’ musculature directs 
attention away from his inappropriate actions and intentions towards her. 
 
218
 Christian figures feature throughout, with many of the characters given specific messianic functions; Neo as 
Christ, resurrected following ‘death’ at the hand of the Agents; Morpheus as John the Baptist, or at one point 
during his capture by Agent Smith, Lazarus; and Cypher as clearly-signalled Judas figure, betraying his 
comrades for the opportunity to return to oblivion. Trinity’s character is somewhat more complicated, and 
indeed her final major act within the narrative is to declare that Neo “can’t be dead...because I love you” and 
provide a fairytale kiss, with Neo as Sleeping Beauty.  In addition, the Oracle is clearly taken from Greek 
mythology – the film employs a promiscuous range of archetypes, in keeping with its rather pick-and-mix 
attitude elsewhere. 
 
219
 In particular the film references the wave of wire-work films which dominated Hong Kong martial arts 
cinema during the 1990s. Following from the more contemporarily-framed Triad films of the decade prior (for 
example the work of John Woo), wire-work films were often embedded in traditional wuxia fiction, almost 
analogous to the Japanese Samurai tradition.  Throughout the 1990s considerable cross-fertilisation of American 
and Asian cinema occurred, as increasing economic liberalisation in Asia led to its identification as a greater 
potential market, and the Hong Kong studios lost on- and off-screen talent to the opportunities Hollywood 
budgets could provide.  The likes of John Woo, Jet Li, Michelle Yeoh, Ang Lee, Zhang Ziyi and Chow-Yun Fat 
moved into Hollywood production and Hong Kong fight choreographer Yuen Woo Ping worked on the Kill Bill 
films as well as The Matrix.  However the flow has not been all one-way.  Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon 
(Ang Lee, 2000) was an American-Chinese-Hong Kong-Taiwanese co-production which became an unexpected 
international hit, as did Chinese production Hero ( Zhang Yimou, 2002).  While these films are in many ways 
different to The Matrix, they share common visual elements, and I do not believe it is too outlandish to suggest 
that the Wachowskis’ film may have paved the way for them outside Asia in more mainstream audience terms. 
See Cheuk (2008).  
 
220
 That the film has inspired a rash of popular philosophy books surely indicates its accessibility as a ‘teaching 
tool’, for all that it does not contain any terribly sophisticated thinking.   
 
221
 One of the more interesting perspectives the film shows us is that of (oddly conflicted) Agent Smith, who 
hyper-rationally asserts that humanity was judged by the machines and found wanting, saying “I tried to classify 
your species. You’re not actually mammals. Every mammal on this planet instinctively develops a natural 
equilibrium with the surrounding environment but you humans do not....[you are a] virus. Human beings are a 
disease, a cancer of this planet. You are a plague, and we are the cure.” 
 
222
 Without wishing to draw unfair comparisons, and acknowledging that 1999 was a comparatively unusual 
year in the depth and breadth of work which came to prominence at the box office, The Matrix’s real counterpart 
that year was perhaps most obviously Star Wars Episode 1: The Phantom Menace (George Lucas), and to a 
lesser extent the likes of The Mummy (Stephen Sommers) and Wild Wild West (Barry Sonnenfeld). To me the 
comparative sophistication of The Matrix is clear. 
 
223
 While Morpheus explains to Neo that he will die in real life if he dies in the Matrix, meaning that Neo and 
Trinity are indeed ‘killing’ the constructs with whom they battle, his earlier note that “many of them are so inert, 
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so hopelessly dependent on the system, that they will fight to protect it” can be interpreted more as an absolution 
of guilt more than as sociologically-based critique.  
 
224
 This calls to mind Fight Club more clearly than any of the other texts, in particular in the emphasis on the 
instability of the natural environment (or the psychological manifestation of such), the messianic cult of 
personality, the quasi-mystical references (although these are more quasi-political in Fight Club) which 
privilege belief over thought, the structuring of both films around various ‘tests’ which must be passed in order 
to access the authentic self.  
 
225
 Note: my references are taken from the original release version of the film. While the subsequent director’s 
cut, released in 2004, adds a great deal of background information, giving the narrative a more worked-through 
science-fiction rationale, I believe that what it adds in clarity, it minimises in tone, atmospherics and intensity. 
 
226
 To give a flavour of the cult appreciation the film continues to inspire, multiple still-active fan sites are 
associated with the film, its ideas, and its aesthetics. These  include not just the labyrinthine official website, 
itself originally a paratextual adventure extending far beyond the film (now available at http://archive.hi-
res.net/donniedarko/ ) but also para-paratexts, such as this guide on extracting maximum utility from the site 
itself: 
http://everything2.com/title/How+to+navigate+the+Donnie+Darko+website+with+some+degree+of+success 
This is in addition to the more ‘usual’ fandom hubs such as http://www.donniedarko.org.uk/ a site on which all 
manner of alternative interpretations of the film are posited. Booth (2008) also produces a consideration of the 
intermedial relationship between website and film.   
 
227
 This was particularly the case in Europe; the song which concludes the film, Tears for Fears’ Mad World, 
performed by Michael Andrews and Gary Jules became an international hit, reaching the coveted Christmas 
number one chart position in 2003.  The film joins Pulp Fiction and Lost In Translation as a one whose cross-
generic modal appeal was converted into cross-media appeal. 
 
228
 Catherine Driscoll includes it in her analysis of the contemporary teen picture, saying that “Donnie Darko 
may be a story about time travel, or about mental illness, but it is certainly a story about the disempowerment of 
youth.” (Driscoll, 2011, 106) 
 
229
 I see the opening sequence as directly referring to Smart forefather David Lynch’s Blue Velvet (1986), where 
the idyllic suburbs of Lumberton are disrupted by the discovery of a severed human ear. 
 
230
 This scene, while emphasising the period aspects and the importance of pop culture to teenage culture, and 
teen (hyper)sexuality, is reminiscent of  a similar set-piece in Reservoir Dogs where the characters discuss 
Madonna and the homoeroticism of Top Gun; the ironic reappropriation and manipulation of culture is a 
recurring trend in these films.  
 
231
 See Fontenot and Harris, 2010, for a history of the PMRC as public-interest group. 
 
232
 See for example Kaveney, who describes Ferris Bueller as a ‘trickster figure’, and notes that in Pretty in Pink 
and Some Kind of Wonderful “personal autonomy is threatened by the pursuit of status and approval [and 
characterised by] Hughes’ identification of moral uprightness with the anarchic and eccentric” (Kaveney, 2006, 
32-33). She identifies various archetypes or motif within the teen film, of which Donnie Darko mobilises 
several:  “the Lord of Misrule, the Humiliation of the Obsessive Authority Figure and that Authority Figure’s 
Persecution of the Weak...the Hierarchy of High School – in forms that crystallise them for later use.” (ibid., 
45).  There are also links with what she describes as Heathers’ ‘satirisation of therapeutic culture’.  The major 
absence from the film is the representation of “dysfunctional families and the way that parental expectations 
cripple adolescents” (Kaveney, 2006, 45).  Donnie’s family are supportive and affectionate, his parents 
concerned less with expectations than with managing the fallout of their son’s ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ 
diagnosis.  This is another indication that it functions not as a teen film per se, but grants teen film tropes a high 
degree of complexity and experiential ‘density’ in nostalgic recollection. 
 
233
 The police visit, during which each student is required to take a handwriting test to match against the 
perpetrator’s, can be related to ‘the frame-up and locker search’ which as Kaveny points out, is “a stock device 
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of teen films and television, obviously reflecting a genuine anxiety about the intrusion of authority figures into 
the private.” (Kaveney, 2006, 96) 
 
234
 In the director’s cut, it is worth noting that an extra scene featuers where Cherita is taunted with the phrase 
“Hey, Porky Pig? I hope you get molested”; this is reminiscent of the sadistic sexual taunting of Welcome to the 
Dollhouse. 
 
235
 Additionally, if we refer to the director’s cut, Donnie’s acceptance of his fate will, it is implied, save the 
world from being sucked into a wormhole, giving his early exchange with Gretchen – “Donnie Darko, what the 
hell kind of name’s that, it’s like some sort of superhero or something.” “What makes you think I’m not?” a 
resonance the original version does not have; here, the exchange serves more as courtship ritual, and prefigures 
only his saving of Gretchen, not the world.  
 
236
 Indeed, Pomeroy’s defence, “it’s meant to be ironic” is directly reminiscent of Sconce’s note that “[t]o speak 
in an ironic tone is instantly to bifurcate one’s audience into those who ‘get it’ and those who do not. The entire 
point of ironic address is to ally oneself with sympathetic peers and to distance oneself from the vast ‘other’ 
audience, however defined, which is often the target of the speaker’s or artist’s derision.” (Sconce, 2002, 352) 
 
237
 In the teen film, property destruction is often framed as a strategy of resistance to forces beyond teenage 
control, and sometimes (although not here) carries distinct references to social class.  
 
238
 Bordwell regards ambiguity as the key unifying principle of the art film – “Thus the art film solicits a 
particular reading procedure: Whenever confronted with a problem in causation, temporality, or spatiality, we 
first seek realistic motivation…If we’re thwarted, we next seek authorial motivation…Uncertainties persist but 
are understood as such, as obvious uncertainties, so to speak.  Put crudely, the slogan of the art cinema might be, 
‘When in doubt, read for maximum ambiguity.’ ” (Bordwell, 1979, 60)  
 
239
 The film is to a certain extent factually based: “Kaufman did indeed have a contract to adapt the Orlean book, 
but he developed a severe case of writer’s block, broken only when he conceived the idea of thematizing the 
screenwriting struggle itself.  Thus Adaptation is simultaneously an adaptation and an original screenplay, one 
which turns a non-fiction book into a fictional adventure……for the neo-Aristotelian McKee, stories should be 
about realities, not the mysteries of writing, yet the mysteries of writing are precisely the focus of Adaptation.” 
(Stam & Raengo, 2005, 1-2) 
 
240
 An aspect of this, too, is the casting of Nicolas Cage as Charlie and Donald.  His early career had been 
characterised by self-consciously ‘quirky’ performances, such as those in Peggy Sue Got Married (Francis Ford 
Coppola, 1986) and in the work of such proto-Smart filmmakers as the Coen brothers (Raising Arizona, 1987) 
and David Lynch (Wild At Heart, 1990), and Oscar-winning for his work in Leaving Las Vegas (Mike Figgis, 
1995).  In the years immediately prior to Adaptation, Cage had been best-known for a variety of idiosyncratic, 
over-the-top action performances. These included roles in The Rock (Michael Bay, 1996), Con Air (Simon West, 
1997), Face/Off (John Woo, 1997) and Gone In Sixty Seconds (Dominic Sena, 2000).  In that sense, his 
performance as flabby, ineffectual Charlie and naïve buffoon Donald was somewhat at odds with his persona 
during that period, for all that it does not constitute a particular departure when his career as a whole is taken 
into account.    
 
241
 Sconce’s, “bespectacled audiences” (Sconce, 2002, 349) of Smart film. 
 
242
 The psychoanalytic device of locating Charlie’s identity crisis as much in his sibling relationship as in his 
personal environment (primarily his creative work) means that the film’s identity politics are actually more 
submerged than might be expected, given Charlie’s simultaneously self-absorbed and questing, philosophically-
adrift, personality.  However it is worth noting in relation to resemblances with many of the rest of these films, 
that Charlie is reacting to what appears to all intents a somewhat successful career, or the prospect of impending 
success (which the self-selecting Smart viewer will ‘know’ he has attained). Similarly, Orlean has achieved a 
high degree of professional success within a specifically bourgeois intellectual environment.  Their various acts 
of fear, self-loathing, and self-destruction therefore function as the kind of middle-class rejection of 
conventional social or professional mores which also attend films like Fight Club and American Beauty, for all 
that they are subtext here rather than text.  
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 An example of the way in which Adaptation calls upon diverging/doubled perspectives on film is the way in 
which the phrase “Laroche, he’s such a fun character, isn’t he?”, or variations of it, recur. The first time we hear 
it is during Charlie and Valerie’s early script lunch, during which he is positive and enthusiastic about the 
prospect of adapting that “great, sprawling New Yorker stuff”, and about his own prospects of remaining faithful 
to Orlean’s source material.  The second time follows a scene in which Laroche and Orlean have an intimate 
phone conversation in which he reveals (and which we see in an ‘insert’) the poignant details of the crash in 
which his mother and uncle died, and following which his wife left him.  Orlean too reveals her emotions, her 
sense of being trapped, saying “I think if I almost died I would leave my marriage too…Because I could. 
Because it’s like a free pass. Nobody can judge you if you almost died.” This scene links directly to Orlean’s 
lunch meeting with Valerie, during which the executive repeats the ‘fun character’ phrase; if the previous scene 
is about deep emotional connection, this is about the commodification of that connection, revealing the deeply 
ambivalent perspective the film takes on the practice of movie-making.  The phrase occurs one last time, as 
Orlean relates it to Laroche, whose response is “No shit, I’m a fun character”, and the conviction that he should 
play himself in the film; in this last instance the film presents this complex, doubled view of itself, but still 
makes conventional claims on the idea of a logic-bound, cohesive diegesis.  
 
244
 Richard Armstrong describes it as a “narrative of displacement” (Armstrong, 2010, 139) and marks its 
resemblance to art cinema classic Hiroshima Mon Amour (Alain Resnais, 1959), as well as noting that it 
combines road movie and melodrama elements. 
 
245
 As Justin Horton points out, the restriction of audible dialogue renders the final conversation between Bob 
and Charlotte forever mysterious, constituting a significant disruption of the classical ending, as “few cinematic 
conventions are as doggedly adhered to as the insistence on clarity of speech. Audiences, it seems, can tolerate 
fractured chronology, ellipses, or narrative irresolution, but the withholding or occlusion of the voice is 
experienced as an unusual and unsettling disruption.”  (Horton, 2013, 4)  
 
246
 Todd Kennedy describes Coppola’s work as having “an aesthetic that simultaneously invokes foundational 
gaze theory, comments upon postfeminist concerns about consumption as a ‘feminine’ ideal, and attempts to 
mirror and reverse macho tropes from the 1960s and 1970s male auteur movement, which includes her 
father...critics and audiences themselves struggle with what to do with Coppola’s films, placing her in the 
middle of categories that have always remained at odds within film criticism: male and female, mainstream and 
independent, feminism and auteurship.” (Kennedy, 2010, 37-38)  Not least due to the marginalisation of many 
female directors, his sense of Coppola as occupying a liminal space contributes to the ‘independent’ framing of 
her work as much as the texts themselves.  That notwithstanding, I believe certain aspects of her approach are 
distinctively female-oriented, from the opening shot of Charlotte’s underwear-clad buttocks, which both 
eroticises her and renders her semi-nudity mundane, to the tiny detail of her applying lipstick in her room (as 
play or distraction, not strategic attraction for the opposite sex, as the gesture is often coded), as well as the 
ikebana (flower arranging) class which privileges the idea of women engaged in a communal activity in their 
own space.  It is also evident in Charlotte and Bob’s accidental visit to a lapdancing club.  Rather than 
objectifying the dancer, Bob sits uncomfortably on his hands; as she does a dramatic backbend, he almost 
instinctively (and paternally) reaches out to grab her, and after Charlotte ‘rescues’ him, awkwardly thanks her 
outstretched legs before leaving.  The scene in which Bob rejects a prostitute is racially problematic, but 
sexually straightforward. In many films, engagement (or flirtation) with the sex industry is included as ‘proof’ 
of conventional virility or masculinity; here, disengagement from it is presented as sexual and moral confidence.  
Coppola’s work may be ‘post-feminist’ enough to include these tropes, but it is feminist enough to implicitly 
critique them. 
 
247
 For the previous decade, Shields had largely confined himself to remixing and producing for artists such as 
Placebo and Yo La Tengo, as well as touring with Primal Scream and contributing to work from Dinosaur Jr. 
and the Manic Street Preachers.  He had also composed music for a Canadian dance troupe, but had not released 
any original work during this period. 
 
248
 These are extra-textual references, but ones which figure significantly in discursive representations of 
Coppola (and perhaps in a more prominent way than if she were a male director); her clothing label ‘Milk Fed’ 
was founded in cooperation with Kim Gordon of famed indie group Sonic Youth, and her husband and long-
time musical collaborator is Thomas Mars, of internationally-known French indie band Phoenix. 
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 While they remain outside the scope of this work, accusations of racism have been levelled against the film, 
culminating at the time of its release in the “Lost In Racism” campaign urging Screen Actors Guild and 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences members to vote against the film in its nominated categories (see 
Wright, 2004).  Some elements are explicitly problematic, such as when Bob jokes that Charlotte’s “black toe” 
will end up on a restaurant menu, or the repeated jokes regarding the supposed Japanese difficulty in 
distinguishing ‘l’ sounds from ‘r’. Others are more implicitly so, as when Bob is sent a “Premium Fantasy” 
prostitute, whom he rebuffs, but whose attempted seduction and/or shakedown carries a deliberate 
incomprehensibility, approaching an ‘orientalist’ view of non-white women as problematically, uncontrollably 
hypersexual.  
 
250
 Charlotte and Bob both toy with the commercialised self-exploration offered by self-help; the audiobook 
which Charlotte silently mocks herself for listening to is perplexingly and presumably deliberately obscurantist: 
“Did you ever wonder what your purpose in life is? This book is about finding your soul’s purpose or destiny. 
Every soul has its path. But sometimes, that path is not clear. The inner map theory is an example of how each 
soul begins with an imprint, all compacted into a pattern, that has been selected by your soul before you’ve even 
gotten here.” 
 
251
 Here it is useful to note that Abel (2010) links what he terms ‘postromance’ with globalisation: “a recently 
emerging ‘genre’ of international art house ﬁlms that engage issues of love, sex, dating, and romance, usually 
set in contemporary urban environments....present[ing] audiences with an essentially pessimistic outlook on 
romantic relationships.  The characters populating such postromance environments could be argued to enact the 
‘success’ of the feminist intervention since the 1960s. They have grown up with the awareness that marriage is 
neither the necessary nor the ‘normal’ framework one needs in postadolescent life, and they share the post-1968 
skepticism of the traditional “ideal” of lifelong, monogamous relationships....symptomatic of the age of 
neoliberal finance capitalism, with its imperative for citizens to be hypermobile workaholics... socioeconomic 
pressures manifest themselves on the private level, where the demands of fast-paced contemporary social life 
hinder one’s ability to maintain the different temporality required for developing and sustaining a romantic 
relationship.” (Abel, 2010, 77)  
 
252
 Todd McGowan links visual, linguistic, and capitalist excess in his psychoanalytic analysis of the film, 
noting that the characters’ resistance of this, their focus on absence rather than excess, is what unites them; also 
that Charlotte resists attempts to position her as the stereotypical ‘consuming female’ of much classical cinema, 
with her minimalist makeup and clothing. As he describes it, the aesthetic “suggests an association of enjoyment 
with absence – an association that has become counterintuitive for subjects of global capitalism.  Though the 
film foregrounds the excess of global capitalist culture, it depicts this excess in such a way that it no longer 
seems excessive. That is to say, Coppola’s aesthetic at once highlights excess and associates this excess with 
absence.” (McGowan, 2007, 56) 
 
253
 Their actions, and occasionally dialogue, such as when Vivian suggests, feet up on her desk in a classic 
‘gumshoe’ pose, that Albert should “go home, let sleeping dogs lie”, engage cinephile references to the hard-
boiled PIs of detective film, but as with all characters here, these references are engaged satirically.    
 
254
 Carol Vernallis links Gondry’s choice of Carrey as actor with both the heritage of silent film and with one of 
the newest media forms, the music video: “In a way it returns us to the silent era, particularly to a form of 
typage used by Eisenstein. Music video directors have to find shots that possess signs of human emotion 
powerful enough for the images to project over the music; but the performers, while usually polished and self-
assured, are not actorly.  Second, music videos do not present classical performances because they lack 
cause/effect, action/reaction relationships, except in the most fanciful ways.” (Vernallis, 2008, 286)  While it is 
interesting to observe the stylistic link between Gondry’s considerable and impressive body of work as a music 
video director and his filmmaking, I believe her comparison does neither Gondry’s direction nor Carrey’s subtle 
and nuanced performance any favours; however, it is interesting in locating Joel as an ‘Everyman’ via the idea 
of  Eisensteinian typage. 
 
255
 One of the reasons, I believe, that this film resonates so clearly with many viewers outside of the traditional 
Smart audience is that despite its formal unconventionality it adheres to the ‘emotional logic’ of much more 
conventional romantic comedies; in the resolution of Joel and Clementine’s clearly dysfunctional relationship 
we hear the echoes of that most formulaic of rom-com definitions of love – “You complete me” (Jerry Maguire, 
dir. Cameron Crowe, 1996). 
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 Stranger Than Fiction (Marc Forster, 2006) provides an interesting counterpoint; while it contains elements 
reminiscent of Eternal Sunshine, including a protagonist who discovers that he is in fact a fictional character 
facing imminent ‘erasure’ through his author’s desire to kill him off, these elements are directed towards much 
more conformist ends. The formally conventional and indeed reassuring nature of the structure militates against 
complex readings; it is clearly influenced by the kind of philosophical and epistemological questions asked by 
the likes of Kaufman, but retains much more of the predictable overtones of mainstream comedy.  I therefore 
count it more as a result of Smart influence operating within the mainstream than a Smart film per se. 
257
 This idea of ‘uncertainty’ as an organising principle of the film’s narrative construction extends to its visual 
and sound aesthetic, and is used to acute effect in illustrating the dream-like nature of Joel’s erasure experience, 
as well as the effects it has on his mind.  Much of the visual interplay between the narrative structure and the 
visual elements is devoted to symbolically representing both the labyrinthine workings of the human mind, and 
the loss of self that goes with the loss of Joel’s memories. He is literally left ‘in the dark’ as lights wink out 
behind him, and the world of his mind becomes akin to a stage-set, full of darkened, oppressively small 
corridors, and entrances and doors which offer impossible transitions. 
258
 It must be noted that within the gender politics of conventional film, childlike behaviour is not seen as 
problematic when performed by a female; behaviour such as Clem’s – for example chanting “Slidy slidy, slidy 
slidy” at the Charles River – would be construed quite differently if performed by Joel. 
 
259
 The place of the ‘Other’ is curiously complex within the world of much Smart film, where rather than 
employ simple oppositions of ‘good guy’ versus ‘bad guy’, or drawing explicit (laboured, even perhaps clichéd 
in the context of interpretation by our notional media hyper-literate Smart audience) analogies between 
conflicting characters, contrasts and parallels are inscribed in more complex ways. Fight Club combines them in 
to sinister effect in the form of Tyler Durden; Adaptation features troubled twins Charlie and Donald Kaufman 
(enriched by our extra-textual knowledge that Nicolas Cage is playing both); I ♥ Huckabees, with its ‘African 
Guy’ and the concept of ‘Othering’ (Albert Markowski and Tommy Corn) as part of a process of philosophical 
and personal development.  
 
260
 One could argue that this becomes something of a commentary on the Mulveyan ‘male gaze’, with 
Clementine positioned as a cipher onto which men (both the fictional men, Joel and Patrick, and the potential 
male viewer) express their own desires; her wishes as a person are denied by Joel, who believes she can save 
him from himself, and his constructed/reconstructed memories of her perform the same action.  The ‘real’ 
Clementine is dishevelled, roots showing, skin flaking, ‘falling apart’ whereas the recalled/imagined Clementine 
is clear-skinned and beautiful; this is in one sense a commentary on the way nostalgia colours memory, and 
indeed the way that love alters visions of the loved one.  But Clementine’s problem is a problem of 
representation both within and for the film, one that dovetails with Kaufman’s original, more pessimistic, ending 
rather more clearly than with the finished product. 
261
 The nature of the immediate, visceral (if one can use the term in relation to an activity so explicitly cerebral) 
access to his memories provided by the erasure renders the experience similar to the practice of Gestalt therapy: 
a form of psychotherapy emphasising the idea that the ‘client’ must alter their own Weltanschauung in order to 
function more appropriately within the world (Woldt and Toman 2005). Crucially it is a form of therapeutic 
process which focuses on lived experience, and on the present:   
The aim of Gestalt therapy is the awareness continuum...where what is of greatest concern and interest 
to the organism, the relationship, the group or society becomes Gestalt, comes into the foreground 
where it can be fully experienced and coped with (acknowledged, worked through, sorted out, changed, 
disposed of, etc.) so that it can melt into the background (be forgotten or assimilated and integrated) 
and leave the foreground free for the next relevant gestalt.” (Perls, 1976, 221-222 [italics as per 
original]) 
Joel’s forcible reintroduction into his own memories forms the foundation of precisely this kind of process, 
whereby he makes therapeutic amendments to his own Weltanschauung. 
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 We can regard this as a refreshing turn away from the ethics of the conventional romantic comedy, in that it 
shows a progressive politics of gender which does not require that the female partner serve as moral and 
philosophical boundary-keeper to the more unrestrained male – ‘the one who can tame him’, so to speak.   
263
 The sequence illustrating Joel as a baby is particularly interesting. For all that it is clearly played for comic 
effect, the absurdity of adult Joel in a child’s patterned pyjamas heightened by the over-sized furniture placing 
him at a child’s level, fascinated by his own strong desire to be picked up by his mother, it also links several of 
the film’s threads.  One of the primary factors here is the extent to which the audience is assumed to have a 
working knowledge of modern psychology.  While the film would presumably function (in the sense of creating 
pleasure) without this, an acquaintance with Freudian psychoanalysis enriches the viewing experience, allowing 
a more elaborated understanding of how Joel manages his ‘strategy’ of (temporary) escape from Lacuna’s 
clutches. 
 
264
 Taking the chicken from his plate (an intimate but ‘familiar’ gesture) is one instance, others are her breaches 
of the normative socio-sexual order in questioning whether the person he lives with is male or female, and her 
assertion that (as they are in the house of Ruth and David Laskin) “I’d prefer to be Ruth but I’m flexible”.  The 
suggestion that Clementine wishes them to temporarily assume the Laskins’ identities dovetails with this film’s 
preoccupation with constructions of personal identity.  
 
265
 The title of the film comes from Alexander Pope’s 1717 poem Eloisa to Abelard, a retelling of the tragic 12th 
century love story. Separated after their secret marriage, with her confined to a convent and him castrated, their 
famous letters are an exploration of human and divine love.  Pope’s poem outlines Heloise’s wish that memories 
of Abelard be obliterated in order to end her suffering.   
266
 In some ways the film functions rather as a screwball comedy, taking Sikov’s conclusion that the word 
‘screwball’ “successfully brought together a number of connotations in a slang and streetwise term: lunacy, 
speed, unpredictability, unconventionality, giddiness, drunkenness, flight and adversarial sport” (Sikov, 1989, 
19) – for all that it locates these primarily within Joel’s mind, rather than in the world outside him.  It also plays 
on the timeline within the romantic comedy framework, complicating Shumway’s assertion (2003) as described 
by McDonald Jeffers, that “romance and marriage have opposing goals, which explains both real-life endemic 
dissatisfaction with the married state and the need for romantic comedies to end before the couple embarks on 
married life.” (McDonald Jeffers, 2007, 13) 
267
 These also call to mind surreal detective series Twin Peaks, which cultivated the sense of teenagers as 
knowingly sexual and aggressive, rather than mindlessly or delinquently so. 
 
268
 This links Brick as much with other strands of Smart cinema which privilege noir elements (Reservoir Dogs, 
Pulp Fiction, Dark City, Memento, and Pi) as it does with the teen film. 
269
 One could at a pinch draw on references to Bugsy Malone (Alan Parker, 1976), which tells a more or less 
classical gangster story – to occasionally queasy effect – with a cast of child actors and cream pie weaponry. See 
also an interview with director Rian Johnson entitled “Drugsy Malone”, a somewhat glib title which however 
makes this link clear (Garnett, 2006). 
 
270
 Laura’s sung performance of a jazz version of a song from that school musical staple, The Mikado, makes 
strong references to the noir and parodic noir trope of the treacherous chanteuse, from Gilda (Charles Vidor, 
1946) to Emma in Dark City, Isabella Rossellini in Blue Velvet, and even Jessica Rabbit (Who Framed Roger 
Rabbit, Robert Zemeckis, 1988).  Until her exposure as the manipulative hand behind much of the mystery, 
Laura functions as a combined ‘woman of mystery’ and ally, in the mode of Veronica Lake’s Joyce Harwood, 
of 1946 Raymond Chandler adaptation The Blue Dahlia. 
 
271
 The other particular spatio-geographic marker employed is the school locker; further work could be usefully 
done on its incidence in the teen film, but here it functions as dead-drop (for paper notes, giving the film an 
appropriately retro feel) and as oddly private-public space, the nearest thing to significant ‘property’ a teenager 
may own, but vulnerable to legitimised predation by the authorities – or treacherous fellow students.  
 
272
 This is the antithesis of the language of something like Dawson’s Creek, which gives its monologuing, 
implausibly super-articulate teenagers something of the quality of puppets. 
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 The emphasis on The Pin’s age - he is “supposed to be old, like twenty-six” – again emphasises the sense of 
separation of teenage from adult life, the intensity of its almost cult-like binds. 
 
274
 The ‘world without adults’ is so clearly delineated that breaching it for narrative reasons diffuses the generic 
complexity which the film has created.  Brendan has in the past provided Truemanhim with information 
regarding a drug dealer in an effort to prevent Emily becoming hooked on drugs.  This allows Brendan both to 
evade accusations of being a ‘snitch’ (permissible in neither teen nor ‘noir’ codes) and gain a certain amount of 
disciplinary flexibility.  While in the classical form, the trickster or rebel often works to disrupt the hierarchical 
structures of school, the tone employed is usually playful.  A key element in teen-adult ‘nemesis’ relationships 
within the classical format is the process by which the adult debases or humiliates themselves in the process of 
exacting petty revenge.  As Trueman functions as an adult and professional at all times, this impression of parity 
seems generically forced – although it does parallel the detective-chief relationship of police drama – and 
Trueman is distanced from the narrative from then on. 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
275
 Dussere describes it as a “postmodern neo-noir……[feauring] the alienated mood, the stylized “realism,” and 
the skepticism about the American mainstream that we recognize as noir” (Dussere, 2006, 18-23). 
 
276
 A convention has arisen whereby the diegetic character played by Brad Pitt is referred to as ‘Tyler Durden’ 
and that played by Edward Norton is referred to as ‘Jack’ after his occasional references to that name – I see no 
reason not to adopt this convention. 
 
277
 See Diken and Laustsen (2002) for a discussion of how the film represents an exploration of “micro-fascism” 
in the network society. 
 
278
 Fight Club holds to the tradition of the ‘unreliable narrator’; more specifically, Jack/Tyler functions as what 
Voker Ferenz calls “the pseudo-diegetic character-narrator (that is, the character-narrator who ‘takes over’, and 
thus appears to be in the driving seat, of the narration…) whom we treat like ‘real persons’ and ‘new 
acquaintances’ and whom we can hold ‘responsible’ for being unreliable about the facts of the fictional 
world…a clearly identifiable fictional scapegoat with sufficient ‘authority’ over the narrative as a whole whom 
we can blame for textual contradictions and referential difficulties.”  (Ferenz, 2005, 135) 
 
279
 See Bernstein, 2002 for a psychoanalytically-grounded take on the pleasures of ‘doubling’, and the way in 
which they might be revealed or intensified by re-watching.  
 
280
 The film’s take on the scopophilic pleasures offered by the presence of so much bared flesh is also somewhat 
mixed – not to mention the eroticism with which the camera treats the body, with lingering close-ups on 
musculature, blood and sweat (interestingly, Iocco, 2007, links this eroticism strongly to Gothic tendencies, and 
Ruddell (2007) also sees Gothic play in the ‘splitting’ of Jack and Tyler).  The homosocial and homoerotic 
nature of the film has also been discussed, in particular by Brookey and Westerfelhaus (2002, 2004) who note 
not just the innuendo-laden dialogue between Jack and Tyler, nor their erotic objectification of the camera, but 
the framing of other fighters, “often caught posing in ways reminiscent of the men who populate the drawings of 
such homoerotic artists as Tom of Finland, as well as more explicit forms of gay pornography… the intense and 
knowing glances and occasional winks exchanged by members of Fight Club when they encounter one another 
in public places.” (Brookey and Westerfelhaus, 2004, 314)  This homoeroticism is explicitly countered by Jack 
and Marla’s conventional heterosexual reunion at the end.  While Jack and Tyler discuss male appearance in the 
context of ‘metrosexual’ valuations, saying “I felt sorry for guys packed into gyms, trying to look like how 
Calvin Klein or Tommy Hilfiger said they should…Is that what a man should look like?”, any critique of 
pressure on men to abide by certain visual ‘standards’ is complicated by the continued fetishisation of Tyler’s 
glossy musculature and prominent V-lines.  Jack pulling a tooth out and dropping it down the drain may feature 
as a sign of renunciation of physical vanity, but does not undercut the predominant fetishisation of the body 
which recurs throughout.  Interestingly, only at one moment does Tyler produce a sign of vanity, checking his 
reflection in a wing-mirror following a climactic fight with Jack; this serves as a reflection of the narcissism that 
underpins the Jack/Tyler crisis rather than a nod to the politics of the body.  
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 This links with Sisco King’s fascinating framing of the film as illustrating the means through which 
hegemonic systems perpetuate themselves here through abjection.  For her, the film is characterised by “a 
pervasive strategy of obfuscation, ambiguity, and symbolic playfulness that perpetuates white masculinity’s 
privilege as an ideological formation and subject position…… Just as the men of Fight Club…experience 
pleasure and privilege from their ability to transgress and cross borders, hegemonic white masculinity benefits 
from its ability to remain amalgamated and diffuse. (Sisco King, 2009, 367) Her close reading emphasises the 
power relations which dominate masculinity contemporary culture: in particular I find her point that the very 
existence of Fight Club is dependent on the willingness to transgress – in order for there to be a Fight Club, 
people must break its first rule – convincingly argued.   
 
282
 For Barker, this process is fundamental to the way in which the film’s politics are fundamentally regressive, 
pointing towards a mythologisation of a supposedly more free or fruitful imagined or former state of being; to 
achieve sublimation to the demands of a fascist mindset “require[s] a méconnaissance or misconstruction of the 
self in terms of an ideal other, and for the narrator, manifests itself in a literal misrecognition of Tyler Durden.” 
(Barker, 2008, 180) While I do not fully concur with her wider point, the links she makes between Jack’s 
misconstruction of his own self and the aestheticisation of politics and violence are well made 
 
283
 Additionally, therapy culture here is framed as a ‘feminine’ activity, built on (assumed) feminine values of 
talk and physical intimacy – the group leader sees “courage” in the room, but it is defined by ‘support’ as crying 
and hugs – dominated by Marla, which therefore must be abandoned in pursuit of a more ‘masculine’ way.  In 
the same way, Bob has grown “bitch tits” from steroid abuse, and abandons therapy culture for Fight Club; 
significantly, this abandonment of the supposedly ‘controlled’ feminine for the aggressive masculine model is 
the cause of his death.   
 
284
 Much of the film’s language is strongly evocative of religious terminology of a patriarchal nature; the film is 
in that sense about a search for search for God as father, as community.  Bob, with whom, at a support group, 
Jack first finds release from insomnia (“Every evening I died, and every evening I was resurrected.”) is “huge 
the way you think of God as big.”  The support group where cancer sufferer Chloe breaks the taboo of sexual 
desire in the terminally ill is described as “tonight’s communion.”  Tyler uses a long string of patriarchal-
religious imagery when burning Jack to bring him closer to “premature enlightenment”, telling him “Our fathers 
were our models for god. If our fathers bailed, what does that tell you about god? You have to consider the 
possibility that god does not like you, never wanted you, in all probability he hates you. We don’t need him. We 
are god’s unwanted children? So be it!…You’re one step closer to being God.”  In her interesting analysis of the 
religious elements of the film, Lockwood links the psychopathology model of cult recruitment, ideological 
fundamentalism and consumer culture, while noting that it is “deeply impregnated with traditional Christian 
themes of asceticism and self-denial, which fundamentally oppose the ideology of Western modernity.” 
(Lockwood, 2008, 331)1 
 
285
 As Giroux and Szeman put it, “Tyler hates consumerism but he values a ‘Just Do It’ ideology appropriated 
from the marketing strategists of the Nike corporation and the ideology of the Reagan era” (Giroux and Szeman, 
2001, 100).  Similarly, Bedford regards the film as “a commercially driven, anti-progressive, Trojan horse” 
(Bedford, 2011, 49).  
 
286
 Gronstad (2003) argues that this conclusion is a recuperative one, in that the film “seems to intend a radical 
decentring of the identity politics of the male hero, perhaps to the extent of admitting that masculinity is not 
only a construction but in fact a vacant signifier. When even the last possibility for regaining a sense of durable 
manhood – bodily violence – ultimately falls short, it is tempting to read Jack’s execution of his alter ego at the 
end of the film as the completion of a long process of symbolic divestiture.” (Gronstad, 2003, 5-6)  I tentatively 
agree with this, however the space the film allows for this to develop is so narrow – as the final sequences’ drive 
to resolve narrative and generic concerns predominates – that these matters are somewhat swept aside.  
 
287
 While retrospective accounts by participants cannot always be regarded with a degree of seriousness, in the 
knowledge that hindsight and personal involvement will inevitably result in partiality, incompleteness and self-
justification, I use Waxman’s account here as it forms as thorough a chronicle of the film’s industrial origins as I 
have found despite not being ‘academic’.  The tone she adopts, this being a somewhat hagiographic account, 
functions largely as mythmaking.   
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 Indeed, part of the mythology – and I would argue, the success – of the film lies with the studio’s supposedly 
horrified initial reaction to the film’s screening, which as with Happiness, figures as a marker of prestige, of 
creative daring, in the film’s eventual cult success.  In the Waxman narrative, and others which rely on an 
excessively auteur-based perspective on production processes (Linson, 2002; Biskind, 2005; Mottram, 2006) 
disputes like these are presented as almost entirely person-centred; as crusades or missions, with the plucky 
auteur director – occasionally replaced or augmented by a ‘maverick’ production executive who shares and 
supports the auteur’s singular creative vision (for Fight Club, Bill Mechanic or Art Linson) – struggling to 
combat the brutal force of metrics-driven studio executives who would neuter all innovation.  It would be a 
mistake to regard this circuit of proscription and negotiation as anything out of the ordinary; script-, daily- or 
full cut-based bargaining processes, in which a studio may for example exchange a notional nipple in one scene 
for a theoretical violent death in another, are quite standard for Hollywood productions at all levels. In sum, the 
total time cut from the film amounted to just fifteen minutes: hardly the stuff of deadlock, or creative hostage-
taking.     
 
289
 As an example, Miramax had paid a record $10 million to acquire the distribution rights of the 1996 Billy 
Bob Thornton piece Sling Blade – a film with a $1m production budget, and a wholly unknown star/director.  
The tendency for even the more conservative studios to align themselves with potentially troublesome material 
can be more easily understood in the light of box office figures for Sling Blade: $34 million returns worldwide, 
and $24 million of that in domestic sales. 
 
290
 Mechanic appears to have been a driving force in production, and a staunch defender of the film (see King, 
2009, 146, 228) against Fox head Rupert Murdoch as much as anyone else (see Waxman, 135-137) – the 
importance of personal relationships to the politics of production should not be underestimated, in a variety of 
ways.   
 
291
 While some of Fox Searchlight’s lower-budget small acquisitions had done large international business – 
Boys Don’t Cry (Kimberley Peirce, 1999), with its $2 million budget and $11.5 million return the most recent of 
them – its incursions into larger projects had been disastrous: Jack Nicholson vehicle Blood and Wine (Bob 
Rafaelson, 1996 took just over $1 million from an outlay of $26 million; The Ice Storm (Ang Lee, 1997) was 
critically-acclaimed but not financially lucrative; more adventurous pieces like Oscar and Lucinda (Gillian 
Armstrong, 1997) and Titus (Julie Taymore, 1999) were mid-budget failures, and Smilla’s Sense of Snow (Bille 
August, 1997) had, disastrously, recouped just $2.3 million of its $35 million budget.  
 
292
 Pitched to Brad Pitt’s CAA agency at $7 million, his final salary was $17.5 million, essentially 
benchmarking – and driving up – all other associated acting labour costs: Fight Club was no longer a ‘medium’ 
budget film.  One aspect of the production process does, however, appear to have been undertaken with minimal 
studio supervision; the scriptwriting, which had essentially (by agreement with the studio) been taken out of the 
development process while Fincher and co-writer Jim Uhls were completing it.  As Fox was not paying him for 
this, the writing process was essentially, according to Fincher, ‘independent’ (Waxman, 2005, 175).  There no 
way to assess whether this period of independence, allegedly free from studio attention, had – or could have, 
given Fincher’s clear knowledge that he was producing the material for an essentially conservative media 
organisation – any effect on the final script; but according to Waxman’s account, certainly from script delivery 
onwards, studio attention was focused on attempting to mitigate ‘problematic’ areas. 
 
293
 The massive success of Titanic (James Cameron, 1997) had provided the studio with a certain amount of 
financial security, as had the successful re-release of the first three Star Wars films. 
 
294
 Pitt’s stock was evidently regarded as sufficiently strong to justify the increase in budget his presence in the 
film would require, despite concerns about Pitt’s appeal to male viewers No such consideration was given to the 
casting of Helena Bonham Carter, whom the studio was allegedly keen to avoid in favour of a ‘name’ actress or 
a younger actress, on the grounds that she “pushed the production still further in the direction of the dreaded Art 
Film.” (Waxman, 2005, 182)   
 
295
 A post-coital “I want to have your abortion” from Marla Singer was amended to “I haven’t been fucked like 
that in grade school”. (Waxman, 2005, 269) 
 
296
 See Waxman, 2005, 259-271 for a full account. 
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 “The other option was to go the intellectual route, and market Fight Club as an art film… ‘We could have 
platformed it, tried to get reviews. It was for a thinking audience. It was social commentary,’ said one Fox 
marketing executive……Fincher believed that his movie needed to be explained and placed in context by the 
more intelligent movie critics. Fox never set that up.  They just sold it…as a movie about underground boxing 
that would appeal to testosterone-heavy guys – which to Fincher wasn’t what the movie was about at all.” 
(Waxman, 265-267) 
 
298
 While some critics embraced the film, a host of influential ones decried it. Roger Ebert described it as 
“cheerfully fascist…macho porn” (cite Waxman, 293); Kenneth Turan as “a witless mishmash of whiny, 
infantile philosophising and bone-crunching violence”; Rex Reed “a load of rancid depressing swill from start to 
finish”; and Alexander Walker “not only anti-capitalist, but anti-society and, indeed, anti-God” (all cited from 
Pulver, 1999). In light of these denunciations, I feel it useful to point to Slade’s note that the film “stages a 
generational conﬂict” (Slade, 2011, 230); it may be said that such is also in operation in the film’s condemnation 
by elder figures within the critical establishment.  It is also worth noting that time has recuperated the film’s 
‘image’ to such an extent that Bedford, writing more than a decade after the film’s release, condemns what he 
describes as the way in which the film “has become uniformly valorized (by the ﬁlm-makers and various critics) 
as a credible, keystone artistic and philosophical statement about cultural and gender malaise in contemporary 
western societies.” (Bedford, 2011, 52). While I feel his overall argument lacks a sophisticated understanding of 
the complexity of the film’s operations, there is perhaps something in his assessment of it as marked by 1990s 
‘grunge’ aesthetics politics, which have themselves become the target of a (commodified) nostalgia over the 
past few years.  
 
299
 Bing (2001) notes these figures and also the effect of the film’s success on the subsequent career of the 
source novel’s author, Chuck Palahniuk.  
 
300
 Something with which Jancovich et al would be very familiar, noting that “if cult fans usually make claims to 
oppositionality, they are largely middle class and male, and their oppositionality works to reaffirm rather than 
challenge bourgeois taste and masculine dispositions.” (Jancovich et al, 2003, 2)  
 
301
 While she does not refer directly to Fight Club, and is discussing French as well as American cinema, I feel 
Franco’s assessment here relates strongly to several of the films I discuss, most particularly Fight Club, 
Happiness, and American Beauty: “These predominantly homosocial narratives exhibit melodramatic traits, 
most obviously by placing emphasis on the family as the site of wider social crisis but also in terms of the mise-
en-scène of the hyper-damaged male who becomes a pleasurable spectacle and a smokescreen for the 
realignment of patriarchal power structures.” (Franco, 2008, 30) 
 
302
 All paratextual materials are available as extras on the original two-disc version of the 1999 DVD release; the 
original (parallel) one-disc version contained only an extra commentary track by Fincher.  
 
303
 In their compelling 2002 article on Fight Club’s DVD release, Brookey and Westerfelhaus argue 
convincingly that the technological capacities of the DVD to accommodate extra-textual material can direct 
viewers to preferred interpretations and simultaneously undermine unfavourable or unwanted interpretations, by 
calling on the shadow of auteurism, and that viewers are more likely to respond to this as they have become 
financially and personally ‘invested’ through their early adoption of DVD technology.   As an example, they cite 
the way in which in one of the DVD’s parataxts – a pamphlet entitled “How to Start a Fight” – negative reviews 
are interspersed with positive quotes from those involved with the film project, undermining the credibility of 
the negative ones.  For them Fight Club’s extra text “is employed to discourage the viewer from interpreting the 
homosocial practices presented as signifying homosexual experience…the extra text is used to deny the 
presence of homoeroticism, to dismiss homoerotic elements, and to divert attention away from these elements.” 
(Brookey and Westerfelhaus, 2002, 29)  
 
304
 The full text of the parody warning reads: “If you are reading this then this warning is for you.  Every word 
you read of this useless fine print is another second off your life.  Don’t you have better things to do?  Is your 
life so empty that you honestly can’t think of a better way to spend these moments?  Or are you so impressed 
with authority that you give respect and credence to all who claim it?  Do you read everything that you’re 
supposed to read?  Do you think everything you’re supposed to think?  Buy what you’re told you should want?  
Get out of your apartment.  Meet a member of the opposite sex.  Stop the excessive shopping and masturbation.  
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Quit your job.  Start a fight.  Prove you’re alive.  If you don’t claim your humanity you will become a statistic.  
You have been warned……Tyler”  
 
305
 The Dust Brothers had gained significant credibility within the underground hip hop and nascent electronica 
field through working with the Beastie Boys (Paul’s Boutique, 1989) whose link with other Smart filmmakers 
like Spike Jonze are well-documented, and Beck (Odelay¸1996). In this context their 1997 production of teen 
boyband Hanson’s MMMBop sounds hilariously unlikely but, as does their workwith Vince Neil from Motley 
Crue, but also fits smoothly into the ‘cultivated irony’ perspective of the 1990s. 
 
306
 While much of it is amusing, taking as it does the form of a faked ‘lifestyle catalogue’ with Jack and Tyler in 
stereotypical poses, selling eyewear “inspired by Pol Pot”, or silk shirts “hand crafted in an Indonesian 
sweatshop by Frida, a single mother of seven whose monthly salary is equivalent to six American dollars”, its 
references to transgressive sexuality, liberal sentimentality, concern-voyeurism, the exploitative nature of 
capitalism, and the shallowness of consumerism are intensified to the point of reader exhaustion, and add little 
to the overall campaign.  
 
307
 Waxman notes that although the studio felt its ‘best’ option was to market it as a kind of black comedy 
specifically focused on men between eighteen and thirty-five (and more or less entirely ruling out female 
viewers), they encountered a serious problem in targeting the film, in that their pre-launch market research 
suggested its greatest appeal was to teenagers, but “in the post-Columbine furore over violence in entertainment, 
studios were under serious scrutiny not to market their R-rated movies to teenagers under seventeen.” (Waxman, 
2005, 265) 
 
308
 An additional irony, perhaps, is that Brad Pitt starred in both; in Thelma and Louise as a contemporary 
reimagining of the cowboy, this time focused on female experience – his thieving more than compensated for by 
his devotion to the female orgasm – and in Fight Club seemingly reclaiming his own aggressive hard-bodied 
masculinity from a star persona which had, repeatedly, cast him in the light of the former.  
 
309
 Joy’s response to his gift “It almost makes me want to learn how to smoke” sets the tone for the film’s 
dialogue; at every point characters evade reality or hard emotional truths, retreating instead to the safety of 
social niceties. 
 
310
 This calls to mind the Doris Day and Rock Hudson romantic comedy Pillow Talk (Michael Gordon, 1959) 
 
311
 Fat, pale, ineffectual, self-loathing, preferring masturbation to human interaction, in some ways Allen is 
strongly reminiscent of a Kaufman character, in particular Charlie Kaufman of Adaptation. 
 
312
 Allen’s fantasies are aggressive and filled with self-loathing: ““I want to undress her, I want to tie her up and 
pump her pump pump pump till she screams bloody murder. And then I want to flip her ass over and pump her 
even more and so hard my dick shoots right through her and so that my come squirts out of her mouth… Not 
that I could ever actually do that.  Oh, if only she knew how I felt, how deep down I really cared for her, 
respected her, she would love me back. Maybe.  But she doesn’t even know I exist.”  The emphasis he places on 
‘care’ and ‘respect’ is ersatz; they have not spoken more than pleasantries, and he appears unable to relate to 
women in any non-pornographic context.  In this way, Allen’s speech both emphasises his own (futile, wasted) 
management of his sexuality, and creates an unease around the conventional romantic comedy trope of ‘love at 
first sight’.  What Allen describes as ‘love’ is depersonalised, misogynistic stalking; within the context of the 
film this is seen as mitigated by his essentially pathetic nature.   
 
313
 There is a separate question here as to whether Kristina’s attentions are coded as ‘ridiculous’ because of her 
size – the framing of this scene, where Allen is pinned under her and must throw her off in order to vomit, and 
the accompanying music, indicate that she is to be seen as comic or pitiable, which would be less sophisticated 
than the film’s general management of gender issues would indicate.  However, my suggestion, given the 
comparatively straightforward treatment of Kristina’s rape, is that this is less a joke about size than a visual 
reference to that event; a tacit condemnation of victim-blaming, an indication that her physical size could be no 
defence against the psychologically-paralysing ambush she suffers. 
 
314
 Hawkins, with whom I agree, sees this moment less as a fat joke than a reference to the more avant-garde 
roots of this film, “a homage to the kind of shock humour and bad taste that characterises the work of John 
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Waters…as well as downtown cineastes like [Nick] Zedd and [Richard] Kern. It is a deliberately punk-
transgressive moment in a film which otherwise presents itself as classy satire.” (Hawkins, 2005, 103); she also 
sees this referencing in the final dog-semen moment of the film. 
 
315
 King’s deconstruction of the scene in which Bill sees Johnny for the first time, notes the “extent to which it 
relies on cinematic devices of such banal conventionality: the use of music, especially romantic music, to 
indicate emotional states, and editing based around eye-line match shots to reveal the object of desire and to 
heighten (progressively closer shots of both protagonists are used) the implied degree of yearning.” (King, 2005, 
197) 
 
316
 There is also a profound irony here in the fact that Bill constitutes a more ‘accepting’ father figure than 
Johnny’s real father, who fears he may be gay and wishes to buy a prostitute to ‘cure’ him.  Holmlund points out 
the comparative rarity of a film outside of the explicitly experimental referring to pre-teen gay sexuality, saying 
“that children could be queer is viewed as really risky business, especially by ‘indiewood’.” (Holmlund, 2005b, 
179)  However, this is problematic in its own way: the way in which the gay identity assumed on behalf of 
Johnny risks being seen as minimising Bill’s crime is troublesome.  As Holmlund says, “Bill’s late night 
‘poaching’ when Johnny sleeps over is thus partially ‘excused’: Johnny is already gay.” (ibid., 184) 
 
317
 James Schamus recounts that “One Hollywood talent agency found the script so offensive that it all but 
openly boycotted the casting process steering its entire client list away from the film.” (Schamus, 1999, 34)  
 
318
 Not all critics embraced the film; Brooks cites several stinging reviews:  
For G. Allen Johnson of the San Francisco Examiner, Happiness was ‘graphic, disgusting and 
overwrought…It’s a dirty movie played for uncomfortable laughs, and if we don’t get it, we’re just not 
hip.’ CNN’s Paul Tatara remarked: ‘If there’s any poetic justice, some abused child out there will grow 
up to make a movie during which a goofy-looking independent film-maker gets bent over an editing 
console and receives a “satirical” violation.’ Despite commending the film in his Village Voice review, 
J. Hoberman still referred to what he felt was ‘Solondz’s cinema of cruelty’ and continued: ‘Awash as 
it is in bodily fluids, Happiness conspicuously lacks the milk of human kindness.’” (Brooks, 2001, 22)  
Charles Taylor’s critique is interesting not necessarily for its description of the film as “exercises in 
humiliation” (Taylor, 1999, 10), or his entirely reasonable concern for the representation of class in it, but for 
his assertion that “as indie distributors come more and more under the control of the major studios and film-
makers feel the need to prove they haven’t sold out…incorporating shock techniques is the easiest way to prove 
you haven’t been co-opted.” (ibid.)  While this fear has not necessarily been borne out, his note that “the studio 
takeover of this now very lucrative ‘niche market’ is really just the best recent example of the corporate strategy 
of divide and conquer.” (ibid.) was perspicacious.   
 
319
 Biskind alleges that this was because Universal CEO Ron Meyer was personally offended by its content 
(Biskind, 2005, 334), although I have not seen the claim repeated in more scholarly sources.  Schamus gives a 
more rounded account, relating it directly to Seagram worries that controversy about the film might result in 
negative publicity and perhaps a consumer boycott, at a time when Wall Street concerns about share price and 
the cost of Seagram’s entry to the entertainment industry were running high.  He also directly implicates “the 
extraordinary concentration and conglomeratization that has occurred in the media industries, beginning in the 
Reagan/Bush era and accelerating substantially during the Clinton years… their dominant market positions and 
ability to ’synergize’ also leave these corporate behemoths particularly vulnerable to political pressure” 
(Schamus, 1999, 35).   
 
320
 Vachon confirms that Solondz would not have acceded to any cuts in the film, which is a claim easy to make 
retrospectively, but given the character of his other work, seems credible (Vachon, 2006, 103). 
 
321
 With an estimated production budget of $3 million, Happiness would gross $2.8 million domestically and a 
further $3m internationally (Vachon, 2006, 92). 
 
322
 As Schamus explains, Trimark (the film’s video distributor), released it unrated: “Since, however, 
Blockbuster controls nearly a third of the rental market, and in most mid- and small-size markets has vanquished 
its independent competition, this meant we were effectively banned throughout a great deal of the United 
States.” (Schamus, 2001, 258)  
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Chapter Nine 
 
323
 This is strongly in line with what King, argues, when he indicates that a distinct element in Focus Features’ 
practice and process was “the articulation of what sets out to be a distinctive brand image for the division” 
(King, 2009, 235). 
 
324
 Boogie Nights’ setting notwithstanding, the film functions much as period drama or biopic, and privileges 
‘reassuring’ heteronormative resolutions. 
 
325
 For example, many accounts of the genesis of Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind omit the fact that the 
central conceit on which the film hangs was developed by Michel Gondry, who then brought this idea to 
Kaufman, making statements such as “this story…could only have been written by Kaufman, the reigning 
craftsman of idiosyncratic tales of human subjectivity.” (Kennedy, 2004)  In contrast, see James, 2004, a piece 
which strongly emphasises an autuerist framing of Gondry, rather than Kaufman: “this is distinctly a Michel 
Gondry film, and not simply because he collaborated on the story. The emotional warmth and tenderness – 
qualities not usually found in a brash Carrey blockbuster or a cerebral Kaufman screenplay – are typical of Mr. 
Gondry’s work, drawn heavily from his own dreams and memories.” (James, 2004, 18) Here, the object of the 
auteurist framing may differ, but the framing remains.  An interesting compromise position comes from 
Manohla Dargis, who offers “the director Michel Gondry does such lovely work here that he makes you forget 
Charlie Kaufman wrote the script” (Dargis, 2004, 16)  
 
326
 “A high-concept film is one which places a great emphasis on style and ‘stylishness’, revolving around a 
simple, easily summarized narrative based on physically typed characters, which in turn affords striking icons, 
images and snappy plot descriptions as marketing ‘hooks’…is heavily reliant upon stars, and gives great 
prominence to its soundtrack (usually a mixture of original scoring and pop songs), which is marketed 
separately as one or more soundtrack albums” (Neale and Smith, 1998, 12) 
 
327
 King attributes Sony Pictures Classics’ ongoing survival to the experience of the Sony Pictures Classics 
heads Michael Barker and Tom Bernard, who had come from Orion, and argues that their continued autonomy 
was maintained “on the basis of a track record for stability, modest spending and consistent profitability” (King, 
2009, 259). 
 
328
 Clearly this has changed rapidly in the period following the peak of Smart cinema, and any research focusing 
on that time would have to be extremely conscious of the changes the internet has wrought, on the one hand 
providing easier, faster access, and on the other creating a variety of complexities – including that of piracy – 
which would be expected to deeply affect this kind of quasi-independent cinema. 
 
329
 The importance of distribution to the balance of power in Hollywood was recognised early, as can be seen 
from Tino Balio’s citation of a 1944 piece on the subject: “Observing that the structure of the motion picture 
industry was ‘a large inverted pyramid, top-heavy with real estate and theatres, resting on a narrow base of the 
intangibles which constitute films,’ [Mae] Huettig concluded that the crux of the motion-picture business is not 
production but exhibition.” (Balio, 1995, 5)  Yet the subject remains somewhat under-explored.  Arguing for a 
reconsideration of it, Douglas Gomery recognises that “film distribution, sadly, is the least analysed part of the 
film industry – there are no fascinating movies to consider, only dry, dull figures, investment decisions, and 
analysis of international political and cultural power.” (Gomery, 2005, 6) 
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